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I.
INTRODUCTION
Vol. I of this study looks at the law of Prohibitions through numerous
procedural lenses. Apart from such interest as they have merely for a realistic picture of what administering that branch of the law involved, the
cases on procedure bear on one important general issue: Without disagreement, Prohibitions were considered in principle to be sought "for the
King" -- in order to protect a public interest in correct lines of jurisdiction. They could accordingly be sought by an "informer" who was not
himself a party in interest, and -- again in principle -- the "informer's"
procedural errors should not be held against "the King." I.e., when it was
clear enough to the judges that a non-common law court was out of line,
that court and the person suing there should be prohibited, even though
the person responsible for making it clear -- plaintiff-in-Prohibition -- had
made a procedural misstep that might be fatal to a merely private complaint. (Even defendant-in-Prohibition falls within the idea, though few
cases turn on his procedural errors and neglects. His role, in theory, was
to inform "the King" that there was no offense against jurisdictional order, and if that was substantially true Prohibition should be denied,
though defendant performed his role imperfectly.)
In practice, on the other hand, the parties to Prohibition cases were virtually always parties in interest. Ordinarily someone being sued in a noncommon law court was seeking for his own advantage to stop the suit
against him. (Occasionally the non-common law plaintiff sought to have
his own suit prohibited, in order to secure common law determination of
an issue that had arisen in it -- equally for calculated private advantage.)
The "public theory" of Prohibitions was therefore in constant tension with
the imperatives of fairness to essentially private parties and the courts'
duty as a general rule to enforce procedural propriety. The cases in Vol. I
tend to ask how clearly the "public theory" was grasped and how consistently it was applied. They ask also how important to the judges jurisdictional order ultimately was, worth how great a sacrifice of procedural
nicety. Behind the latter question is a more abstract, but historically real,
one: how important the ideal jurisdictional order ought to be in modern -post-Reformation -- circumstances, when all courts, including the ecclesiastical, were the King's agencies, all presumptively dedicated to seeing
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something like one "law of the land", as well as natural justice, faithfully
applied.
In the upshot, the cases in Vol. I better illustrate the existence of the
tension than any decisive resolution of it. Results are mixed, varying over
a multiplicity of contexts. Perhaps, however, the point most to be emphasized is that the "public theory" did have an impact. Neither that theory
nor a preference for common sense over nicety was drowned out by competing inclinations, including relative indifference as to whether cases and
issues were decided where, by the ideal jurisdictional schema, they
should be. From the ecclesiastical and royal point of view, such relative
indifference -- and corresponding insistence that seekers of Prohibitions
have clean hands and observe the normal rules of private litigation -- had
more to recommend it than the common law judges would concede.
Vols. II and III of the study together deal with another large matter: the
substantive scope of the Prohibition (substantive as contrasted with some
"scope" questions treated under procedure in Vol. I -- e.g., whether the
writ can be extended to somewhat more flexible functions than simply
stopping a non-common law court from continuing with a suit before it.)
"What is the Prohibition really for?" is another formulation of the question. This issue is naturally implicit in the subject-matter categories to
which the study beyond Vol. III is devoted. Vols. II and III collect the
cases on miscellaneous subjects in which it tends to be explicit and central.
The Prohibition was manifestly for one thing -- "paradigmatically" so,
I shall say: to stop non-common law courts from entertaining suits which
could and should be brought at common law. A section of Vol. III deals
with miscellaneous cases involving these "paradigmatic" Prohibitions. Its
burden is to show that even the simplest and most easily justified form of
Prohibition was not entirely simple. Head-on encroachment on the sphere
of business assigned to the common law courts was not always obvious to
perceive. (Extremely blatant encroachment of course tends not to occur,
or at any rate to produce cases worth controverting and reporting. Interesting instances in some way raise the question whether a situation actually does conform to the "paradigm" that would be represented, say, by an
ecclesiastical suit to recover real property.)
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Four recurrent kinds of cases shade away from the "paradigm", or arguably, perhaps, carry the Prohibition beyond its proper scope, employ it
for purposes wider than "what it is really for." Two of these -- relatively
rare classes as far as miscellaneous cases are concerned, though the types
are prominent in some subject-matter categories reserved until later in the
study -- are treated in Vol. III. These are: (1) Cases in which an attempt is
made to stop proceedings in one non-common law court on the ground
that the suit belongs in another non-common law court. (2) Attempts to
stop non-common law suits merely because, as I shall put it, the complainant is trying to extend "the ambit of remediable wrong" unduly. I.e.,
the non-common law plaintiff is in no position to recover at common law
if only he would turn to the proper place; he is not even pressing a bad
claim so related to established causes of action at common law that only a
common law court should pronounce it bad; plaintiff-in-Prohibition simply thinks that his opponent is trying to make him liable for something no
court should be permitted to hold a person liable for, even if the general
flavor of the complaint is not especially alien to the normal responsibilities of, say, an ecclesiastical court.
Cases of both these types raise a fundamental puzzle, about which
there is express controversy in the cases: Does the power of the common
law courts transcend the self-protective function of preventing encroachment on their own territory? Do they have, besides that "paradigmatic"
power, a general "superintendency" (as it was sometimes spoken of) over
the English legal system as a whole, such that they may both police the
internal lines of non-common law jurisdiction and be the arbiters of "the
ambit of remediable wrong"?
That jurisdictional issue overlaps considerably the ones that arise in the
present section of the study, Vol. II. Cases in the forms collected in Vol. II
represent a much larger part of Prohibition practice than the lines-of-noncommon-law-jurisdiction and "ambit" cases. That is one reason why they
are treated first. The other reason is that in a sense they strain the "paradigm" more, exemplifying in at least some dimensions the boldest use of
the Prohibition.
The two remaining basic questions -- those involved in Vol. II -- are:
(1) Does the scope of Prohibitions extend beyond stopping suits improperly brought in non-common law courts ab initio? May it be used to stop
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a suit which to begin with was quite properly brought there, in order to allow an issue that has arisen in such suit to be determined at common law?
(2) Granting, realistically, that the answer to that question is "Yes", but
even if it is not: May prohibitions be issued on complaint that a non-common law court, in an initially proper suit, has actually made an unacceptable ruling or insisted on an unacceptable rule? Two general responses
to the latter question are possible: (a) it may well be that issues arising in
initially proper non-common law suits can be recognized as appropriate
for common law determination (jury trial or legal determination by common law judges.) Prohibitions may perhaps be issued on surmise that
such an issue has arisen; the non-common law suit may be arrested unless
and until the issue is resolved in such a way as would warrant Consultation. If, however, no attempt has been made to prohibit the suit merely
because a given issue has arisen, Prohibition does not lie. No action of the
non-common law court will warrant a writ; if the suit initially belongs to
it, and no issue-arising is pointed to as inherently requiring common law
determination, the non-common law court is free to handle the case as it
sees fit -- to make such rulings or apply such rules as it likes (subject, of
course, to internal appeal when available, as it always was in the ecclesiastical system up to the Delegates.) (b) Suits may perhaps be stopped
when certain recognizable "common law issues" have arisen, but if that is
true, they may also sometimes be stopped because of the way the noncommon law court has handled the suit before it -- because, in effect, it
has made an intolerable or erroneous ruling or proposes to apply a rule
which cannot be countenanced. In addition to their power to regulate jurisdiction -- jurisdiction over certain kinds of issues, perhaps, as well as
over certain kinds of suits -- the common law courts have, again, a kind
of "superintendency" over the entire legal system. They are sometimes
entitled to concern themselves with what goes on in other jurisdictions.
The first of the fundamental questions was not very controversial in
general terms, nor is it the heart of Vol. II. "Common law issues" were in
fact recognized; readers of Vol. I will have seen many Prohibition cases
occasioned by them. There remained a penumbra of doubt. Beyond a few
acknowledged "common law issues", some judges were skeptical of the
category. They were inclined to say that once a suit was properly in a
non-common law court's possession that court should be left alone to dispose of nearly any issue that arose; as they usually put it, the "incidents"
should follow the "principal." Other judges were readier to see "common
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law issues" beyond the accepted few, less ready to trust the non-common
law courts with matters they thought they themselves were more competent to decide. Although one Section of Vol. II ("Problems of the Disallowance Surmise") deals with some of the more difficult aspects of
"common law issues" -- aspects which overlap the central concerns of
Vol. II -- the residue of the subject is left until later in the study. (The
General Introduction, at the beginning of Vol. I, explains this arrangement.) The heart of Vol. II is the second fundamental question -- the common law's title to intervene because of some action taken by a
non-common law court and, granted its title in some sense, how the
power was to be used in practice.
That title so to intervene was assumed to be part of the law cannot, in
the light of the cases, be doubted. Non-common law courts were often
prohibited on complaint about moves they had allegedly made, or were
about to, in suits rightly before them, and such complaints were still more
often considered, whether or not a writ was ultimately granted. Probably
no judge could be found who would simply disclaim power to control the
conduct of non-common law courts once their jurisdiction over a suit or
issue as such was conceded. By contrast, power to police jurisdiction outside the common law system and to fix the boundaries of remediable
wrong in situations of no direct concern to the common law was more
cleanly debated. There was no agreement, but judges could be found to
deny the power flatly. With respect to "conduct control", debate was
about whether to intervene in this or that situation or type of situation and
about the rationale of a power assumed to exist.
It is unsurprising that such debate should have been confused and divisive. One might almost be surprised that no judges, apparently, were
ready to reject "conduct control" as a legitimate function of the Prohibition altogether, for it is problematic in the abstract, and in practice it was
hard to find an agreed-on rationale and to intervene on consistent principle. The cases will illustrate, however, why a complete disclaimer would
have been very difficult. Judicial division -- never satisfactorily generalized -- almost inevitably settled around the difference between an expansive approach to "conduct control" and a minimalist one, with shades in
between. At the minimalist pole, intervention to prevent non-common law
courts from making certain rulings or applying certain rules could be defended as an extended form of the self-protective function served by
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"paradigmatic" Prohibitions -- a way of preventing incidental damage to
interests protected by common law jurisdiction, though the jurisdiction itself was not infringed. That is perhaps a more modest adaptation of the
writ than, say, regulating jurisdiction within and among non-common law
systems. The most expansive theory to justify such intervention tends to
erect some standards and rules of the common law into something like
constitutional law, binding on all tribunals. There are arguments for that
theory, but they are tricky, and granting it entails a perplexing search for
which common law standards to insist on as "national law", when, it was
agreed, the non-common law systems were in general independent and
entitled to be different from the common law in procedure and substance.
Save for those on self-incrimination in Section V (whose presence here
I shall explain), the cases in Vol. II arise by way of what I shall call the
"disallowance surmise": Plaintiff-in-Prohibition, implicitly admitting that
he has no complaint about being sued in the non-common law court initially, surmises that he has made a move in that court which has been
'disallowed", wherefore the suit should be prohibited pending common
law determination of the matter to which the disallowed move relates. I
divide disallowance surmises into two species: (a) substantive (b) evidentiary.
A substantive surmise of disallowance says that the non-common law
court has made a ruling which is unacceptable as a matter of substantive
law and which the common law court should prevent from being given
effect. Almost always the ruling consists in ruling out a defense. For a
semi-realistic example: Suppose A sues B for ecclesiastical defamation -properly in the sense that the words are perfectly actionable in an ecclesiastical court. B admits he spoke the defamatory words but claims they
were true. The ecclesiastical court disallows the defense, thereby implying the legal position that defamatory speech cannot always be justified
by proving that what was said was true. B seeks a Prohibition on the theory that ecclesiastical courts should not be permitted to adopt that legal
position.
Evidentiary disallowance surmises were occasioned by a formalistic
proof requirement in ecclesiastical law. By a "formalistic proof requirement" I mean a rule that prima facie evidence of a certain type or quantity
must be produced to back up a claim if that claim is to be listened to at
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all. Evidentiary formalism contrasts to the practice of letting litigants present whatever evidence they can to the judge of fact, the judge being free
to draw his conclusions from such admissible evidence as is put before
him, or from the lack of it (also, in the case of the English jury under the
ancient theory, from any knowledge of his own that falsifies or supplements presented evidence.) The actual embodiment of ecclesiastical formalism was a two-witness rule -- i.e., a rule that required certain claims to
be supported by the oral testimony of two competent witnesses if those
claims were to be considered. For a realistic example of an evidentiary
disallowance surmise: Suppose A sues an executor in an ecclesiastical
court for a legacy. The executor claims that A released the legacy and offers to prove the release by one witness. The executor seeks a Prohibition
on surmise that proof by one witness was disallowed. He does not maintain that the ecclesiastical court has taken an unacceptable position of
substantive law (such as that a legacy may not be released), but that the
two-witness rule ought not to be enforced against him.
In both types of case -- substantive and evidentiary -- the effect of a
Prohibition would be to let the excluded plea, or the evidence which
ecclesiastical standards regarded as defective, be used for plaintiff-inProhibition’s benefit at common law. In the defamation case, that means
that the ecclesiastical suit must not continue if the words were true. Their
truth would accordingly be tried by jury. If they were found true, the Pro:
hibition would stand; if false, the ecclesiastical suit would be revived by
Consultation. So in the release case: If the legatee wanted to deny that he
had made a release, he must do so pursuant to the Prohibition. A jury
would decide. The testimony of the executor’s one witness could of
course be presented to the jury, which might or might not believe him,
might be influenced by other evidence or by the lack of more evidence
than the single witness, and might use its own knowledge. If the verdict
went for the executor the Prohibition would stand; if for the legatee, Consultation would lie.
In other words, the Prohibition operated to cause any factual dispute
between the parties to be tried at common law. Similarly, any legal questions arising by the way would be decided by the common law court (presumably using common law standards, though a nicer question than is
directly raised in any of the cases below can perhaps be asked about
that.) E.g., with reference to the examples: There can sometimes be ambi-
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guities about classifying utterances as "true" or "false", and whether a
transaction constitutes a valid release can be controvertible. (The "nicer
question" would be, e.g., whether the criteria for a valid release of an interest or expectation in the common law sphere need be the same as those
for valid release of a legacy, or whether construction of language for purposes of determining its "truth" need follow the same rules in both
spheres.)
This is to say that ecclesiastical courts were not normally ordered to
treat defenses as legally good or to accept proof by less than two witnesses. I know of no attempts to order them to do such things directly--by
Mandamus -- and doing so indirectly -- by Prohibition quatenus a certain
defense or certain evidence is ruled out -- was not normal. Once a common law court decided to prohibit on a disallowance surmise, it almost always took over. It should be noted, however, that to surmise disallowance
of a plea or proffered evidence was to allege a fact; defendant-in-Prohibition was in general free to deny that any disallowance had occurred. As
against that point of general principle, we shall encounter a judicial inclination sometimes to presume that a type of claim always would be disallowed by ecclesiastical courts. Moreover, it would be risky as a rule for
defendant-in-Prohibition to evade taking issue on the merits of his case
and go to a jury on a question of what happened in an ecclesiastical court.
That is the sort of situation in which jurors are likely to go to the merits
on their own accord, or to suspect that a party who resorts to quibbling
over jurisdiction has no case on the merits.
Both types of disallowance surmise raise the large question: Do common law courts have any business intervening because of something an
ecclesiastical court has done in a case wholly within its jurisdiction? With
reference to the examples: What title has the common law to care whether
truth is a defense to acts of defamation solely remediable in ecclesiastical
courts by spiritual sanctions? What title has it to insist that the proof requirements of a sister branch of the legal system may not be enforced in
cases, such as litigation over legacies, solely within that branch's sphere?
Does the power to control jurisdiction even in the more extended senses - to assume jurisdiction over issues arising in proper non-common law
cases, to regulate the "ambit of remediable wrong" and to keep non-common law courts out of each other's territory -- entail this further power?
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In the rest of this Introduction, I shall try to adumbrate at a few steps'
remove from the cases some of the considerations to keep in mind when
looking at them. Let us first ask whether there is a difference of principle
between substantive and evidentiary disallowance surmises. Is there any
reason why an ecclesiastical court should be entitled to its procedure, including its evidentiary formalism, but not always to its legal positions? Or
is the opposite discrimination more defensible? It seems to me that there
are basically three possible stands on these questions: (a) Ecclesiastical
courts have a pretty clear right to their evidentiary standards -- at least to
the kind of proof requirements they actually have. The two-witness rule is
not irrational, even if it is undesirably rigid. It is meant to insure reliable
truth-finding, an end nobody quarrels with; the ecclesiastical method of
trial, where a single judge decides the truth on the basis of testimony, requires such insurance (as the perhaps superior common law method of
jury trial does not, but since there is no way of converting the ecclesiastical system to common law procedure altogether, it must be permitted
safeguards appropriate to its way of doing things); formalistic proof requirements do not ordinarily work real hardship on people, but only require them to take a little more trouble to have transactions witnessed and
penalize the imprudent. Insisting that facts be proved in a certain way,
when that method is not irrational and the facts bear on a question that
only concerns ecclesiastical courts, can hardly be called wrong. It is at
least more plausible to become disturbed over a legal ruling -- e.g., that
truth is no defense to defamation -- which, if nothing worse, goes against
expectations formed by common law practice.
(b) Rigid evidentiary requirements prevent rights or immunities of
whose legal validity no one has any doubt from being established. They
prevent such rights from being established when "by accident" a man
finds himself in an ecclesiastical court. The immediate cousin of an ecclesiastical right -- e.g., a release of debt -- would have an excellent chance
at common law although only one witness supported it; just because the
thing released "happens' to be a legacy instead of a debt, the release without two witnesses will be out of luck. Is that not a strange and unfair discrepancy? Perhaps a strong case can be made for letting ecclesiastical
courts recognize such substantive rights and duties in their sphere as they
see fit, at least within reason -- e.g., to enforce in their defamation cases
the widely-subscribed "higher morality" that says a man should abstain
from making cruel and gratuitous remarks about people even when they
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are true. The case for letting ecclesiastical courts block rights which they
themselves acknowledge and would have no conceivable justification for
not acknowledging -- for letting them close themselves off from even
considering in particular cases whether there is any basis for doubting that
an act not supported by two witnesses took place -- is much weaker.
(c) There is no basis for saying that evidentiary holdings are generally
more or less deserving of control by Prohibition than substantive holdings. Comparing evidentiary and substantive disallowance-surmises is
"the wrong way to slice it." The right way is to focus on the claim being
made in an ecclesiastical court, not on why that claim is obstructed. Thus:
An executor wants to allege a legacy-release. The common law court
knows that he is being prevented from using that defense, and that is all it
needs to know. It only muddies the issue to worry about whether the executor's claim is blocked because of the two-witness rule or because the
ecclesiastical courts do not regard legacies as releasable, for it makes no
difference which is the reason. The issue is whether common law courts
have any title to interfere in the handling of legacy suits, or the handling
of legacy-release claims. Maybe they do, maybe they don't. It all depends
on the theory that justifies action on some disallowance surmises but not
on others -- if indeed there is such a theory, if action on such surmises is
ever justified, and if it is not justified whenever the common law court
disapproves of the ecclesiastical result -- the result, not how the ecclesiastical court got to it. For example, if we adopt the theory that ecclesiastical
practice should conform as closely as possible to the analogy of common
law practice, then perhaps releasees of legacies ought to get the same
treatment as releasees of debts; an ecclesiastical court should be prevented from standing in the way of anyone who can convince a common
law court that he has a release, for whatever reason it stands in his way.
By the same theory, ecclesiastical courts should be prevented from standing in the way of a defamatory speaker who was telling the truth.
A different theory might discriminate the two exemplary cases. E.g.:
The common law should not concern itself with legacy suits or any incidents thereof because a legacy is an interest of which the common law
simply takes no account; as it were, when a man comes crying that he has
not been allowed the advantage of a legacy-release, common lawyers
ought not to understand what he is talking about; if ecclesiastical courts
wanted to say that testators may not leave legacies, or that legacies may
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never be released, or that legacy-releases must be proved by the oaths of
twelve bishops, it would be entirely their privilege to do so. Defamation,
on the other hand, is something that the common law does take account
of; some types of defamation it does not remedy itself, but permits the ecclesiastical court to; the fact that a defamation suit is, as it were, delegated
to the ecclesiastical courts does not mean that the common law has no interest in it; therefore common law courts are entitled to insist that ecclesiastical courts handle their defamation suits by approximately the same
standards, substantive and evidentiary, as analogous common law suits
would be governed by.
Conversely: Legacies and legacy-releases may involve serious property interests and be mixed up with common law affairs. E.g.: An executor to whom a large legacy has been released may suffer consequential
loss if he cannot establish the release and has to pay the legacy; his capacity to satisfy the debts of the estate, even out of his own pocket, may be
diminished. Also, many releases are general -- comprising all claims, or
debts and legacies. An executor who could not establish such a release in
a legacy suit might conceivably be hurt in a subsequent common law action -- as if the jurors had heard that he paid the legacy referred to in a
comprehensive release and therefore concluded that the release was a
fake. Prohibition is justified by the common law's responsibility for protecting the subject's property and his interest in potential secular litigation. Ecclesiastical defamation, by contrast, was petty stuff. The common
law remedied slanders likely to bring pecuniary loss or other serious damage on people, leaving the ecclesiastical courts with "spiritual" power to
make casters of moral aspersions apologize. It is reasonable to say that
the common law had washed its hands of such defamatory conduct as it
did not remedy itself, that ecclesiastical defamation by definition had no
material consequences, and that the field was a specialty appropriate to
churchmen in their pastoral capacity -- for all which reasons, ecclesiastical courts should be free to have any rules or evidentiary standards they
like in the area of defamation. In sum, there are various ways of discriminating cases in which common law intervention is and is not justified, but
they ought not to depend on the distinction between substantive and evidentiary surmises.
In reflecting on the relationship between substantive and evidentiary
disallowance surmises, we have touched on some of the possible theories
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for distinguishing justifiable and unjustifiable instances of common law
control over non-common law conduct. Let us now look away from the
substantive-evidentiary distinction and ask directly what alternative theories seem possible for that purpose. Our hypothesis -- only an hypothesis - is that common law intervention is not justifiable whenever "foreign"
courts fail to meet preferred standards; that common law control over the
system is less than all-inclusive; that the non-common law courts were
sometimes entitled to be let alone, whatever Westminster Hall thought of
their way of doing things. The hypothesis demands a criterion and a conception of the common law's supervisory role to back it up -- a test to
identify the situations in which the judges ought to sit back and let ecclesiastical courts do as they will. It seems to me that three criteria and corresponding theories should be put on the map. The degree to which traces
of them, rivalry between them, or the prevalence of any one can be seen
in the cases will be the underlying question throughout Vol. II.
(a) In some ways, the most attractive theory a priori is the "rule of reason." Might the simplest approach not be for the common law courts to
ask only whether the complained-of conduct of a "foreign" court failed to
meet elementary standards of fairness and accountability? Of course application of a "basic reasonableness" test is an intuitive affair. One cannot
expect criteria of reasonableness to remain altogether steady over a multiplicity of situations, nor will "positive" standards and habits, such as the
rules of the common law, fail to influence what those accustomed to them
take for reasonable, The great advantage of the "rule of reason," however,
is that it implies the right to be different. It is suited to a mixed system under central control because it recognizes the legitimacy of mixture. The
common law courts would not be put in the position of telling other
courts that they must dance to the common law's tune -- that they operate
within their sphere at the common law's mere sufferance -- but only that
the common law courts have a trust to protect the subject against abuse.
One-sided rules (it is important that ecclesiastical courts were presumptively apt to favor clerical interests), rules which imposed ridiculous burdens on the everyday conduct of business or which took insufficient
account of their own implications, must be denied enforcement; otherwise, non-common law courts are entitled to apply their own rules to suits
and issues admittedly within their jurisdiction. The basic function of the
supervising agencies is to control jurisdiction; "foreign" courts do operate
at the common law's sufferance in the sense that they may only touch
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what it says they may. Beyond that basic function, all the common law
courts need is a loose power to insure that what is suffered is not misused.
If the common law needed to ride closer herd on the "foreign" courts than
that, it ought probably to restrict their jurisdiction more narrowly. Better,
in other words, to say that issues of given types must be determined at
common law than to leave them to ecclesiastical courts and then interfere
when they are handled in a way that offends common law standards. Such
interference, after conceding jurisdiction, should be confined to the exceptional case, where an issue is grievously mishandled, by standards so
fundamental that one could not have anticipated their violation.
(b) We may call the second approach the "conflict-avoidance" theory.
The presupposition of this theory would be that "foreign" courts must
look to the common law's lead when it is meaningful to do so; that such
courts must imitate the common law at those points where it supplied
relevant analogies. The imperative implicit in the threat of Prohibition
should not say simply "Be reasonable," but "Take the common law for
your guide whenever it makes sense to do so; treat your litigants as they
would be treated at common law in analogous situations." The question
for the supervising agencies to keep in mind would be whether a meaningful common law analogy existed. There is no mechanical way of answering that question--no more than there is an easily-arrived-at set of
criteria into which the "rule of reason" can be translated. But which question is asked -- "Is this rule basically unreasonable?" or "Is there a fruitful
common law analogy to which the ecclesiastical court could be made to
conform?" -- might considerably affect the disposition of a case. Referring back to our examples above: "Truth is not always a defense to defamation" might of course fail a reasonableness test, depending on the
length of the judge's foot. It would have a hard time not failing a conflictavoidance test, since defamation was shared between the common-law
and ecclesiastical systems. A meaningful common law analogy existed,
for the very suit would be at common law if the opprobrious words had
been a little different. Per contra, one might question whether the common law provided any analogies for legacy cases, since it had no such
category. On the other hand, it handled release cases. Whether a case of a
legacy-release should be considered a legacy case or a release case is a
problem under the conflict-avoidance theory, but not under the reasonableness theory. One might question whether the two-witness rule could
conflict with the common law, since it was geared to a different -- and ac-
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cepted-as-different -- procedural system. Using the reasonableness test,
one would no doubt have to say that the two-witness rule was reasonable
enough in general (the alternative, at any rate, would be to hold it altogether unreasonable and block it in every instance); yet one would be
quite free to differentiate reasonable and unreasonable applications of it -e.g., reasonable to apply it to some transactions but not to others; reasonable to insist on two witnesses in the absence of any documentary or circumstantial evidence, unreasonable not to allow other evidence to be
substituted for one witness.
The conflict-avoidance test rests on the conception of the common law
as the lex terrae in a broader sense than "the law of the pre-eminent
courts, including the rules by which they control the jurisdiction of other
courts." It involves saying that the rules applied by those pre-eminent
courts within their own jurisdiction represented more than the law of one
part of the legal system. They also represented the norms of the community at large, embodied its values and defined its expectations. They did
so because of their prescriptive warrant: more than the sum of a tribunal's
precedents, they were the sum of a community's experience through infinite ages. This way of thinking about the law was commonplace; its
brass-tacks significance is indeterminate. One possible application to real
legal problems is our present one: If the common law were only the law
of Westminster Hall, there would be little point in asking that "foreign"
courts in some sense and degree conform to it. Within the limited sphere
the law of the land allows them, and subject to Westminster Hall's residual power to insure that what is allowed is not perverted to injustice, they
would seem entitled to their own law. The "grant" of a delimited sphere to
judges whose art and tradition was not the common lawyer's would seem
to imply the intent that "foreign" law should prevail infra libertatem. But
the common law is not only the law of Westminster Hall. It contains the
standards by which Englishmen are to be treated wherever authority is exercised over them, and by which they are to design their conduct. There is
accordingly a condition implied in the "grant" of non-common law jurisdiction -- a proviso that "foreign" judges conform to the common law
when it furnishes an imitable model, that they have regard to the values
and expectations which all Englishmen share, which they have a moral
right to, and which they enjoy the benefit of in that major part of their legal relationships governed by the common law. Of course the proviso has
only a limited application. Obviously the "foreign" courts cannot simply
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follow the common law; they are permitted and intended to do things the
common law does not do, to enforce duties which it does not recognize
except by conceding the power of other tribunals to enforce them; inevitably, given the acceptance of "foreign" jurisdictions within the system,
there will be senses in which the common law fails to "meet" the law of
other jurisdictions, to be comparable, to supply meaningful analogies. But
quatenus comparability does exist, to that extent Prohibitions should be
used to assure the subject this birthright of common law standards.
The "rule of reason" (the argument goes on) is appropriate where English jurisprudence clearly employed it: judicial scrutiny of local customs.
Local law is as much the subject's birthright as the common custom of
the realm; that which is as old as the common law -- as much grounded in
immemorial native usage -- has every right to vary from it. There, the
subject is only entitled to protection against customs which a jury might
find (perhaps because the evidence indeed showed long continuance and
no sign of commencement), but which a mythical "reasonable man" could
hardly believe had really stood the test of infinite time. The rule that
every special custom must be reasonable in the judges's eyes was the
means to that order of protection -- protection against extremely onesided customs; customs which those affected by them could have had no
interest in consenting to; customs which, if indeed infinitely old, must
have originated in the tyrannous imposition of one man's will on others
and survived through lack of occasion to test, or lack of imagination to
perceive, their vicious implications. If other facets of jurisprudence are
considered, it will be apparent that the "rule of reason" and the minimal
standard of control it implies do not describe the check on exceptions to,
and qualifications of, the common law in England. Equity, for example,
ought to "follow the law." That means in essence that it should not criticize the common law head-on, should not frustrate the operation of the
law merely because some of its rules are less than ideal, or because a man
is standing on his legal rights with something less than an unspotted conscience. It should positively respect the values and expectations embodied in the common law; it should block only those unconscionable
activities which the law is not structured to prevent or punish, but to
which it gives no sort of countenance. "Foreign" law proper -- ecclesiastical and civil law -- is on the far end of the spectrum of institutions permitted to encroach on the common law's simple, universal hegemony. At one
end is custom and the tribunals, such as manorial and borough courts,

15

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
largely devoted to administering local law; in the middle "natural equity,"
which in its place -- as the power to make exceptions in hard cases, to fulfill the policy of the law while occasionally infringing the letter -- no legal system can do without, and which ancient English practice has
institutionalized in the Chancery and other conciliar organs; at the other
end, courts and laws admitted to occupy precisely delimited spheres, to
perform specialized functions, to supplement the common law in ways
which it would have every right to do without or to make its own provision for. At one end, the "rule of reason," designed only to check abuse
of an inherently just privilege, was the single appropriate control; in the
middle, a tradition of restraint, largely enforced by the courts of equity
themselves, insured that the power to mitigate the common law was not
used to subvert it; at the far end, at least ecclesiastical law was positively
bound to refrain from contradicting the common law -- bound not to do
what, within reason, custom was fully entitled to do and what, so long as
it was under the species of "mitigation" or "directing the conscience of the
party," equity was needed to do.
The restraint on ecclesiastical law was recorded in the statute book (25
Hen.8, c. 19, sect. vii), though Protestant-Anglican-Erastian orthodoxy insisted that the statute only declared what had always been law: canon law
has force in England only insofar as it does not conflict with the statutory
and common-customary law of the realm. Admittedly, it may not be technically necessary to deduce our "conflict-avoidance" theory from that requirement. I.e.: It would be possible to say that jurisdiction-control proper
is a sufficient means to guarantee that "foreign" law at odds with the common law is not suffered; that the rule expressed in the statute is best implemented by prohibiting ecclesiastical courts from entertaining suits and
issues which they cannot be expected to handle without depriving the
subject of rights assured to him by native law; that the decision to allow a
suit or issue to ecclesiastical courts ought to imply the judgment that
nothing the ecclesiastical court can do (short of abuses controllable by the
"rule of reason") will conflict with the law of England. On the other hand,
there is at least harmony of spirit between the positive legal restraint on
the freedom of canon law and the "conflict-avoidance" approach to disallowance cases. Inasmuch as the law of ecclesiastical courts must not contradict the common law, it makes sense to argue, it ought to have regard
for the values, standards, and expectations embodied in the common law.
Ecclesiastical courts ought not to proceed on the assumption that canon
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law is licensed (i.e., guaranteed to be sufficiently consonant with the common law) to the extent that suits and issues as such are left to their disposition. They ought rather to use their jurisdiction with an eye to
minimizing conflict with the common law in those contexts where the law
whose direct imperatives they may not resist provides applicable analogical guidance. Prohibitions should be used to insure such practice.
(c) The third possible approach to disallowance cases may be called
the "common law interest" theory. What I have in mind here amounts to a
modification of the "conflict-avoidance" theory. It says that that theory is
correct in principle, but only applicable in certain cases, where the common law has a specifiable interest in the way an ecclesiastical issue is
handled. In other words, there are some cases in which, admitting ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the common law courts should not concern themselves with whether common law analogies, values, and expectations are
respected. Such cases, if not the majority, are perhaps at least the norm, in
the sense that the common law should be presumed to have no concern
with the disposition of ecclesiastical suits unless an interest can be made
out specially. But if such an interest can be specified, then maximum feasible approximation to common law standards should be demanded.
Like the other two theories, this one has no determinate application.
Like those theories, it only points to a criterion -- "Does the common law
system have sufficient interest in this ecclesiastical matter to insist on
closer observation of common law standards than would ordinarily be expected?" "Interest" has no pre-defined meaning. One might, for example,
argue that the common law is "interested" in defamation suits because it
entertains a large share of them itself. The most obvious kind of "interest," however, arises where a single transaction has effects within both
the common law and ecclesiastical systems and might come in question in
common law litigation. E.g.: A parishioner being sued for tithes pleads a
lease of the rectory to himself. The common law is interested in the lease
because more depends on it than the parishioner's discharge from the ecclesiastical duty to pay tithes; common law litigation depending principally on the lease could happen any day -- say an action of Trespass or
Ejectment over the right to the physical property of the rectory, an action
of Debt for the rent.
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By the "common law interest'' theory, the ecclesiastical court should
clearly be prohibited if it will not handle the lease case by common law
standards. But here an important question arises: Should the ecclesiastical
court not be prohibited from determining the validity of a lease at all? Is a
lease (or, more generally, any transaction in which the common law has
the clearest kind of "interest") not a "common law issue," which the ecclesiastical court should not touch, whether or not it is willing to observe
common law standards? As I point out above, there is reason to doubt
whether the "common law issue" was a universally and simply acceptable
category. The "common law interest" approach to disallowance surmises
affords a way to have something like that category in effect without recognizing it straightforwardly. I.e.: The courts could endorse the rule that
the "incidents" follow the "principal," and then modify it by prohibiting
on surmise of disallowance in accord with the "common law interest" theory. In other words, they could hold that ecclesiastical courts are always
entitled in principle to determine all questions that must be determined in
order to dispose of suits properly before them -- provided that questions
in which the common law has a specifiable interest are determined by
common law standards. By this approach, a party may never have a Prohibition by surmising that an issue of a certain type is before an ecclesiastical court; he must surmise that an issue of a certain type (one in which
the common law is interested) is before an ecclesiastica1 court, and that
the ecclesiastical court has wrongfully refused to handle that issue in a
common law way. Whether the courts did take such an approach -- avoiding the "common law issue" as a category of untouchable questions, but
creating a class of issues which ecclesiastical courts could handle so long
as they conformed to common law standards -- is one of the inquiries to
be addressed to the cases. (Of course the courts would not be presented
with a stark choice. It would be possible to have some "untouchable" issues, other issues that must be determined by common law standards, and
still others which were entirely the ecclesiastical courts' business, subject
at most to "rule of reason" control. The cases will bring out another possibility, that some "untouchable" common law issues were created by fictionalization of the disallowance surmise -- i.e., by holding that
ecclesiastical courts' alleged failure to handle issues in a manner acceptable to the common law could not be denied.)
Leaving aside its intersection with the problematic category of intrinsic
"common law issues," the ''common law interest" theory would seem to
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have firmer implications than the rival theories for two-witness-rule cases
in particular. The two-witness rule can hardly be considered unreasonable
across the board; there are problems about seeing conflict with the common law in evidentiary rules adapted to an alien system of procedure. If,
however, one focuses on the common law's "interest" in what happens in
an ecclesiastical suit, it is difficult to give free run to ecclesiastical procedure. For the focus is shifted to results and their impact in the common
law sphere. For example, if a lease of a rectory is unestablishable is a
tithe suit, knowledge of that result, or of the consequent payment of
tithes, might dispose jurors to be skeptical of the lease when it came in
question by way of an action of Trespass for breaking into the glebe.
Therefore it becomes strongly arguable that the ecclesiastical court must
not insist on the two-witness rule with the effect of making it impossible
to establish a lease -- a lease which might be establishable under common
law procedure and which ought not to be prejudiced at common law by
ecclesiastical events. (Per contra, it is possible to argue that the common
law has no interest in legacies since they can never be the subject of temporal litigation and the transaction on which they depend -- the making of
a will disposing of personalty -- has no status at common law. Ergo, nothing about a legacy, such as whether one has been released, is of interest to
the common law. Ergo, however unreasonable one considers the two-witness rule, or however ready one is to see a "conflict" where a release of a
£100 debt is easier to establish than a release of £l legacy, one should
swallow one's scruples and let the two-witness rule have its head. In the
lease case, however reasonable and unconflicting one considers the twowitness rule, the common law has an interest in blocking it. Given comparable assumptions as to reasonableness and conflictingness, the same
distinctions apply to substantive rules on what makes a lease or release
valid.)
The three theories outlined -- "rule of reason," "conflict-avoidance,"
and "common law interest" -- perhaps ought to be thought of as alternatives, but there is no logical necessity that they be so considered. In other
words, it might have been good judicial policy to think out the theory that
justifies intervention to control the conduct of non-common law courts
and to apply consistently the criterion appropriate to that theory. But
there is nothing logically wrong with saying that all the theories are true - i.e., that "foreign" courts may be prohibited if they propose to apply
rules which the supervising court finds unreasonable; that they may also
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be prohibited from enforcing rules that conflict meaningfully with the
common law, whether or not such rules would be held unreasonable by
the standards applied, say, to local customary law; that they may in any
case be prohibited if they refuse to determine issues in which the common
law is specially interested by common law standards. Among other questions to be addressed to the cases is whether the courts approached anything like a choice among theories, or whether signs of all three appear in
such ways as to suggest that all were embraced and choice among them
avoided.
The cases will of course reveal many complexities which I have made
no attempt to anticipate. Except for one component, however, I have perhaps said enough at a general, a priori level to introduce the contents of
Vol. II. The arrangement of the material is in a sense implicit in the analysis above, though practical considerations have influenced the exact order
in which I shall discuss the cases. I shall first take up cases arising on
substantive disallowance surmises in which such surmise was probably
the only hope for Prohibition. That is to say, I shall exclude from Section
II those cases in which the disallowance surmise occurs, but in which it
may not have been necessary because the ecclesiastical suit may have
been prohibitable on the ground that a "common law issue" had arisen.
The latter class will be treated in Section III, "Problems of the Disallowance-Surmise." There I shall consider the cases in which the disallowance
surmise may have been used unnecessarily, but may, on the other hand,
have served to render the category of "common law issues" superfluous
or suspect. With that class of cases, a couple of other groups are connected -- cases in which the fictionalization of the disallowance surmise
was considered; cases in which parties failed to get Prohibitions by maintaining that a "common law issue" had arisen, but were told that Prohibition would lie if wrongful disallowance was attributed to the ecclesiastical
court. Section IV deals with the numerous cases arising on evidentiary
disallowance surmises. In the final Section V, I shall deal with cases on
self-incrimination, the appropriateness of which to this chapter I must
briefly explain.
Evidentiary disallowance surmises bring in question the ecclesiastical
courts' right to their procedure -- arguably, at least, a more (or less) defensible right than the right to dispose of their own suits by their own substantive rules. Cases on the power of ecclesiastical courts to demand
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sworn testimony put the same right in question. Despite numerous contextual differences, title to insist that claims be supported by two witnesses and title to compel men to supply evidence under oath are both
titles to go about ecclesiastical business by methods well-warranted in ecclesiastical law. Moral responses are readier-to-hand to condemn inquisitorial procedure; they were available to the judges and lawyers we are
concerned with, as, through the medium of the history of the "privilege
against self-incrimination," they are available to us. But those responses
themselves want scrutiny. Inquisitorial procedure admitted of abuse; so,
in the form of extremely inflexible application, did the two-witness rule.
At the margin of downright unfairness and stupidity, both ecclesiastical
practices -- especially the former, of course -- admitted of "rule of reason"
control. Short of that margin, it may be questioned -- and often has been - whether there is anything intrinsically wrong about asking reasonably
suspected or charged persons to tell the truth under oath about their activities, insofar as the information they can supply is relevant for the disposition of a legitimate case. Such investigation can be unfavorably compared
to the common law way of doing things -- whereby (under the old system,
before the power to compel testimony of any sort was introduced) cases
had to be disposed of on the basis of voluntarily presented evidence and
the jurors' own knowledge. By very much the same token, one might
consider ecclesiastical "evidentiary formalism" pretty silly. It was nonetheless the ecclesiastical way. Assuming that there is a prominent gap between "pretty silly" and "utterly unreasonable and unacceptable," it would
not do to block the two-witness rule in every case. Distinctions and rationale were called for, criteria for singling out those ecclesiastical cases
in which the common law courts had grounds for insisting that ecclesiastical evidentiary canons be waived. Likewise, disapproving of a system
which countenances, and perhaps needs, the power to exact potentially
self-incriminating testimony does not lead straight to the conclusion that
the exercise of such power must be totally banned. It does lead to the
kinds of questions we have been reflecting on abstractly and which pervade the disallowance cases. E.g.: However strongly one disapproves of
a system that countenances and needs inquisitorial procedure, can one admit ecclesiastical law into a limited sphere and then turn around and simply forbid the operation of one integral aspect of ecclesiastical procedure?
Is the "rule of reason" a drastic control on inquisitorial procedure? a sufficient one? (I.e.: Is it flatly contrary to the law of nature to ask a man to
convict himself of a crime, so that all inquisition in criminal matters
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should be banned, leaving the power only in civil cases? If so, the "rule of
reason" would be a drastic control. Or can reason only object to extremely offensive forms of inquisition -- such as "fishing expeditions" not
preceded by any specification of charges, or questioning designed to entrap in especially unfair ways? If so, are further controls necessary?) Is
there any sense in which the common law has a "privilege against self-incrimination," and hence any foothold for demanding that ecclesiastical
courts avoid contradicting the common law, at least in some cases? (Cf.:
Is there any sense in which the common law has standards which conflict
with the two-witness rule, as opposed to a wholly different system incapable of conflicting in respect of particular rules?) Are there "common
law interests" in whose name inquisitorial investigation may sometimes
be blocked and sometimes not? E.g.: May an ecclesiastical court be prohibited from exacting testimony that might put a man in danger of secular
liability -- either criminal prosecution or civil loss -- whereas forcing a
man to accuse or convict himself of a purely ecclesiastical crime must be
tolerated (short, at least, of extreme unfairness)?
In sum, self-incrimination as a topic of inter-jurisdictional law -- a
much better-known topic than most of those studied here -- is "formally"
of a parcel with disallowance cases, part of our present concern with common law control over the conduct of "foreign" courts in suits within their
spheres. The "material" senses in which self-incrimination cases are distinct, such as their involvement with the statutory powers of the High
Commission, will be specified when we come to those cases. In the separate Introduction to Section V, general considerations bearing on self-incrimination and its relation to the wider concerns of Vol. II are discussed
in greater depth.
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II.
SUBSTANTIVE SURMISES OF DISALLOWANCE
Summary: In the very broadest terms, perhaps judicial restraint, rather
than great readiness to interfere in the handling of “foreign” suits, is the
predominant impression left by the cases, Something of a trend toward
greater restraint can be seen in the 17th century. No single theory, clearly
and exclusively specifying when and why common law intervention is
justified, emerges. The cases, in their several groupings, tend to caution
against general theories capable of cutting though many classes. Although
some results may be construed as reactions to ecclesiastical conduct
thought merely unreasonable, the weight of careful thinking about disallowance cases went rather against conceiving the common law as enforcing a “rule of reason.’’ Because there was an ecclesiastical appellate
system capable of correcting errors by ecclesiastical standards and particular decisions so foolish by any standard that it could hardly be presumed that they would survive appeal, there was a strong argument for
assigning a different function to the conduct-controlling Prohibition. The
cases do not say with much precision what that different function was.
Some decisions encourage the view that the common law should be made
to prevail by Prohibition in the event of head-on rule-conflict. However,
very few cases present even relatively unambiguous instances of such
conflict. Some results can be seen as instances of directing non-common
law conduct in order to protect interests in the common law sphere, but
sometimes the courts refused to intervene even when a plausible case
could be made that secular interests might be harmed. In the upshot, the
most practically useful generalizations are lower-level ones, referring to
particular kinds of cases -- e.g., that the chance of getting the common
law courts to interfere with ecclesiastical assessment of the capacity of estates to bear legacies diminished as the 17th century went on; that Prohibitions would be pretty freely used to prevent complaints of defamation
from being treated more tenderly in ecclesiastical courts than at common
law; that the judges could very likely be persuaded to intervene if an ecclesiastical court took a more indulgent view of the legal capacity of married women than the common law; that tithe-payers had a fair chance of
securing help by the disallowance surmise in the relatively rare circumstances in which that was their only route to common law assistance. On
the whole, a man with an unusual case would be well-advised to try hard
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in the ecclesiastical court and take appeals if he was not initially successful. A man tempted not to try very hard, even hoping that the ecclesiastical court would do something wrong enough to justify removing the suit
to the common law by Prohibition, should be dissuaded from putting
great stock in such calculations.
* * *
A few relatively early cases, different from each other, will serve to introduce the topic. They go to show that ca. 1590 the courts felt free to intervene when pleas were in their judgment improperly disallowed.
Whatever the conditions and limitations of such intervention, there are no
signs of its having been challenged in general. That is to say, there is no
evidence of a theory to the effect that power to control jurisdiction by its
very nature entails indifference to the manner in which a court with admitted jurisdiction disposes of the case before it.
In Somers v. Sir Richard Buckley (1590),1 a Prohibition was granted
to the Admiralty on surmise that that court would not allow plaintiff-inProhibition to plead an agreement to divide a prize. Two ships had collaborated in taking the prize in such a manner that by Admiralty law their
masters were entitled to split it. One master, plaintiff-in-Prohibition, was
sued in the Admiralty by the master of the other ship for retaining more
than his share. He claimed that they had agreed to split 4-1 in his favor,
instead of 50-50. Allegedly, he was not allowed to assert the agreement.
On its face, the disallowance seems outrageous, for surely a considerate
agreement to share in a given way should prevail over the disposition that
Admiralty law would make in the absence of a bargain. Subsequently,
defendant-in-Prohibition's counsel moved for Consultation, claiming that
the Admiralty would in fact allow the plea. A Consultation was granted
on condition that it do so. The outcome suggests that plaintiff-in-Prohibition was either confused or disingenuous, more likely the latter. I.e.: He
may have alleged the disallowance fictitiously, hoping that the defendant
would leave it unchallenged and take issue on the fact of the bargain. The
Court's willingness to grant a conditional Consultation on motion (as opposed to insisting on a formal traverse of the disallowance) might indicate
a certain disinclination to prohibit by reason of a disallowed plea when
there was an alternative course and the surmise looked improbable. The
1

32 Eliz. C.P. (No term) 2 Leonard, 182.
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case does, however, make the point that the Admiralty's jurisdiction over
prizes taken at sea does not entitle it to handle litigation over them in any
way it chooses.
In Bennet v. Shortwright (1590),2 a man was sued for tithes and
claimed that he had duly set them out in the field, but that the parson had
not taken them away. A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the ecclesiastical court had refused to let him plead his defense. Again, the disallowance seems so absurd as to be incredible, for the plea amounted to
saying that the parishioner had performed his legal duty as normally understood. Was the ecclesiastical court really prepared to hold that a parishioner who had set out tithes would be liable for non-payment if (as
remarks in the reports suggest was the case) the tithes were carried off by
a stranger or eaten by beasts before the parson collected them? The
Queen's Bench spoke on the assumption that the ecclesiastical court was
prepared so to hold. In support of not letting it get away with it, the Court
relied on the maxim that by setting out decima transeunt in cattalla. I.e.:
By the common law, once tithes are set out the parson has property in
them and can maintain an action of Trespass against a stranger who takes
them.
An ecclesiastical rule holding the parishioner liable for loss of the
tithes during the interval between setting out and collection would certainly jar with the common law rule, though perhaps the two rules are not
strictly repugnant. According to one report (Leonard), the Court said by
way of dictum that a man who sets tithes out and then, before the parson
collects them, takes them back himself may be sued in the ecclesiastical
court for non-payment. The effect of the dictum to say that tithes turned
into chattels by the common law are not ipso facto taken out of ecclesiastical cognizance. That being admitted, an ecclesiastical rule that setting
out does not discharge the parishioner from liability once and for all
would be consistent with the common law rule that setting out constitutes
payment in the sense of "a transfer of property from one owing a duty to
the person to whom it is owed." The implied ecclesiastical rule in this
case is only an instance of "a rule that setting out does not discharge the
2

M. 32/33 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 206;
Harl. 1633, f.l19; Add. 25,196, f.253b.
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parishioner from liability once and for all." Therefore it is not strictly repugnant to the common law maxim. However, it would be odd to legislate that the parson may sue a stranger for taking the set-out tithes and at
the same time may sue the parishioner as if he had not set them out. The
oddness would be eliminated if the parishioner, having been forced to pay
twice, could recover over against a trespasser. Indeed, the supposed rule
amounts to treating the parishioner as an insurer pending collection. But
because the common law rule transfers the property to the parson, the parishioner could not maintain an action (unless in equity) against a trespasser. He would therefore be an absolute insurer, which is an
unreasonably hard position to put him in.
In looser terms, perhaps the implied ecclesiastical rule is not contrary
to "natural reason." Still, it seems very hard to attach liability to the parishioner for an indefinite time after setting out, during which the tithes
might spoil, and the risk of their being taken or destroyed by a trespasser
would be perpetuated by the parson's own negligence. The hardness of
such a rule, and its disharmony with the common law maxim, were quite
enough to justify a Prohibition in the judges' eyes. The subsequent events
of the case suggest, however, that the ecclesiastical court probably did not
in fact propose to enforce so unlikely a rule. For defendant-in-Prohibition
took issue on the disallowance. That he dared do so suggests that the
plaintiff was mistaken about what the ecclesiastical court had actually
done; or that he alleged the disallowance fictitiously, in the hope that issue would be taken on another element in his surmise (the fact of setting
out or an exiguous customary variation from the de jure manner of tithing, which was also involved); or that the disallowance was really for evidentiary reasons, which the plaintiff concealed because he doubted that
the King's Bench would block ecclesiastical enforcement of the two-witness rule.
In Pendleton v. Green (1591),3 a parishioner being sued for tithes
wanted to claim that one Taylor, rather than his adversary, Pendleton, was
the lawful parson entitled to the tithes. A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the ecclesiastical court would not let the parishioner plead that
3

3 Leonard. 266 (dated M. 33 Eliz. -- either 32/33 or 33/34); Croke Eliz., 228 (dated P. 33, sub.
nom. Green v. Penilden).
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defense. The implied ecclesiastical rule would seem to be that a parishioner does not have standing to challenge the right to the parsonage. He
must either pay the parson de facto or excuse himself by a modus, bargain, or the like. He may not plead that someone else is parson de jure. So
I would state the implied rule to give it color of reason. (The reports are
scanty.) Surely no ecclesiastical court would prevent a parishioner from
claiming that his adversary had no pretense whatever to sue as parson.
The parishioner here must have confessed Pendleton’s de facto incumbency and sought to show a defect in his title. The Queen’s Bench held
that the rule was unreasonable because the parishioner might have to pay
twice: If he cannot dispute Pendleton’s title, he will have to pay him, after
which Taylor, as rightful parson, might sue for the same tithes.
Is the decision in this case as clearly justifiable as those in the two
cases above? Surely the prospect of an unjust double payment depends on
how the ecclesiastical court would handle a future suit by Taylor. In the
event of such a suit, justice would obviously require that Green be excused and Taylor be driven to recover against Pendleton. Why should the
Queen’s Bench assume the worst before it happened? In the two cases
above, the vetoed rules attributed to the ecclesiastical courts had a strong
flavor of unreasonableness. Here, a rule was vetoed because it might lead
to injustice if not supplemented by other rules. The earlier cases would
stand with the principle that “foreign” courts are entitled to their own
rules so long as they do not offend against reason in a fundamental way.
This case implies that the common law may impose its standards more
freely, if not indiscriminately. There was, in this case, a prospect of injustice. It could be avoided now by imposing the judges’ preference on the
ecclesiastical court. Their preference was not arbitrary. It is probably
more sensible to let the right of the parsonage be disputed and settled now
than to restrict the rightful parson to recovery against the usurper. On the
other hand, the implied ecclesiastical rule is reasonable in the sense that
respectable reasons can be give for it. There is an advantage in not letting
Green and Pendleton dispute about Taylor’s interest in his absence. There
is perhaps a public advantage, from the point of view of the Church’s corporate interests and morale, in encouraging parishioners to pay the representative of the Church in possession promptly, leaving clergymen and
their patrons to quarrel at their leisure about who ought to represent the
Church. The question of title to a parsonage is likely to involve the right
to the patronage -- an issue outside ecclesiastical competence. Because
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the ecclesiastical rule can be defended by these reasons, Pendleton v.
Green argues for a strong version of the common law’s right to regulate
ecclesiastical handling of ecclesiastical cases.
In Pett v. Baseden (1592), 4 a man bequeathed £100 to his wife pro et
in exoneratione of her dower in certain land, the sum to be paid within a
year of the testator’s death. The widow promptly married Baseden, who
exchanged mutual promises with the executor, Pett: The executor to pay
Baseden £100 within the said year of the testator’s death; Baseden to
make the executor a discharge of the legacy and dower. Baseden then
sued for the legacy in an ecclesiastical court. Pett pleaded: (a) that he had
offered to pay the promised £100, but Baseden, hoping to recover both
the legacy and the dower, would not make him a discharge, so that the
agreement remained unexecuted; (b) that he was now ready to pay the
£100, provided Baseden would make the discharge. The executor obtained a Prohibition because the ecclesiastical court would not accept his
plea and proffer. On demurrer, the Prohibition was upheld.
I would reconstruct the ecclesiastical court’s overruled position on the
case as follows: (a) The legacy is not conditional on the dower’s being
discharged. Under the terms of this will, the executor must pay the legacy
and leave it to those interested in the land to help themselves as best they
can to avoid the dower. (The land was devised to the testator’s son when
he should reach twenty-one, the executor meanwhile to take the profits
for payment of debts and legacies. Would equity not be the only resort for
the executor or son to avoid the dower?) (b) The agreement is a temporal
thing, of no consequence from the ecclesiastical point of view, whatever
legal or equitable rights it may engender. Therefore it is not appropriate
for the ecclesiastical court to force Baseden, in effect, to execute the
agreement.
The Queen’s Bench expressly rejected the first point, holding that the
legacy was conditional. The ecclesiastical court ought not to have held the
executor liable to pay the legacy until the dower was discharged and
therefore ought to have accepted the executor’s offer. If Baseden refused
it, it ought to have dismissed his suit for the legacy. This being held, the
4

P. 34 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 274.
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agreement hardly matters except as reinforcement: It shows that Baseden
had himself acknowledged that he ought to release the dower in order to
have the £100. The executor's promise and attempt to perform it tend to
excuse him of any negligence. But if the legacy must be taken as conditional, the case would be the same without these additional circumstances.
(Baseden's counsel argued that the executor had not pleaded sufficient
circumstances in his favor. They contended that his case would be better
if he had shown expressly that Baseden had refused payment -- as opposed to merely declining to make the release -- and if he had shown exactly when he had offered to perform -- i.e., that he had done so within
the year specified in the will. The Court was not moved by this argument.
On my analysis, the reason would be that the conditional character of the
legacy was the only really material point.)
Was the Queen's Bench justified in interfering with the ecclesiastical
court's construction of the legacy? On the one hand, the interference
seems dubious, inasmuch as legacies were purely ecclesiastical interests.
The judges themselves said that the agreement would support a common
law action. If the executor, having been compelled to pay the legacy,
could sue Baseden for breach of contract if he failed to make the release,
was the executor not pretty well protected? On the other hand, a damage
suit is no substitute for specific fulfillment of the testator's intentions. It
seems to me that the ecclesiastical court construed the legacy foolishly, in
such a way as to defeat the plain meaning of the will. Whatever objections can be made against interfering in the construction of legacies -- at
least when there is no utter violation of common justice -- the Queen's
Bench saved trouble and possible hardship by deciding the case as it did.
With Lord Rich's Case (1594),5 we pass to a line of connected reports
which as a group provide the most coherent focus on disallowed pleas as
a basis for Prohibition. Lord Rich the elder left £1500 to his daughter,
provided she marry with the consent of his heir and another. Lord Rich
the younger was sued as his father's executor for that legacy. He pleaded
that the estate was utterly insufficient to satisfy the legacy (worth only
£1500 and £5000 in debt.) Upon surmise that the plea of "No assets" was
disallowed, he obtained a Prohibition. If there was nothing more to the
5

M. 36/37 Eliz. Q.B. Harg. 26, f.42; Harl. 4817, f.152.
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case, the decision seems overwhelmingly justified. Disallowing "No assets" in unambiguous circumstances could only imply the unreasonable
rule that legacies should be satisfied before debts. Even if legacy law as
such should be considered beyond common law control, the interests of
creditors must obviously be protected. One report of Lord Rich's Case
(Harl. 4817) adds that the daughter-legatee had in fact married without
the consent specified in the will. There is no apparent connection between this circumstance and the main point of the case. The reporter appends a note, however, which flatly contradicts Pett v. Baseden above:
"...If she marries without assent, though by the common law the legacy is
not payable, yet the spiritual court will award that she will have [it], and
no Prohibition lies on that since it is [a matter of] testament and legacies." If correct, the suggestion is that ecclesiastical courts would either
simply not recognize conditional legacies -- surely an incredible rule -- or
that they would disregard some conditions, such as the attempt to limit
freedom of marriage in this case. Whereas in Pett v. Baseden the common
law intervened to prevent construing conditional language away (and perhaps "pro et in exoneratione" is not perfect conditional language), the reporter here would have the common law powerless to insist that a plain
condition be respected. Quaere.
Norton and Sharp v. Gennet et al.6 presents a variation on the theme of
Lord Rich's Case. The basic situation was the same: Executors were sued
for a £200 legacy. The estate amounted to £350. The testator was bound
in £1000 and, according to the executors, the condition had been broken
so that the £1000 were forfeit. The ecclesiastical court would not allow
the executors to plead this matter, which amounted to a claim that the estate was insufficient to satisfy legacies. The problem of the case arose
from the fact that it was disputable whether the bond had actually been
forfeited. The principle that the common law may intervene to prevent
enforcement of legacies against an insufficient estate or to the detriment
of creditors was not controverted. There was some discussion of the effect of outstanding bonds on the ecclesiastical court's power to go ahead
and award recovery of legacies. Coke, for the legatee, argued that legacies may not be recovered if bonds to pay money or the like are outstand-

6

T. 37 Eliz. Q.B. Owen, 72; Moore, 413; Harg. 12, f.41b: Harl. 1631, f.45b; Lansd. 1059, f.232b.
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ing, but that they may be recovered if outstanding bonds are such that the
condition may never be broken. Here the bond was of the second type -- a
jailer's obligation to save the Sheriffs of London harmless if prisoners
should escape. Save for Justice Fenner, who was in some doubt, the Court
accepted Coke's distinction. The serious contention in our case -- whether
the bond was forfeited or not -- need not detain us. The Court was finally
convinced that it was not forfeited. A Consultation was granted on condition that the legatee enter into an obligation to the executors to make restitution if the bond should be forfeited in the future. For our purposes, the
significance of the case is that the common law may intervene, not only to
prevent recovery of legacies against an estate plainly insufficient to satisfy more than debts, but also to resolve doubts as to the estate's sufficiency to support legacies in view of the particular claims against it. (The
alternative rule would be to trust the ecclesiastical court to work out a fair
solution in ambiguous circumstances. Although that course might have
something to recommend it in some cases, the present case points to the
danger: Considerable common law technical competence could be required to evaluate claims against an estate.)
A number of later cases retest the principle that the common law may
protect the plea of "No assets" against legacy claims. In a Common Pleas
case of 15977 the executor pleaded that he had paid out all the testator's
assets to satisfy debts, showing how and to whom. It is not clear that the
plea was actually disallowed. The report gives the Court's opinion that if
the plea is disallowed Prohibition will be granted. The opinion emphasizes that there will be no Prohibition unless it is disallowed. That is to
say, the executor has no right to have such facts as may be disputed -- the
size of the estate, the truth about its indebtedness, etc. -- tried at common
law. The common law will only guarantee that the ecclesiastical court accept the priority of debts over legacies as a matter of law.
The debate in Agarde v. Porter (1602)8 reached a much higher pitch of
jurisprudential interest than that in earlier related cases. In this case, the
executor did not seek common law assistance until he had been sentenced
to pay a legacy and the sentence had been upheld on appeal to the Dele7
8

39 Eliz. (No term) Add. 25,199, f.3.
P. 44 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.467 (the strong report); Add. 25,213, f.31 (brief).
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gates. But apparently no attempt was made to hold his delay against him.
When he got around to seeking a Prohibition, he surmised: (a) that he had
pleaded that the estate was extensively indebted and that various debts
due to the testator were desperate. (The report does not say that he alleged
the estate's absolute insufficiency to pay legacies. The plea should be
taken as a claim that no legacy should be paid pending collection of debts
to the testator and payment of debts owed by him.) (b) He had offered to
prove these facts by "reasonable testimony." (c) The plea had been refused. This surmise leaves it ambiguous whether the plea was refused because the circumstances were regarded, if true, as insufficient to excuse
the executor from paying the legacy, or because the testimony offered
was not regarded as "reasonable." Arguing for a Consultation, Tanfield
claimed that the plea had not actually been disallowed, and that the ecclesiastical court was not seeking to enforce evidentiary requirements stricter
than the common law would insist on. Tanfield also argued, however, that
there should be no Prohibition even if the plea had been disallowed. The
present interest of the case lies in this further argument.
Tanfield maintained in effect that common law intervention is justified
only when the ecclesiastical court's "error" is not an error in the terms of
ecclesiastical law. That is to say, the common law may intervene when
the ecclesiastical court has correctly (in its own terms) applied a rule that
conflicts with the common law. It may not intervene when the ecclesiastical court has made an "unjust" decision capable of being corrected by appeal within the ecclesiastical system. This position implies that the
common law judges should take judicial notice of the rules of "foreign"
law outside the context of the immediate case. They should try to estimate
whether a given decision reflects an inexorable conflict of laws, or
whether it is simply a particular judge's misguided attempt to apply rules
which the common law would regard as tolerable in themselves. The
common law court should not act whenever the rule implied in a particular decision seems unreasonable or at odds with the common law.
In a sense, Tanfield's distinction has axiomatic truth -- or speciousness.
Plainly the Prohibition did not exist to do the same job as ecclesiastical
appeals. Yet applying the distinction presents difficulties. Suppose an ecclesiastical court disallows a plea and a Prohibition is sought. Suppose the
common law court calls in civil lawyers and, being persuaded that the disallowance was bad ecclesiastical law, refuses the Prohibition and tells the
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party he must help himself by appeal. Then suppose the party exhausts all
appeals, but the original disallowance is upheld at all levels. Is he entitled
to a Prohibition now? Common sense might say "yes," since it is now his
only remedy against injustice. But it is not clear that Tanfield's principle
leads to that answer. (In the instant case, he plainly did not want it to, for
his adversary had already lost in the Delegates, the highest normal court
of appeal in the ecclesiastical system.) It is just as possible for successive
ecclesiastical courts to apply their own law mistakenly as it is for the
original court to do so. Appeals are only designed to reduce the practical
likelihood of injustice and error. If the common law ought not to jump to
the "positivistic" conclusion that the ecclesiastical law is what the original
ecclesiastical court by implication says it is, should it indulge in "positivism" on second thought, holding that after all the ecclesiastical law must
be what the highest appellate court says it is? Surely the common law
should stick to its original determination -- that the disallowance does not
reflect an intrinsic conflict of law. The losing party is no doubt pitiable,
but he is no worse off than a man who loses in a Writ of Error. In the eyes
of a critic of the judges in error, the loser there is pitiable too. Legal systems have to assign the last word. They can only do so at some risk of injustice. It is not a defect in the English legal system that it does not assign
the last word to the common law in all circumstances. Subjecting every
decision to a finite series of appeals is the most that can be done to reconcile justice and finality.
But to carry out the logic of Tanfield's position, it seems to me, is to
ask too much of the common law courts. On the first round it is easy
enough to say, "This is mere error or injustice. Take your appeal." It is a
great deal harder when the error proves perdurable. To hold that a decision is merely foolish, and so remediable by appeal, is one thing. To refuse to intervene when there is no other way to prevent a decision one has
already branded as foolish from taking effect is a harder thing. Moreover,
it is anomalous to leap in when the ecclesiastical court is bound to apply a
perfectly reasonable rule which happens to differ from the common law
and to stand back when the ecclesiastical system has failed to reverse an
unreasonable decision which can legitimately be regarded as bad in ecclesiastical law. I therefore conclude that Tanfield's principle is unworkable
in the long run. Therefore I can see little point in invoking it in the first
instance. Every economic advantage is on the side of intervening at once
if intervention might ultimately be necessary. In addition, it is much sim-
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pler to take the ecclesiastical law to be accurately reflected in what the ecclesiastical court has actually done than to engage in a constructive process to decide whether Prohibition or appeal is the right remedy. To reject
Tanfield's principle is not to rob the ecclesiastical appellate courts of their
function, or to make the Prohibition a mere equivalent of appellate control. For a distinction can be made between unreasonable decisions,
which justify Prohibitions even though they might be reversable by appeal, and decisions only correctable by appeal because they are no worse
than questionable by ecclesiastical law. Nevertheless, we shall encounter
"Tanfield's principle" (as I shall continue to refer to it) at various points.
It gives strong expression to the "conflict-avoidance" theory of the common law's title to intervene on disallowance surmises.
In Agarde v. Porter, Tanfield would appear to be applying his principle
in two ways: (a) To say that ecclesiastical law does not "really" hold that
legacies should be paid before it is clear that the estate can sustain them
over and above debts -- whatever these particular ecclesiastical courts
may have done. (b) To say that ecclesiastical law does not "really" insist
on unreasonable evidentiary rules, or rules at odds with the common law - whatever the particular courts may have done. The latter point we may
leave aside until we turn to evidentiary rules. The former appears to contradict the preceding cases. In those cases as reported, there is no discussion about the "real" ecclesiastical law. The Prohibitions were issued as if
the ecclesiastical law would prefer legacies to debts. The probability that
a decision unambiguously charging an insufficient estate with legacies
would be reversed within the ecclesiastical system was not discussed as a
reason for denying Prohibition. (Tanfield cited Lord Rich's Case in favor
of his general distinction. I can only say that on the basis of my slight reports there is no evidence that the Court acted on it in that case with respect to the plea of "No assets." It is conceivable that it was applied to the
other issue -- the conditional legacy.)
Unfortunately, the Court did not produce a decisive resolution of the
issue of principle raised by Tanfield in Agarde v. Porter. The judges did
refuse the Consultation which Tanfield was seeking by motion. He was
invited to plead formally if he wanted a Consultation. That means he
could demur and use the arguments we have reviewed in support of the
demurrer, or deny the disallowance as a matter of fact, or plead the ecclesiastical law as he understood it and challenge the other side to contradict
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him or demur. There is no report of what he decided to so. In turning
down the motion, the judges at least did not deny Tanfield’s general argument as it relates to the plea of “No assets.“ They did not say that the
Prohibition was good if it was true that the ecclesiastical courts had de
facto refused to let the condition of the estate be pleaded, regardless of
whether that act was in principle remediable by appeal. Leaving that
question open, the judges denied the motion because they thought it at
least probable that ecclesiastical evidentiary requirements would prevent
the executor from establishing his defense. That was probable enough to
require that the truth be investigated upon formal pleading. In effect, the
Court ducked the legal problem and adopted a procedural solution, perhaps wisely.
In a case of 1605,9 the plea of “No assets” was disallowed in more
complicated circumstances. In effect: A. devised a legacy to B., making
C. executor; B. sued C. for the legacy and had sentence to recover; before
paying, C. made D. his executor and died; B. sued D. to perform the sentence; D. pleaded that he had no assets from A.’s estate and sought a Prohibition when that plea was disallowed. Three judges -- Gawdy,
Yelverton, and Fenner -- favored the Prohibition, while Justice Williams
opposed it.
Since the line taken by Tanfield in the preceding case does not reappear in this one, we are free to consider the ecclesiastical decision with
respect simply to its reasonableness and congruity with the common law.
In those terms, it will perhaps seem offhand that little can be said for it:
D. cannot reasonably be charged with C.’s duties as A.’s executor unless
he is in possession of goods which C. held qua executor. It is equally
clear, however, that D. should be charged as C.’s representative to the extent that C. was responsible for the absence of A.’s goods in D.’s hands.
If C. once had possession of A.’s goods in sufficient amount to satisfy
A.’s debts and legacies but inexcusably let them out of his hands and died
before satisfying his executorial duties, C.’s estate should be liable (subject to any priorities the law might assign to claims against C personally - surely ahead of C.’s legacies.) If D. were sued at common law for A.’s
9

H. 2 and P. 3 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1111, f.39b. (Second hearing dated P.1, but that must be an error
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debts and pleaded that he had no assets from A.’s estate, the creditor
could reply that C. had wasted A.’s goods and so should answer for the
debt out of his own. A fortiori, one would suppose, when the debt is a
judgment debt against C. as executor. No one, I take it, would deny that
the ecclesiastical court would be entitled to behave analogously with respect to a legacy. The ecclesiastical court might well hold D. responsible
for A.’s legacies out of C.’s goods if it appeared that C. had wasted A.’s
estate. A fortiori when, as here, C. had been sentenced to pay the legacy.
The issue then becomes whether, in disallowing D.’s plea that he had no
assets from A., the ecclesiastical court was adopting a legitimate means to
hold D. liable to the extent that he may justly be so held.
Justice Williams based his dissent on the possibility that C. had wasted
A.’s goods. I think his position may be expanded as follows: The ecclesiastical court is entitled to hold D. liable as C.’s executor for C.’s unperformed executorial duties -- especially those confirmed by sentence -unless an excuse is shown. It is entitled to say that the bare plea “No assets from A.’s estate” is an insufficient excuse. It may insist on a plea that
the lack of assets is not C.’s fault, or presume that it is his fault in the absence of a contrary showing. In other words, the ecclesiastical court is entitled to subject C.’s own estate to C.’s duties as A.’s executor if D.
cannot account for A.’s estate as C. would be obliged to do if he were
alive. It is entitled to say to D., as it would to C., “Either show that A.’s
estate was insufficient from the start to support legacies, or else pay.” D.’s
plea that de facto he has no assets from A does not necessarily show that.
Such handling of the case would not be strictly analogous to common
law handling of the most nearly comparable case, for at common law the
plea of “No assets” in response to a debt claim would be good in itself,
subject to being answered by a plea alleging that the goods had been
wasted. But why should ecclesiastical behavior be as analogous to common law behavior as possible? Moreover, Williams' position is especially reasonable in view of the fact that B. had already successfully sued
C. If B. were suing D. for the legacy without having sued C. before, it
might be argued that to presume a fault in C. unless D. can rebut it is unfair, hard on D., or contrary to the probabilities. One might argue that in
fairness D. should be allowed to rely on the one fact of which he has
manifest notice -- that none of A.’s goods are in his hands -- pending allegation and proof of a fault in his testator. The most likely explanation, af-
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ter all, would be that C. had paid out all of A.’s goods for debts. But here
B.’s recovery against C. surely raises the presumption that A.’s estate was
originally sufficient to bear legacies. It does not prove the estate’s sufficiency, because C. might have defended B.’s suit on other grounds. However, C. did have an opportunity to plead want of assets. Since he did not
do so, at least not successfully, it is fair to presume that A.’s estate was
sufficient, and therefore that the absence of A.’s goods in D.’s hands is
owing to some fault in C.’s administration.
Williams’s brethren, however, did not agree with the above position. In
effect, the other three judges preferred offhand to insist that the ecclesiastical court conform more strictly to common law standards. A Prohibition
was accordingly granted. The case was reopened the next term when Serjeant Heale moved for a Consultation. Heale’s argument adds some facts
and hence somewhat changes the perspective in which the case appears.
According to Heale, C. had pleaded non devisavit when B. sued him for
the legacy. C. claimed that his testator made no such bequest. C. lost on
that plea and costs were awarded to B. Subsequently, C. brought two appeals and also sued (presumably in vain, or without full prosecution)
three Prohibitions to the three ecclesiastical courts that heard the case successively. On the basis of these facts, Heale thought B. should have a
Consultation at least for the costs which the ecclesiastical court had
awarded against C. The justice of this demand seems very strong. It
would seem that C.’s own estate should be liable for the loss which C.
caused B. by contesting his legacy on a false plea.
The report does not make it entirely clear what Heale was asking for
beyond such a Consultation. I take his position to be that at least a Consultation quoad costs should be granted, but that a full Consultation
would be appropriate even on motion. Heale excepted to the sufficiency
of D.’s surmise, but the report does not make his grounds clear. I am inclined to assume that his basic contention was what I project from William’s opinion above: that D. should have claimed that C. was not
responsible for the want of assets in D.’s hands, or at least that the ecclesiastical court was entitled to insist that he so claim if he wanted to avoid
the legacy. The putative ecclesiastical position amounts to a rebuttable
presumption of C.’s responsibility. The facts in a sense reinforce the reasonableness of the presumption, for it appears that C. went to great
lengths to avoid paying the legacy, while at no time suggesting that the
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estate could not support it. He also consumed assets of the estate in litigation. (Significantly, all the trouble was over a £10 legacy.)
The last point is related to the one clear additional argument contributed by Serjeant Heale. According to Heale, "by the ecclesiastical law if
an executor appeals and the sentence is affirmed...he will be charged de
bonis propriis." If that rule is enforceable, our case should be settled in
B.'s favor, at least quoad costs, even though the other arguments for B.
fail. The rule seems reasonable, being designed to prevent executors from
consuming the estate by undue litigation. Yelverton (Henry, as opposed
to the judge, Sir Christopher), arguing against the Consultation, said: "It
is against a ground of law that he will be charged for the accessory who is
discharged of the principal." To the extent that D. is not liable to pay the
legacy (the "principal"), he is not liable to carry out the sentence against
C. (the "accessory"), whether for the substance or the costs. Yelverton
goes on to make the basic argument for D.: D. is liable for C.'s executorial duties only if he holds assets from A. or if C. wasted A.'s estate. D.
denies the former and has not been contradicted. B. has not alleged the
latter. Yelverton takes "C.'s executorial duties," generally -- i.e., to comprise both payment of legacies and execution of sentences to pay legacies.
His "principal and accessory" argument comes to saying that the ecclesiastical rule stated by Heale is unenforceable: The common law ought not
to tolerate a rule which shifts liability from the testator's estate to the executor's estate in the absence of actual waste -- ultimately, I suspect, because the common law would not do so itself in analogous circumstances.
The report ends with the Court telling Heale he may demur to the surmise if he wants to. All that can be inferred is that the Court by now was
not convinced that the position taken by Heale and Justice Williams was
utterly without merit. As in the last case, the judges avoided a difficult legal problem for the moment by sensibly refusing to face it on mere motion.
With Herdy v. Herdy,10 a Common Pleas case of 1605, we return to
the simple case: disallowance of an executor's plea that he lacks assets to
pay legacies. Herdy v. Herdy is significant in three ways: (a) It reveals a
10
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shift in Common Pleas opinion. According to the brief report from 1597
above, the Court agreed that such disallowance warrants a Prohibition. In
Herdy v. Herdy, the Court was divided. (b) The argument made by Tanfield in Agarde v. Porter reappears in simpler circumstances and is pretty
clearly embraced by two judges. (c) New arguments the other way -- i.e.,
in favor of granting a Prohibition -- are introduced.
Chief Justice Gawdy and Justice Daniel favored a Prohibition in Herdy
v. Herdy. They were willing to take notice of ecclesiastical law and concede that the disallowance was erroneous by ecclesiastical standards.
Therefore the party seeking a Prohibition could equally well have helped
himself by appeal. But that did not seem a sufficient reason to refuse a
Prohibition. The two judges seem to accept duplication of remedies without apology. It is worth noting, however, that they did not adopt what I
call above the "positivistic" approach -- inferring the ecclesiastical law
solely from what a single ecclesiastical court had done. They were willing
to consider what the ecclesiastical law "really" was, and hence to recognize that there is a problem as to whether the Prohibition should be used
when it is not strictly necessary. Just by recognizing the problem, they left
the possibility open that duplication of remedies is not always unobjectionable. Their reasons for thinking it unobjectionable in this case therefore have the greater importance. Two such reasons are given.
(a) The factual issue -- whether the estate is really insufficient to pay
legacies in addition to debts -- is "a temporal thing triable by our law"
This statement is momentarily disturbing. One might suppose that if the
issue is "temporal" Prohibition should lie whether or not the ecclesiastical
court disallowed the plea. The truth of a modus or validity of a deed
should be tried at common law; therefore an ecclesiastical court will be
prohibited even though it is perfectly willing to let the party plead his modus or deed. If Gawdy and Daniel thought the condition of the estate triable at common law, should they not have considered the disallowance -and hence the problem of duplication of remedies -- irrelevant? The answer, I think, is that they were using the "temporal" character of the issue
as a reason for permitting duplication of remedies here, not as a reason
for prohibiting even if there had been no disallowance. Their position
may be stated as follows: Granting a Prohibition in a legacy suit, over
which the ecclesiastical court has clear jurisdiction, is only warrantable if
an error has been committed. Granting a Prohibition to correct an error is
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problematic when the error could be corrected by appeal. It is justified,
however, when the effect of granting a Prohibition will be to try a question at common law which (negatively) will not take the common law
court out of its depth, or (positively) which in itself is more suitable to the
common law than to an ecclesiastical court.
(b) Gawdy and Daniel also argued that there is a relevant, though not
immediate, conflict between ecclesiastical and common law. According
to Gawdy and Daniel, although the two laws agree that debts have priority over legacies, they disagree about the executor's obligations with respect to the estate remaining after debts are paid. The ecclesiastical law
requires the executor to do his best by all legatees, while the common law
permits him to satisfy one ahead of the others. (I.e.: A leaves £10 to B
and £10 to C, and the estate after debts amounts to £10. By ecclesiastical
law the executor must pay £5 to each. By the common law, he may pay B
his full legacy and nothing to C. If he does pay £10 to B -- Gawdy and
Daniel would presumably say -- C's legacy suit should be prohibited.)
But granting that such a conflict exists -- What was the judges' purpose in
pointing it out? The plea disallowed here was that the estate would only
satisfy debts. The executor was not trying to excuse himself on the
ground that he had used up the estate paying other legacies, as by common law standards he might. Once again, the relevance of the argument is
to justify a Prohibition here notwithstanding the availability of appeals.
The argument must come to saying that in such a case as this it is not unlikely that a dispute over the priority of legacies will arise later, and
therefore that it makes sense to seize the moment -- to make sure now that
the matter is settled in a manner acceptable to the common law and avoid
the risk of another Prohibition's being sued. One might add that it would
also avoid the risk of another Prohibition's being foreclosed. To see the
force of this argument, imagine that plaintiff-in-Prohibition is told that his
remedy is by appeal. He appeals, and the appellate court does the right
thing: remands the suit with instructions to allow the plea of "No assets to
pay legacies." The plea is allowed and contradicted by the other party.
Upon trial it is found false, so that the executor is sentenced to pay this
legacy. The fact is, however, that the executor has used up the estate paying debts plus one of several legacies. According to Gawdy and Daniel,
he should now be entitled to a Prohibition to stay execution of the sentence. Since this sequence of events is not wildly improbable, it surely
makes better sense to economize by granting a Prohibition now. More-

40

Substantive Surmises of Disallowance
over, if a Consultation were issued at the present stage, 50 Edw. 3 might
stand in the way of a new Prohibition when, in the imagined sequence of
events, the executor became entitled to one.
Justices Walmesley and Warburton vehemently opposed Gawdy and
Daniel, on the ground that their opinion tends to dispossess the ecclesiastical courts of their rightful appellate role. For Walmesley and Warburton,
jurisdiction over a suit in principle gives the ecclesiastical court power to
try any issues arising in that suit. The generally valid response to a man
who dislikes the way an issue is tried is "Take your appeal." At what
point this ceases to be the valid response -- so that a Prohibition becomes
appropriate -- Walmesley and Warburton did not try to say. They would
presumably have said what Tanfield did in Agarde v. Porter: when it is
evident by judicial notice of the ecclesiastical law that an appeal could not
possibly produce a result acceptable by common law standards. (Tanfield
himself argued in Herdy v. Herdy, but nothing is reported of his argument
except that he cited Lord Rich's case -- to what intent does not appear.)
The alternative to adopting that position (which the language and examples used by Walmesley and Warburton do not exclude) is to say "Never"
-- i.e., that once the ecclesiastical court has jurisdiction there is no way
of making it conform to common law standards, only the ecclesiastical
appellate system to insure that unreasonable rules will not prevail. To take
this latter position is to reduce the Prohibition to its paradigmatic role -regulating jurisdiction. I doubt that Walmesley and Warburton were ready
to go that far.
A conclusion is not reported in Herdy v. Herdy. Civilians were called
in so that the judges could be sure they understood the ecclesiastical law
correctly. The civilians agreed that the disallowance was erroneous and
that appeal would lie. Then, the Court being deadlocked, there was nothing to do but put off decision. The Chief Justice said the Court would stay
until other judges could be consulted. I have found no further traces of the
case.
In Angell's Case (1607), 11 an executor was not allowed to excuse himself from paying a legacy by pleading that he had spent the estate paying
11

T. 5 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,213, f.77b.
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debts on simple contracts. The King's Bench refused a Prohibition because the creditors whom the executor had satisfied could not have recovered by common law action. Duties to pay money founded on oral
agreements (as opposed to specialty debts) could not be enforced at common law against an executor, though they could be against the contractor
during his life. The decision in Angell's Case need not imply approval of
the ecclesiastical holding, or of a putative rule that legacies should be preferred over debts on simple contracts. (In reason and equity they surely
should not be.) What the decision does imply is that common law intervention is justified only to protect common law interests: If an ecclesiastical holding is merely unreasonable, the remedy should be by appeal (or
conceivably, in a case such as this one, in a court of equity.) If enforcement of the legacy would make it less easy for creditors entitled to common law actions to recover against the executor, or if it is likely to result
in an unfair charge on the executor's own resources, a Prohibition is appropriate.
Carried far enough, this distinction would permit one to say that the
common law has no interest in either the reasonableness of "foreign" law
or its conformity, by analogy or directly, with the common law. The common law's interest, aside from regulating jurisdiction in the strict sense, is
confined to protecting potential common law litigants who might be hurt
by "foreign" decisions. In the context of "No assets" pleas, the distinction
makes sense. In other contexts, it was not carried to its logical conclusion,
for the Prohibition was frequently, if tacitly, used to enforce a "rule of
reason," as well as reasonable congruity with common law standards. If
the Prohibition was bound to be so used, might it not have been used here
to save an executor who had done the right thing by his testator's honor?
If the executor could save himself by appeal or by resort to equity, a Prohibition would save him more expeditiously. It would save him from
"temporal" loss and permit disputed "temporal" facts to be tried at common law. His interests seem closer to the common law's concerns and
competence than, say, those of a man sued in the ecclesiastical court to
make him apologize for a defamatory remark. Yet, as we shall see, the
common law would intervene to prevent ecclesiastical courts from applying their own standards in defamation cases.
We have seen signs of retreat from the courts' original confidence that
Prohibition lies when ecclesiastical courts will not allow executors to
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plead "No assets." Our next case, from 1624,12 goes all the way. According to the brief report, the executor alleged that his assets were less than
sufficient to pay debts. The plea having been disallowed, the Common
Pleas refused a Prohibition. Two reasons are given: (a) "... Legacies are
things merely determinable in that court and no other court can have cognizance thereof." (2) "... This is a thing that consists upon the judge's discretion." Unqualified, the first reason implies that the Prohibition may
never be used to control the conduct of a court having jurisdiction, however indefensible its decisions are, even however detrimental to common
law interests. The second reason operates as a qualification by specifying
why control by Prohibition is inappropriate in this case.
The second reason points to a significant peculiarity of legacy suits. It
is quite true that judging the sufficiency of an estate is likely to call for
considerable discretion. Even if we assume that the court has a perfect inventory of the testator's goods before it, the real value of the estate is
likely to be uncertain. There will be claims against it and debts owing to
it. The realizability of claims of both sorts must be in some degree doubtful. Any number of legal doubts may surround the claims, and if all of
those were resolved the solvency and attachability of debtors would remain uncertain. The legacy in question may be one of several large ones,
a single trivial one, or anything in between. In the absence of rigid rules
requiring claims for and against an estate to be realized within a certain
time or fail, the decision whether to require payment of a legacy now is
necessarily discretionary. It must be based on an estimate of the probability that the estate can support the particular legacy in question.
The issue, of course, is "Whose discretion?" There are certainly respects in which the common law courts seem to be the best judge. They
are particularly competent to judge the one thing that is most likely to be
problematic -- the validity of creditors' claims against the estate and of
the executor's claims against debtors. (Cf. Norton and Sharp v. Gennet,
above.) On the other hand, ecclesiastical courts could pretend to expertise
in the law of wills and executors' duties. If the common law could better
judge the strength of an unrealized estate, the ecclesiastical law was perhaps the better judge of an executor's conduct. Legatees must often have
12

P. 22 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5148, f.11.
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had long waits and painful struggles before collecting their sometimes
modest due from over-cautious or unfriendly executors. The ecclesiastical
courts had a legitimate claim to know best how to balance fairness to the
executor against respect for the testator's intentions and the legatee's expectations. Refusing a Prohibition does not, after all, mean condoning a
particular ecclesiastical court's disallowance of what on its face was an
undoubtedly good plea. It means trusting the ecclesiastical system as a
whole to work out a fair solution. In some cases, I suspect, disallowing
the plea of "No assets" was a response to proffered evidence, not anything
so absurd as a rejection of the legal theory that debts come ahead of legacies. To the extent that such responses depended on over-strict standards
for establishing facts, there was a genuine conflict-of-laws problem. But
if the reason for the disallowance was evidentiary, plaintiff-in-Prohibition
should say so, raising the genuine problem. Otherwise, disallowance of
"No assets" must almost always have been a function of discretion -- a
matter of whether or not to count debits and credits of the estate in assessing its sufficiency to bear a particular legacy in the light of others. The ecclesiastical appellate system was equipped to control the exercise of such
discretion by the original court, and, if necessary, to correct true errors of
law and failures to respect the principle that debts have priority.
In sum, good arguments can be made for the Court's resolution of the
case of 1624. That resolution breaks with earlier cases, but carries out a
trend already perceptible ca. 1600. It may be symptomatic of a more indulgent attitude toward ecclesiastical jurisdiction as the 17th century went
on. On the other hand, it may only be the result of cumulative rethinking
of a real problem. It may have implications beyond "No assets" cases, but
such implications are not clear, since the decision was predicated on the
peculiarities of legacy suits.
A couple of Caroline cases tend to confirm the 1624 decision. In the
briefly reported Tomlinson's Case,13 an executor sued for a legacy
pleaded Plene administravit -- virtually the same thing as "No assets,"
that the estate had already been used up in satisfying legitimate claims
against it. A Prohibition was sought because the plea was not allowed, but
the Court denied it, saying simply that the ecclesiastical court was compe13

T. 7 Car. C.P. Hetley, 168.
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tent to judge whether the estate had been fully administered. In another
late case,14 an executor was sued, not for a legacy, but for his testator's
dilapidations. The testator was a clergyman, who had allegedly failed to
keep up the property of the benefice, to the damage of his successor. The
claim against the estate amounted to a tort claim on behalf of the corporate living and its present holder. Such suits were entirely appropriate to
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In our case, the executor pleaded that he had
used up the estate to satisfy debts, and his defense was disallowed. The
report only says that the Common Pleas was in doubt as to whether to
grant a Prohibition, inasmuch as the subject matter of the claim -- dilapidations -- was of purely ecclesiastical cognizance. Like the first reason in
the case of 1624, this doubt seems to imply the extreme rule that the common law has no way of regulating an ecclesiastical court's conduct, once
its jurisdiction is clear. Fuller discussion might have added a qualification
analogous to that in the 1624 case: To recognize its jurisdiction is not always to give the ecclesiastical court a carte blanche, but in testamentary
matters it is practically advisable to give it a very free hand. Jurisdiction
does not entail unlimited power to behave unreasonably. To deny that an
executor's primary obligation is to satisfy debts would be unreasonable,
but it is a safe assumption that ecclesiastical courts will not do so and
have not actually done so when they have disallowed the plea of "No assets." The best assumption is that they are only using the discretion
which they need to deal with estates, and to concede discretion is to deny
oneself the privilege of scrutinizing its exercise. It is arguable that dilapidations fall more clearly within a legitimate discretion than legacies. It is
easy to see that debts have a higher claim on a dead man's assets than
legacies. "Natural reason" (as distinct from the common law) might not
necessarily rate even debts above reparations for the dead man's wrongful
neglect of property in his trust. Giving ecclesiastical courts scope in legacy cases carries some risk of injustice to creditors as against legatees. In
the dilapidations case, perhaps justice has less to choose, as between
creditors and the Church, or creditors and a successor whose property has
been damaged.
In addition to the "No assets" cases, there are a few other significant
ways of grouping cases on disallowed pleas. Let us look now at three
14
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defamation cases. The first of the cases, Ambler v. Metcalfe,15 is appropriate to consider immediately after the "No assets" group, for it presents
a contrast. In Agarde v. Porter, Tanfield suggested that ecclesiastical
courts might legitimately be prohibited when they disallowed pleas owing
to head-on conflict with the common law. His concern was to show that
"No assets" cases were not of that sort. Disallowing that plea, he maintained, was not the result of a difference between ecclesiastical and common law -- rather, of the exercise of a discretion appropriate to the
ecclesiastical court, controllable by appeal if misexercised. In effect,
Tanfield's view prevailed in the long run, though not at once, with specific reference to the "No assets" plea in legacy suits. Ambler v. Metcalfe,
by contrast, presents head-on rule-conflict between ecclesiastical and
common law.
A case was as follows: A man was sued for defamation in an ecclesiastical court. The alleged defamatory words were, "Thou art a lyer and a
bastard and begotten without the feare of God." The ecclesiastical defendant sought to justify the words as true. (Quoad bastard. Nothing was said
about "liar" in the discussion of the case. We may take it as if "bastard"
were the only aspersion.) To that end, he pleaded that his opponent was
born after his parents had contracted to marry, but before they actually
married. By the common law, one born in those circumstances was a bastard. By the ecclesiastical law, he was not. I.e.: We have here a straight
and well-known rule-conflict. By ecclesiastical law, marriage legitimated
retrospectively any children born between contract and actual marriage.
By the common law, only those born after actual marriage' were legitimate (and. hence entitled as heirs.) The defense (that the words were true
because by common law standards the adversary party was a bastard) was
disallowed, and sentence was given against the ecclesiastical defendant.
He then appealed to the Delegates, who affirmed the sentence. Then he
sought a Prohibition on the ground that the defense had been improperly
disallowed. The puisne Justices of the Queen's Bench, Chief Justice Popham being absent, granted the Prohibition. (No issue was made over the
delay until after sentence and appellate sentence.) The next term, the case
15
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was reconsidered and the decision to grant a Prohibition confirmed. The
term after that, Attorney General Coke moved for a Consultation. Three
judges (Popham, Clench, and Fenner) remained convinced that the Prohibition was properly granted (Justice Gawdy saying nothing), but they adjourned the case without definitive decision on Coke's motion.
Coke's argument came to a contention that since the ecclesiastical
court had jurisdiction its conduct was beyond control. The Court's response, as expressed by Chief Justice Popham, requires somewhat complex statement. (a) Coke said that "bastard" will not support a common
law action for slander unless spoken in such a context that someone's interest as an heir to land might be damaged. Since a common law action
would not lie, Coke argued, there was simply no basis for prohibiting. In
other words, he proceeded on the theory (dubious, as we shall later see)
that ecclesiastical courts may be prohibited from entertaining defamation
suits only when the plaintiff there could have sued at common law. That
being the only basis for prohibiting, Coke maintained, it followed that the
ecclesiastical court's manner of handling a defamation suit within its jurisdiction was no basis. Popham, Fenner, and Clench quarrelled with
Coke on the common law actionability of "bastard." They thought (also
dubiously) that "bastard" will support a common law action in whatever
circumstances it is spoken, because there is always a chance that the imputation will affect interests in land. Two possible consequences follow
from the judges' position on this question. (i) If words were actionable at
common law, they were usually for that reason not actionable in ecclesiastical courts. I.e.: If "bastard" would always support a common law action, the usual reasoning would conclude that every ecclesiastical suit for
"bastard" should be prohibited. If the judges meant to follow that usual
line, they had a basis for Prohibition in the instant case without regard to
the disallowance. (ii) It was not always held that when the common law
had jurisdiction over particular words the ecclesiastical courts lacked it.
I.e.: Concurrent jurisdiction over defamation was occasionally admitted.
Suppose the judges would have conceded that "bastard" may be sued on
either at common law or in the ecclesiastical court. Would they not then
have a special reason for insisting that the ecclesiastical court observe
common law standards -- I.e., that a defense which would be good at
common law be accepted by the ecclesiastical court? It is surely arguable
that uniformity is especially important where jurisdiction is fully concurrent. One could reasonably say that ecclesiastical courts are free to apply
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their own rules and standards in suits that can only be brought there, but
that they are not free to do so when the party has a choice of courts. It is
not socially healthy for people to be able to pick the court whose rules
suit them better.
(b) However, Popham expressly waived his disagreement with Coke
on the common law actionability of "bastard." "Though the words will
not support an action at common law," he said, "yet because by the common law he can justify and it is not punishable, therefore the Prohibition
lies." Popham's rule seems clear: Any justification for defamatory words
which the common law regards as valid must be accepted by ecclesiastical courts, even in cases plainly and exclusively within their jurisdiction.
As Ambler v. Metcalfe actually stood, the principle has two applications:
(i) In fact, the ecclesiastical court was careful not to insist on the definition of "bastard" implicit in its rule on legitimacy. Instead, it did something more portentous -- refused to accept truth as a defense. (This is
clear from the sentence, the words of which are reported in order to convey this point. For retraction and denial of the defamatory remarks were
not required. What was required is not reported specifically -- no doubt
some nominal penance plus costs. The ecclesiastical court did not hold
that untrue words -- by its standard -- had been spoken and therefore
should be retracted. It held instead that "pro temeritate sua et quia nixose
dixit" he should be punished. He was regarded as guilty of gratuitous
malice and uncharitableness, regardless of whether he spoke truly or
falsely.) Popham's principle obviously requires that truth be accepted as a
defense to alleged slander.
(ii) However, the ecclesiastical court should presumably not be prohibited merely for intending to reject truth as a defense. If it appeared from
the record that the alleged slanderer had in fact spoken untruly, there
should be no Prohibition. It would so appear if the ecclesiastical definition of "bastard" applied. Since the judges were inclined to uphold the
Prohibition, they must have been ready to insist on the common law definition. Popham did not only mean that certain general principles of defamation law, such as "Truth is a defense," are binding on ecclesiastical
courts. An ecclesiastical court which accepts those general principles can
still expose itself to Prohibition by failing in more particular ways to be
guided by the common law.
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Ambler v. Metcalfe was complicated. Despite their inclinations, the
judges were in sufficient doubt to put off decision. (Reluctance to grant a
Consultation on motion in a doubtful case may have entered into their
hesitation.) Going on their inclinations, several observations should be
made. On the surface, the case seems to point to a strong form of common law control, and to the sort Tanfield in Agarde v. Porter said was
justifiable: The ecclesiastical law has a definition of "bastard" different
from the common law's. It seems hard to say that one is more reasonable
than the other. The ecclesiastical definition is more humane. (Though it
should be noted here that the common law rule on legitimacy was sometimes pointed to with pride as "more moral," more dissuasive to adultery,
than the Church's rule -- even the Church's.) Nevertheless -- just because the legal definitions clash -- the ecclesiastical court is not free to
use its own standards in its own cases. Likewise, the ecclesiastical law
holds that truth does not always justify defamatory speech. (The report of
Ambler v. Metcalfe states that as a rule as straightforward as the legitimacy rule. I am not sure it was, but at any rate it was the rule implied in
the actions of the ecclesiastical courts in our case, including the highest
court of appeal.) There is an obvious case in "natural reason" and Christian morality that saying uncharitable things about one's neighbor is not
necessarily excusable by truth. Nevertheless --just because the common
law holds truth a defense -- ecclesiastical courts must do so too. Truth
was a defense in common law actions for defamation causing material
loss and punishable by damages; therefore it must be a defense in ecclesiastical suits, the nature and consequences of which were quite different -rather psychological satisfaction to the offended than economic restoration.
Below the surface, however, having regard to the peculiarities of defamation law, the Court's inclinations in Ambler v. Metcalfe seem to me
less stark than the above picture suggests, and basically sensible. First,
one must take account of overlaps in the field of defamation, even short
of the special problem of strictly concurrent jurisdiction noted above: A.
calls B. a bastard in a context such that the defamation is only actionable
in an ecclesiastical court. C. calls D. a bastard, and because D. happens
to be heir-apparent of an estate a common law action will lie. To let the
legal definition of words and rules on justifiability produce different results in circumstances identical except for the slight difference of context
that drives B. to one court and D. to another is to admit a pretty jarring
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anomaly into the legal system. Even in less close cases, it was often problematic whether a suit belonged in one court or the other. In sum, the field
of defamation was an exceptionally shared field, and hence an especially
apt one for uniformity.
Secondly, "Truth is a defense to slander" is one of those rules of law
that expresses a pretty fundamental moral choice -- choice, not axiom.
The opposite rule can also be defended by reason, but precisely because
both rules are defensible a society has to make up its mind which it prefers. As it were: Shall we be the kind of society that encourages and protects truth-speaking, even when that means immunity for certain kinds of
anti-social conduct? Or shall we be the kind of society that favors charity
and considerateness even though that entails some compromise of the
generally valid principle that people may and should speak the truth? This
kind of choice is not quite like the choice among mere rules of law because it is so close to the choices individuals make among "life-styles."
Visceral expectations are influenced by legal choices of this character as
they are not by choices as to what shall constitute a valid conveyance or
the like. A man who says something malicious and insulting but true may
feel justified in a genuinely moral sense if the legal institutions surrounding him suggest that truth is always a defense against a charge of slander.
It may be damaging to social morale for such a man to find himself in a
court where his understanding of the law and the morality behind it turn
out to be wrong. In short, within a national system, conflicting attitudes
toward truth as a defense are more dangerous than routine conflicts of
law, and uniformity dictated by the senior member of the system has
much to recommend it. Insisting on the common law on that kind of question is in a way closer to insisting on "reasonableness" than to upholding
the common law when and insofar as ecclesiastical law conflicts with it
directly.
Once one considers the realities of defamation law, the same can be
said of the common law definition of "bastard." A man who calls another a bastard is hardly thinking of the legal meanings of the word. The
common law meaning was the same as the everyday -- simply "born out
of wedlock." That is what a speaker would ordinarily mean. It would be
hard to let a man be punished for saying truly what he meant to say (assuming truth to be a defense.) An ecclesiastical court which followed the
ecclesiastical meaning (as the court in Ambler v. Metcalfe did not) would
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in reality do something worse than contradicting a common law rule. It
would in effect make use of a legalism to stick a man with liability for
defamation. That would be more significant as a violation of a common
law policy than as a violation of a common law rule. For the common law
typically resorted to legalism for just the opposite purpose -- to avoid attaching liability for words. The common law courts tried to find a "favorable sense" of allegedly defamatory words (often a sense much more
favorable than what the speaker obviously meant.) The pedantry that effort engendered served a valuable end -- to discourage defamation-happy
people from quarrelling in the courts. It would make sense to insist that
ecclesiastical courts follow the general bent of judicial policy as the common law set it in an area shared between the two systems. Again, to insist
on that is more like insisting on vague "reasonableness" than like denying the ecclesiastical courts their own rules in their own cases.
Two late-Jacobean cases may be considered alongside Ambler v. Metcalfe, since they also involve disallowance of attempts to justify defamatory words. In Webb v. Cook,16 the ecclesiastical suit was for saying the
plaintiff had a bastard. The defendant confessed speaking the words and
justified by pleading that two Justices of the Peace had adjudged the
plaintiff reputed father of a bastard under the statute of 18 Eliz., c.3. (The
act authorized J. P.s to make such findings and to charge reputed fathers
with support of their offspring.) A Prohibition was granted (nisi, according to Lansd. 1080, but there is no report of any reconsideration or change
of mind) because the justification was not allowed. Apparently the Court
was in agreement, though Lansd. 1080 gives a hint of doubt on the part of
Chief Justice Montagu. The defamatory words in a case two years later17
were that the plaintiff had a bastard and that a named parish was charged
with his maintenance. Again the justification that the plaintiff had been
adjudged reputed father was disallowed; again a Prohibition was granted
without dissent. I shall discuss the two cases together since the issue was
the same: Were the ecclesiastical courts bound to accept administrative
findings of reputed parentage as conclusive proof that the words were
true?
16
17
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There was no discussion in these cases as to whether the ecclesiastical
courts had to accept truth as a justification and no inclination to assume
that they would not. Indeed, a remark in one report of Webb v. Cook
(Rolle) shows that the judges took it for granted that truth was as good a
defense in the ecclesiastical court as at common law. Justice Houghton
said that a Prohibition would not be granted if the ecclesiastical court had
disallowed a general justification on grounds of truth -- i.e., if the defendant had simply pleaded that the words were true. For then, Houghton
said, the remedy for the improper disallowance would be by ecclesiastical
appeal. In other words: Truth being a good ecclesiastical defense, disallowing the justification amounts to an error by ecclesiastical standards,
not correctable by Prohibition -- in accord with "Tanfield's principle."
The error in the instant case, however -- unwillingness to take the Justices' finding as conclusive -- was not to be considered a violation of ecclesiastical standards. (Why not? Could one be sure that an ecclesiastical
court of appeal would back up the original court on what amounted to a
factual presumption? The answer, I assume, is that one could not be confident that an appellate court would reverse, even though it might, just because there was no notorious rules or familiar experience on which to
base a prediction.)
In Webb v. Cook (according to Lansd. 1080), Justice Houghton put the
following case by way of dictum: A sues B for the defamatory word "bastard." B. pleads a common law verdict (as in a property suit) finding A. a
bastard. If the plea is disallowed, Prohibition lies. Houghton presumably
thought the instant case close enough to that model to justify the same result. Chief Justice Montagu seems to have doubted the model case. ("It
seems otherwise, per Montagu, where the slander is merely spiritual.") It
is from his doubt about the model, which seems the stronger case, that I
infer Montagu's possible doubt in Webb v. Cook itself. His doubt may
have gone to the essential point: Whatever control the common law may
exercise over the rules of law applied in ecclesiastical courts, does it follow that mere results or established facts outside the ecclesiastical system
have to be given any particular weight? Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over
defamation is "merely spiritual," a matter of correcting un-Christian conduct, a purpose too far removed from those for which verdicts or Justices'
findings are made to require carrying established facts over from one
sphere to the other. It is more likely, I think that by "merely spiritual"
Montagu meant to distinguish a defamatory expression such as "bastard,"
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which, if believed, could affect secular interests even though punishable
in the ecclesiastical court. He agreed with Houghton's case, but warned
against extending it so far as to say that any truth established by verdict
must be taken as true by ecclesiastical courts for the purpose of justifying
defamation.
The important problem raised by Houghton's model is how close it is
to Webb v, Cook. Verdicts were a singularly solemn and conclusive
method of establishing the truth. The anachronistic term "administrative"
may be applied to Justices' findings because they were statute-based, did
not involve juries, and were designed to alleviate a contingent social
problem in a fair and expeditious way. That is not to say they were unjudicial in form, procedurally unfair, or less likely to be true than other
kinds of fact-finding. (There was a right of appeal to Quarter Sessions, for
example.) Still, they were "administrative" in that they did not serve the
ultimate purpose of law -- to put men at peace, to conclude by "art" the
differences that "nature" would leave festering -- but the shorter-run ends
of welfare and regulation. The specialness of the verdict comes not so
much from its putative reliability as from its association with the need for
finality, for feigned certainty in the absence of knowledge. Is there any
need -- is it more a gain than a loss -- to extend the special aura of conclusiveness to other proceedings which the legislature invents from time
to time? That is an issue worth reflection. Whether the judges in our
cases were worried by it does not appear. In both cases, they went the
way of common sense, stopping the reinvestigation of matters already investigated, foreclosing men adjudged bastard-makers from vindicating
themselves and casting aspersions on the local authorities. They favored
the credit and authority of statutory proceedings, for which special claims
could always be made because the putatively unanimous will of the community lay behind them and all courts owed them respect.
In the second of our cases (not, so far as appears, in Webb v. Cook),
much was made of the fact that the Justices of the Peace had only found,
as they were required to, that the ecclesiastical plaintiffs were reputed fathers of bastards. The defamatory words would be true, and so justified,
only if the plaintiffs were really fathers of bastards. Why should the ecclesiastical court not be free to regard the reality as an open question,
however bound it was as to the reputation? Why should it not be free to
regard men's bad reputation as rebuttable by any evidence of the truth
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that might be forthcoming -- conceivably evidence not available when the
J.P.s made their determination? Should the ecclesiastical court be forced
in effect to lower its standard of what is defamatory -- i.e., to hold that it
is not defamatory to say that one who is certainly reputed to have sired a
bastard actually did so? In our case, the judges rejected such worries as
"not material, for there is no way to know a father but by reputation. The
mother may be certainly known." That seems to me a sound answer. The
J.P.s were strictly speaking only charged with establishing reputed fatherhood and could presumably infer it from reputation in the literal sense.
But they were surely willing and obliged to listen to evidence bearing on
actual fatherhood -- i.e., to anything that would rebut reputation. Practically, an ecclesiastical court investigating real fatherhood would be going
over travelled ground. At the same time, if the ecclesiastical court chose
to be strict and exclude evidence of reputation it might run a high risk of
contradicting the J.P.s and weakening their authority. In the end, the considerations which I suspect were important in Ambler v. Metcalfe probably influenced the outcome of the later cases too: An inclination to check
defamation suits wherever they occurred, an inclination both to indulge
and restrain legalism to that end. Not falling into the gap between real and
reputed fatherhood is an instance of restraining it.
The reports of Webb v. Cook suggest one further angle. They emphasize that the ecclesiastical court accepted the defendant's confession (that
he spoke the words), while rejecting his justifying plea. That emphasis
perhaps reflects an attempt in the surmise to make out that the ecclesiastical court was unfair. If it was going to refuse the plea, should it not have
ruled out the confession, putting the burden of proof that the words were
spoken on the plaintiff? There is no discussion of this point. If it was actually made, there is a sense in which it seems odd. At common law, a
man could confess and avoid. His plea in avoidance was subject to demurrer. If his justification was held legally bad on demurrer he was not
allowed to retract what he had confessed and go to trial. What had the ecclesiastical court done in our case but rule a justification insufficient in
law and stick the pleader with what he admitted to be true by the act of
claiming it was justified? If an objection can be made to the ecclesiastical
court's conduct on this score, it must be based on the premise that in one
respect ecclesiastical courts were not free to imitate the common law.
Realistically, such a contention might have merit. Would the defendant
have had an opportunity to argue for his plea at all comparable to that
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which was available upon demurrer at common law? Would he have
known that the confession would be held against him if the plea was disallowed with anything like the certainty with which men could be expected to know about the rules of common law pleading? (For that matter,
was the ecclesiastical court right by ecclesiastical standards?) Nothing
having been said about these ticklish questions, one may suspect that the
judges were pleased to settle the case without getting into them.
An incidental point in the second of our cases adds a final dimension.
When the Prohibition was being discussed in that case, it was said that the
ecclesiastical plaintiff had in fact appealed to Quarter Sessions before the
words were spoken, where the original finding by the J.P.s was reversed.
The Court said that a Consultation would lie on those facts, but that they
must be pleaded. The judges would not consider a Consultation on motion, or denying the Prohibition, on the basis of informally ascertained
facts outside the record. Perhaps the bias against quarrelsome defamation
suits is reflected in their unwillingness to cut procedural corners. The
other point to note is that Consultation would be granted, upon due pleading, if the words were spoken after the reversal at Quarter Sessions -- not,
presumably, if they had been spoken before. (The importance of dates
may have been one reason why full pleading was insisted on.) May 1 , A.
is found reputed father. June 1, B. calls him bastard-maker. July 1, Quarter Sessions reverses the earlier finding. A. now sues B. in the ecclesiastical court and B’s plea is disallowed. The Prohibition will stand. Fair
enough, in a sense: When he committed the slander, B. had a good excuse.
But that result is a little hard on A. By the higher record -- Quarter Sessions -- the truth is that he is not so much as the reputed father of a bastard. Yet there is no way he can vindicate his honor. The ecclesiastical
court is bound to look to B.’s excusability when he spoke. It is not free to
take the position that slanderers speak at their own risk -- justifiably if
they speak the truth, but only if it appears to have been the real truth by
the most conclusive evidence now available (granting that official records
are conclusive.) If a case of this sort had arisen, what was said by the way
in our report could possibly be questioned.
Prohibitions were granted because of disallowed pleas in two other
defamation cases. In both, it seems to me, pretty good arguments can be
made against prohibiting. (The reports are too brief to show arguments
pro and con.) I am inclined to see in both, as in the preceding cases, a
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policy of favoring when possible those who were hauled into court for
words. In Philips v. Piper et al.,18 a man and wife sued the churchwardens and sidemen of their parish for saying that the plaintiffs kept a
bawdy house. The defendants admitted so saying, but pleaded that they
did so in the line of duty -- viz. by way of presentment under oath at the
time of visitation. (When bishops and their officials visited parishes under their authority, it was customary to swear in the churchwardens to
give information about moral offenses, in the manner of a presentment
jury.) A Prohibition was granted on the surmise that the justification was
disallowed. A motion for Consultation was denied per Curiam the next
term. It seems to me that two doubts can be raised about this Prohibition:
(a) The ecclesiastical decision does not seem flagrantly unreasonable, taking it to be that a false presentment is defamatory. (b) Granting that it
would be more reasonable to regard presentments as immune from defamation-liability (deliberately untrue ones being under pain of perjury), the
presentment was a purely ecclesiastical act. Granting (as in the above
cases) that ecclesiastical courts are concluded by statutory paternity-findings, should they not be free to make their own rule as to whether defamation can be committed by making a false accusation in an official
ecclesiastical capacity? Surely their liberty to do so can be defended,
even if it is true that a common law action for defamation would fail in
analogous circumstances (as if grand jurors present for a felony and the
presentee is acquitted and sues members of the grand jury for slander.)
However, assuming the common law rule to be clear in that case, there is
an advantage in uniformity. It would be confusing for men called on to
perform apparently similar public duties to be subject to the risk of defamation in one case and not in the other. A grand juror might be over-cautious because of an unfortunate experience as a churchwarden. Finally,
the decision in Philips v. Piper may have been influenced by the nature of
the defamatory words. “Bawdy house keeper” was arguably actionable at
common law (because keeping a brothel, unlike fornication per se, was a
secular misdemeanor) with the consequence that the expression was
either not actionable in ecclesiastical courts or concurrently actionable in
both jurisdictions. The brief report suggests that the occasion on which
the words were spoken, rather than the words themselves, was the ratio
18

T. 44 Eliz. K.B. Add. 25,203, f.556b.
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decidendi. But if there was doubt about the ecclesiastical actionability of
the words, or if jurisdiction was concurrent, common law scrutiny over
the justifying plea is perhaps more defensible. Certainly it is more understandable.
In Howell v. Come,19 two men with a quarrel arising from, or resulting
in, defamatory words agreed to arbitration. The report does not say
whether they so agreed after one had commenced a suit against the other
or before any litigation. In any event, the arbitrator made an award. One
party began, or persisted in, an ecclesiastical suit. The other party pleaded
the arbitrator's award and sought a Prohibition on surmise that the plea
was disallowed. The two judges whose opinions are reported, Winch and
Chief Justice Hobart, favored a Prohibition. There is no report of the reasoning. The disallowance does not seem to make sense off-hand, but, as
usual when that is true, one may wonder whether it would survive appeal.
Going a step deeper, should ecclesiastical courts not perhaps be free to
hold that ecclesiastical defamation is not by nature arbitrable? So holding
would seem colorable because of the criminal character often attributed to
ecclesiastical charges of defamation: May an offended individual give
away the Church's right to punish a slanderer? Perhaps he should be held
to have given away any right to litigative costs by his agreement to abide
by arbitration, but so far as appears our case was about the substance of
the suit, not costs. On the other hand, the considerations brought out
above strongly argue for the Prohibition: Defamation was a shared field,
where uniformity was desirable in itself. (Presumably an action for words
at common law would be barred by a plea of arbitrament.) Moreover, judicial policy was dissuasive toward vexatious suits for hot words. Surely
the last way to serve that policy is to allow second thoughts to people who
have patched up their feud to the extent of agreeing not to afflict the
courts with it.
The defamation cases just discussed do not in reality present hard-andfast rule-conflicts between ecclesiastical and common law. In Ambler v.
Metcalfe, the ecclesiastical court did not actually insist on its definition of
"bastard," though its right to do so had to enter into discussion of the case;
some ecclesiastical courts may have held that truth was no defense to the
19

M. 16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.245.
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charge of defamation, but we have seen positive reason to doubt that was
a generally understood and consistently applied rule; in a couple of cases,
ecclesiastical courts refused to accept findings of reputed fatherhood as
concluding them in defamation cases, but such decisions can hardly be
taken as reflecting ecclesiastical rules (as opposed to ad hoc rulings on a
rather ambiguous question of logic and policy.) Our next group of cases,
involving the legal capacity of women, provides the strongest example of
true rule-conflict.
In Glanvyle v. Newport (1600),20 the Common Pleas was divided
over whether the ecclesiastical court should be permitted to apply a rule
straightforwardly at odds with the common law. In this case, a woman
sued for defamation, viz. calling her "whore." The defendant pleaded her
husband's release of all actions. A Prohibition was sought because that
defensive plea was disallowed. The effect of a Prohibition would be to
enforce the common law rule that the husband's release binds the wife.
Two Justices opposed the Prohibition and one favored it, Chief Justice
Anderson remaining silent. The final decision was to invite a demurrer -i.e., to grant the Prohibition only in order that the issue might have fulldress debate. Since there is no report of further proceedings, there is no
way of knowing whether the parties accepted the invitation, or whether
plaintiff-in-Prohibition preferred to drop his suit rather than try to persuade a divided court.
Justice Glanville thought that the husband's release must bind the wife
even in an ecclesiastical suit for defamation. ("... for against the husband's release it is not reason that the wife should proceed in the suit
there.") Moreover, he said, "such a case was so ruled in 14 Eliz. in the
King's Bench when I was a reporter there, as other students are now here,
for it was said there that we are all subjects and are held in both laws to
take notice of such discharges."
Justice Kingsmill opposed the Prohibition, "for the suit is for the defamation of the wife's good name, for which there will be no pecuniary recompense, but restitution of credit." The rule that the husband's release
binds the wife, that is to suggest, is a function of the husband's property
20

H. 42 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1065, f.42b.
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in his wife's goods. His release would block the wife's action for damages because releasing the possibility of damages is tantamount to conveying property which he has in her right. The wife has no interest in
damages or specific property apart from her husband's, because he has legal authority to dispose of her goods. But, because the wife lacks full legal personality qua property-holder, it does not follow that she is a
non-person otherwise. It does not follow that she has no separate interest
in her good name. There is no reason to foreclose her from vindicating it
by the non-pecuniary sanctions of retraction or penance, whether or not
the husband's business concerns have accidently led him to release actions to his wife's slanderer, and whether or not he values her good name
as much as she does. (It is of course not hard to imagine domestic situations in which a husband would be content to see his wife's whoredom
uncontradicted.)
Justice Walmesley opposed the Prohibition more vehemently and for
different reasons; "See the statute, that in the case where the suit is in the
Court Christian for cause of defamation, Prohibition will not be granted,
and that is a mortal offense, which no one may release except only God."
The statute that Walmesley refers to is Circumspecte agatis (13 Edw. 1).
While it is true that the statute affirms ecclesiastical jurisdiction over
defamation, it is difficult, though not utterly implausible, in the light of
numerous cases, to argue that defamation suits are simply unprohibitable
(save -- to make an exception which Walmesley would perhaps not have
disputed -- when the same defamatory words are actionable at common
law.) The difficulty of so arguing, even in cases where there was no common law remedy for the words, was pointed out by Glanville in reply to
Walmesley: "...the statute of Circumspecte agatis gives to the Court
Christian as great authority to hold plea in case of tithes as in case of
defamation, and yet there if the defendant pleads a lease and it is proved
by the testimony of only one and the judge of the spiritual court disallows
the proof because it is not by two, there is no doubt but that Prohibition
lies." Walmesley's other point seems to be that the ecclesiastical court
might, even ought to, disallow the wife's own release-- a fortiori the husband's. Again, Walmesley's point is plausible, though probably not generally acceptable. It comes to saying that a private ecclesiastical suit for
defamation (like, one might note, a Prohibition) is not strictly a private
suit, but a criminal charge -- in ecclesiastical terms an "information" of a
sin, which, for the slanderer's own good and that of the Christian commu-
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nity, ought to be punished even though the offended party does not insist.
Here too, Glanville expressly contradicted Walmesley: "That is true [that
the offense may only, in strictness, be released by God], but yet if an offense is committed against me I may remit it as to me." On this point,
Kingsmill would probably have agreed with Glanville, for his position, in
contrast to Walmesley's, was only that the rationale of the common law
rule rendered it irrelevant in this case -- whether or not ecclesiastical
claims for defamation were generally prohibitable or releasable.
In Stevens v. Totty (1602)21 the Queen's Bench was confronted with
a similar case. Here again, the ecclesiastical court's alleged fault was disallowing a husband's release in a wife's suit. Two circumstances distinguish this case from Glanvyle v. Newport: (a) The wife was suing for a
legacy rather than for defamation. (b) The husband and wife were "divorced." No mention was made of Glanvyle v. Newport. It was assumed
in Stevens v. Totty that apart from the divorce the ecclesiastical court
would be obliged to let the husband's release bind the wife. That assumption repudiates any theory to the effect that ecclesiastical courts may apply whatever rules they like in cases within their jurisdiction. It does not
in any way repudiate Justice Kingsmill's position in the earlier case, for
there is a clear difference between legacy and defamation. In releasing a
legacy left to his wife, a husband in effect conveys property which is his
during the marriage. Such a release falls within the rationale of the common law rule as Justice Kingsmill understood it. Even Justice Walmesley's stronger position in Glanvyle v. Newport was confined to
defamation in its terms and is therefore consistent with the opinion of the
Queen's Bench in Stevens v. Totty.
Consequently, the argument in Stevens v. Totty turned entirely on the
"divorce." There were both factual and legal uncertainties. When the case
was first argued, it was assumed that the husband and wife had been divorced a mensa et thoro by ecclesiastical process because of the husband's adultery. I.e.: Although the marriage had not been adjudged void

21

T. 44 and M. 44/45 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.548b and 609b (the best report); Croke Eliz., 905
(sub. nom. Stephens v. Frances Totty, M. 44/45); Add. 25,213, f.35 (brief, but the only report to
show there was a demurrer, T. 44); Noy, 45 (P. 44, misdated, since the report relates to the final
disposition.)
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ab initio (annulled, as we would say), the partners had been fully released
from all conjugal duties and forbidden to cohabit without license from the
ecclesiastical court. Later, however, the judges inspected the record and
found that the ecclesiastical sentence was weaker than that: The award
was only that the partners be separated from bed and board until they
were reconciled and agreed to cohabit again, and it did not appear of record what the reason for the award was. The difference between the
stronger and weaker kind of "divorce" was probably not decisive for the
outcome of the case, but reinforcing. Upon the first argument, when they
were assuming the stronger kind, all the judges were somewhat uncertain,
but two of them (Gawdy and Fenner) leaned clearly in favor of the Prohibition. In the end, the whole Court favored the Prohibition, probably even
on the assumption that the divorce was as strong as it could be, short of
annulment.
The problem concerning the "divorce" may be analyzed into the following questions: (a) What is the exact meaning in ecclesiastical law of a
"strong" divorce a mensa et thoro? (b) Apart from its exact meaning in
ecclesiastical law, does the common law in its own sphere (with respect
to the wife's capacity to maintain common law actions and hold property
separately) attach any consequences to cessation of the full, normal marital relationship? (c) Exactly how are these questions relevant for the case
at hand?
To help answer the first question, civil lawyers were called in. Initially,
the common lawyer Dodderidge argued against the Prohibition (upon demurrer, but there is no report of the arguments by counsel contra.) Although unpersuaded by Dodderidge, Gawdy and Fenner did not resist
Justice Yelverton's express request that civilians be heard. (The Chief
Justice was silent if he was present.) According to the best report, two civilians argued on each side. On the basis of their argument, the Court was
persuaded that even a "strong" divorce does not dissolve the matrimonial
bond itself -- i.e., so that the parties may remarry. If they had been persuaded the other way, even Gawdy and Fenner would no doubt have
agreed that the husband's release would not affect the wife. It is surprising that it was thought worth discussing whether the divorce was full
enough to permit remarriage, for we tend to assume that divorce in the
modern sense was simply not recognized by the Church of England. Dodderidge, however, argued that the prohibition on remarriage after a
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"strong" divorce, at any rate, was a comparatively recent innovation. The
arguments of the civilians are not reported at large, but it would appear
that Dodderidge found two civilians to back him up.22
On the second question, Dodderidge argued that the common law for
its own purposes distinguished the matrimonial bond as such from the
"society" of marriage. When the "society" is dissolved, whether by a sentence of divorce (perhaps even a "weak" one) or by such accidents as the
husband's exile, the wife is given separate legal capacities which she
would otherwise lack. The Court was not impressed by this argument.
The judges thought that divorce can only restore separate legal capacity to
the wife if it is an absolute dissolution of the bond of matrimony by ecclesiastical law, though they had to concede, on the basis of authority
cited, that other circumstances, such as the husband's exile, might restore
her separate legal capacity. To the extent that instances could be cited in
which a once-married woman had been restored to single status after divorce, the judges preferred to assume that the divorce was a true annulment.
That Dodderidge made a separate argument on the third of the questions above is less manifest, but I think it is visible in one sentence. ("And
[the opinion of] those in the spiritual court, who best know the effect and
force of this divorce, is that the release is not allowable.") If that sentence
contains an argument, it must be the following quite sensible one:
Whether or not the partners could remarry, the ecclesiastical court is enti-

22

The passage on this point goes as follows: "And it has been used that after such a divorce the
parties have married others, which Waterhous, Clerk of the Crown Office, and he said that it was
in question in a Yorkshire case whether after such a divorce the woman may be endowed or not,
and it was held that she may, but he said that of late time after such divorce the parties have been
forbidden to marry any other." There is obviously an omission in the MS. (not appearing as a
hiatus or illegible word.) Perhaps Waterhous was consulted and is the speaker, instead of
Dodderidge, for the rest of the passage; perhaps the clause should say "which Waterhous ...
confirmed (agreed to, or the like)" after which Dodderidge continues. Conceivably there was
only a reference to a case involving Waterhous. The substance is in any event clear. If a woman
could recover her dower after a divorce (as if her ex-husband were dead) there would be an
excellent argument against letting his release affect her, even if the partners could not remarry.
(Such, in the context, would seem to be the significance of the Yorkshire case. A more
predictable issue about divorce and dower would be whether land acquired by the husband after
the divorce is subject to dower. A holding that it is -- i.e., that the woman "may be endowed" -would argue for the indissolubility of the matrimonial bond.)
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tled to hold that for other ecclesiastical purposes, such as this legacy suit,
the divorce (even, perhaps, in the "weak" sense) makes the wife a separate legal person again. In other words, the very act of disallowing the release construed the meaning of the divorce to one intent, however it
should be construed to others. To that intent, it is irrelevant what further
consequences ecclesiastical law would attach to the divorce, what the
general theory of such divorces is, or, on the premise that the ecclesiastical construction is decisive, how the common law treats divorces for its
own purposes. Without answering this argument, the court rejected it. The
judges' implied position was that uniformity should prevail -- that the
wife should not escape her husband's release in a legacy suit if she ought
not to be treated as a separate person in analogous common law situations. In order to decide how a divorce should be treated in all situations,
it was thought necessary to know how the ecclesiastical law construed the
divorce in general, with particular regard to the remarriage test. Seeing
that by the better ecclesiastical opinion there was no dissolution of the
vinculum matrimonii, the judges held that the ecclesiastical courts had no
power to determine the effect of their divorces to miscellaneous ecclesiastical intents.
The Court's opinion in Stevens v. Totty was less humane than its final
action. The holding obviously invites abuse: A husband who had made
life intolerable for his wife and in consequence legally forfeited the right
to have anything to do with her could nevertheless defeat her interests
from motives all-too likely to be spite. Realizing the danger, the Court examined the executor who brought the Prohibition. The examination revealed that the legacy was large and the release made for little or no
consideration. Having every reason to suspect mischievous collusion, the
Justices told the parties that a Consultation would be awarded unless they
would compound. A clerk of the Court was assigned to work out a settlement with the parties, which he did. The flexibility characteristic of Prohibition proceedings served a good purpose in this case.23
23

One report (Noy) has Popham saying that unless the parties would compound a partial
Consultation would be granted -- ita quod the plea of the release be allowed. One of the civilians
who argued, Dr. Crompton, then said that the wife would certainly recover if such a Consultation
were issued. I take it that the Queen's Bench judges intended that effect, since their purpose at
this point was to protect the wife against the husband's fraudulent deal with the executor. The
point is of technical interest, though moot (because the parties in fact settled.) The partial
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Glanvyle v. Newport and Stevens v. Totty meet in the later case of
Motam v. Motam.24 There, a wife sued for defamation after a divorce
similar to that in Stevens v. Totty. (Counsel made contradictory statements about the exact terms of the divorce. One side said it was a mensa
et thoro et mutua cohabitatione, while the other side said the decree contained the additional words de omnibus matrimoniis obsequiis. Nothing in
the arguments depends on the difference. In any event, the divorce was
stronger than the actual divorce in Stevens v. Totty.) Sentence was given
for the wife and costs awarded to her. The ecclesiastical defendant then
appealed. Only at that point did the divorced husband release, The defendant pleaded the release before the appellate court, which disallowed it,
remitting the case to the lower court for execution of the sentence (penance) and costs. According to Rolle and the virtually identical MS., the
judges were plainly inclined to deny the Prohibition but withheld decision
in order to advise further. According to Bulstrode, they did deny it.
Stevens v. Totty was cited and distinguished25 on essentially the grounds
taken by Justice Kingsmill in Glanvyle v. Newport (though not so as to
exclude Justice Walmesley's still stronger position in that case): A legacy
is a material interest, with respect to which husband and wife are inseparable, while the wife's interest in her good name is intrinsically individual. The costs gave the award a property aspect, but the Court discounted
that feature because the costs were only an appurtenance to the principal
matter, covering only the expenses of litigation -- i.e., were not damages.
An additional argument by the wife's counsel was not mentioned by the

24
25

Consultation would "save face." I.e.: The judges would not decide that the plea should be
allowed but still, on grounds of equity, flatly overrule the Prohibition. At the same time,
apparently, sentence could be given for the wife without violating the condition in the ita quod
Consultation. I take that to mean that the ecclesiastical court could fulfill the condition by
allowing the plea, then proceed to consider whether the release was obtained by fraud. The other
reports do not intimate that the threatened Consultation was partial.
M. 14 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 426; Harl. 4561, f.266; 3 Bulstrode, 264 (sub. nom. Motteram v.
Motteram.)
The fallibility to which the use of judicial precedents was subject in the 17th century is nicely
illustrated here. Counsel arguing for the Prohibition (Coventry) cited Stevens v. Totty, describing
it correctly. The "precedent" (record) was physically shown to the Court, but something was
missing, for "the precedent did not comprehend the divorce." Justice Dodderidge came to the
rescue: He "said that he well remembered the case when it was argued, that there was talk of a
divorce (que parlance donque fuit del divorce)."
Fifteen years earlier, Dodderidge himself had
argued at length on the significance of the divorce. Memories dim, and authority often depended
on
memory.
(Rolle/MS.
Bulstrode has Dodderidge remembering Stevens v. Totty more
precisely.)
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judges -- that the ecclesiastical court of appeal in any case had no power
to take the release into account, since such appellate tribunals are confined to reviewing the lower court's actions, and the release did not exist
at the time of the original sentence.
Motam v. Motam is formally distinguishable from Glanvyle v. Newport because there was a divorce in the former but not in the latter. The
divorce was not decisive in the resolution of Motam v. Motam, however.
The case should be taken as deciding that the husband's release will not
bar the wife's suit for defamation. As such, it follows an earlier Jacobean
case in the King's Bench, Fenton v. Edwards.26 There, a woman sued
separately for defamation, and the plea of her husband's release was disallowed. From the Bar, Yelverton said that he had been of counsel in such
a case where a Prohibition was granted, and Richardson urged that the
prospect of costs' being awarded gave the husband a releasable pecuniary
interest. But counsel got nowhere. Justice Williams, noting that the
woman's very capacity to sue without joining her husband was a peculiarity of ecclesiastical law, took the position that the ecclesiastical court was
entitled to decide what effect the release should be given. ("Since the action originally belongs to their court, and you plead your release there,
you must be adjudged by their law.") Williams added that when he was a
Serjeant the Common Pleas would not grant a Prohibition in such a case.
Nor would the Common Pleas do so now, Chief Justice Fleming added.
The Prohibition was accordingly denied in the instant case.
A year later, however, Coke's Common Pleas made a flatly contradictory decision in the identical case of Vincent v. Genis.27 If Williams and
Fleming in Fenton v. Edwards were right about former Common Pleas
practice, then that court reversed itself. The position taken by Glanville in
Glanvyle v. Newport prevailed. In Vincent v. Genis, the wife's suit was
for "whore." The husband's release having been disallowed, a Prohibition
was unanimously granted. Coke, speaking for the Court, cited what he
called the "like case" of Bosome v. Sletter from the time of Chief Justice
Wray (1574- 1592) in the Queen's Bench, taking no note of more recent
precedents in that court precisely in point. In Bosome v. Sletter as Coke
26
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describes it, a conveyance of a parsonage came in question collaterally in
an ecclesiastical suit. A Prohibition was granted to prevent the ecclesiastical court from holding that the parsonage passed by deed, without livery
of seisin. In other words, the common law intervened in that case to enforce a fundamental and notorious rule of real property. Coke made no
distinction between that form of intervention and enforcement of a husband’s release against a wife’s suit for “spiritual” defamation.
Finally, the King’s Bench took one more turn. In Motam v. Motam,
that court held expressly that a husband may no more release the costs recovered by his wife in a separate suit for defamation than the action itself. That position was reversed in a Caroline case,28 without any
reported reference to Motam v. Motam or other earlier cases. In this case,
the husband’s release was only pleaded upon appeal from a sentence, plus
costs, in the wife’s favor. (Whether the release was made before sentence
does not appear.) The Court held that the release ought to have been allowed quoad the costs, though not quoad any penance or other punishment imposed on the slanderer. A Prohibition nisi was granted to that
end.
The reasonable rule that a husband may not release his wife’s ecclesiastical suit for defamation had its best moments in the Jacobean King’s
Bench. A few cases on other subjects tend to confirm that that court was
less ready than others to impose a rather mechanical conformity with the
common law on other jurisdictions. One case, Wise v. Wapthorp,29 involved the legal capacities of married women. In this case, a man made
his wife executrix, left legacies, and died. After the wife had remarried, a
legatee sued her without joining her new husband. She pleaded that as a
married woman she ought not to have been sued alone, and a Prohibition
was sought when the ecclesiastical court disallowed the plea. The Prohibition was denied, 3-1, the aged Chief Justice Popham not participating.
Justice Williams doubted whether the ecclesiastical law had been correctly applied, but held that if it had not been the remedy was by appeal.
The matter being within ecclesiastical cognizance, there was no warrant
for insisting on common law standards. Justices Yelverton and Tanfield
28
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agreed. Justice Fenner dissented, holding that intervention is appropriate
“if they proceed contrary to the law and reason” (law and reason, for Fenner, being defined by common law standards as to women’s separate capacity.) The decision seems strong, inasmuch as the husband could be
held responsible for his wife’s executorial duties at common law (i.e., for
debts of the estate.) His liabilities could be affected, say, by the wife’s
failure to assert the estate’s incapacity to support legacies. Even on Williams’s assumption that the ecclesiastical decision was correctable by appeal, non-intervention in such circumstances was generous.
A case from the next year is similar.30 Here, a man made his wife and
son executors and left a legacy to his grandchild. The grandchild, “to
spare his father and put all the charge on the wife,” sued her alone for
the legacy. She was not allowed to plead that there was a co-executor,
who had joined her in proving the will and ought to have been joined in
the legacy suit. However unreasonable or bad in ecclesiastical law the
disallowance may have been, the King’s Bench refused to grant a Prohibition. The reported reason was simply that legacies are of exclusively ecclesiastical cognizance.
The non-interfering spirit of the Jacobean King’s Bench is again exemplified in a case of 1608.31 A man made his wife executrix and left
£60 to his daughter. The testator further willed that the executrix might
retain the £60 so long as she and the daughter agreed, and that if they
agreed the money should be delivered to the local Overseers of the Poor
for safekeeping. The money was accordingly delivered to the Overseers,
who made a signed and sealed receipt. The daughter subsequently sued
the executrix for the legacy. The executrix tried to plead the above facts
and the Overseers’ acquittance, but was not allowed to. A Prohibition was
denied by Justices Yelverton, Williams, and Croke, alone in court. They
did not in this case rely on the generality that legacies were the ecclesiastical courts’ business. Three circumstances making the ecclesiastical
court’s conduct reasonable were mentioned: (a) If the executrix could excuse herself, the daughter would have no means of recovering her legacy
in the ecclesiastical court, since no suit against the Overseers would lie
30
31
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there. (Presumably a court of equity would be her only way to get at
them.) (b) The daughter was within age when she agreed to let the money
be delivered to the Overseers. (c) If the executrix loses anything, it is her
own fault, since she could have been taken a bond from the Overseers to
save her harmless. In short, the ecclesiastical court had made an equitable
decision. That is especially true in view of the daughter's nonage (which
would be relevant for her contractual liability at common law as well.) If
we waive that consideration, it is perhaps questionable whether the ecclesiastical decision (right or wrong) implies any clash with the common law
comparable to the rule-conflicts on husband-and-wife and co-liability in
the cases above. The strongest construction of the circumstances against
the daughter would be that she released the legacy in consideration of the
benefit to her of having the money kept (and perhaps increased by investment) by the Overseers, assuming the risk of recovering it from them on
demand. Whether an ecclesiastical court that refused a legatee's unambiguous, considerate release (as distinct from one that refused a husband's
release of his wife's legacy) should be prohibited makes a question.
Could such conduct be taken as anything but downright irrational, hence
correctable by appeal? On the other hand, a Prohibition could perhaps be
justified where the transaction was ambiguous (as here) on the theory that
releases even of "spiritual" legacies are "temporal" by nature, hence construable at common law. If disallowing the plea implied a misconstruction
of the transaction, Prohibition should lie. In the instant case, the Court
could have reached the same result by saying that the transaction did not
amount to a release of the legacy or agreement not to sue the executrix -i.e., that the ecclesiastical court had passed correctly on a common law issue. Judging by the report, however, the Court did not go through such
steps, but simply chose to stay out of a legacy matter which gave every
appearance of having been fairly handled by the court with jurisdiction.
A further case, Starkey v. Berton,32 bears a superficial and misleading
resemblance to the cases above on the husband's power to bind his wife.
Here, two churchwardens sued a parishioner for a rate levied to repair the
church. The parishioner pleaded the release of one churchwarden and
sought a Prohibition when it was disallowed. The King's Bench turned
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him down unanimously, but the reason was not that the subject belonged
to the ecclesiastical courts. Rather, the judges considered the nature of
churchwardens and held that the ecclesiastical court had acted correctly.
(Churchwardens were a corporation in effect. The corporation, rather than
the churchwardens as individuals, held the property and claims of the
church to the use of the parish. One lacked capacity to convey property or
release claims without the other. These must be regarded as points of
common law, correctly understood by the ecclesiastical court in this case.
Presumably the ecclesiastical court would have been prohibitable in principle if it had allowed the release, or even for no further reason than that
the effect of a release by a single churchwarden had come in question.)
Counsel in Motam v. Motam urged Starkey v. Berton in support of the
proposition that the ecclesiastical court was entitled to disallow the husband’s release. The irrelevance of so using it was pointed out.
One undated case closely resembling Starkey v. Berton33 seems to
contradict it. Churchwardens jointly sued a parishioner for a repair tax.
The parishioner pleaded that he had offered to pay, and sentence was
given in his favor. That sentence was reversed on appeal, and £15 costs
awarded to the churchwardens by the appellate court. They then sued in
an ecclesiastical court to recover the costs. The parishioner pleaded that
one of the churchwardens had released the costs. The report says that it
seemed to the judges (of whichever court) that Prohibition would lie if the
plea was disallowed (suggesting that disallowance had not been alleged - either that the Court was not sure whether it had, or else that the Prohibition was sought merely because the effect of the release was in question.)
The report contains a note on the seemingly contradictory Starkey v. Berton, and a note (whether or not relating to that case) that costs recovered
by churchwardens are to the use of the parish. It is not clear whether this
contrary authority was cited or only recorded by the reporter in his notebook alongside the judges’ opinion. The case seems distinguishable from
Starkey v. Berton only on the theory that while rates are due to the
churchwardens as a corporation and therefore are not releasable by one,
litigative costs recovered in suing for rates belong jointly to the churchwardens as individuals and are accordingly releasable by either one. Assuming such a distinction, the reported case implies that it amounts to a
33
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rule of the common law binding on the ecclesiastical court -- i.e., that ecclesiastical courts are not free to construe the nature of their own costs
awards.
It was relatively rare for Prohibitions to be sought because of disallowed pleas in tithe cases. Suits for tithes were as a rule either prohibitable because the defense was triable at common law, whether or not the
ecclesiastical court would allow it, or not prohibitable because the defense was perfectly valid by ecclesiastical law and triable as to fact by
the ecclesiastical court. By what we have called "Tanfield's principle," an
ecclesiastical court which unaccountably refused a valid ecclesiastical defense ought not to be prohibited because such an error should be appealable. A few tithe cases test "Tanfield's principle," however. One case
from the Elizabethan Queen's Bench contradicts it. In Moore v. Buttoll,34
the parishioner pleaded simply that he had performed his legal duty, viz.
severed the tithe from the rest of the crop and set it out in the field. He
obtained a Prohibition on surmise that the plea had been disallowed. A
Consultation was sought on motion, on the ground that the defense was
triable in the ecclesiastical court (unlike, e.g., a modus.) As far as the brief
report shows, counsel did not elaborate, to the effect that the disallowance
was correctable by appeal. The judges (without Chief Justice Popham,
who was absent) were in any event unwilling to grant the Consultation on
motion. They took the disallowance "positivistically," as implying the unacceptable rule that the parishioner is bound to deliver the tithes. ("For the
parishioner has done his duty, and it is not reason that he should be compelled to carry the tithes to the parson's house.") It is of course possible
that the Court could have been persuaded upon demurrer that ecclesiastical law "really" had no such rule.
Two other cases from the same court tend the same way, a little less
decisively. In Green v. Hun,35 a prescriptive variant from the de jure
rules of tithing was pleaded -- viz. that wool was payable at Lammas
whenever during the preceding year it was sheared (at the time of shearing being the de jure rule.) The parishioner claimed to have duly set out
the wool at Lammas. Upon demurrer, counsel opposing the Prohibition
34
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argued that a custom merely governing the time at which such a product
as wool should pay tithes, unlike a customary commutation, is triable in
the ecclesiastical court. Whether or not correctly, the Court apparently accepted this point. It sustained the Prohibition, however, because it was alleged (and admitted by the demurrer) that the defense had been
disallowed. In effect, the judges took the ecclesiastical decision as implying that custom may not vary the de jure time of payment. There was no
discussion as to whether such a decision would be likely to survive ecclesiastical appeal. Possibly the question did not arise because the custom, if
not a modus, was still modus -like. Even if it was in theory triable in the
ecclesiastical court, the judges may have thought it just as well for it to be
tried by jury. They might not have gone along with the distinction between a timing-custom and a commutation if the disallowance had not
given them an alternative way to uphold the Prohibition. Moreover, the
custom affecting wool tithes was only part of a lengthy prescriptive surmise addressed to a conglomerate tithe suit. Although a Consultation
quoad the wool could have been granted, there was a practical advantage
in such cases in upholding or overruling the Prohibition as a whole. On all
the additional controverted points in this case, the Court thought the Prohibition should stand.
In Gusling v. Hincke,36 a parson sued a parishioner’s executor for
tithes due in the testator’s lifetime. The executor pleaded that his testator
had agreed to pay 10/ in lieu of the tithes in question and had paid that
sum. A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the executor’s defense
was disallowed. Justice Williams warned plaintiff-in-Prohibition that the
alleged disallowance had better be true. I.e.: In Williams’s opinion, there
was no basis for Prohibition merely because the testator’s bargain with
the parson was in question. (We shall deal with the fictitious or immaterial allegation of disallowance below. The effect of insisting that the disallowance was material was to make it a traversable fact.) As in the last
two cases, it would seem arguable that the disallowance was so unreasonable as to be correctable by appeal. Williams’s insistence that the alleged
disallowance be true suggests that he did not believe the ecclesiastical
court had really rejected the defense as such (as opposed, perhaps, to rejecting proffered proof of the bargain.) But nothing about appealable er36

P. 9 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1172, f.180b.

71

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
ror was said. It is possible that the Court was in doubt as to whether ecclesiastical law would "really" recognize an oral agreement by a dead
man in defense to a tithe claim against an estate. The case was not a common one.
A couple of later tithe cases go the other way. In Allen v. Mady,37 a
parishioner claimed that his plea of mere payment was disallowed. A
Common Pleas Prohibition was granted, but Chief Justice Hobart (no one
contradicting him) was ready to undo it by Consultation on motion. In another case where the same claim was made,38 the Prohibition was simply
denied.
A final case of late vintage,39 however, leaves the standing of "Tanfield's principle" in doubt. A parishioner being sued for tithe-lambs
pleaded a custom of a type that was common in the case of young animals. Since lambs, calves, etc., are not normally born in multiples of ten,
it was necessary to have some way of dealing with irregular numbers. The
custom pleaded in this case was a typical formula: 1/2d. per lamb if the
number born in a given year is less than seven; if there are seven, the parson to have the seventh and refund 3d., etc. According to the parishioner
in this case, the parson would not accept what was due to him according
to the customary formula, but insisted on waiting until a tenth lamb was
born and claiming that. The ecclesiastical court refused to let the parishioner allege this matter in his defense. The King's Bench was divided as
to whether Prohibition would lie. Justices Berkeley and Jones opposed
prohibiting. They were on solid ground because the parson here was not
standing on his de jure right against the custom in a simple sense. If the
ecclesiastical law had simply given the parson the tenth animal when it
was born (e.g., nothing in 1600 though nine lambs were born, one lamb in
1601 though only one was born that year), three solutions would be possible: (a) Prohibition whether or not the plea was disallowed, modi being
triable at common law; (b) Prohibition if the plea was disallowed (on the
theory that this special type of modus -- like the wool-at-Lammas custom
above -- could be tried in the ecclesiastical court but must be accepted as
37
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a defense under pain of Prohibition); (c) No Prohibition (on the theory
that the defense is triable in the ecclesiastical court and that exclusion of
the plea is correctable by appeal.) But in fact, as was well-recognized,
ecclesiastical law did not simply give the parson the tenth animal whenever it was born. Rather, it had a de jure formula at least similar to the
one claimed as customary here. I am not sure whether the values were
exactly the same, or indeed whether there was one consistently applied
and notorious formula as to values. In the report, Berkeley and Jones
seem to say that what the parishioner claimed was exactly the same as
what the ecclesiastical law gave him. But perhaps their position does not
depend on the truth of that proposition. If the ecclesiastical law only recognized the principle that liability for young animals in a given year was
limited by a formula covering irregular numbers, there would be a good
argument for denying Prohibition. I.e.: Assume that the ecclesiastical law
as it "really" is says negatively that parishioners are not liable for the
tenth animal in succession whenever it is born, and positively that a given
formula or any reasonable variant warranted by custom will be applied
instead. Then the disallowance of the defense in this case would seem,
however inexcusable, to be an appealable error. A fortiori if indeed the
standard formula was exactly the same as the formula pleaded.
Chief Justice Brampston and Justice Croke disagreed. As I read the report, they did not altogether dispute the theory that Berkeley and Jones
were going on. If the parishioner had expressly stood on a standard ecclesiastical formula, or if it had been unmistakable that the "custom" relied
on was only the standard formula, they too would have opposed prohibiting. As it was, they were ready to give the parishioner the benefit of any
doubt because he had stood on a custom. The ecclesiastical court had at
last acted as if it regarded the parson as entitled to the tenth animal whenever born, and as if a custom could not prevail against that rule. Brampston and Croke preferred to look no further. In effect, they adopted
position (b) of the three outlined above. The Court being thus divided,
Berkeley and Jones agreed to a Prohibition in order to draw a demurrer
and permit fuller debate. There is no report as to whether the parson
thought it worthwhile to demur.
The remaining, miscellaneous cases on disallowance are best classified
as between those in which the Prohibition was granted and those in which
it was denied. Let us take the latter group, which is larger, first. In one
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late-Elizabethan case,40 a parson leased his tithes. Subsequently, the
whole living was sequestered for dilapidations. I.e.: Because the parson
was permitting the property of the living to run down, to the detriment of
future holders, it was made over by due ecclesiastical proceedings to the
equivalent of a guardian or trustee. The property of the living generally -right to tithes, glebe, parsonage-house, etc. -- was so "sequestered." The
trustee then sued certain parishioners for tithes. They pleaded the lease of
the tithes and alleged that they had paid the lessee. A Prohibition was
sought because the plea was disallowed, but apparently denied. ("Apparently": The report does not state the outcome sharply, but gives a clear
opinion against prohibiting. It appears to come from a judge and is uncontradicted.)
" ... We do not know the quality of their sequestrations," the opinion
says. In other words, sequestering a living is a lawful ecclesiastical process, the incidents of which are defined by ecclesiastical law. If by ecclesiastical law the sequestration extends to the whole living, including tithes,
and if prior leases are postponed to the sequestration (i.e., the sequestered
parson's lessee loses what the parson-lessor would lose) -- so be it. The
ecclesiastical law is entitled so to hold (even though a lease of tithes qua
transaction was an ordinary secular conveyance, and in that sense the lessee had an interest recognized and protectable by the common law.) "The
lessee," says the opinion, "at his peril must provide with the parson when
he accepts the lease that no such forfeiture will be committed." (It is
worth noting that the ecclesiastical rule here hardly clashes with the common law applicable to analogous situations. A lessee of forfeitable property was normally subject to the risk of forfeiture -- e.g., lessee of a
life-tenant where the life-estate is forfeited by the life-tenant's making a
conveyance in fee.) No more pity was spared for the parishioners, who
had paid the wrong man and would have to pay twice, than for the lessee
himself. (No doubt they could get restitution if they could catch the lessee, but the "peril" of not knowing about the sequestration rested on
them.) One final remark in the opinion is interesting: "... We will not presume that this is covin in the parson or the Bishop or corruption in the
spiritual judges in their courts, no more than they will presume it of us."

40
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The implication there is that an actual showing of "practice" might
change the case, that despite the legal reasons for non-interference a Prohibition might be employed to control abuse of ecclesiastical process.
(The possible "covin," I suppose, would be for the parson to connive at
the sequestration in order to defeat his own lease, or else for the ecclesiastical authorities to sequester on fabricated grounds in order to "get" an unfavored parson and/or lessee.) But the Court would not see foul play by
presumption.
In Quarles and Cawllye v. Fairechilde,41 the Queen's Bench was urged
to intervene in an ecclesiastical suit for a different reason than usual: not
because a defendant's plea was disallowed, but because the ecclesiastical
court would not let a stranger come in to protect his interest. The underlying dispute in this case was over whether a living was "donative" or "presentative." (The patron of a living, or advowson-owner, normally had the
right to present a clergyman to the bishop. If the presentee was acceptable, he was installed in the benefice by the three legal ceremonies of institution, admission, and induction. Some advowsons, however, were
"donative." That meant that the patron could convey the living directly to
a clergyman, without going through the bishop and without installation
ceremonies.) In our case, one J. -- claiming to be the owner of a presentative advowson -- presented Fairechilde. But the living was already in the
possession of Forth. Forth got the living by the gift of Quarles and Cawllye, who claimed to own the advowson and that it was donative. Fairechilde sued in the ecclesiastical court to secure induction -- i.e., to force a
legal decision as to whether the living was presentative, in which event he
would be entitled to induction. As the Queen's Bench was to hold, Fairechilde's suit was essentially ex parte -- a claim addressed to the bishop
asserting the right to be inducted. However, as was proper in such suits,
he named Forth as "disturber" of his alleged right. Forth appeared, contested Fairechilde's claim, lost, and appealed to the Delegates. Pending
the appeal, Forth died. Thereupon his patrons (Quarles and Cawllye)
sought, in effect, to take his place. I.e.: They claimed that their interest
was affected by the outcome of Fairechilde's suit and accordingly asked
to be received by the Delegates to show that the living was donative. The
ecclesiastical court refused to receive them, wherefore Quarles and Cawl41
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lye sought and obtained a Prohibition. Our report gives the arguments and
decision upon a motion for Consultation.
The case was argued by great men -- Coke against the Consultation,
Tanfield for it. The Court, per Chief Justice Popham, decided to grant the
Consultation. Popham's opinion, however, contradicted Tanfield's argument for the same result. (a) Tanfield argued that the Prohibition should
never have been granted because there was nothing to prohibit. That was
true, he said, because Forth's death killed Fairechilde's suit. (By, it would
seem, universal-necessary, hence ecclesiastical, standards, not by a standard peculiar to the common law: "For it is in the Court Christian as in
other Courts, that to every suit there must be two parties ....") Therefore
when Quarles and Cawllye asked to be received, they were asking for the
impossible -- to be made quasi-parties to a suit that did not exist. Therefore the basis for their claim to a Prohibition -- improper refusal to receive them -- was nugatory. Since a Prohibition which ought not to have
been granted had been, it should be undone by Consultation. (It seems
implied in Tanfield's argument that what the ecclesiastical court was actually doing was irrelevant. If the ecclesiastical court regarded the suit as
still alive and was carrying on with it, it was, so to speak, flapping its
wings. I take it that two consequences might follow from this somewhat
surrealistic perception of the situation: 1) If the ecclesiastical court was
behaving in an absurd, unreasonable, or unlawful-by-any-standard manner, it should not be prohibited, for, by "Tanfield's principle," "foreign"
courts should only be prohibited when they are correctly applying rules of
their own which, by controlling common law standards, they ought not to
apply. To that, one might, of course, make the "positivistic" reply that if
the ecclesiastical court -- indeed, the Delegates -- regarded the suit as
alive it was alive by ecclesiastical standards, which standards, by Tanfield's showing, are "wrong." The alternative to saying the ecclesiastical
court was behaving absurdly is of course to say that its refusal to receive
Quarles and Cawllye was a function of its "correct" recognition that there
was no suit to receive them into. The report gives, and perhaps the record
gave, no positive indication that proceedings in Fairechilde's suit were
continuing, though it is obvious that they either were continuing or were
likely to. Tanfield's client wanted a Consultation badly enough to hire an
expensive lawyer, hardly a good investment unless there was in reality
something to authorize the continuation of. Still, it was clever legalism to
contend that refusal to admit Quarles and Cawllye was right, and hence
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no basis for Prohibition, even though the ecclesiastical court did not deduce that holding from the correct premise, viz. that the suit was dead. 2)
Nothing the ecclesiastical court did as a result of entertaining a non-existent suit could have any effect. If Fairechilde was inducted, that would be
a manifest error. No weight could be given to it in any common law litigation over the status of the advowson. Therefore, one might argue, there
is no common law interest to protect by prohibiting. Quarles's and Cawllye's common law interest in their donative advowson, if they had such
an advowson, would be just as well off without a Prohibition as with one.
And what basis for Prohibition could they have except that interest? They
ought to go ahead and appoint a new clergyman, and if Fairechilde got in
their way bring a Quare impedit. Fairechilde's having secured induction
would not hurt their cause. Indeed, it would probably help it, by constituting an actionable interference with their right of patronage.)
Coke immediately jumped on Tanfield's general reasoning: If there
was nothing to prohibit (at least in any sense "real" enough to worry
about), then there was nothing to authorize the continuation of by Consultation. The Consultation Tanfield sought would be "in vain," for surely
a flesh-and-blood Consultation operates to let the ecclesiastical court do
what it lawfully can and actually will do once the arresting hand of the
Prohibition is removed. Coke was on plausible ground here, for, as we
have seen in Vol. I, there were situations in which a Prohibition that utterly misfired -- failed to shoot down an ecclesiastical suit actually in being -- could be held void, but not be undone by Consultation. However, I
doubt whether Coke's counter-stroke of logic-chopping was necessary to
convince the Court that Tanfield's theory itself was pretty much "in vain."
In any event, the Chief Justice rejected the notion that the ecclesiastical
suit did not or should not exist. Because the suit was essentially ex parte,
Popham said, there was no reason why the death of a quasi-party, or one
"in for interest," should terminate it. Therefore the Prohibition stopped
something about whose reality there was no doubt; therefore it must
either stand or be reversed straightforwardly.
(b) The Court then went on to hold that Consultation should be granted
because (as above, without the tortuosities) Quarles and Cawllye would
not be hurt if Fairechilde got his induction, while Fairechilde had a real
interest in trying for it. In other words, if the Church was donative, Quarles and Cawllye could not protect their interest at common law whether or
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not Fairechilde was inducted. His induction on the premise that the
church was presentative would simply have no effect on a common law
test of the premise. If, on the other hand, the church was presentative,
Fairechilde needed induction before he could take any profits from the
living (challenging the adverse claimants to sue him) or himself bring any
action at common law to test the nature of the advowson and hence his
right. It seems to me that the Court did not hold that the Delegates were
right to exclude Quarles and Cawllye (allowing them to come in would
seem conducive to an intelligent decision on Fairechilde’s title to be inducted, as Forth’s participation had been), but that whether they were
right or wrong did not matter for any common law purpose. Coke’s main
argument against Consultation came to saying that the nature of the living
was ultimately determinable at common law (as it unquestionably was),
and therefore that the Queen’s Bench should keep the possession which
the Prohibition gave it until the real issue was tried. Practically, that is a
very sensible argument. If Fairechilde had been forced to deny that the
church was donative to reverse the Prohibition, the problem could be settled here and now. As it turned out, the ecclesiastical Court was left to
consume its time on a question ultimately beyond its competence, and
further common law litigation was almost guaranteed. In rejecting a
course with such clear practical advantages, the Court showed considerable scrupulosity about prohibiting when the theoretical basis for doing so
was shaky. In the abstract, the Prohibition was hard to justify (as Coke
probably realized, for he made no very formidable case for it.) To say that
an ecclesiastical court is not free to rule out intervention-for-interest by a
non-party -- at that, a lay non-party whose interest in the right of patronage is secular -- would be interfering indeed. A fortiori when, as here, such
intervention was ruled out only at the appellate level, for it is surely defensible to hold that a suit should not be restructured by the addition of
parties-in-interest when the judgment of a lower court, predicated on the
old structure, is under review. Though Forth’s death pending appeal created an ambiguity in our case, it was surely the ecclesiastical court’s
business to resolve it.
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In Child v. Caninge42 an occupier of land cut his hay and sold it without paying the tithe. Instead of suing the occupier, the parson sued the
vendee. In principle, that was certainly an odd thing to do, for the duty to
pay tithes belonged to the producer, not to persons into whose hands
tithable produce might later come. Practically, it is not so hard to imagine
what happened. The report says that the occupier put the hay (all of it,
without severing the tithe) in a rick and sold it. Probably the property in
the hay changed hands while physically it stood right there in the field.
Probably the parson took on the vendee, pointing out that the tithe was
unpaid and that it would be perfectly easy for him to pay it now in approximately the normal way. But the vendee refused, making himself the
"enemy" -- the obstinate one. (Perhaps the producer politely, or even
truly, told the parson that he had reminded the vendee to take care of the
tithe before he hauled off his hay, the vendee saying of course he would.)
Some such story, at any rate, might explain why a parson believed it was
appropriate or fair to sue the vendee (unless, of course, his motive was
simply the hardboiled one -- to go after the person more likely to be able
to pay, hoping to make a legal case for an unorthodox suit.)
Whether the Prohibition that was sought in this case was based on an
alleged disallowance is not clear. Claiming a Prohibition solely on the
ground that the tithe suit was directed at someone other than the producer
would have been entirely plausible, whether or not successful. Chief Justice Hobart said, however, that "if they of the Court Christian will not allow this plea, the defendant is without remedy." That suggests that the
surmise "sounded in disallowance"; I.e.: The vendee was sued, for all that
appeared from the libel, as if he were the normally-liable producer. Instead of immediately seeking a Prohibition on the bare surmise that he
was a non-liable vendee, he sought to plead that fact in the ecclesiastical
court and brought a Prohibition when he failed. In any event, Hobart's
opinion is strong: A vendee sued for tithes may not have a Prohibition,
not even when it is clear that he cannot help himself, at least in the ecclesiastical court of first instance (much less if he has not tried.) The opinion is all the stronger because Hobart himself said that suing the vendee
was improper ("Clearly the vendee cannot [ne poet, perhaps ne doet,
42

T. 16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.209b.
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ought not] pay them.") Nevertheless, Hobart took his stand on the proposition that the suit was "merely spiritual." Perhaps that comes to an application of "Tanfield's principle": There is no basis for saying that the
common law rules out holding a vendee liable for tithes in certain circumstances, as it rules out, for example, suits for tithes of exempt products.
The very unorthodoxy of the attempt to nail the vendee makes it hard to
say that the common law has any rules, pro or con, on the subject. On the
other hand, insofar as the attempt looks novel and unreasonable, there is a
basis for predicting that it would not survive ecclesiastical appeal.
Justice Hutton disagreed. He did not think the case was open and shut
("It seems a good question whether he will have a Prohibition or not"),
but on balance he though prohibiting could be justified, apparently without reference to whether the vendee had tried to defend himself and been
disallowed. Hutton was troubled by the unfairness of making a vendee
answerable even in the kind of situation I sketch above (where he is in a
sense morally responsible, has an opportunity to take care of the tithes.)
For suppose the vendor falsely tells the vendee that the parson has been
satisfied. Such a lie would not be false on its face even when the whole
crop was lying in the field, plainly untithed, for the parson might have accepted a substitute by agreement. Surely it is hard to put responsibility
for knowing the truth on the vendee, hard even to make it his job to prove
that he was deceived. At heart, perhaps, Hutton thought that letting ecclesiastical courts get a foot in the door to hold vendees liable spelt trouble,
however sensibly ecclesiastical courts would try to behave; under the surface, perhaps Hobart did not think that attaching liability to vendees
would be a disaster if it were done with great restraint, only in cases of
fraud. (Fraud is imaginable: Sell your crop the moment you cut it or before, give the vendee a piece of paper certifying the tithes satisfied -known by him to be utterly fabricated -- and "skip town.")
The report tells us that when the case was taken up again later it "appeared in another manner than is here put." How is not specified. In the
event, the Prohibition was denied. However much that was a result of the
reformulation, the report says that Hobart repeated his opinion on the
question as formerly conceived.
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In Browne's Case,43 the King's Bench made a clear self-restraining
decision. Browne was proceeded against in an ecclesiastical court for not
attending services at his parish church. He sought a Prohibition because
what he took to be his reasonable and lawful excuse was disallowed. (He
said that he went to another church nearer home, could not reach the parish church at all in winter owing to impassable roads, but nevertheless
went there three times a year and received the sacrament.) When the case
was first taken up, no conclusion was reached. Only Justice Dodderidge's
remarks are reported. Dodderidge said that this excuse was satisfactory
for the purposes of 1 Eliz. (the Uniformity Act, making church attendance
compulsory, subject to temporal penalties), but not by ecclesiastical law.
I.e.: The statute required attending one's parish church as a general rule,
but in respect of the temporal penalties accepted attendance elsewhere if
one had a reasonable excuse; ecclesiastical law, as Dodderidge understood it, treated parish-church attendance as a categorical duty. On this
occasion, Dodderidge expressed no conclusion. Subsequently, the Court
agreed unanimously to deny Prohibition. The judges in effect refused to
give the statute any "preemptive" operation -- i.e., to take it as bringing
secular law into the field of church attendance, formerly occupied solely
by ecclesiastical law, and thereby imposing secular standards on the ecclesiastical courts in that field. Conflict between the spiritual and temporal spheres was not in this instance considered disturbing. (It is a nice
question whether conflict occasioned by statutory incursion of secular law
into the ecclesiastical sphere is less bad than conflict between ecclesiastical law and analogous common law. The Court in this case took on no
such large, and perhaps fruitless, weighing-problem, but simply found no
intent in the statute to interfere with ecclesiastical rules on church attendance. Its words were: "For notwithstanding this statute, they [this Court]
have nothing to do with coming to churches, for this statute does not give
authority to meddle with such things, but was made in corroboration of
the canons." I take this as equivalent to saying that the statute "preemp43

2 Rolle, 438 (dated T. 21 Jac. K.B.); Lansd. 1063, f.20b (dated T. 22.) From the party's name
and the substantially identical facts it is clear that both reports relate to the same case. Rolle
gives Dodderidge's tentative remarks and ends with an adjournment; the MS. gives the decision
and Dodderidge's further concurring remarks. A full year is a large gap between first hearing and
final disposition, but even if one of the reports is misdated, they plainly relate to two successive
discussions.
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ted" nothing. It cannot be considered as doing no more than reaffirming
the canon law and leaving church attendance solely to ecclesiastical
courts, for it undoubtedly did create a secular duty and penalty. The point
must be that the statute was meant to add "teeth" to an ecclesiastical duty
by superadding a secular liability, but for that very reason could not be
meant to take away any existing ecclesiastical power or alter the way it
was used. If the statute directed the secular authorities to enforce a somewhat less stringent duty than ecclesiastical law insisted on -- i.e., did not
demand parochial attendance so strictly -- that was a mere contingency;
as it were, the added "teeth" were in one respect a little blunter, but there
was no intent to make the existing one less sharp -- or voracious. This
conclusion is good statutory construction, for the act is markedly affirmatory of the ecclesiastical courts' power to enforce all its provisions.)
On the second hearing, Justice Dodderidge made two further individual observations: (a) A prescriptive title to attend a church other than that
of one's parish will not avail unless there is a "spiritual composition."
Judging by the reports, it would not appear that Browne set up a true prescriptive claim -- i.e., a claim that his right to go to a "foreign" church
was based on immemorial usage, as opposed to a claim that it was his established and justified habit. (It would obviously make no sense for an individual to claim a prescription, but one might do so as the occupier of a
tenement or an inhabitant of an outlying sub-division of a parish.) I take
Dodderidge's statement as a dictum leading to an a fortiori: A prescription like those enforced by Prohibition against some ecclesiastical duties
will not prevail against the duty of parish-church attendance; the only
way out of that duty is some sort of composition or dispensation sanctioned by the ecclesiastical authorities (and perhaps usage to the degree
that ecclesiastical courts are themselves willing to count it as evidence of,
or equivalent to, such a composition.) A fortiori, a common law court's
mere opinion that an excuse is reasonable, or the fact that the excuse
would be good vis-a-vis the additional statutory duty to attend church,
cannot justify interference with ecclesiastical autonomy.
(b) Secondly, Dodderidge said, "The temporal judges have no business
reforming [nont riens a reformer] the injustice of the spiritual judge."
That is to state the negative branch of "Tanfield's principle": whatever
conflicts of law or overlaps of interest do justify Prohibitions on disallowance surmises, they are not justified when a common law court thinks an
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ecclesiastical result unreasonable or unjust by universal standards, standards which ought to be, and presumptively are, recognized by the ecclesiastical system. In application to the present case (I take it): The most that
can be said against the ecclesiastical court’s conduct is that it has foolishly and unfairly disallowed what sounds like a very good excuse, which
is precisely not a basis for Prohibition. (To make any other charge
against the ecclesiastical court would involve doing just what the judges
were unwilling to: taking the statute as giving the common law an interest
in church-attendance cases and creating an undesirable conflict between
secular and ecclesiastical standards.)
So much for miscellaneous disallowance cases in which the Prohibition was denied. In those following it was granted, or at least may have
been. In James v. James,44 the Prohibition was considerably qualified, so
that perhaps the case is mainly evidence of restraint in interfering in ecclesiastical business. Mrs. James was called to account as administratrix
for the goods of her husband’s estate. She pleaded a deed of gift to a
daughter of some or all of the goods, made by the husband in his lifetime,
and sought a Prohibition on surmise that the plea was rejected. I find it
difficult to state the shape of the case quite crisply on the basis of the reports, but I think the gist was as follows: No one on the Court thought that
the ecclesiastical suit should be prohibited merely because the inter vivos
gift was pleaded. The disallowance was essential; the ecclesiastical court
was entitled to consider whether certain of the husband’s goods had in
fact been conveyed away in his lifetime and were therefore not part of the
estate to be accounted for, provided that it applied common law legal
standards in assessing whether such a gift had been effectually made and
what it comprised. The question that caused trouble, provoking an extended debate between Chief Justice Coke and Justice Dodderidge, was
whether the bare surmised fact that the gift had been disallowed was sufficient basis for concluding that the ecclesiastical court had violated a
binding common law standard. Coke’s position was the readily intelligible one: A partial Prohibition should be granted because the gift was a
perfectly good plea to account for as many of the husband’s goods as it
did and legally could comprise; the disallowance implied rejection of that
proposition; admittedly, only a partial Prohibition (quoad the goods in44

H. 12 Jac., K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 315 (best report); 1 Rolle, 123; Add. 25,213, f.169 (brief.)

83

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
cluded in the gift) would lie, for the gift could not account for everything
the administratrix was liable to account for (specifically, the estate's
claims, which, as choses in action, were not conveyable to the daughter
even if the intestate meant to give her everything he had.) Justice Dodderidge seems to have been skeptical as to whether the disallowance really did imply rejection of any "common law truth." He wanted to be
surer than the record permitted him to see as to why the plea was rejected,
suspecting that it may have been ruled out on grounds of form. He was
worried by its manifest inadequacy as a full answer to the demand for an
accounting. (I.e.: The record did not show that the administratrix had
done anything more than plead the gift. Did that not show that she was
proceeding on the indefensible premise that she could discharge her accountability merely by establishing the gift, which the ecclesiastical court
was entirely right not to permit?) In short, I think the issue was between
Coke's willingness to see error in a disallowance that made no immediate
sense and Dodderidge's belief that the context should be more thoroughly
scrutinized before an error worthy of Prohibition was seen -- an important
issue of judicial policy. In the end, a compromise was arrived at. The rest
of the Court went along with Coke, being somewhat moved by the fact
that the administratrix sought her Prohibition before sentence. But to satisfy Dodderidge a nisi was appended to the partial Prohibition and arrangements were made for a civilian to appear before the Court to show
why the plea was disallowed. The Prohibition would fail if the judges
were persuaded that the disallowance was a reasonable act in context, implying no rejection of legal standards which the common law would insist
on.
Harrison v. Hearing45 yields only a dictum on the present subject. It
was decided in that case that probate of a mixed will (comprising land
and goods) should be prohibited only quoad land even when the sanity of
the testator is challenged. (This went against other holdings on the same
question.) It was said by the way, however, that the ecclesiastical court
would be prohibited in toto if it disallowed the plea that the testator was
insane. In other words, the ecclesiastical court may settle the sanity ques-

45

P. 14 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,211, f.155b. Two anonymous reports of the same case (1 Rolle, 358, and
Harl. 4561, f.201b) do not contain the dictum.

84

Substantive Surmises of Disallowance
tion by its own lights for its own purposes (taking the will as if it concerned only personal estate), but it must permit that question to be raised.
Creedland's Case46 is badly reported, but it may be another instance of
a granted Prohibition. Creedland was made interim administrator of his
brother's estate during the minority of the brother's son. (The son would
have been entitled to administer by statute if he had not been a minor, for
there was apparently no surviving wife or other children. By the same token, the son would have been entitled to everything the father had after
paying debts.) The son made Mrs. Hindman his executor and died. Hindman sued Creedland to account for the father's estate. Creedland pleaded
that he and Hindman had made an agreement to settle accounts, pursuant
to which Creedland had paid Hindman £80 in full satisfaction. A Prohibition was sought on surmise that the plea was disallowed. The two judges
who speak in the report (Richardson and Croke) appear to agree on one
point: if Creedland had pleaded only that he had paid £80 in satisfaction
of the account, there would be no basis for Prohibition. That means (I
take it) that the common law has no authority to scrutinize an ecclesiastical accounting insofar as the pleading in the ecclesiastical court goes only
to the state of the account. It would be presumed that the ecclesiastical
court had its own reasons for disallowing a plea that went merely to say
that Creedland had paid Hindman £80 and that there was nothing more to
account for, whether or not the reasons were evident. If the disallowance
was in any way improper, ecclesiastical appeal would have to take care of
it, for it would amount to an error in the ecclesiastical business of evaluating the state of the account. On the other hand, both judges thought that
the agreement between Creedland and Hindman altered the case. Croke
appears to say that the agreement would justify a Prohibition (whether because the plea was disallowed or because the agreement should be tried at
common law, disallowed or not--which is not clear.) Richardson appears
to say that Prohibition would lie if the agreement alone had been pleaded,
but not when actual payment of the money was also pleaded. The report
is inconclusive as well as unclear. It is mainly valuable for pointing to a
case in which Prohibition by virtue of a disallowed plea would not be
granted -- viz., when the plea claims mere payment on administrator's account. (Cf. "mere payment" of tithes).
46

3-7 Car. C.P. Hetley, 18.
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III.
PROBLEMS OF THE DISALLOWANCE SURMISE
A. Introduction
In the cases above, the issue was whether, by disallowing a defensive
plea, the ecclesiastical court committed an error controllable by Prohibition. In those cases, improper disallowance had to be surmised in order to
argue plausibly for a Prohibition. If plaintiff-in-Prohibition had not made
his plea in the ecclesiastical court, and if the plea had not been disallowed, there would have been no basis for a Prohibition. The plea having
been made and disallowed, the question arose whether ecclesiastical conduct needed to be, or appropriately could be, controlled by the common
law courts. Since our present concern is primarily with the conditions under which common law control of conduct was held appropriate, it is the
cases above that are important for our purpose. There are, however, some
further problems connected with the surmise of improper disallowance. It
will be convenient to treat them here, before resuming the main thread
with cases on common law control of evidentiary and procedural practices of ecclesiastical courts.
Sometimes disallowance of a plea was surmised when it perhaps did
not need to be. Whether it needed to be was occasionally an express issue.
In other instances, the case could be disposed of without discussing
whether the allegation of disallowance was really necessary. That is to
say, we have some direct authority on when it is necessary to make a plea
in the ecclesiastical court and wait for it to be disallowed before seeking a
Prohibition, and when, per contra, a Prohibition is obtainable on another
theory, without plea-and-disallowance. In addition, we have some ambiguous cases. The latter constitute factual or "practice" precedents -- i-e.,
instances in which a Prohibition was granted or considered upon surmise
of disallowance, and in which nothing was said to rule out the possibility
that the surmise was essential. It may, however, be extremely doubtful
that surmising disallowance was in fact necessary.
Unnecessary surmises of disallowance are not hard to account for. Let
us take the most indisputable case to start with: One could prohibit a tithe
suit by surmising that a modus existed. One did not need to surmise that
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the ecclesiastical court had refused to let one plead the modus. We shall
see below how and in what sense this was firmly held. What then does it
mean if we find a plaintiff-in-Prohibition alleging that his plea of a modus
was disallowed? Several possibilities may be distinguished: (a) At one
time (before the point was settled), there may have been genuine doubt as
to whether one needed to show that one had attempted to assert one’s modus in the ecclesiastical court before one could be entitled to a Prohibition. In case of doubt, a parishioner wanting to claim a modus would have
good reason to make his plea and surmise disallowance. For if the common law courts would not intervene unless an attempt were first made in
the ecclesiastical court, it in all probability would intervene if an ecclesiastical
court failed to respect a modus. Now, in no other case was it ever so firmly
settled that a Prohibition could be had without an allegation of an improper ruling on the part of the ecclesiastical judge. That is to say, no other response to an
ecclesiastical suit was so clearly an ipso facto basis for Prohibition. (Of
course no showing of disallowance was ever expected when plaintiff-inProhibition was asserting the ecclesiastical court’s total and original lack of
jurisdiction. For an extreme example: If a man was sued for breach of promise in
an ecclesiastical court, he could have a Prohibition simply by pointing to
the utterly improper suit against him. It was never suggested that one
needed to except to the jurisdiction on legal grounds in the ecclesiastical
court and wait to pursue a Prohibition until one could claim that the ecclesiastical judge had mistakenly upheld his own jurisdiction.) In consequence, especially in non- modus cases, it was often the part of prudence
to surmise disallowance. If the common law court would not prohibit
without a showing that the ecclesiastical court had done something
wrong, perhaps it would prohibit with such a showing. One could rarely
be sure; the chance for a Prohibition would usually be improved by
claiming disallowance. But it does not follow that claiming it was necessary.
Only in the case of the modus could it be confidently said it was not necessary,
but in fact several other responses to ecclesiastical claims were probably ipso
facto grounds for Prohibition too. The reason for saying that is that there are
cases in which Prohibitions were granted or considered upon surmises
which apparently merely asserted such responses, without reference to the
ecclesiastical court’s conduct. There are two reasons for adding the
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"probably": (i) The case-lines supporting ipso facto grounds for Prohibition other than modi are rarely unambiguous. To take a realistic example:
May a parishioner prohibit a tithe suit by surmising that the parson made
an agreement to accept money instead of tithes, without showing an unsuccessful effort to assert the agreement in the ecclesiastical court? It
would have been hard for a lawyer to predict the answer to that at several
times in our period. On the other hand, my guess would be that the
chance of getting a Prohibition in that case would be about as good without a surmise of disallowance as with one, neither way being sure-fire.
(ii) Reports do not always make it clear (as full records would) whether or
not disallowance was surmised. If we find a court discussing whether to
prohibit a tithe suit because the parson allegedly commuted the tithes by
agreement, there is no guarantee that an unsuccessful attempt to plead the
agreement had not been surmised. A judge who in a few brief words opposed the Prohibition, say, might be holding that ecclesiastical courts do
not have to respect commutations-by-agreement unless they choose to
(disallowance having been alleged.) On the other hand, he might be holding that a commutation-by-agreement is not an ipso facto basis for Prohibition, without prejudice to whether ecclesiastical courts are free to
disallow such agreements as defenses. Both are probably plausible positions. In the absence of positive indications in the report, all one can say
is that where there is no apparent sign of alleged disallowance it was
probably not alleged.
(b) A party might plead in the ecclesiastical court with the genuine intention of accepting its jurisdiction. E.g.: I plead my modus (or whatever)
in the hope that it will be allowed and that the contention can be settled
without a Prohibition. I am driven to a Prohibition when my plea is disallowed (and perhaps when my prospects for defending the suit on some
other ground have dimmed.) Since I actually have a complaint against the
ecclesiastical court's conduct, I might as well reinforce my claim to a
Prohibition by alleging it, even when I am confident that I could have had
a Prohibition without reference to the ecclesiastical court's behavior.
This situation contrasts with that in which a man makes a plea in the ecclesiastical court, hoping or expecting it to be disallowed, because he
fears that Prohibition will not lie except on a showing of disallowance.
The latter runs the risk that the plea will not be disallowed, in which event
he will have to give up his hope of prohibiting, or seek a Prohibition without surmising disallowance, or claim disallowance untruly.
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(c) The last of those three choices leads to our final possibility: the fictitious surmise of disallowance. Suppose one calculates that a surmise of
disallowance would improve one's chance for a Prohibition. But suppose
either that one's plea has in fact been allowed, or else that one is reluctant
to make a plea for fear it might be accepted. So one alleges disallowance
fictitiously. The stratagem may work in either of two ways: (i) The adversary may not dispute the disallowance. I say, for example, my modus
(lease, agreement, or whatever) was disallowed. The other party knows
that surmise is feigned and that he could in principle block the Prohibition
by contradicting it. But if he does so he runs the risk that a jury will find
against him. Even if the evidence is all on his side, suppose the jurors turn
out to be biased against ecclesiastical courts. And might they not suspect
that taking issue on the disallowance betrayed a weak case on the merits?
Might they not he inclined to give a dishonest verdict for their tithe-paying neighbor, say, perhaps assuming that rough justice was on his side
whatever the technicalities? Then perhaps the evidence on the fact of disallowance would not be entirely clear. Cases suggest that it was not always
clear whether an ecclesiastical court had actually disallowed a plea. Parties
and their lawyers seem sometimes, for example, to have been confused as to
whether pleas were disallowed for substantive or evidentiary reasons. Confusion seems to have been possible as to whether an ecclesiastical court had
said, "As a matter of our law, this is no defense even if it is true," or, "The
evidence you offer will not support this defense by our standards, so you
must either waive the defense or offer further evidence." Imagine a jury trying
to decide whether a plea had been disallowed in the face of conflicting
expert testimony as to whether the plea was ruled out definitively or only
provisionally, pending an offer of sufficient evidence. Even if the jury
got the bare facts straight and returned a special verdict, it might create a
risk-laden legal question as to whether the acts of the ecclesiastical court
constituted disallowance in the proper sense, a question requiring dilatory
argument and high-priced lawyers. More generally, it is risky to try to establish in-court events before a jury which, however fair, will hardly understand what it is expected to decide.
If, therefore, defendant-in-Prohibition has reasonable hope of winning
on the merits, he will be well-advised to take issue thereon. Instead of
contradicting the claim that a modus, say, was disallowed, he had better
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dispute the modus itself. (There was never, I think, any doubt about defendant-in-Prohibition's power to take issue on the merits. A theoretical
argument can be made against it: If the basis for claiming a Prohibition is
improper disallowance, defendant-in-Prohibition ought logically either to
deny the fact of disallowance, or else object to the Prohibition on the legal
ground that the disallowance did not constitute controllable error. In practice, however, I see no sign that such logic was ever insisted on. Defendant-in-Prohibition could admit the fact of disallowance, waive legal
objection to the Prohibition, and contest the truth of the claim admitted to
have been improperly disallowed. That, after all, was what plaintiff-inProhibition wanted him to do. If defendant was willing, it would be hard
on the parties -- though tender toward ecclesiastical jurisdiction -- to prevent it.) If desperate, defendant-in-Prohibition might have to take issue
on the disallowance; if at all hopeful, he should take issue on the merits
(or, in quite a few cases, on the legal objectionability of the disallowance.) Even if he was not too hopeful, it might hardly be worth the time,
risk, and trouble to avoid "getting down to it," letting the real quarrel between the parties be settled at common law. If one's case was bad
enough, one might lose in the ecclesiastical court even if one succeeded
in keeping it there. The recurrent nature of tithes, the subject of the majority of disputes, argues the same way. Only a determined litigative warrior would as a rule have sufficient motive to go "all out" to win this tithe
suit by any possible means. For if one succeeded in collecting tithes in
kind in the face of a modus or agreement this year, the identical quarrel
might have to be fought out next year -- perhaps to different results with
different judges, lay or ecclesiastical, a different jury, and lawyers, civil
or common, of greater or less skill. In the end, the only way for a seriously challenged parson to collect his tithes in kind was to break the modus or other obstacle by verdict or judgment at common law. Better to
try, even at some risk, than fool around with such maneuvers as traversing an alleged disallowance.
(ii) One might get away with a feigned surmise of disallowance because the other party would not dispute it. In addition, one might hope to
persuade the judges to hold it indisputable. That is to say, one might surmise disallowance untruly on the theory that even if the defendant should
try to take issue thereon, the Court might be convinced that he ought not
to be permitted to. One might, in other words, talk the judges into creating a legal fiction. As we shall see, a fiction was in effect created in the
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case of the modus. That is, it was held in a leading case that defendant-inProhibition may not take factual issue on an allegation that a modus was
pleaded and disallowed. It is not determinable whether plaintiff-in-Prohibition in that case or any other deliberately feigned the disallowance. After the decision, however, anyone who saw advantage in a fictitious
allegation could make one (in modus cases -- not altogether confidently in
any other kind.) Once the fiction was available, it must have been used. I
do not think it became de rigueur form. The typical fate of a fiction is to
be embalmed as a form: For a time, parties must allege and prove Fact X.,
inter alia, to have relief. One day, the judges decide that they should have
relief whether or not Fact X. is true. The allegation of X. is accordingly
held untraversable. But because X. has always been alleged in the past, it
goes on being alleged despite its irrelevance, It is expected, the "done
thing." If some bold Benthamite should come along and leave out the
meaningless allegation, he might lose on a point of form, though fully entitled to relief in substance. In the case of the disallowed modus, the story
would seem to be different. I think it is apparent that Prohibitions were
commonly granted on surmises of modi without pretense of disallowance
before it was held that disallowance, if surmised, may not be traversed.
Later on, I see no evidence that a fictitious claim of disallowance was insisted on as a matter of form. But once in a while reports show that disallowance of modi was alleged. When it was, I suspect, it was usually
alleged fictitiously -- because a lawyer thought it safer, or merely better
form, to lay disallowance. It may not have been appreciably safer, but one
never knows -- an ecclesiastical court that disallowed a modus should
clearly be prohibited, and the allegation of disallowance could clearly not
be traversed; a common law court might take it into its head to doubt
whether the mere alleged existence of a modus was sufficient grounds for
prohibiting; it might be under ecclesiastical and political pressure to entertain such doubts,
If we go back and imagine the traversability of a disallowed modus to
be an unsettled question, it is possible to see why fictionalization would
look like a good bet: I am not sure my client can win by surmising his
modus without claiming disallowance. (I am not sure the other way either.
There are precedents of Prohibitions granted on bare surmise of a modus.
But I am nervous. The courts do not seem to have firmly decided -- on
demurrer, say -- that Prohibition will lie on the bare surmise. My opponent looks determined and has a good lawyer.) I figure that the chance of
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a feigned surmise of disallowance being controverted is pretty slight (for
the reasons above.) But, if an attempt is made to traverse, in the first
place, the judges are not going to like making a jury issue out of the acts
of an ecclesiastical court (for the same reasons that a sensible and nondesperate defendant will not welcome that prospect.) They are going to
be impatient with a defendant who wants to maneuver by taking issue on
the disallowance instead of disputing the modus and helping the contention get resolved for good. If traversing a claim of disallowance (in a modus case or any other) is next to unheard-of (as it seems to be), perhaps
the judges will be disposed to look for reasons why it cannot be done.
With judges so disposed, might I not argue, for example, that ecclesiastical law does not "really" or reliably recognize the modus? That is, even
if it is not true that the ecclesiastical court in our case has disallowed the
plea, it is at least not clear that ecclesiastical law in general or across the
board respects prescriptive exemptions from tithes in kind, at least not all
exemptions which the common law would insist on. (By "Tanfield's principle," one should look to the "real" ecclesiastical law, not to the mere act
of a particular ecclesiastical court. One should not prohibit a suit just because one ecclesiastical court has made a seemingly unreasonable or unintelligible decision. One should consider whether there are any genuine
conflicts of law such as to render it unlikely that the error of a particular
court can be remedied by appeal. Might not "Tanfield's principle" operate
conversely as well? Is it not a matter of indifference whether a particular
ecclesiastical court has allowed, or might allow, a plea, if one is convinced that ecclesiastical law does not "really" understand or respect a
claim which by the common law is indisputably valid -- e.g., a modus? If
the conduct of the particular ecclesiastical court is not the essential point,
surely parties should not be allowed to dispute about it factually.)
Failing that rather high-level argument, perhaps I could persuade the
Court that the practical advantages of having modi tried by jury are overwhelming. I.e.: Granted that as a rule -- "Tanfield's principle" or no "Tanfield's principle" -- ecclesiastical courts should not be prohibited
speculatively, without reference to whether they have actually done anything wrong, an exception should be made for the peculiar case of the modus. For however willing ecclesiastical courts are to respect modi, to
understand them just as the common law does, and to try them with scrupulous fairness, they are still condemned to try them by testimony. But the

93

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
custom of a community can never be exhaustively tried by testimony.
A bargain, a lease, or any number of other defenses to tithe suits perhaps
can be, but not the custom of a community, which by its very nature
can be considered truly known only when the representatives of the
community have given their verdict, drawing ultimately on their own
knowledge. (The argument for the special virtue of jury trial in modus
cases of course also goes to support Prohibitions on bare surmise of a modus. For present purposes, one can go either way: If there is some formal
merit in insisting on a surmise of disallowance, the advantage of jury trial
is so great that it should be insured when possible. Here it is possible,
just by refusing to permit a traverse which, as argued above, is practically
awkward and probably frivolous in motive. We have a bird in the hand -a way to insure jury trial by a small act of fictionalizing prestidigitation -whether or not it could be insured with certainty in the unlikely event that
someone were to demur to a Prohibition because it was founded on bare
surmise of a modus. If, on the other hand, it is virtually certain that Prohibition lies on such a bare surmise, it would surely be wrong and unfair to
let a modus escape trial by jury just because one parishioner has seen fit
to surmise disallowance. If a man for reasons of his own tries to plead in
the ecclesiastical court and, having done so, thinks it proper to allege disallowance, the modus should not be sent back for trial without a jury because this possibly misguided man has exposed himself to a traverse of
the disallowance and might not be able to prove that his plea was in fact
disallowed. Among other things, strangers’ interests are usually involved
with modi. Admittedly, validation or invalidation of a modus by ecclesiastical trial would have no direct effect on future common law litigation involving the same modus and different people -- subsequent parsons and
other parishioners. Indirectly, however, a decision on a modus in a single
case is likely to have an unsettling, litigation-promoting effect. If the parson
wins, he will be emboldened to go after tithes in kind from other parishioners,
who will be sure to resist and to try for a common law determination by any
means their lawyers can contrive. If this parishioner wins, others will be
emboldened to refuse tithes in kind, forcing this parson or his successor to
make another attempt at litigation. Determination on the merits now by
the only means that is ultimately going to be accepted throughout the
community (i.e., by verdict) will save trouble and uncertainty for other
people than the immediate parties.)
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The reasons for considering fictionalization a good bet reflect back, in
turn, on the probable calculations of defendants. Traversing the disallowance is not a very wise stratagem in itself; it is rendered a little worse by
the serious prospect that it will not be permitted. Even if I am otherwise
inclined to traverse, I must consider that my attempt to may be opposed
by strong arguments, whose rebuttal I must be prepared to undertake, and
if I am unlucky I may lose my chance to contest the merits. (Bad luck
would be to traverse without having been able to get any preliminary advice from the Court on the acceptability of doing so, then to lose on a demurrer to the traverse and be denied the opportunity to plead to the
merits. How much procedural stringency to expect in a Prohibition case
could be hard to judge.) The upshot of this analysis is as follows: While
in the case of modi a fiction was created, in other cases the possibility of
traversing the disallowance may have remained open. It surely must have
(in theory, though factual issues on the disallowance are as rare as one
would expect in any case) in cases of the sort discussed in the preceding
section -- where there was no basis for Prohibition except the disallowance. In other sorts of cases to be inspected in this section, surmises of disallowance may be largely feigned, though there is no way to be sure. It may
be extremely likely that if the surmises had been contested as to fact their
right to be feigned could have been successfully defended. The fictitious
surmise of disallowance in non- modus cases of certain specific sorts may
have had a de facto existence, by virtue of the excessive risk of contradicting the surmise, even though its untraversability was never upheld judicially.
The cases in this section are all interrelated, in that they all bear on
whether disallowance need be alleged -- or need be alleged non-fictitiously -- to justify Prohibition. That is equivalent to saying that they all
concern the status of the “common law issue” as a distinct ground for Prohibition, apart from any alleged mistake on the ecclesiastical court’s part.
According to the different angles from which the cases bear on the common questions, I shall treat them in three groups: (a) Cases on the traversability of disallowance surmises; (b) Cases in which it was expressly
held that disallowance must be surmised before a Prohibition could be
considered; (c) Cases in which the disallowance surmise occurs, but in
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which it is at least problematic whether it was necessary (or necessary except perhaps as a fictitious form.)

B. The Traversability of Disallowance Surmises
Summary: There are few cases directly on the traversability (factual
disputability) of disallowance surmises. We have a firm holding that alleged disallowance of a modus may not be traversed, and an authoritative
opinion that disallowance of a plea going to the bounds of parishes is not
traversable. The other cases discussed here touch on traversability but are
too special to yield rules applicable to common situations.
* * *
A plaintiff-in-Prohibition who wanted to complain of an ecclesiastical
court’s conduct ordinarily made a disallowance surmise. (The only alternative way, aside from the Habeas Corpus proceedings sometimes employed against the High Commission -- the one ecclesiastical court with
color of power to imprison -- was to seek a Prohibition without disallowance surmise after the ecclesiastical court had given judgment. Occasionally the thrust of seeking a Prohibition after sentence was to ask for relief
on the theory that the ecclesiastical court had committed a visible error.)
As practice stood, when a man complained of ecclesiastical conduct via
disallowance surmise, the proceedings of the ecclesiastical court were not
certified before the common law court, enabling the latter to see for itself
whether the complained-of act really took place. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition
stated that his plea or evidence had been disallowed as he might state any
other fact. There was no guarantee that he was telling the truth and no
routine legal way (as opposed to informal investigation) for the common
law court to check for itself. In this situation, three choices were open: (a)
Always to regard the disallowance surmise as a controvertible statement
of fact -- i.e., to let defendant-in-Prohibition traverse the disallowance if,
subject to the risks and inconveniences of doing so, he chose that course.
(b) Never to permit disallowance surmises to be traversed -- i.e., to remove every suit complained of to the common law if, taking the disallowance surmise as true, there was any basis for Prohibition. (c) Sometimes
not to permit such disallowance to be traversed -- i.e., to single out some
issues as triable at common law regardless of whether the ecclesiastical
court was willing to handle them by standards acceptable to the common
law courts.
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The third of those possibilities is probably the "right answer." In a very
few cases, it was expressly held that a disallowance surmise was not traversable. The most important such case, Wright v. Wright, so holds with
respect to the modus and equivalent prescriptions in discharge of tithes.
Aside from those few cases, every award of a Prohibition because a
"common law issue" had arisen in an ecclesiastical suit is suggestive on
the question of traversability. For example, if a tithe suit is prohibited because a lease had come in question incidentally -- prohibited on bare surmise of the lease, without disallowance surmise -- it is inferable that no
disallowance surmise was necessary. If no disallowance surmise was necessary, then if such a surmise were to be made it should not be traversable. If plaintiff-in-Prohibition said that he had a lease and had been
disallowed from pleading it, defendant-in-Prohibition should not be allowed to take factual issue on the disallowance, but only on the reality of
the lease.
However, only an express holding that disallowance is not traversable
in given circumstances would "sew up" its untraversability. A hundred
precedents of Prohibitions granted on bare surmise that a lease was in
question would be mighty persuasive, should A. come along and say that
his lease was disallowed, and should B. traverse the disallowance. But
one could argue that the precedents do not establish its untraversability. If
in all hundred cases defendant-in-Prohibition had acquiesced in the legal
sufficiency of the Prohibition (i.e., had not demurred so as to raise the
question whether Prohibition lay in principle, but disputed the factual reality or legal validity of the lease itself), one could argue that such Prohibitions had never been tested in law; that by the law Prohibition ought not
to lie unless the lease was disallowed; and that such disallowance must be
"real" i.e., traversable. Similarly, and more obviously, a series of Prohibitions granted on disallowance surmise in a given type of case would say
nothing conclusive about the disallowance's traversability if a traverse
had never been attempted. In short, there is no substitute for express holdings on traversability, and of those we have very few. Disallowance of a
modus, indeed, is the only allegation we can label untraversable with
complete confidence. The firm and relatively early establishment of untraversability in that most important of cases must, however, have made
the risk of traversing seem all the greater in other standard cases. That is
to say, the courts showed themselves ready to hold disallowance surmises
incontrovertible in one case; a lawyer would be foolish to assume that
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they would never do no in other cases, especially cases where there were
precedents of Prohibitions on bare surmise that a given issue had come in
question.
On the other side, I have no express holdings that disallowance surmises may be traversed. That means there is no basis for drawing the
boundary between traversable and untraversable surmises. The possibility
cannot be excluded that no such thing as a traversable disallowance surmise would have been recognized if more traverses had been tried. That
would of course not mean that any ecclesiastical suit would be prohibited
if a party came and said that a plea had been disallowed. Some suits were
in every sense the ecclesiastical courts' exclusive business; the common
law court would have to perceive some justifying "interest" or reason before it lifted an intervening hand.
It is arguable, however, that the common law courts ought only to consider whether such a basis for intervention existed -- if so, prohibit without regard to what the ecclesiastical court had actually done; if not,
"hands off." This position might be modified by judicial discretion with
an eye to probability: issue cannot be taken on a disallowance, but even
where there is a basis for intervention it should be withheld if the judges
know, or have strong reason on grounds of probability to suspect, that the
alleged disallowance never occurred. The desire to preserve such room
for discretion would be a reason for insisting that disallowance be alleged
in at least some cases. One might also so insist in order to keep a little
pressure on parties to stick with the ecclesiastical courts. That is to say,
one might see some purpose in demanding a disallowance surmise even
though one were almost 100 per cent ready to believe any party who
made one, and one's purpose might go a step beyond the desire to "make
things look better" by way of a purely fictitious form. For if parties were
told they must surmise disallowance in order to get Prohibitions, they
might figure that to be on the safe side they ought actually to make a plea
or offer evidence in the ecclesiastical court; having done so, they might
decide to stick it out and win, or, losing, conclude that the evidence was
so much against them that their chances at common law would be negligible; the incidence of Prohibitions and the political friction that accompanied them would be cut down. One might consider that a bona fide
attempt in the ecclesiastical court was "on the safe side" even if there had
been strong reason to believe that disallowance surmises, though some-

98

Problems of the Disallowance Surmise
times required, were never traversable (i.e., if there had been general
statements to that effect, or many cases of great variety overruling attempts to traverse, for one can rarely be absolutely certain in the law, and
insistence on the disallowance surmise would have figured as a reminder
that judges at least pretended to take the conduct of the ecclesiastical
courts seriously and might someday be persuaded actually to do so -- informally if not by permitting traverses.
In short, a lawyer who predicted that any disallowance surmise he
chose to make would be traverse-proof as a matter of law would not be
out of his mind. There is not much practical difference between predicting that and guessing that the chance of the other party's trying a traverse
was very slight. In strictness, however, I think the better prediction, and
certainly the safer, would have been that there was a line between traversable and untraversable disallowance surmises. It is not a line plainly
visible in directly relevant cases; intelligent guesses can be made as to its
location; conservative guessing would take note of the paucity of cases
and steer clear of feigning disallowance surmises too freely. In other
words, I think the courts would have permitted disallowance surmises to
be traversed in many cases if their traversability had been firmly put in
question. In the next section, we shall look at some cases in which the disallowance surmise was insisted on. In those cases and in general, the best
assumption, surely, is that the judges "really meant it" -- i.e., that on the
whole, subject to exceptions, they were concerned with what the ecclesiastical courts had actually done and with whether they had really committed the misdeeds ascribed to them. Both legal propriety and political
convenience surely suggested that as a rule ecclesiastical courts deserved
a crack at the issues arising in their cases. In general terms -- when not
faced with a hard question of traversability -- the judges frequently said
as much. They sometimes showed signs of concern lest the disallowance
surmise be effectively fictionalized, probably realizing that de facto it
could easily be. I think they would have resisted fictionalizing it de jure
except in a narrow range of cases.
Here we are concerned with that narrow range insofar as it was firmly
defined. I shall first discuss Wright v. Wright, the leading case on modi,
then two other cases directly on traversability. Finally, I shall discuss two
cases which, although they do not involve attempts to traverse, are related
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to Wright v. Wright in that they involve both modi and the disallowance
surmise.
In Wright v. Wright,1 the parishioner relied on a prescriptive discharge
-- not a modus properly so-called, but a total exemption based on usage.
For present purposes there is no difference. Such total prescriptive discharge was not lawful for laymen, but was for spiritual persons. The parishioner here claimed through the Bishop of Winchester -- i.e., set up the '
title of discharge for the Bishop and his tenants and claimed to be a tenant. (Whether a tenant of a spiritual person might take advantage of such
an exemption was debated in the case and resolved in the affirmative.)
To obtain his Prohibition, the parishioner surmised that he had pleaded
the above matter in the ecclesiastical court and been disallowed. The parson formally denied that the plea had been disallowed. The parishioner
demurred on the traverse, squarely raising the question whether the disallowance needed to be proved as a fact. Walter, of counsel for the parson,
argued in general terms that once the ecclesiastical court has jurisdiction - as it in a sense does in every tithe case -- it may not be prohibited until it
does something wrong. In support of this proposition, however, he could
do little more than cite cases in which Prohibitions had been granted on
surmise of disallowance. It was easy enough for Coke, on the other side,
to point to the non sequitur: Sometimes erroneous disallowance is the basis for taking jurisdiction away from the court to which it belongs in the
first instance, but it does not follow that that is the only basis.
None of Walter's cases were modus cases, ergo they said nothing to
this case. On his side, Coke cited no positive authority, at least so far as
the report shows. He confined himself to asserting that modi are different
-- that it should simply be presumed that a modus is not a good defense to
a tithe claim in ecclesiastical courts, whether to not a particular ecclesiastical court was willing to accept the plea. In the process of so arguing,
Coke narrowed the application of his distinction by suggesting that all
other defenses to ecclesiastical claims must actually be disallowed for
Prohibitions to be justified. In the interest of persuading the court to make
an exception for modi, he seemingly conceded that every other surmise of
disallowance is traversable. Whether or not that is questionable, it may
1

M . 3 8 / 3 9 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 511: Moore, 4 2 5 (dated H. 38.)
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have been good strategy. In any event, Coke won. The Court held unanimously that the allegation of disallowance was not material in this case
and upheld the Prohibition. (Going by the formulation of the Court’s
opinion in Croke’s report, the judges may have been a little more careful
than Coke about narrowing the range of traversability. They said that the
allegation of disallowance was not material here, especially since a modus
was in question -- as if to say it might be immaterial in other circumstances as well.)
I know of no future challenges to the immediate rule of Wright v.
Wright: If disallowance of a modus or equivalent prescription is alleged,
it may not be traversed. That holding is a good basis for saying that disallowance need not be alleged if one wants to rely on a modus. It would be
possible to insist on a fictitious allegation of disallowance purely as a
matter of form, but there would be little point in so insisting, and I see no
signs that the courts were inclined to. Walter’s losing argument in Wright
v. Wright was broader than his purpose absolutely required. He could
have said that disallowance of a modus must be proved as a fact if it is alleged as a fact, irrespective of whether a modus must be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court and disallowed before a Prohibition based thereon may
be obtained. But that would have been a pretty pointless distinction, unlikely to persuade the Court.
In advancing a general theory, Walter did the intelligent thing. His theory said that there are two and only two foundations for prohibiting: (a)
The ecclesiastical court’s lack of jurisdiction ab initio; (b) Actual -- hence
traversable -- disallowance of a defense which the common law courts are
entitled to insist on the validity of. From that dichotomy, Walter wanted it
to follow that merely alleging that a modus exists does not state a cause of
Prohibition. But does it follow? On the answer to that depends the strict
interpretation of the Court’s decision in Wright v. Wright. There are two
possible readings: (a) Walter’s general theory is inadequate. In addition to
the two foundations for prohibiting which it recognizes, there is (at least)
a third. For sometimes ecclesiastical courts may be prohibited simply because they ought not to determine certain sorts of issues arising in connection with litigation properly commenced in ecclesiastical courts,
irrespective of their willingness. Whether modi constitute the only issue
of that sort may be regarded as an open question; they certainly constitute
one such issue. There may be various reasons why an ecclesiastical court
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should not determine a modus -- or various alternative or overlapping criteria for identifying issues which ecclesiastical courts should not determine. (E.g.: Because some issues can only be properly tried by jury as to
fact; because some issues of law require common law technical expertise;
because ecclesiastical courts across the board cannot be relied on to respect certain types of valid claim, even though particular courts show apparent willingness to respect them; because conflicting rules on a subject
are so tangled that with the best will in the world an ecclesiastical court is
likely to go astray and require correction at a later stage.) Be all that as it
may, Walter's dichotomy is too exclusive.
(b) Walter's theory is valid, but the consequence drawn from it -- that a
modus by itself, without disallowance, is no cause of Prohibition -- is a
false inference. To argue in this way requires showing that to assert a modus is not to defend a properly launched ecclesiastical suit, but to dispute
the ecclesiastical court's jurisdiction ab initio. A defense may be conceived logically as saying, "Your claim against me is perfectly valid as
you state it, but further facts which you do not state change the picture."
("Your claim against me is perfectly valid" includes "You have made
your claim in the correct court.") Pleading a modus may be conceived as
saying, "Tithes in kind are not due in this parish by the law (i.e., by custom entitled to the force of law), therefore your claim is without color in
the first instance and does not demand a defense." (Which may be said to
include, "There is no court in which such a totally uncolorable claim can
be advanced, for courts have authority only to entertain such claims as are
capable in principle of being either falsified as to fact or explained away.
But to claim tithes in kind in a place where there is no legal duty to pay
such tithes is to advance a claim which can be neither falsified nor explained away. It is equivalent to suing on a contract in a country that recognizes no power in promissory language to generate enforceable
obligations, not to suing on a pretended -- or inconsiderate, or improperly
exacted -- promise in a country which does, in general, recognize such
power in promissory language.")
Whatever the difficulties in such an analysis, it has some plausibility,
especially in view of the legal force given to custom in common law jurisprudence. It might, for example, be said that a contract to take money
instead of tithes is a mere defense to a perfectly good tithe claim, whereas
a modus is not, because the former is a countervailing fact while the latter
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goes to the very law of the relevant local unit. It would follow that the
contract must be pleaded and disallowed before Prohibition lies, unlike a
modus. In other words, our second theory tends to make modi almost the
only response to a tithe suit that would not have to be pleaded and disallowed before Prohibition (as Coke in Wright v. Wright seemed to suggest
it might be, whether or not he had our theory in mind.) I say "almost" because the same analysis might be applied in a few other circumstances.
For example, a claim that a parson is seeking tithes from an intrinsically
non-tithable product need not be advanced in the ecclesiastical court before seeking a Prohibition because that claim, like a modus, goes to the
suit's total lack of color. A composition-real (unlike a mere temporary
bargain or lease) might be conceived as so solemn and final a waiver of
all right to tithes in kind from the parish that to assert such a composition
is not merely to "defend" a tithe suit. On the other hand, our first theory -that there are simply issues beyond ecclesiastical competence, however
unexceptionably particular ecclesiastical courts are ready to handle them-is more expandable. The list of such issues would in principle be open, to
be added to for sufficient practical reason.
The Court in Wright v. Wright did not choose between these abstract
theories. At least the reports give no sign that they were discussed as
such. I suspect that the case was decided as it was basically because modus -based Prohibitions, without allegation of disallowance, were familiar
in practice. That would have been excellent practical reason for the decision, for to hold disallowance of a modus traversable would have been to
open questions about the familiar practice. I have elaborated the theories
because having them in mind may give us a useful perspective on other
cases.
The second case producing a direct opinion on traversability is Pyper
v. Barnably.2 We have considered this case in Vol. I as it bears on selfprohibition. The facts were as follows: A. sued B. for tithes; B. pleaded
that the land was not in A's parish; neither party sought a Prohibition; B.
won; A. appealed; the appellate court affirmed the sentence below; A.
then sought to prohibit his own suit on the ground that the bounds of parishes, constituting an intrinsic "common law issue," were in question.
2

H. 41 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.47b.
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Serjeant Heale, of counsel for B., first tried unsuccessfully to object to
A's self-prohibition. Having failed on that front, he turned to the general
proposition that ecclesiastical courts may determine any issue that arises
in a suit over which they have jurisdiction in the first instance. Chief Justice Popham replied, "... That is true if they will allow the same proofs as
are allowable by temporal law, but sometimes they will not admit any
proofs except by two witnesses at least, and then prohibition lies." Foster,
A.'s counsel, then offered to prove that evidence tending to show that
B.'s land was in A.'s parish had been improperly disallowed. (i.e., Foster
made an oral offer, in effect saying, "Although our surmise is not founded
on improper evidentiary rulings, but on the theory that parish bounds constitute a common law issue, we shall be glad to change the surmise, if, as
the Chief Justice suggests, the ecclesiastical court must be shown to have
made an erroneous holding before it can be prohibited.") Heale replied by
offering to take issue on whether A's proofs were refused. To that, Popham said, "You may not traverse that, but you must take issue on
whether the house is within the plaintiff's parish or not."
No other judge speaks in the report. Popham's unmistakable statement
to all intents wipes out his concession to Heale. His two remarks taken together come out as follows: "It is true in general that ecclesiastical courts
having jurisdiction of the 'principal' may deal with the 'incidents.' But
that general truth must be qualified, for at least some 'incidents' may be
tried in ecclesiastical courts only if those courts waive their evidentiary
requirements. Then the qualified statement must be qualified some more,
for in some cases -- at least the case of bounds of parishes -- whether the
ecclesiastical court did waive its evidentiary requirements may not be disputed about. If plaintiff-in-Prohibition says it made improper evidentiary
rulings, in contemplation of law it did make them." In application to
bounds of parishes, the tendency of Popham's position accords with most
opinion.
By the way his position unfolds in the dialogue with counsel, he might
be taken as demanding a pro forma disallowance surmise, but I doubt that
he really was. We shall see in Section D below that the disallowance surmise sometimes occurs in bounds-of-parishes cases, and that its superfluity is not totally clear. On the whole, however, to surmise that the bounds
of parishes were in question tout court was probably almost as reliable a
way to get a Prohibition as surmising a modus in a tithe suit. Popham's
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opinion on traversability in Pyper v. Barnably makes for that result. If
there is any comfort in such metaphysics, one may argue that a bounds issue goes to the "original color" of the ecclesiastical suit in the same way a
modus does: A tithe suit by the Rector of Cornvale for crops produced in
Barleyville has no more original "right to be" than a suit for tithes in kind
where none are due; in either case, whether the suit has original colorability ought to be settled at common law.
Our third straightforward case on the traversability of disallowancesurmises, Kelly v. Walker,3 was as follows: Walker, a clergyman, sued
Kelly before the Delegates for assault and battery. Although that offense
was temporal as a general rule, the ancient statute of Articuli cleri (9
Edw.2, sect. 3, confirming a similar clause in Circumspecte Agatis, 13
Edw.1) gave ecclesiastical courts power to proceed against those who laid
violent hands on a clergyman. Kelly pleaded in justification that Walker
assaulted his servant: to help the servant and keep the peace, Kelly laid
hands on Walker in a peaceful manner; thereupon Walker assaulted
Kelly, whose further acts of pugnacity were in self-defense. A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the Delegates disallowed the justification
and proceeded to fine Kelly £10 and award damages to Walker. Walker
traversed the disallowance in absque hoc form: The plea was not rejected;
rather, it was committed to a Dr. Cotton for examination (in the nature of
reference to a Master in Chancery proceedings); Cotton attempted to hold
a hearing, at which Walker appeared, but Kelly refused to attend; because
of his default, the court proceeded to sentence against him. Kelly demurred to this traverse.
The demurrer was entirely in point of substance. The reported argument of Kelly's counsel is solely that the matter traversed was untraversable. Godfrey, of counsel with Walker, warded off another possible
argument -- that the award of a fine and damages was beyond the Delegates' power -- by contending that the Supremacy Act warranted it. For
the rest, Godfrey tried to show that the disallowance was perfectly trav3

H. 41 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 655; Moore, 915 (misdated M. 31); Add. 25,203, f.48. (Moore is
slight; Croke and the MS. are both good reports. The only difference in the slightly fuller MS.
report is that what Croke represents simply as a unanimous decision following Gawdy's opinion
comes out as Popham substantially agreeing with Gawdy and the rest of the Court going along
silently.)
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ersable. (a) He argued that the only reason for taking jurisdiction away
from the ecclesiastical court, seeing that it indisputably had jurisdiction
by the statute, was its mishandling of the case, so that whether it had actually been mishandled was of the essence. (b) He put forward the general
rule that ecclesiastical courts may determine questions arising in suits
properly commenced there, then expressly conceded Wright v. Wright as
an exception (i.e., took the position that a modus was the only plea whose
disallowance could not be traversed.) (c) Descending from general principles, Godfrey cited the analogy of proceedings to remove pleas from manorial courts in ancient demesne; there the alleged reason for removal is
traversable as matter of fact; the lord of the manor should not lose jurisdiction unless he has actually done something to justify taking it away
from him.
Two judges, Gawdy and Chief Justice Popham, flatly rejected Godfrey's argument. No one else on the Court contradicting them, the demurrer was upheld and the Prohibition sustained. Both Gawdy and Popham
said that the suit was outside the statute, whence they went on to hold that
the disallowance was untraversable. In other words, they held that plaintiff-in-Prohibition's surmise and declaration went to show that the ecclesiastical court should not be entertaining the case; ergo, what it did with
the case was immaterial. (Cf. the theory that surmising a modus is claiming that the suit for tithes in kind was void ab initio.) The logic of this
opinion is unexceptionable, but the premise is troubling. The statute undoubtedly did give ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction "pro violenta injectione manun super clericum." What distinguishes this case from the
general class of such offenses? What makes Kelly's plea anything but a
commonplace defense to a prima facie valid ecclesiastical suit? Justice
Gawdy's answer is singular: "For he had good cause to beat him." That
can only be taken as an act of rather unusual statutory interpretation: viz.,
the statute gives ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction over assault and battery
of clergymen, but does not give them authority to determine when such
assault and battery is justifiable or to try the factual truth of justifications;
ecclesiastical courts may determine the bare fact whether an assault took
place, but any plea in justification, by the statute's intent, is a "common
law issue," or ipso facto cause of Prohibition, regardless of the ecclesiastical court's handling of it. That is perhaps an odd way to take a jurisdiction-conferring statute (and specifically one covering assault and battery,
where justifications of self-defense and the like must be expected in many
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cases. If the legislature gave A. pleas of assault and battery in Dale and
said nothing to suggest that A. should not have power to try common defenses, it would be jealous construction to say that general language did
not give him such power.)
In the circumstances, however, it is not surprising that the judges took
the narrowest possible view of the statute. As Chief Justice Popham said,
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over assaults on clergymen was purely statutory. In his view (ahistorical perhaps) there was no inherent ecclesiastical
power to entertain such cases; the statute was not entitled to permissive
interpretation on the ground that it declared the ancient law; it was privatory of a fraction of common law jurisdiction and "penal" in the sense of
adding liability to ecclesiastical prosecution to the secular liability already
on the subject's back. It was good doctrine to hold that such a statute
should be construed as narrowly as possible. It is plain enough that the
judges had no great use for an old piece of legislation creating a superfluous category of ecclesiastical jurisdiction -- superfluous in the sense that
any assault remediable in ecclesiastical courts could also be remedied at
common law, and must in any event be dealt with by common law standards. The alternative to giving a narrow interpretation to a statute that deserved no great indulgence would have been to let the controversial
disallowance go to trial (for clearly the judges would not embrace the
most extreme position that can be advanced in Walker's favor -- the theory that, having been given jurisdiction over assaults on clergymen, ecclesiastical courts were given full license to deal with them as they
pleased, e.g., to hold that Kelly's justification was insufficient even if
true.) Another cost of not restricting the statute would have been that the
propriety of the fine and damages would have had to be debated. The
judges are unlikely to have been happy about the use of those sanctions
by a spiritual court; by simply deciding that the suit was outside the Delegates' jurisdiction, the problem of whether they had statutory authority to
use them could be avoided.
In sum, the Court's way of treating Kelly v. Walker is understandable,
probably defensible. The case is too exceptional for the essential holding
to imply very much as to the traversability of disallowance surmises in
general, though it could be taken as authority for the abstract proposition
that untraversable disallowance surmises are those -- perhaps only those - which call attention to the ecclesiastical court's "original" want of juris-
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diction (i.e., its lack of authority to deal at all with a contention superficially appropriate to it, once the real nature of the contention is known).
A further argument by Justice Gawdy is perhaps more significant, and
more disturbing. After saying that the suit was outside the statute, Gawdy
went on to speak more particularly to the traversability question. In other
works, he did not quite confine himself to the argument that the disallowance was immaterial because it occurred in what the record showed to be
an ultra vires suit. Rather, he proceeded to admit Godfrey's point about
ancient demesne cases, but to resist generalizing it. True, he said, alleged
mishandling of suits in ancient demesne may be traversed, "Otherwise the
lord will lose his court. But in other cases it is not so, for if a plea is removed by Recordare out of the County, the cause is not traversable ...." If
this remark is taken as a pure negation, there is nothing to be said against
it. As such, it may be translated as follows: "It is true that complaints
about ancient demesne courts may be disputed about factually. The law
respects the lord's private interest in his jurisdiction and will not take it
away unless it has actually been abused. But the rule about ancient demesne is only a rule about ancient demesne. Other situations we shall take
as they come. That we do not have any general rule appears from the fact
that the complaint about a county court that lies behind a Recordari facias
cannot be traversed. Since there is no comprehensive rule, we may treat
complaints about ecclesiastical courts as sui generis if we see fit, considering whether in these circumstances or those they should be held traversable. Therefore, in this case, we are free to take the position that the
disallowance is untraversable for immateriality, the suit appearing to be
ultra vires."
I am inclined to give such a meaning to Gawdy's remark. There is a
more radical possibility, however. He might be saying that the case of ancient demesne is an exception, made out of respect for the lord's private
interest, to the general rule that complaints about "inferior courts" including ecclesiastical courts may not be controverted factually. In other
works, he may have been taking the Recordari facias as the typical case
and embracing the rule, as to ecclesiastical courts, that the disallowance
surmise is never traversable. Such a rule would mean that common law
courts ought always to assume that a claim allegedly disallowed was actually disallowed, considering only whether the alleged act of disallowance
was an error of such sort as to justify Prohibition. That is an extreme position, both materially and symbolically. It opens the door to fictitious sur-

108

Problems of the Disallowance Surmise
mises, hence to the party's automatic power to remove some suits (how
many depending, in effect, on the principles by which a list of "common
law issues" is compiled) to the common law, notwithstanding the ecclesiastical court's original "rightful possession" and total willingness to proceed by common law standards, substantive and evidentiary.
Symbolically, it implies that "foreign" courts are "inferior" courts -- that
the ecclesiastical courts are not so much an independent sub-system liable
to control if they err in certain ways as lower members of a homogeneous
system (as in relation to Westminster Hall county courts undoubtedly
were), subject to having their cases removed to higher courts under certain set conditions. By this theory, the mere owner of an ancient demesne
manor is entitled to tenderness because jurisdiction is part of what he
owns; no public court, whether the petty county courts or the judicial organs of the Church, has anything to complain about if the supervising
common law courts see fit to designate certain suits as removable, regardless of whether any error has been committed.
Though this is an extreme theory, it is not fantastic to suppose that Justice Gawdy held it. He was not generally friendly to ecclesiastical interests. (Popham, who was less a "prohibiting judge" than Gawdy, is
reported in general terms as agreeing, but the only remark of his own
goes to the ecclesiastical court's want of jurisdiction over a justifiable assault. It is possible that Gawdy meant to say that disallowance surmises
are never traversable, and that Popham meant to agree with him about the
instant case but not to agree to that proposition. But the reports are too
slight to show any such thing positively. Whatever Gawdy's intent, Kelly
v. Walker itself was resolvable by construction of the statute.)
Having looked at the cases directly on traversability, let us turn to two
cases related to Wright v. Wright, in the sense that they involve both the
modus and the disallowance surmise. In the early Sir Gilbert Gerard's
case,4 a modus was surmised without any allegation of disallowance. It is
probably safe to assume that the Court would have prohibited the tithe
4

Q.B. Harg. 11, f.28. The case presumably occurred between 1581, when Gerard became Master
of the Rolls (he is designated as such in the report) and 1592, when Chief Justice Wray died.
There is what appears to be a date on the report, but I find it illegible -- it may be 22/23 Eliz.
(1580), which would put it slightly before Gerard's assumption of the Mastership. Of course the
reporter or a transcriber might have added the plaintiff's title later.
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suit if special circumstances had not made the case debatable. The ecclesiastical plaintiff (Gerard, the Master of the Rolls) was the farmer of an
impropriate rectory belonging to the Queen. His counsel, Egerton, maintained, in effect, that the Queen (hence her farmer derivatively) was Prohibition-proof -- privileged by prerogative to sue for tithes in the court of
her election, ecclesiastical court, Chancery, or Exchequer.
It would presumably follow from that position, not that the ecclesiastical court could ignore the modus and get away with it, but that it ought to
have its chance to determine the suit, including the truth of the modus -i.e., that Prohibition would lie only on traversable surmise that the modus
was disallowed. Counsel contra, Sherrington, denied that the Queen's
farmer should enjoy the Queen's prerogative, without disputing Egerton's
picture of the royal privilege in principle. He did, however, as his second
argument, deny that the prerogative was applicable in this case. Here, the
Queen stood in the position of the abbot from whom the rectory came to
her, for the Statute of Monasteries provided that the monarch could hold
as the abbot of the dissolved house held. The case should therefore be approached as if the ecclesiastical plaintiff were the abbot. On that assumption, Sherrington maintained, Prohibition would undoubtedly lie, for it
was notorious that ecclesiastical law would not recognize prescriptive discharges from tithes. (The prerogative, that is to say, would take effect
when the right to tithes came to the monarch by other means than the dissolution of the monasteries. The monarch was "capable of tithes" -- i.e.,
could be entitled to them by various means in addition to the ones available to lay subjects: leases of rectories or vicarages or of the tithes attached to them.)
Chief Justice Wray replied to Sherrington as follows: "... notwithstanding that at common law they, scil. the civilians, will not take notice of our
law, yet he knew no reason why not, it being enacted by act of Parliament, but that they should take notice of it and allow this prescription."
The Court as a whole then adjourned the case until the next tern for further advisement, but at the same time said that if the modus was pleaded
in the ecclesiastical court and disallowed it would grant a Prohibition.
Nominally, the judges did nothing for the moment; actually, they gave
plaintiff-in-Prohibition a broad hint -- that in this case his chance for a
Prohibition on bare surmise of a modus was not good; that the ecclesiastical court must probably be given an opportunity to entertain the modus;
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that it would certainly be prohibited if it should refuse to do so. This resolution implements Wray’s opinion, which I construe as follows: Generally speaking, it is notorious that ecclesiastical courts will not respect modi.
Therefore, as a rule, tithe suits will be prohibited on bare surmise of a
modus (and, should disallowance of a modus be alleged, it would not be
traversable.) But tithe suits brought by impropriators are a special case.
For it is not notorious, expectable, or presumable that ecclesiastical courts
will disallow modi alleged against impropriators. The Statute of Monasteries in effect directs that the legal situation in existence at the time of
the dissolution be perpetuated, thus that the successors of abbots have just
such rights as the abbot had and no more, thus that where the abbot was
entitled to 10/ in lieu of tithes in kind, so is his successor (as Sherrington
said.) Statutes are addressed to all courts, whence it is presumable that
ecclesiastical courts will consider themselves bound by the Statute of
Monasteries to take note of the abbot’s legal (i.e., common law) situation,
even though their ordinary habit is to ignore prescriptive tithe commutations. Therefore there is no ground for prohibiting until it appears that the
ecclesiastical court has actually failed to follow the statute. If it fails to, it
will certainly be prohibited (and, since the conduct of the ecclesiastical
court is of the essence, a surmise of disallowance will be traversable.)
This opinion and the resolution based on it turn Sherrington on his
head. Without granting Egerton’s argument from the prerogative -- indeed, rejecting it, quoad ex-monastic tithes, in the process of accepting
Sherrington’s premise -- but without “disputing” about the always-jealous
prerogative, the Court gave Egerton and his high-placed client all they
could reasonably ask for -- the privilege of proceeding in the court of their
choice until it appeared that the court had violated the law. Wray’s opinion respects the principle that ecclesiastical courts should be presumed
willing to obey statutes and capable of understanding them until the contrary was manifest. The opinion also takes note of a practical reality: Is it
not to be expected that ecclesiastical courts would be more receptive to
modi when their effect was to reduce a lay impropriator’s haul than when
it was to erode the value of an active clergyman’s living? Under the surface, Gerard’s Case supports Wright v. Wright, for no one in the earlier
case was disposed to doubt that Prohibition will normally lie on bare surmise of a modus. Wray’s opinion does, on the other hand, except one type
of case out of the rule of Wright v. Wright -- viz. by upholding the eccle-
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siastical court's title to "first crack" at a modus plea when it is opposed to
an impropriator's suit. However, Wray's opinion was not embodied in a
proper decision, and it may have been contrived to meet the special delicacies of an important official's case touching on the prerogative. There
is no sign of its doctrine later on.
In the later case of Goslin v. Harden,5 a parson sued on a modus, rather
than for tithes in kind, and the parishioner alleged an alternative modus.
(Specifically, the parson relied on a Yarmouth custom whereby he was
entitled to five per cent of the total catch of deep-sea fish taken by his parishioners. The parishioner maintained that the custom entitled the parson
to five per cent of what was left over to the fisherman after he had paid
the boat-owner's agreed share, that share going tithe free.) The parishioner sought a Prohibition on the ground that he had pleaded the alternative modus and offered to prove it, but had been disallowed. There was no
direct issue about the traversability of the surmise, but in discussing
whether to grant the Prohibition the judges found themselves in some disagreement over the materiality of the disallowance.
The Court agreed that a suit originally founded on a customary right to
tithes, rather than the de jure right, is not prohibitable ipso facto -- i.e.,
merely because a custom is put before an ecclesiastical court by starting
such a suit. Justice Houghton, however, thought that custom-based tithe
suits should be prohibited at the request of an ecclesiastical defendant
who claims that the custom is different, as in this case. If Parson sues for
10d in lieu of tithes, Parishioner may have a Prohibition by surmising that
6d is the customary sum; Parishioner need not say the ecclesiastical court
prevented him from establishing his 6d custom; a contest between rival
customs is a "common law issue." In support of this rule, Houghton gave
the obvious practical reason: If ecclesiastical courts could try contests of
customs, parsons would have a motive to sue for large sums as modi instead of suing for tithes in kind; parishioners would lose their chance to
5

M. 14 Jac. K.B.
Goseling); Lansd.
virtually identical.
was only decided
text how I havc
significantly.

1 Rolle, 419; Harl. 4561, f.259b; 3 Bulstrode, 241 (sub. nom. Harding et al. v.
1080 (sub. nom. Yarmouth's Case, misdated T. 16.) Rolle and Harl. 4561 are
Lansd. 1080 is a brief, but correct, report of the result, noting that the case
after long debate, as the major reports confirm. It is sufficiently clear from the
synthesized the major reports. They complement each other without conflicting
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have their claims to modi worth less than the tithes in kind tried at common law. (To this argument, it may be replied that there is a difference
between allowing ecclesiastical courts to try contests between modi and
allowing them "first crack." So long as the ecclesiastical court is not free
to rule out the parishioner's modus -- or to make him prove it by standards stricter than the common law would require -- it cannot by waving a
wand award parsons, say, the full monetary value of tithes in kind plus
ten per cent. The answer to that, surely, is that a corrupt ecclesiastical
judge in his right mind would not disallow the parishioner's plea or insist
on the two-witness rule; he would do everything "by the book" and use
his almost uncontrollable fact-finding discretion to uphold the parson's
modus.)
Justice Dodderidge disagreed with Houghton. His doubts seem somewhat tentative, but he was inclined to think that contests between modi
belong as such to the ecclesiastical court -- subject to Prohibition only if
the two-witness rule is insisted on. Quod nota -- only if the two-witness
rule is insisted on. It was surmised in this case that the parishioner's modus was disallowed. Houghton would have prohibited even without the
disallowance surmise; Dodderidge hesitated to prohibit even with it. He
expressly said that he wanted to know whether the two-witness rule was
the reason for the disallowance (as to which the surmise was vague, stating only that the parishioner had offered to prove his modus.) What was
Dodderidge thinking about? Why was he not content to say, "I would not
prohibit without a disallowance surmise, but here we have one. For some
reason, substantive or evidentiary, the alternative modus was ruled out.
Therefore let Prohibition be granted; if the disallowance surmise is
feigned, let the parson traverse it?" Did Dodderidge really mean that the
only basis for prohibiting in such a case would be the two-witness rule,
that an ecclesiastical court which ruled out an alternative modus for no
apparent reason, or some unacceptable legal reason of its own, was untouchable?
I find it hard to answer those questions satisfactorily in legal terms. I
suspect Dodderidge was thinking practically and smelt a rat. That is, he
could not think of any reason why the ecclesiastical court would be likely
to disallow an alternative modus, unless because the evidence offered in
its support did not meet ecclesiastical standards. But the surmise was
vague enough to evoke suspicion that an evidentiary ruling was not the
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cause. So perhaps the surmise was dishonest. Had a parishioner without a
substantive leg to stand on perhaps feigned a disallowance surmise in the
hope that a jury of Yarmouth men would serve him well? In such circumstances, telling the prohibitee he could traverse the disallowance surmise
would be cold comfort. The possibilities of abuse are imaginable enough
in the instant case. Fish taken at sea were in all probability not tithable in
kind. The parsons of parishes heavily dependent on the fishing trade ordinarily had customary rights to a share of the catch, without which their incomes would be negligible. In our case, the rival customs were not
trivially different. Five per cent of the gross catch would come to appreciably more than five per cent of the net catch after deduction of the boat
owners’ share. Under a “share-cropping’’ system, the owners of the major
piece of capital equipment must have contracted for a healthy portion.
Either the parson or the parishioner, therefore, was seriously mistaken
about the custom, if not lying shamelessly in the hope of prevailing with a
friendly trier, ecclesiastical judge or common law jury as it might turn
out. For as between two customs sharply different in principle and economic value, one would expect inhabitants of the parish to know the usual
practice, however ready either side might be to gamble on overturning it
by a lawsuit. In these circumstances, one might well think the public interest better served by leaning in the parson’s direction. If he won, even
by the favor of an ecclesiastical court, the church would at least be supported to the tune of five per cent of what was probably the larger part of
the gross local product (compared to ten per cent of the gross local product in a parish wholly devoted to arable agriculture.) If the parishioner
won by a jury’s favor, the church would suffer (For another angle, both
versions of the Yarmouth custom assigned an additional 5% -- computed
on whichever tax-base -- to the town. A verdict for the parishioner would
put the municipality, as well as the church, out of a considerable amount
of income.) As a practical matter, leaning in the parson’s direction
meant, not holding the disallowance surmise technically traversable, but
making sure informally that it was an honest surmise. If it was, then there
was no avoiding a Prohibition and entrusting the parson’s fortunes to a
jury. Justice Dodderidge wanted to know.
The Court deferred to his wishes. On the first hearing of the case, only
Justice Croke was present, in addition to Houghton and Dodderidge, and
he had nothing to say at this time. The three judges adjourned the case,
but referred it to clerk of the Court to investigate what really happened in
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the ecclesiastical proceedings. Whether anything came of the clerk’s inquiry, and indeed exactly how the Court at last lined up, is not clear from
the reports. It is plain enough that a Prohibition was finally granted. Rolle
and both MSS. say so. Rolle and Harl. 4561 represent the decision as unanimous in the end. Bulstrode gives a second, but not final, hearing,
eventuating in a temporary stay to the ecclesiastical court. On that occasion, Croke put himself in Houghton’s camp clearly enough, but Dodderidge seems still to be in a posture of dissent, perhaps a wavering one.
He reiterated his dissenting opinion that the mere allegation of an alternative modus is not grounds for Prohibition. He went on, however, to note
that ecclesiastical rules on prescription were different from common law
rules, and to conclude therefrom that Prohibition will lie if a parson sues
on a purported modus where there is "really" none, but only a recent practice or agreement.
Putting this remark together with his others, a coherent position can be
attributed to Dodderidge as follows: He was, it seems to me, working
with “Tanfield’s principle.” He did not favor prohibiting unless a practically meaningful rule-conflict between common and ecclesiastical law
could be made out. Such a conflict would not appear from a bare surmise
of an alternative modus, or from an unexplained surmise that an alternative modus had been disallowed. If the disallowance was evidentiary (and
it could be reliably assumed that such a disallowance had actually occurred), Dodderidge had already granted that he would prohibit -- for
there was notorious conflict of evidentiary rules, and it was beyond dispute that the two-witness rule must not be applied to contests between
customs.
A second notorious conflict was in rules of prescription: continuous
usage over relatively short periods begot rights by ecclesiastical law,
whereas only immemorial usage had that effect at common law. Again,
there was no disputing that a customary duty to pay tithes -- or something
other than 1/10th of the product as a payment in the nature of tithes (five
per cent, 6d per acre) -- must be a customary duty by common law standards. If the common law court can see that the contest in the ecclesiastical
court is between one party’s claim that a customary tithe or tithe-like payment is due and the other party’s mere negation of that claim, the common law court should take over. (Perhaps -- though this is to project -“mere negation” should be construed to mean “denial that anything at all
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is due," as when Parson makes a custom-based claim to a tithe, or quasitithe, of an intrinsically non-tithable product, such as coal or the sea-fish
in our principal case, and Parishioner says there is no such custom, hence
that he owes no share of his product, or monetary equivalent of a share.
The contrasting situation is where Parson claims payment according to a
modus instead of demanding tithes in kind of a tithable product -- as
where he claims 6d per acre of hay-land instead of hay in kind. If Parishioner merely denies the modus -- i.e., does not advance an alternative modus -- he inevitable admits that tithes in kind are due. Perhaps a contest
between one party's claim to money and the other party's claim of the
right to pay in kind -- like a contest between alternative modi in Dodderidge's opinion -- belongs to the ecclesiastical court.)6

C. Fatal Failure to Surmise Disallowance
Summary: No very firm rules emerge from cases in which it was held
that Prohibition could not be granted without a disallowance surmise. It
can be confidently said that defensive responses to ecclesiastical suits
based on statutes must be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court and disallowed before Prohibition would lie. Holdings and dicta on the need to allege common law transactions -- leases, releases, contracts and the like -in the ecclesiastical court and claim disallowance present a confused picture. The best advice to a party, on the whole, would be to take the ecclesiastical suit seriously -- i.e., to put in a plea; not to be too sanguine about
getting a Prohibition without disallowance surmise.
* * *
The cases above say that alleged disallowance of Plea X may not be
controverted. That is not equivalent to saying that X need not be pleaded
in the ecclesiastical court (that the disallowance surmise may be dispensed with, that Prohibition lies on a bare surmise of X.) Holding X.
untraversable is compatible with requiring a pro forma disallowance surmise; indeed, requiring it could be more than a bare form, were the judges
to keeps a residue of discretion to look into the reality of alleged disallowances on their own motion. However, these qualifying points are more
logical than practical. The only certain value of X. is the modus, though
there are other strong candidates; Prohibitions could clearly enough be
6

See "Endnote" at the end of this section.
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had by surmising modi without alleging disallowance; in the case of other
pleas, there is unlikely to be any greater discrepancy between their untraversabiIity and their sufficiency as a basis for Prohibition without disallowance surmise.
Now let us look at cases in which the absence of a disallowance surmise was held an obstacle to Prohibition -- i.e., in which the judges admitted they would prohibit if Plea X had been pleaded in the ecclesiastical
court and disallowed, but in which the omission of a claim of disallowance was considered a compelling objection to prohibiting as the record
stood. Insisting on a disallowance surmise is not equivalent to saying that
the disallowance would be traversable. Whether to allow a traverse was a
tough question in the rare instances when it occurred. Judges might well
hold a disallowance surmise necessary in the case of Plea X. without
committing themselves in advance to hold the surmise traversable, should
someone attempt a feigned surmise and someone else bother to challenge
it. However, the best assumption, in the absence of a positive holding to
the contrary, is that when the judges insisted on a disallowance surmise
they "meant it" -- i.e., intended that the party should make a serious attempt to obtain justice by appropriate standards in the ecclesiastical court.
Before looking at cases in which Prohibitions were actually turned
down for want of a disallowance surmise, let us note a few dicta and generalizations in the reports. We have not yet seen, and will not encounter,
any holdings which absolutely preclude the proposition that disallowance
must always be surmised to prohibit a suit properly commenced in an ecclesiastical court. Save for Wright v. Wright and the lesser holdings on
traversability above, there is nothing that utterly stands in the way of saying that disallowance must always be truthfully surmised. A few dicta,
concentrated in the late-Elizabethan Common Pleas, positively say that
the disallowance surmise is an all-but universal necessity. In a case of
1596 (noted in Section II above),7 the Common Pleas held that Prohibition would lie on the plea of "no assets" if and only if the executor had
unsuccessfully tried to make the plea in the ecclesiastical court. From that
position Chief Justice Anderson proceeded to generalize: "the same law,
per Anderson, in every case [my italics]: one must first plead there, and
7

39 Eliz. C.P. (no term) Add. 25,199, f.3.
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on disallowance he will have Prohibition, and not contra." The nearly
contemporary Somerset v. Marham8 concerned the Admiralty and the
right to seek a Prohibition after sentence. Somehow in the course of discussing that case, the Court laid down the following rule: "It was agreed
per Curiam that if one sued in the Spiritual Court for matter whereof they
have jurisdiction, and therein a plea is pleaded which is triable at the common law; yet if they will allow the plea, they shall have jurisdiction
thereof, and try it: otherwise a prohibition lieth."
In Blackwell's Case,9 the question was whether the ecclesiastical court
had jurisdiction over a claim to tithes based on the complaint that the parishioner had nominally "paid" his tithes by severing them, but then denied the parson access to them by locking the gate. The Common Pleas
held, 3 - 1, that the ecclesiastical court had jurisdiction, and incidentally
that it had a right to insist on the two-witness rule in this case. The reason
for the decision was that, in the majority's opinion, jurisdiction in such
cases was conferred on the Church courts by statute. In the course of the
discussion, Chief Justice Anderson said: "If a man begins a spiritual matter in the spiritual court, as for a horse devised to him by the testator, if
the defendant pleads a gift of the horse to him in the testator's life, they
may determine the gift although it is a temporal thing, but if they will not
allow his gift, Prohibition lies." The relation of this statement to the principal case is loose, but relevant. The disturbing thing about allowing the
ecclesiastical court jurisdiction was that the tithes were severed, hence
converted into the parson's chattels and protectable by action of Trespass.
I take Anderson's dictum as a way of saying that sometimes, even without the help of a statute, spiritual courts may determine temporal matters.
If the gift of a horse, why not what amounts to interference with the parson's enjoyment of hay in which he has temporal property? Anderson
may also have meant to raise the question whether ecclesiastical handling
of the principal case would be subject to common law scrutiny -- as its
handling of the inter vivos gift in a legacy suit would be -- owing to the
temporal nature of the severed tithes (though later in the discussion he

8
9

M. 39/40 Eliz. C.P. Croke Eliz., 595.
T. 43 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1058, f.22b; Add. 25,202; Lansd. 1058, f.4b (dated H. 43, a brief report
probably relating to an earlier hearing of the same case.) Lansd. 1058, f.22b., is the best report,
from which the quotation is the text is taken; the plaintiff's name appears from Add. 25.292 only.
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held that common law evidentiary standards did not need to be applied in
the principal case -- probably unlike the gift case -- because of the statute.) For our present purposes, it is the example in Anderson's dictum
that is important: An ecclesiastical suit may not be prohibited merely because an inter vivos gift comes in question, though making such a gift is
plainly a temporal transaction, its efficacy resting on the common law and
its construction within common law competence; but the ecclesiastical
suit may be prohibited if it is shown by way of disallowance surmise that
the gift was mishandled.
Finally, in Robinson's Case,10 the Common Pleas refused to prohibit a
legacy suit on surmise that the legatee had accepted a lease in satisfaction
of the legacy. The Prohibition was sought on the theory that the ecclesiastical court simply ought not to handle the lease; there was no disallowance surmise. The Court refused the Prohibition without saying that it
would prohibit if the lease were disallowed. For that reason, the case does
not belong strictly in our present category, though there is probably no
reason to doubt that a disallowance surmise would have fetched a Prohibition. (The lease case seems indistinguishable from Anderson's inter vivos gift above.) The principal interest of the report lies in the way in
which the Court contrasted the case at hand to tithe cases: "[In the instant
case Prohibition does not lie because] those of the Court Christian have
power to determine the plea of a legacy, but in case of tithes it is true that
we are accustomed to allowing Prohibitions on such suggestion, because
we well know that they will not allow any plea in discharge of tithes, because they hold that they are due iure divino, against which no plea is to
be allowed there."
Whereas the two general statements above suggest that the disallowance surmise is almost always necessary (with perhaps a tacit exception
for the modus), and whereas Anderson's dictum in Blackwell's Case and,
in all probability, the decision in Robinson's Case say that it is necessary
when common law property transactions come in question in legacy suits,
the Court's further language in Robinson's Case may swing the other way
with respect to tithes. That language contains a possible ambiguity. It
could be taken to apply to modus cases only, the example the Court must
10

M. 44/45 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1058, f.55.
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have had primarily in mind. In that event, it would come to saying, "True,
we sometimes prohibit suits properly commenced in ecclesiastical court
on the bare surmise of a plea, without demanding that improper disallowance be shown. To wit, we do so when we have reason to believe that the
plea would be disallowed if it were advanced. For all practical purposes,
that means we do so when the plea is a modus, for we do not believe that
ecclesiastical courts will consistently give effect to prescriptive tithe-commutations in the face of their-doctrine that tithes in kind are due by the
law of God." As it stands, however, that is not what the Court's statement
says. It is cast more generally, and indeed gives the impression that the
Court was thinking of the tithe case most analogous to the present legacy
case ("on such suggestion," as if to say "on an analogous suggestion in a
tithe suit".)
The alternative translation would be: "From the ecclesiastical doctrine
that the origin of tithes is jure divino, we infer that no plea claiming that a
man sued for tithes has no duty to pay them will be properly handled in
an ecclesiastical court. The claim that most obviously cannot be trusted to
ecclesiastical courts is the modus, but it is not the only one. Take the case
analogous to our legacy case, where one being sued for tithes claims that
the tithes were leased to himself or to someone other than his opponent.
Admittedly, the man so claiming is not disputing that tithes in kind are
due jure divino, as a man claiming a modus is (in the sense that he is asserting the power of custom to take away a duty decreed in terms by God;
or, if even a divinely ordained duty need not be literally executed so long
as an equivalent service is rendered, in the sense that he is asserting custom's right to put any good 'consideration,' as secular law chooses to define it, in place of his duty to God, whether or not it is a true equivalent
under present conditions.) As a practical matter, the Church has no clear
interest in awarding tithes to A. when they are leased to B., whereas it obviously does have an interest in preventing the erosion of ecclesiastical
incomes by uneconomic modi. Nevertheless, ecclesiastical courts take so
high and mighty a view of the duty to pay tithes that even such pleas as
leases cannot be entrusted to them if the party objects. There is simply
too much doubt as to what ecclesiastical judges will do with any attempt
to escape liability for tithes, so wrongheaded and at odds with the common law is their whole orientation toward the subject of tithes.
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Will they, for example, hold that a man being sued by A. may not
plead that the tithes were leased to B.? (A plausible theory, abetted by the
jure divine doctrine, argues for that result: I am sued by A. for failure to
perform my duty -- my divinely ordained duty -- A. claiming to be the
lawful beneficiary of my performance: if I cannot say that I have done my
duty -- set out the tithes, so that A. or anyone with better title than his
could take them -- have I standing to excuse myself by the plea that B. is
entitled?) Even if I claim that the tithes A is suing for were leased to me,
can ecclesiastical courts be trusted? Will they perhaps adopt the theory
that the duty to pay is so divine that as far as the Church is concerned one
must pay one’s own lessor on demand, going to the secular law for any
redress -- as for breach of contract or dispossession -- which the justice of
this world thinks appropriate? Short of that will they perhaps take to looking over leases by standards of their own, upholding them only if the rent
represents the fair value of the tithes? No doubt the answer to these questions is uncertain. The point is only that the risk is sufficient, in view of
the general ecclesiastical attitude toward tithes, to justify the short-cut of
dispensing with disallowance surmises and simply taking over issues
amenable to common law determination when they arise as claims to escape answering for tithes. As for Robinson’s Case itself, there is not the
least reason to suspect the general ecclesiastical attitude toward legacies.
Those are private interests. No one would pretend that the duty to pay
them arises from any higher source than a branch of human law which the
ecclesiastical courts are permitted to administer in England. Partly because rights of legatees and the like are only a chapter of the ordinary law
of the realm, the courts preeminently responsible for the law of the land
have a duty to make sure that ecclesiastical courts do not mishandle the
testamentary jurisdiction entrusted to them. But until it appears that they
have mishandled it, there is no basis for suspecting that they will.”
The second reading of the Court’s statement in Robinson’s Case probably goes too far in one direction -- towards wiping out the disallowance
surmise in most tithe cases. It is, however, a plausible position; one cannot easily assume that the Court did not mean to adopt it. The first reading, like the slightly earlier generalized dicta, probably goes too far in the
other direction -- towards demanding disallowance surmises in all cases
except those involving modi. That inter vivos gifts and leases taken in satisfaction of legacies should be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court, and
Prohibition granted only on disallowance surmise, is a pretty safe propo-

121

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
sition. Let us now turn to the cases directly holding that the disallowance
surmise is required for Plea X.
My first specific holding that disallowance must be surmised comes
from 1588.11 A parishioner being sued for tithes alleged simply that his
opponent was not incumbent, because he was automatically deprived for
failure to read the articles as required by 13 Eliz., c. 12 . The whole question was whether the surmise was good without a claim of disallowance.
Coke, representing the parishioner, conceded that the surmise was not
good in the sense of "ideal" or "artistic." It would have been better, he admitted, to allege the failure to read the articles in the ecclesiastical court.
But Coke tried to use the "public" theory of Prohibitions and the procedural liberalism implied by that theory to save his client. His words are:
"Though it be not a good suggestion, yet inasmuch as it appears to the
court a good cause of Prohibition here they ought not to grant Consultation." The first point to note is that it would appear from this remark that
the issue was whether to grant a Consultation on motion. (From the rest
of the report, one would not know that a Prohibition had been granted.)
That being the precise issue, Coke could have been asking for either of
two things: (a) Quash the Prohibition if you must, but do not remand by
Consultation: (b) Uphold the Prohibition. I think the discussion makes it
clear that Coke was shooting for (b).
The other possibility might have been a useful second-best, because
the parson would perhaps be discouraged from proceeding further in the
ecclesiastical court without a Consultation. He would know that his suit
would be prohibited if the ecclesiastical court did actually disallow the
parishioner's pleas, for without a Consultation there would certainly be
no 50 Edw. 3 problem -- see Vol. I. (A Consultation would probably bar a
second Prohibition, though there are no cases on this rather interesting
point -- Prohibition undone by Consultation because the plaintiff ought to
have pleaded his matter in the ecclesiastical court; matter pleaded there
and improperly disallowed; second Prohibition on the same libel sought.
The respectable theory that Consultations on motion go only to give notice of the Prohibition's nullity ab initio and are therefore not within the
intent of 50 Edw. 3 could be used to argue against a barring effect. Quaere
11

T. 30 Eliz. Q.B. Harl. 1633, f.8b.
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de hoc. If the ecclesiastical court dared proceed without a Consultation, it
would be disinclined to reject the plea, even on evidentiary grounds,
when it was sure to be prohibited as soon as it did. In short, quashing
without Consultation might put the parishioner in an excellent position to
bring a new Prohibition at once with a feigned surmise of disallowance.
Any other course than taking issue on the fact -- reading the articles -might seem futile or risky to the parson.
Taking Coke’s argument as a straightforward one for granting or upholding Prohibition: the Court had no trouble seeing through it. The
judges simply said that the plea was in itself perfectly determinable in the
ecclesiastical court and therefore must be pleaded there first. They distinguished the present case from modus cases, using the theory that ecclesiastical courts may be prohibited without the disallowance surmise in the
latter because they notoriously refuse to recognize modi. Coke’s argument amounted to reducing the absence of a disallowance surmise to a
matter of form, or to saying that a claim of disallowance should be read in
for the sake of getting the real question -- did the ecclesiastical plaintiff
read the articles and therefore have standing to maintain a suit for tithes? - to a jury as quickly as possible. For all the practical virtue in that, the
judges were surely right in holding that legitimate interests of the ecclesiastical courts were at stake -- the right to try issues which they were perfectly willing and competent to try, and which concerned the
qualifications of benefice-holders and Church discipline.
With characteristic resourcefulness, however, Coke spotted the flaw in
the Court’s language and counterattacked. The judges said that the plea
was determinable in the ecclesiastical court -- unlike a modus -- and
therefore that it must be pleaded there. Very well, said Coke, what about
a plea going to the bounds of parishes? That is, a parishioner is sued by
the Parson of A. and claims that the land which produced the tithes sued
for is in the Parish of B. No one would maintain that this is not a perfectly
good ecclesiastical plea; ecclesiastical courts might not recognize modi,
but they obviously acknowledged that the Parson of A. is as a rule only
entitled to tithes produced in A. Yet, according to Coke (and the great
preponderance of authority), Prohibition will lie on the bare surmise that
the bounds of parishes are in question, without showing disallowance.
Ergo, the “determinability” of a plea in the ecclesiastical court -- meaning
that the ecclesiastical court is willing to try it and has no legal rules on the
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subject (as distinct from different trial methods) at odds with the common
law--is no test for the necessity of the disallowance surmise.
With this argument, Coke won a moral victory. The judges were
forced to narrow their reason for opposing a Prohibition in this case: The
fact that the parishioner's plea was statute-based was sufficient reason for
insisting that it be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court. ("This is a good plea
in Court Christian in respect of an Act of Parliament which makes him
deprived ipso facto, which Act [is] general, as well in Court Christian as
in any other Court.") The point was well-taken. It was awkward to say
that "foreign" courts were incompetent to interpret and apply statutes, for
by statutes Parliament gave instructions to them, as well as to the common law courts. Therefore Prohibitions to enforce statutes should be delayed until is appeared that a "foreign" court had actually disregarded or
misunderstood a statute. The Court's riposte disposed of Coke's last hope
for his client. (The report gives no result, but presumably a Consultation
was granted if there was a definitive Prohibition in existence.) The case
is authority for the general proposition that statute-based pleas must be
pleaded in the ecclesiastical court, above and beyond the particular plea in
question (not incumbent for failure to read the articles.) It would be dangerous to use it for any other general proposition. If anything, I would
suspect that the judges were a little reluctant to be forced onto the high
ground of statute-based claims. They acknowledged that disallowance
did not need to be surmised in modus and parish-bounds cases, and that
the principle involved in those two cases was not the same. They did not
generalize about other non-statutory pleas.
In Berry v. Whetstone,12 a parishioner sought to challenge his opponent's title to sue for tithes on different grounds. The ecclesiastical plaintiff was purportedly lessee for years of the rectory. The parishioner
claimed that his lease was invalid because the patron had not confirmed it
in terms. (The situation would appear to have been tangled, for it was not
alleged that the patron had not been consulted at all, as he needed to be if
a lease of the living was to be valid beyond the life of the lessor-incumbent. Rather, the patron had allegedly confirmed a lease pur auter vie,
cestui que vie now being dead. Presumably the original, duly confirmed,
12

M. 2 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,205, f.5b.
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lease was for the life of A. -- someone other than the lessor -- upon
whose death it was renegotiated as a straight term of years, but not reconfirmed. Conceivably, though I doubt it, there could be a legal issue as to
whether confirmation was required the second time, since the patron had
already consented to a lease that could run beyond the lessor's life, and
what he had consented to -- an estate pur auter vie -- was "greater" in the
hierarchy of estates than the term of years. I mention these details because if there was a legal issue it was plainly one for the common law.)
A Prohibition was sought by a surmise stating the parishioner's claim,
without pretense that the defect in the lease had been unsuccessfully
urged in the ecclesiastical court. Tanfield, representing the parishioner,
claimed to have a Queen's Bench case from 29 Eliz. on his side, but it is
not recited so as to show whether or not it was exactly in point. It probably was, for Justice Walmesley conceded in general terms that the matter
had been resolved in the Queen's Bench in favor of prohibiting. Nevertheless, Walmesley refused to go along. Whatever the Queen's Bench position, he said, he opposed Prohibition "because the principal is for tithes."
The other puisne Justices, Warburton and Daniel, agreed with Walmesley. As stated, their position was the broad one -- "incidents" of a
tithe-suit simply belong to the ecclesiastical court -- rather than the narrower one -- the plea must be disallowed before Prohibition is justified.
Chief Justice Anderson, however, intervened to insist on the narrower
ground: As the case stood, Prohibition would not lie, but it would on surmise of disallowance. The issue -- validity of a lease of a rectory -- is intrinsically appropriate to common law determination and governed by
common law standards, and for that reason should not be simply left to
the ecclesiastical court, but as an incident of a tithe suit it should go to the
ecclesiastical court first. If the other judges had wanted to stand on the
more sweeping position, they had the votes, but they seem to have acquiesced in Anderson's view.
As unusual way of implementing it, illustrative of the flexibility of
Prohibition procedure, was adopted. Instead of denying the Prohibition,
the judges sent a message to the ecclesiastical court to ask whether the
plea would be allowed. The ecclesiastical court replied that it would not.
(Presumably meaning that ecclesiastical law did not require confirmation
of such a lease by the patron, at least in the somewhat complicated circumstances of this case. One might perhaps wonder whether the ecclesi-
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astical judges searched their hearts and books very deeply. They may
have been perfectly willing for the common law to settle the validity of
the lease, now that the opportunity was at hand and their "first refusal"
had been respected. The lessee was probably a layman, not a representative of a true "ecclesiastical interest" about whose right to collect
God's tenth the ecclesiastical authorities perhaps could not have cared
less.) Being informed that the ecclesiastical courts would disallow the plea
if it were made, the Common Pleas "awarded to stay suit until title tried."
So says the report -- not that a Prohibition was granted. There is not much
practical difference (for the suit could be remanded by Consultation if the
lease were found valid), but my guess would be that the report means
what it says -- i.e., that a stay, not a Prohibition, was granted, so that if the
lease was found good a Consultation would not be required. As we have
seen, stays were sometimes used in special circumstances, where a Prohibition would not have been appropriate but the effect of a Prohibition was
desirable. In the instant case, there is no obvious reason for avoiding a
Prohibition.
I wonder whether the unusual procedure (if indeed the language of the
report is significant) might not be a concession to the flat opposition to
prohibiting expressed by Walmesley and, at least offhand, concurred in
by Warburton and Daniel. As it were: In the face of that "flat opposition,"
Chief Justice Anderson says, "Wait a minute. We could prohibit if the
objection to the lease had been pleaded and disallowed. Wouldn't it be
more economical if, instead of just turning the Prohibition down, we took
informal measures to see whether there is any serious chance of the plea's
being allowed?" The other judges or some of them concede the point of
law and accept the proposal for economizing. When it is discovered that
the plea would be disallowed, so that there is no practical point in simply
saying "No" to plaintiff-in-Prohibition, perhaps the obvious course is to
prohibit. But then Justice Walmesley, say, protests, "On the record, things
still stand where I said they did in the first place. No cause of Prohibition
has been stated in the surmise. That being the case, it would be most unsuitable to grant a Prohibition. Maybe the writ would lie if the plea were
actually to be disallowed -- about that I shall worry when it happens -- but
I shall certainly not give my consent to a Prohibition now." The point being, in strictness, unanswerable, the temporary stay is proposed; it commands a majority as a less questionable course, if not unanimity. That

126

Problems of the Disallowance Surmise
may not be the exact scenario, but the conclusion it comes to makes sense
in itself and sense of the report.
The report of Berry v. Whetstone contains in addition a dictum by
Anderson, Walmesley, and Warburton "that the bounds of parishes are
triable in the spiritual court." The link between this remark and the discussion of the case at hand does not appear specifically, but in the context
it presumably goes to say that ecclesiastical courts should not be prohibited when bounds come in question without a surmise of disallowance, if
then. (Contrary to Coke and the Court in the last case and most authority.)
In Penn's Case,13 a parishioner being sued for tithes wanted to challenge his opponent's incumbency on the ground that he came in by simony and was ipso facto deprived by force of the statute of 31 Eliz., c. 6.
The parishioner's counsel said that the ecclesiastical court would not allow that plea. The Court, however, "would not give credit to this suggestion" (Brownlow's report.) Counsel was told to offer his plea to the
ecclesiastical court, and assured that a Prohibition would be granted if it
was actually disallowed. I take it that counsel was asking the Court to presume or hold by way of judicial notice that no ecclesiastical judge would
accept such a plea. Alternatively, (a) he might have failed to surmise disallowance and hoped that the Court would take it on his word, or go outside the record to verify his word informally, that disallowance had
actually occurred; or (b) disallowance may have been surmised, but the
Court suspected, and perhaps counsel admitted upon questioning, that the
surmise was feigned. The first and best possibility makes sense in this
case, though it probably does not as a generality. For thought it is unlikely
that the ecclesiastical court would disallow the plea abstractly stated -"The person suing for tithes is not incumbent, but deprived for simony by
force of the statute" -- the allegedly simoniacal transaction was complicated here (as appears from Browlow's report, and as presumably appeared from the surmise.) (The Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield was
patron, but the three successive "next avoidances" had been granted to
three other people. The incumbent was old and sick. Penn made a deal
13

M. 8 Jac. C.P. 2 Brownlow and Goldesborough, 7; Add. 25,209, f.211b. (The two reports agree
but complement each other significantly for details. The judges do not speak individually or so
fully in Brownlow; the MS. does not give the details of the corrupt agreement.)
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with the Bishop's brother, whereby Penn agreed to lease the tithes to the
brother if the latter would help him get the benefice when the old incumbent died. The brother agreed to procure the holders of the "next avoidances" to surrender them back to the Bishop at once, and then when the
incumbent should die, to procure the Bishop to present Penn. The contract
was executed on both sides.) There may have been reason for supposing
that the ecclesiastica1 court would not regard this particular path to a living as simoniacal, but one can hardly blame the judges for being skeptical, for the transaction smells to heaven. If it is possible that disallowance
was surmised, but was ascertained to have been feigned: The best way to
deal with a fictitious or pro forma surmise of disallowance, if it was informally identified as such, and if the judges thought that actual, traversable disallowance was necessary to warrant a Prohibition, would be to
refuse Prohibition and send the party off to make his plea in earnest -- not
to close one's eyes to the truth, grant Prohibition, and bring the problems
of a traverse upon one.
In substance, the judges rested on the need to make statutory pleas in
the ecclesiastical court and to seek Prohibitions only on pretense that the
statute had been misconstrued. " ... In such cases it is their duty to have
counsel learned in the law," the Court said. (As if to say: "Although there
is of course a sense in which construction of statutes is primarily common
law business, and the expertise of common lawyers is likely to be required, that is not reason enough to deny ecclesiastical courts the right to
apply statutes, which are addressed as much to them as to us -- for they
can and should take advice.") The reasons for insisting on actual disallowance in this case were especially strong, because apart from the statute
there would probably have been no basis for common law intervention.
Simony as such was a purely ecclesiastical offense. Had there been no
statute affixing consequences to simony, it would probably have been up
to the ecclesiastical court whether to let a parson's incumbency be challenged on the ground that it was acquired by simony. Chief Justice Coke
proved as much by way of another rule of law: "It has been ruled in this
Court that if one makes a bond for simony it is not void. The reason is
that the common law takes no notice or cognizance of simony." (That is,
a contract which amounts to a simoniacal bargain is a perfectly good contract at common law, however heinous an ecclesiastical offense. The contract is not void owing to its immoral purpose, like, say, a gambling
contract or a bond with an unlawful condition.) The statute alone gave the

128

Problems of the Disallowance Surmise
common law an interest, hence it was especially important that the ecclesiastical court be shown to have misapplied the statute.
I would not, however, expect the common law's non-cognizance of
simony to prevent a common law court from determining the definition of
simony once a case was properly before it. If disallowance was alleged
bona fide in the instant case and Prohibition accordingly granted, and if
the question turned out to be whether the transaction by which the parson
gained his benefice was within the legal meaning of simony, I think the
common law court would decide, though not necessarily without reference to ecclesiastical sources and civilian opinion. There are cases in
which common law courts did just that. In the MS. report of the present
case, Coke makes a remark about the meaning of simony, and Justice
Warburton cities the holding on that question in Smith v. Sherborne, a
case discussed below. Both of those observations go to warn against an
over-strict definition of simony, specifically against taking mere acquisition of advowsons and "next avoidances" as simoniacal, even though
one's purpose in acquiring them may be to prefer a particular clerk. I
would take the judges' remarks as incidental -- rather called to mind by
the transaction in the instant case than intended to hint at a solution. It is
true that part of the transaction consisted in the Bishop's "merely acquiring the next avoidances" by way of surrender, but even that part of the
business involved the further element of "procurement" by the brother for
a consideration paid by the aspirant. Whether or not the transaction would
ultimately be held simoniacal, the significance of "mere acquisition" of
avoidances or advowsons would probably be only a small element in determining the question.
Moving on from cases on incumbency or capacity to sue for tithes to
miscellaneous instances on the surmise of disallowance: One rather cryptically reported testamentary case14 seems to fall in that class. An executor being sued for a legacy surmised that debts of the estate remained to
be paid, and that assets in sufficient amount to cover the debts and the
legacy existed only in the form of unliquidated obligations. The executor's claim was not "No assets," but only that the present condition of the
estate was such that he should not be compelled to pay the legacy at once.
14

M. 5 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,215, f.38.

129

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
Whereas a surmise of disallowance was certainly necessary to assert the
claim of "No assets" at common law, and even then the chance for a Prohibition was not at all good, the executor here made no surmise of disallowance. His failure to do so was not flatly disastrous, for the judges
were ready to presume that the lesser claim -- in effect, that the estate was
not yet ripe to pay legacies -- would be disallowed. They said that the allegation would not be allowed because priority among the debts was a
common law question. I.e.: The position apparently imputed to the ecclesiastical courts was, "We cannot make a proper assessment of the debts of
the estate, therefore cannot estimate whether the debts are such as to
make it unlikely that the estate will eventually be able to bear legacies.
Since we are not competent to make such an estimate, we will go ahead
and award recovery of the legacy if nothing is done to stop us. If you
want to object, get a Prohibition."
The judges also said that unrecovered obligations are not assets -- as if
to suggest that the ecclesiastical court would be likely to count them as
such and award recovery of legacies if, with no more that a casual look at
the debts, it seemed safe enough by such an accounting. However, having
spoken in such a way as to suggest that Prohibition should lie without a
claim of disallowance, the Court then told the executor to "make proof
and take his Prohibition on that." I can only interpret this as a sign of reluctance to prohibit without a pro forma showing of disallowance. Believing that the executor's claim could not be genuinely asserted and
properly handled in the ecclesiastical court, but also believing that legacy
suits should probably not be prohibited without disallowance, at least
when the executor's claim was a near relative of "No assets," the Court
adopted a device: Go make your plea and proffer evidence, and we will
grant you a Prohibition on surmise that your proofs were disallowed.
Disallowance of common law evidence bearing on a common law subject
was a frequent cause of Prohibition; an attempt to reverse the disallowance would probably be unsuccessful, since it was notorious that ecclesiastical evidentiary standards were different; it was less notorious, though
the judges were inclined to suspect it, that an objection to the estate's present liability for legacies in view of unsettled debits and credits would be
disallowed out of hand. In short, by my reconstruction from a scanty report, the case is an instance of insistence on the disallowance surmise, but
only in a pro forma sense.
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The Caroline case of Watton v. Ball15 was occasion for an important
discussion of the need to surmise disallowance. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition
originally omitted to do so. He was sued for a pew and claimed a prescriptive right to the seat as an appurtenance of his manor. Justice
Berkeley took exception to the claim because there was no allegation of
disallowance. Taylor, of counsel with the plaintiff, argued back by analogy with the modus: "On suggestion to have a modus decimandi they will
grant prohibition in respect of the prescription, which is temporal, and yet
the original, viz., tithes, belongs [to them], wherefore so here." Berkeley's
reply is interesting. He starts off explaining the reason for the modus
case, as if to differentiate it from the present case, but ends by bringing
them together, if not entirely closing the gap. To sue for tithes in kind
when there is a modus, Berkeley explains, is as good as demanding tithes
from a non-tithable product, such as coal (as if, one would suppose, to
suggest that disallowance of a modus need not be surmised, any more
than one need take exception to a tithe suite for coal in the ecclesiastical
court before seeking a Prohibition -- contra in the instant case, where the
prescription is only a defense or counterclaim to a perfectly valid ecclesiastical suit for the use of a pew.)
At the end of his speech, however, Berkeley say, "But yet there you
must plead the modus decimandi in the spiritual court. For regularly they
have jurisdiction of tithes, and indeed when you prescribe it is made lay
chattel, but not before." That can only mean, I think, that a pro forma, untraversable surmise of disallowance is required in the modus case. Pleading the modus in the ecclesiastical court is a necessary ritual to make it
appear that the tithe suit was bad ab initio, but once that appears it makes
no difference what the ecclesiastical court does, so no surmise that the
modus was disallowed should be traversable. In principle, I suppose, a
surmise ought to say that the modus was pleaded, not pleaded and disallowed; and the bare fact that it was pleaded ought in principle to be traversable. However, I know of no allegations that matter was pleaded
unaccompanied by the allegation that it was disallowed, and there are certainly no reported cases of attempts to dispute factually as to whether a
15

P. 9 Car. K.B. Harl. 1631, ff. 386b and 404b. (Second entry reports Taylor's second motion for
Prohibition, with the disallowance surmise.)
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bare plea had been made. I therefore doubt whether Berkeley's point
boils down to anything more than common law form: Surmises ought to
say that modi have been pleaded and disallowed -- subject to absolutely
no danger that the statement will be falsified. And quaere whether most
courts would have insisted on it even as a form, in the unlikely event of a
surmise's or declaration's being challenged for omitting fictitious language.
What then of the principal case? Berkeley comes back to it in his next
speech. Meanwhile, Justice Croke had expressed agreement with
Berkeley and put the case of parish bounds. If bounds come in question,
Croke says, that is in itself reason for Prohibition, yet the matter must be
pleaded in the ecclesiastical court. (Pro forma only? Presumably.) Then
Berkeley speaks to the principal case as follows: "If you plead it there and
they resolve and allow your plea, there will be no Prohibition, for you are
not at any prejudice, but the suit is at an end. Otherwise, if they do not allow your plea or will take issue on it, for [it is] a lay thing." (Italics
mine.) In other words, "allow" is being used to mean "accept as factually
true and legally sufficient," not "accept as legally sufficient, subject to the
factual truth's being established if disputed." The prescriptive claim to
the pew must be pleaded, but because prescriptions intrinsically require
common law trial, Prohibition will be granted unless the ecclesiastical
court gives judgment in favor of the party pleading the prescription. Is
this to reduce the disallowance surmise to as hollow a matter of form in
the principal case as in the modus case? Almost, I should say, but perhaps
not quite. The ecclesiastical court is to be given no chance to do the one
thing it would be likely to do if it regarded the prescription as a legally
tenable defence or counterclaim -- try it as to fact.
On the other hand, inasmuch as Berkeley was at pains to show that this
case differed from the modus case, I am inclined to conjecture that traversability would make the difference. The act of pleading the modus,
though nominally necessary, goes to establish (pending common law falsification of the modus) the ecclesiastical court's ab initio lack of title to
hold plea; the act of pleading the "defensive prescription" only goes to
disqualify the ecclesiastical court from disregarding, interpreting, or trying the prescription. In the second case, it is perhaps entailed that the ecclesiastical court must actually disregard, misinterpret, or propose to try
it, and therefore that a statement charging one of those things may be
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traversed (small though the chance of its being traversed in practice may
be.) If the conduct of the ecclesiastical court can be put in issue, the party
must actually make his plea in the ecclesiastical court, not just pretend to
have done so. Thereby, the ecclesiastical court might gain a little room for
maneuver. Suppose, for example, it "accepts" the plea in the sense that it
does not let it be put in issue, but agrees to take it as true if two witnesses
can be produced to confirm it. If the two witnesses cannot be found, perhaps the ecclesiastical court is prohibitable for insisting on an improper
evidentiary requirement; if they can be, the other party -- who, as ecclesiastical plaintiff, can prohibit his own suit -- may be able to make the same
complaint and get the prescription tried at common law, should he consider it worth his while. But then, at least, we would have a new ballgame
-- a different reason for prohibiting, possibly a more disputable one, than
the bare fact that a prescriptive title is in question.
These points are speculative and exiguous. My reason for belaboring
them is in the end only to say that Berkeley seems to me to have been on
a profitless course. The reasons for insisting on a disallowance surmise as
Berkeley developed them are so refined, and so scarcely distinguishable
from imposing a common law form which itself might as well be dispensed with, that I can see no advantage in bothering with them. In other
words, since there was no intention of letting the ecclesiastical court try
the prescription, it would have been just as well to prohibit on the original
surmise. Generalizing, parties might as well be given Prohibitions on the
bare surmise that prescriptive titles, intrinsically appropriate to common
law trial, had been brought in question in ecclesiastical litigation -whether these prescriptive titles were modi or something else. However,
Berkeley took the rest of the Court with him (the others as well as Croke,
who expresses agreement in the report.) Taylor, having been told to go
plead in the ecclesiastical court, predictably reappeared later in the same
term with a surmise of disallowance, whereupon he had his Prohibition
without debate.
Watton v. Ball admits of being read as a Caroline exercise in scrupulosity toward the rights of the ecclesiastical courts. If it was that, it was a
cost-free exercise, except for the time and energy of the judges and litigants. For the judges could unanimously agree to insist on respect for the
ecclesiastical system -- on pleading there in suits belonging there, on the
principle that no incident of a proper ecclesiastical suit, even, in a sense,
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the modus, may be nakedly rapt away for common law determination -with practically no real consequences. Though there can be no certainty
about such an interpretation, it perhaps makes historical sense that the
rather "Whiggish" Justice Croke subscribed to the views of the rather
"Royalist" Justice Berkeley in this case.
A final case, from 1641,16 only goes to confirm the rule that pleas
based on statutes must be offered to the ecclesiastical courts in earnest. A
man sued for failure to attend church claimed what the report only describes as "something by way of excuse." What it was does not matter,
for clearly he sought his Prohibition on the theory that the adequacy of
any excuse should be determined at common law. He did not dispute (it
would have pointless to) that ecclesiastical courts could punish non-attendance even though that offense was also subject to secular penalties by
statute. Rather, he took the position that the statute (the Uniformity Act of
1 Eliz.) "preempted" the field -- i.e., subjected the ecclesiastical courts to
whatever definition of the extent of the duty to attend church the statute,
as ultimately interpreted by the common law courts, imposed. The Court
in this case (contrary to Brown's Case in Section II above) endorsed the
theory but denied the Prohibition on the ground that the excuse had not
been pleaded in the ecclesiastical court and must be. The ecclesiastical
court had jurisdiction; plaintiff-in-Prohibition in effect wanted to say, "By
the governing statute, correctly interpreted, I am not delinquent in respect
of my duty to attend church"; several cases on different specific subjects
held that the ecclesiastical court should have first crack at evaluating such
a claim, and, if it was accepted as a matter of law, the right to try facts incidental to it.
Alongside the miscellaneous cases above on the need to surmise disallowance, we may consider one line of related cases. These concern agreements and leases alleged as defenses to tithe suits. My first report in this
category is a Common Pleas holding in general terms from 1597,17 as follows: If one being sued for tithes pleads matter triable at common law,
such as a lease or release of the tithes, and the plea is accepted, the ecclesiastical court shall try it by witnesses; if the plea is disallowed, Prohibi16
17

H. 16 Car. C.P. March, 93.
H. 39 Eliz. C.P. Harl. 1631, f.239b.
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tion shall be granted and the matter tried by jury. As far as the examples
used are concerned -- leases and releases -- that is straightforward. Extending the rule beyond the examples would be dangerous. Does "matter
triable at common law" include prescriptions (inclusive or exclusive of
modi) -- so that a willing ecclesiastical court may try prescriptive titles (if
not modi, at least "defensive prescriptions," contrary to Watton v. Ball
above)? Does the rule include contracts as well as leases and releases?
According to our holding, if the parishioner pleads a lease of the tithes (a
common law conveyance thereof for a term of years) or a release (a conveyance by deed, working by way of extinguishment, rather than transfer,
or rights), the suit will be prohibited if and only if the ecclesiastical court
disallows the plea. Disallowance could take a generic or specific form -either the unlikely judgment "Leases are no defense to tithe claims" or the
judgment "This lease, owing to internal defects or to insufficient evidence
proffered to back it up, is not acceptable as a defense" -- but either way
disallowance is necessary to support a Prohibition. Suppose, however,
that the parishioner pleads only a considerate agreement on the parson's
part not to demand tithes. No doubt the ecclesiastical court may try that
claim as to fact if it is willing. The doubts arise in the other direction: If
the plea is generically or specifically rejected, will Prohibition lie? For
reasons that will appear, one should not jump to conclusions in the contract case on the basis of a holding which uses property transactions -leases and releases -- as examples in an apparent generalization.
Only a couple of terms later, in the Dean of Gloucester's Case,18 the
same court flatly contradicted the above holding, in the direction of making Prohibitions harder to get. The defendant in a tithe suit pleaded a
lease of the tithes to him and sought a Prohibition on surmise of disallowance. The Common Pleas turned him down, claiming Queen's Bench
practice as authority for that course. The judges said that the lease was a
perfectly good defense in ecclesiastical law, and therefore that any impropriety was remediable solely by appeal. They also registered suspicion
that the disallowance surmise was feigned. ("And therefore [there is] no
reason why we ought to award Prohibition, where also the surmise perhaps is false.") The logical way to implement that suspicion might be to
hold the disallowance traversable. One can see, however, how a desire to
18

M. 39/40Eliz. C.P. Harl. 1631, f.270b.
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discourage fictitious surmises and needless Prohibitions might push
judges to the flat rule of this case -- disallowing a lease is no ground for
Prohibition -- even if they were not otherwise clearly disposed that way.
As I argue above, traversing the disallowance would be unlikely to occur
very often in practice even if it was permitted in law, and trying in-court
happenings by jury is not the most convenient of proceedings. Judges
might well be inclined to embrace a twofold scheme and resist the temptation of a threefold one -- i.e., recognize only those claims which will get
a Prohibition without any surmise of disallowance, or only a pro forma,
untraversable one, plus those which will not get Prohibitions, disallowance or no disallowance; not to recognize the tertium quid, claims which
will get a Prohibition if and only if they are actually disallowed. It is
plainly impossible, I think, to exclude the tertium quid entirely -- witness
statute-based claims and those cases in which the ecclesiastical court has
applied its own rules in a correct but intolerable way. But to narrow the
scope of traversable disallowance surmises makes sense, and the decision
in the Dean of Gloucester's Case would be a reasonable implementation
of such a policy. I wonder, however, about the extent of the decision. The
report would suggest that the surmise was strictly generic -- simply, "I
pleaded that the tithes, were leased to me, which plea was disallowed."
Suppose the surmise gave some reason to believe that there was a legal
problem about the meaning or validity of the lease. It could do so with
varying degrees of specificity -- at one end of the spectrum, a precise
"laying of error" ("The ecclesiastical court, construing this lease to mean
X. whereas it means Y., or regarding it as invalid for such-and-such reasons, has improperly refused to let me use it as a defense"); at the other,
just enough specific description of the lease to raise the thought that
maybe the disallowance resulted from a misconstruction or mis-evaluation of the lease by common law standards (as opposed to defective evidence or unaccountable error by ecclesiastical standards.) If our case had
fallen anywhere within that spectrum, would the Prohibition have been
denied? If granted, would a traverse of the disallowance have been permitted?
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In the Jacobean Fowe v. Paule,19 the parishioner pleaded an agreement, not a lease. Parson Paule had allegedly agreed to take 10/ per annum in lieu of tithes for the rest of Fowe’s life, and the ecclesiastical court
had allegedly disallowed that plea. A Prohibition was denied because the
agreement was not supported by a written deed. That is to say, as far as
the principal case is concerned, the judges thought the ecclesiastical court
not only within its rights but right in rejecting the defense. To bar tithes,
an agreement for life or years should be embodied in a deed; the parishioner’s only remedy on the oral agreement was an Action on the Case for
breach of contract in the event that the parson demanded and recovered
tithes in kind. This decision has no bearing on the need to allege disallowance: it was alleged, but even so there was no basis for prohibiting. The
Court added a dictum, however: Prohibition would be granted on an oral
agreement covering only one year. So, at any rate, a somewhat obscure
report seems to say. The rule is strange -- in effect that a one-year agreement must be given specific enforcement as a bar to tithes while a longerterm agreement need not be. Nothing specific is said about a disallowance
surmise in the case of the one-year contract. Quaere whether it would be
necessary. Generically speaking, a lease was a good ecclesiastical plea in
bar of tithes. Could the same be said of a parol agreement? Yet it would
seem odd to hold that an ecclesiastical court may try a lease as to fact if it
is willing, but not the less solemn one-year, word-of-mouth bargain.
Among other things, witnesses would be a rational way to try the bargain,
and insistence on two witnesses would not seem unreasonable, whereas
trial of a lease by ecclesiastical methods ought perhaps to observe common law standards to such intents as not demanding two witnesses to
authenticate a written deed. (But see the next case.)
A few years later, in Griffin v. Bulerist, 20 the King’s Bench was ready
to prohibit in the case of an agreement if and only if disallowance was alleged. The statement of the case is garbled in the report, so that it is impossible to tell the duration of the agreement and whether it was in
writing. It is clear, however, that an agreement discharging tithes in kind
was claimed, and that a Prohibition was sought without surmising disal-

19
20

P. 8 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f.2l3b.
P. 15 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1080, f.30
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lowance. Chief Justice Montagu (speaking for the Court, so far as appears) said that Prohibition would not lie now, but would lie on a surmise
that the agreement was disallowed, or on surmise that proving it by a single witness was not permitted. Note the second point: If we assume that a
parol agreement was in question, the ecclesiastical court was not free to
try even that by its own evidentiary standards. It was, however, to have
the trial if it was willing to allow the plea in law, and if it observed evidentiary canons acceptable to the common law.
Meanwhile, in --- v. Vaughan,21 the King's Bench had insisted on the
disallowance surmise in a tithe case where a lease-assignment was in
question. Since the case is not stated fully, it does not appear what kind
of a lease-assignment was alleged. Probably the parson sued A, who alleged that the tithes were leased to B. and assigned to him. Alternatively,
a lease-assignment could come in question with regard to the ecclesiastical plaintiff's title to sue: e.g., the tithes were leased to X and assigned to
Y, but X is suing; or the original lessor; or Y is suing and the parishioner
claims that the assignment to him was invalid. In any event, a Prohibition
was sought on the ground that the validity of a lease-assignment was before an ecclesiastical court. The king's Bench asked whether the matter
had been pleaded there and said that if it was disallowed a Prohibition
would be granted. The question was evidently answered in the affirmative, for the Prohibition was granted with the cursory remark that ecclesiastical courts ought not to meddle with contracts (n.b.) and assignments
of leases. I assume the question was asked only because the judges did
not have the surmise before their eyes and wanted to be sure that disallowance was indeed alleged. It was, so Prohibition lay. Quaere what
would have happened if an attempt had been made to traverse the disallowance. "Ought not to meddle" is strong language, suggesting that the
ecclesiastical court perhaps ought not to try a lease-assignment as to fact
even if it was willing to, and that the demand for a disallowance surmise
was pro forma. But the report is too brief for such language to be taken
very seriously.

21

P. 9 Jac. K.B. 1 Bulstrode, 125.
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A case from Charles I’s reign,22 confirms the Dean of Gloucester’s
Case above with respect to leases, contributing a few points of interest by
the way. The parishioner claimed a lease to him of some of the tithes sued
for (grain) and a modus covering the rest. He sought a Prohibition without
alleging disallowance. Justice Jones opposed the Prohibition quoad the
grain on the ground that the lease was a perfectly good ecclesiastical plea.
From a subsequent remark by Jones and Justice Berkeley, it is clear that a
disallowance surmise would not have helped, for they said that the parishioner’s remedy was by ecclesiastical appeal if he should have any complaint against his treatment. Both judges agreed that Prohibition lay for
the tithes covered by the modus. It was of course correct to prohibit
quoad only part of conglomerate tithe suit when Prohibition was only appropriate for part.
That feature of the case is only worth noting as a possible measure of
the judges’ determination not to prohibit quoad the grain. If they had
nothing more than qualms about prohibiting for the tithes covered by the
lease, combined with the feeling that it would be just as well to have all
disputed questions settled at common law when some would have to be
anyhow, they might have had some color for prohibiting the conglomerate suit as a whole, forcing the parson at least to move for a partial Consultation if he really thought that course more worthwhile than
controverting the lease at a common law. When Bankes, of counsel for
the parishioner, was rebuffed by Justice Jones’s first speech, he responded
with incredulity: “Will the plaintiff there [be allowed] to proceed against
his own lease?” Both the incredulity and the form of expression are noteworthy. Jones may have been on solid ground, but Bankes sounds surprised, as if his common sense and experience would have led him to
suppose that Prohibition lay automatically to enforce a common law lease
in the face of a repugnant tithe claim. As for the formulation, it seems to
say: “This is not so much a case of the ecclesiastical defendant relying on
a lease for justification as of the ecclesiastical plaintiff suing when he is
estopped to do so. Perhaps ecclesiastical courts should not be prohibited
from entertaining defenses which they in all probability respect as much
as we do. But ecclesiastical suits which ought never have been brought
22

P. 9 Car. K.B. Harl. 1631, f.377b.
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should be prohibited. Where a modus applies, the parson has no business
claiming tithes in kind; no more has he any business claiming them when
the very act of doing so contradicts his own deed." However, Jones and
Berkeley were adamant. "You say that the lease is by indenture," they replied, "and so what prejudice to you but that you may well have appeal?"
I take this as equivalent to, "You really can't lose, having a deed to back
you up." Is that literally true? What would make it so? I would suggest
the following analysis: A parol discharge of tithes -- a mere contract or
perhaps a very short-term lease, whatever would be valid in itself to any
intent -- might be in danger in the ecclesiastical courts. It might be subjected to ecclesiastical proof requirements which, on consideration, would
be held unduly stringent. If there is even an appreciable chance of the ecclesiastical courts' going wrong, perhaps stopping the suit here and now
should be considered. But the deed makes the parishioner's case virtually
open-and-shut. If one ecclesiastical court gets unaccountably mixed up
and rules out a lease that so manifestly exists, the chance that the error
will survive appeal is negligible. If, a little more accountably, one ecclesiastical court demands two witnesses to prove that a deed-indented is
authentic -- well, the chance of that demand's holding up on appeal is not
very good. In the event of a Prohibition's being sought on the specific
surmise of inappropriate evidentiary standards, perhaps it should in any
case be granted. even before appeals, but that is very different from prohibiting now. At the very worst, the parishioner might reach the end of
the appeals road still the loser, his lease-by-indenture still unhonored. If
that were to happen, resort to Prohibition to prevent execution of a plainly
unlawful sentence would still be open. Seeking a Prohibition now is going to the last resort in the first instance, almost surely unnecessarily.
If that reconstruction of the judges thinking is correct, it adds perspective to Justice Jones's final remark in the case. "We ought to allow all that
belongs to them [the ecclesiastical courts]," Jones said, "for they would
have more." The pressure on the judges in the Laudian period is revealed in
the observation, and one judge's response. As it were: These are times to
be careful about prohibiting too freely. No doubt one should always be
careful, one should respect ecclesiastical jurisdiction in its place. But
there is a political reason for caution as well as the normal, fully respectable one. Judges thinking such thoughts might be inclined to refuse Prohibitions a little against their best judgement, to adopt a
"When-in-doubt-don't-prohibit" policy. But in the instant case, to put it
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that way would actually overstate the judges’ tendency. For in fact they
only refused a gratuitous Prohibition, a Prohibition the parishioner almost
certainly did not need to protect his interest. They might almost be taken
as saying to Bankes (who in a few months would become Charles I’s Attorney General), “Spare us your theoretical pro’s and cons of this kind of
case. Let us be tender to ecclesiastical interests when we have so innocuous an opportunity.” As in Watton v. Ball above, scrupulosity came
cheap. Only Jones and Berkeley are heard from in the report, probably
because they were alone in court.
One further case, from the King’s Bench during Coke’s Chief Justiceship, may be considered alongside those on leases and agreements. In this
case, Parker v. Kemp,23 the parishioner’s claim was that a tithe dispute
had been put to arbitration, and that the arbitrator had made an award that
so much be paid for the tithes; nevertheless, the parson was suing for the
full tithe in kind. On the matter of principal concern to us here, the two
reports of the case conflict. Bulstrode says that disallowance of the plea
of arbitrament was alleged, and that Prohibition was denied. Rolle agrees
that Prohibition was denied, but says that there was no disallowance surmise. At the end of Rolle’s report, the parishioner is expressly advised by
the Court to move for Prohibition again if the plea of arbitrament should
be disallowed. The two reports could be reconciled by supposing that on
the first hearing plaintiff-in-Prohibition was turned down, but advised to
make a disallowance surmise, and that he then reappeared, claiming disallowance, only to be turned down again. Telling a man that he would have
a better chance with a disallowance surmise is not to guarantee that he
would succeed with one. But perhaps the more likely explanation is simply that Rolle is accurate, Bulstrode wrong. (Rather than the other way
around, for one would be unlikely to record that the judges gave a party
advice to revise his claim unless one had heard them do so, whereas in
merely stating a case of this sort one might easily misunderstand, or carelessly assume, that a disallowance surmise was included.)

23

P. 12 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 227; 1 Rolle, 12. (Only Bulstrode gives the name of the case, but the
facts and judicial remarks are so similar that there can be no serious doubt that both reports deal
with the same case. Conflicts in detail are dealt with in the text.)
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At first sight, the plea of arbitrament seems hardly distinguishable
from a plea of a contract to take money instead of tithes in kind. The essence of the parishioner's contention must have been that the parson
agreed not to press for tithes in kind, but to accept whatever sum of
money the arbitrator decided was a fair equivalent -- hardly different in
principle from agreeing to accept a sum-certain arrived at by negotiation.
The reports give no details, except that the product in question was apples
(a likely enough subject for a dispute and an arbitration agreement, since
apples would perhaps not be harvested all at one time, some of the crop
might be worm-eaten, etc. -- circumstances in which the parson might just
as soon have the money as the fruit, but in which an argument over what
the crop was worth might easily blow up.) Conceivably, however, one
might argue that an arbitration agreement is rather more solemn than an
ordinary trade -- a matter of two parties' deciding to appoint their own
judge instead of using the official facilities. Perhaps there is a sense in
which a parson who agreed to go to arbitration over tithes can be thought
of as committing himself specifically to stay out of the ecclesiastical tribunals, to let a "spiritual" matter be decided in a secular way. (Per contra,
if a parson only agrees to take 10d instead of certain tithes, he has not said
he will refrain from bringing suit for the tithes -- at least he has not said it
in quite the same "accent." With, at any rate, a touch of the Bad Man theory of law, one who agrees to give up something to which he is entitled in
exchange for something else perhaps does not quite commit himself not
to sue for the first thing. Perhaps he reserves the privilege of trying to
"break" the agreement in law if he changes his mind.)
How these considerations would cut in the inter-jurisdictional context
seems to me questionable, however. If the parson who sues contrary to
his arbitration agreement is "worse" than one who sues against his commutation agreement, then maybe the ecclesiastical court has a stronger
duty not to permit the former than to prevent the latter. Arguably, an
agreement to "secularize" a tithe dispute gives the common law a foothold, as protector of secular interests and supervisor of all private arrangements for semi-formal conflict-resolution (all of which, one would
suppose, are inherently temporal, since they originate by contract, not by
the dispensation of God, the Supreme Head, or the legislature -- whoever
creates spiritual jurisdiction.) On the other hand, all official courts have
an interest in what amounts to voluntary substitution of an arbitrator for
themselves -- whence the extensive common law topic "Arbitrament,"
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comprising the various ways in which the judges oversaw the activities of
private arbitrators in the sphere of temporal affairs. Do ecclesiastical
courts not have a comparable interest in supervising arbitration within
their sphere? If an ecclesiastical court disallows a plea of arbitrament concerning tithes, might it not be implementing its legitimate supervisory
authority -- e.g., deciding that the arbitrator went beyond the authority
which the parties gave him, or made an award predicated on a mistaken
view of the ecclesiastical law (within which, as to the duty to pay tithes,
he was presumably commissioned to proceed)? Per contra, an ecclesiastical
court that disallows a commutation agreement can only be supposed to
hold that such agreements do not bar suits for tithes in kind (unless the
disallowance is evidentiary.) Maybe that is an unobjectionable position,
or at least not controllable by Prohibition, but even if it is objectionable,
and controllable, arbitration is arguably different. For the disallowance
does not imply a simple rule, right or wrong, that an arbitration agreement, or award thereon, will not bar a suit for de jure tithes; it might imply only legitimate supervision of the arbitration.
The Court in Parker v. Kemp plainly held that arbitrament is not a
"common law issue." An agreement to arbitrate an ecclesiastical dispute
was not taken to cut the ecclesiastical courts off from all further involvement, leaving the supervision of the arbitration solely to the common law
courts. Following Rolle, the judges did not concede the ecclesiastical
court a completely free hand, for they acknowledged that a Prohibition
would at least be worth considering if it were sought on disallowance surmise. That might mean that ecclesiastical courts are not free to hold that
ecclesiastical disputes may not be put to arbitration, or that the duty to
pay tithes in kind is inviolable qua ecclesiastical duty (any loss to the parishioner as a result of his having to pay in kind, instead of carrying out
the arbitrator's award, being compensable at common law, if secular justice so requires.) But need the Court's opinion mean that Prohibition
would lie on an unexplained surmise of disallowance (as opposed to one
showing with some specificity why the plea of arbitrament was disallowed)? On this question, the language of the Court is suggestive.
Nothing was said about the possible differences between an arbitration
agreement and a commutation agreement, along the lines of my analysis
above. On the contrary (following Rolle), Chief Justice Coke started out
assimilating the two cases, not differentiating them. He could see no ba-
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sis for prohibiting a tithe suit merely because the parishioner claimed an
agreement to pay 10/ -- so here. Nor did Coke think there was any difference between the present case and two varieties of legacy case -- where
the executor claims merely of have paid the legacy, or where he claims to
have an acquittance for it. In those cases, as in the case of an agreement -commutation or arbitration -- ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the "principal" carries the "incidents." Coke went on to express his apparently general disapproval of Prohibitions to block enforcement of the two-witness
rule. (We shall see below that he held consistently to that view.) Justice
Houghton then intervened with what reads like a corrective note -- lest
Coke's assertion of the freedom of ecclesiastical courts to handle suits
properly brought there be overinterpreted. If a legacy suit is brought for a
lease, Houghton said, it should be prohibited. (I.e.: A testator bequeaths
an unexpired term of years to A. A. sues for it in the ecclesiastical court -properly in a strict sense, because a term of years in being is a chattel,
transmittable by will without the statutory power by which alone a man
could create interests in his freehold by will. Houghton held, however,
that the ecclesiastical suit was prohibitable ipso facto, upon bare surmise
that such a suit existed. The rationale for such a holding would seem to
be that ecclesiastical courts are presumptively unable to handle suits involving leases of land, which, though personal property, have too much
"real-estate flavor" for spiritual judges to be trusted with. I should be inclined to deduce from Houghton's position that ecclesiastical suits are
also prohibitable without disallowance surmise when a lease comes in
question -- as if, being sued for tithes, the parishioner claims a lease of the
rectory. Leases, in short, are "common law issues," unlike contracts.
With respect to contracts, including arbitrament, and the cases of payment
or acquittance of a legacy put by Coke, Houghton did not disagree.) Coke
immediately conceded Houghton's position on legacy suits for terms of
years. He went on to qualify his own former remarks: Although ecclesiastical courts should be free to entertain pleas of arbitrament and legacy-acquittance, they must handle them by common law standards, under pain
Prohibition. Justice Dodderidge endorsed that rule, whereupon the Court
advised plaintiff-in-Prohibition to come back if his plea of arbitrament
should be disallowed.
Coke then said that ecclesiastical law conflicted with common law as
to what constitutes a valid inter vivos gift of personal property, and that
an ecclesiastical court called to judge such a gift must apply the common
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law rule or be prohibited. This final remark (in Rolle's report) is significant. The case at hand plainly stimulated Coke's thinking about the principles of "conduct-controlling" Prohibitions. His mentioning an instance
of clear rule-conflict of no immediate relevance (ecclesiastical law held,
contrary to common law, that the property in goods cannot pass without
physical delivery) shows that his thinking turned to "Tanfield's principle." Putting his last remark together with his others, Coke's position
(and, as far as appears, the Court's) would come out as follows: There are
some issues, such as leases, which ecclesiastical courts should simply be
prevented from handling if the party complains. However, the list of such
issues should not be carelessly expanded; in general, the "incident" follows the "principal"; as a rule, disallowance surmise is required. In turn,
intervention upon disallowance surmise should be limited to those cases
where ecclesiastical rules clearly conflict with the common law--where
the ecclesiastical court either certainly has applied a conflicting rule, or,
because of its notoriously different standards, probably has. Ultimately,
the "common law issue" should be conceived as the limiting case: where
the likelihood of unacceptable handling is so strong that no disallowance
surmise, or at most an untraversable one, is required.
Bulstrode's report (which conflicts only in stating the case) confirms
this interpretation of Coke's position. In that version, he illustrates the
rule that the "incidents" follow the "principal" by an inter vivos gift. (A
legatee sues for a horse devised to him; the executor pleads that the testator gave the horse to him in his lifetime. Prohibition does not lie on bare
surmise of the plea. Incorporating Coke's point at the end of Rolle's report, it does not lie on bare surmise even though the rules on what constitutes conveyance of a horse are notoriously not the same in ecclesiastical
and common law.) Then, in Bulstrode's version, Coke goes on to say that
"common law matters" arising in ecclesiastical suits must be determined
by common law standards, citing the same rule-conflict (traditio is necessary to make gifts and leases good by ecclesiastical law.) In context,
"common law matters" may be translated as "matters on which the common law has specifiable rules capable of conflicting with ecclesiastical
rules." The point, as above, is clearly that certain or presumptive ruleconflict justifies Prohibition on disallowance surmise, not without it, unless in limiting cases (of which the inter vivos gift -- much less a plea of
arbitrament -- is not an example.)
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The application of these principles to Parker v. Kemp itself remains
unclear. Even apart from the conflict between the reports, it seems to me
worth asking whether disallowance of a plea of arbitrament would by itself point to a rule-conflict and hence justify a Prohibition. If an executor
was sued for a horse and pleaded a gift of the horse in the testator's lifetime, I take it he could have a Prohibition by surmising disallowance of
the plea. For the disallowance would be attributed to the unacceptable
(because cleanly conflicting) rule that livery is required to convey a
horse. Is there anything comparable to attribute disallowance of arbitrament to? Would even the extreme position that tithe disputes are not arbitrable clash with the common law? In Rolle's report, Coke admits that a
plea of arbitrament could be mishandled by common law standards. But
would an unexplained act of disallowance signify mishandling? Is it possible that Prohibition would lie only upon a showing that, after accepting
the plea of arbitrament in principle, the ecclesiastical court made a judgement on the terms of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrator's use of
his authority at odds with what the common law would do with a parallel
case? (The same kind of question may be put in connection with commutation agreements: Might the ecclesiastical court be free to disregard such
agreements altogether, but not free to construe them by its own lights?) If
Bulstrode is right on the facts -- i.e., if a disallowance surmise was finally
made and Prohibition nevertheless denied -- Parker v. Kemp holds that an
unexplained allegation that arbitrament was disallowed will not fetch a
Prohibition. Rolle is at least not incompatible with that result, for the
judges in that report do not guarantee that Prohibition would be granted
on any disallowance surmise.
Their thinking, as Rolle reports it, leans against easy Prohibitions and
tends, without coming to roost, to focus on the rule-conflict in comparable situations as the theoretical basis for "conduct-controlling" Prohibitions. In any event, both reports affirm that Prohibition will not lie to stop
a tithe suit on bare surmise of arbitrament.

D. Disallowance Surmises of Doubtful Necessity
Summary: For the general character of the cases in this section, see
immediately below. Because the cases fall into substantive sub-groups,
they do not admit of summary. The closest approach to a comprehensive
generalization about these cases would probably be that the presence of
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the disallowance surmise in situations where one might not expect it is
usually explicable. "When in doubt surmise disallowance" probably remains the best rule. Sometimes it might pay even when one could probably get by with a bare surmise that a suit or issue beyond a "foreign"
court's competence was before it.
* * *
The cases in the last two sub-sections tend to draw firm lines. Those
in B. say, "Disallowance of Plea X. may not be traversed." It follows
that anyone wanting to introduce Plea X. may have a Prohibition
virtually for the asking. That is to make X. a "common law issue," in the
sense of "an issue which will be determined at common law even though
the 'foreign' court is willing to accept X. as a generically valid plea, and
willing to determine its specific validity and factual truth by standards acceptable to the common law courts." (It does not follow from holding disallowance X. untraversable that disallowance need not be surmised pro
forma, nor that a fictitious disallowance surmise would be absolutely safe
against informal investigation of its bona fides.) The cases in C. say
"You may not have a Prohibition merely because you want to introduce
Plea Y. into the ecclesiastical suit; but if you were to make Plea Y. in
the ecclesiastical court and it were to be disallowed, then you certainly
could -- or possibly might -- have a Prohibition." In other words, Y. is not
a "common law issue" in the above sense.
In this sub-section, we shall look at cases in which the disallowance
surmise occurs, but in which it may not have been necessary. Cases of this
sort tend to blur lines. As "precedents," they count in favor of the disallowance surmise. If disallowance of Plea Z. is alleged and a Prohibition is
granted, one has a basis for arguing that Z. in not a "common law issue" - or at least that the surmise of disallowance is necessary as a form when
Z. is in question. However, that argument does not have much force unless there are many uncontradicted precedents or, better, decisions that
Prohibition will not lie without disallowance surmise. For there was never
any harm in surmising disallowance when one was in a position to do so
truthfully, and even doing so fictitiously carried little risk. Thus, the cases
in Section II above in which a Prohibition was granted do not establish
the necessity of the disallowance surmise for any set of circumstances,
except insofar as their bare precedential value can be supplemented. The
cases in the present sub-section are those whose precedential value is most
likely to be discountable. They are cases where Plea Z. is alleged to have

147

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
been disallowed, but they can be compared with other cases (treated later
in the study) in which Plea Z. seems to be regarded as a "common law issue," or basis for Prohibition without disallowance surmise. If you like,
they are precedents in favor of the disallowance surmise which, indecisive in themselves, are all the less significant because they are probably
outvoted by counter-precedents.
As a rule, however, comparability among cases cannot be so neatly established as to permit simple weighing of precedents. That is, Six Plea-Z.
cases in which Prohibition was granted without disallowance surmise versus one case in which disallowance was alleged would indeed suggest
that the surmise was superfluous in the anomalous case. But is the odd
case really comparable to the other six? It may belong to the genus of
Plea-Z. cases, but perhaps it has some differentiating feature which will
account for the presence of the disallowance surmise. In that event, the
relationship of the odd case to the others becomes more complex. The irregular case cuts less against the generalization "disallowance of Plea Z.
need not be laid" than it would if it were entirely indistinguishable from
the six cases. On the other hand, the disallowance surmise in the odd case
becomes more problematic. Was it necessary, because the special circumstances of the odd case really make prohibiting without a disallowance
surmise less plausible than in the standard cases? Or is surmising disallowance only understandable in the exceptional case -- probably not really necessary, because at bottom the case is only significant as a member
of the Plea-Z. genus, but a move which the party might naturally think it
to his advantage to make? Such problems are intimated in some of the
cases following. As this topic requires, I shall discuss the cases in subgroups, each one representing a type of claim asserted here by disallowance surmise, but possibly assertable without it.

(1) Prescriptive claims in tithe cases
First of all, one may wonder whether the disallowance surmise was
ever requisite when prescriptive claims were advanced in response to
tithe suits. The simplest case is where the ecclesiastical suit is for tithes
in kind and the parishioner puts forward a modus. From the untraversability of allegations that modi had been disallowed, and from the apparent absence of the disallowance surmise in most modus cases, I infer
that such a surmise was unnecessary even as a matter of form. The occasional instances in which disallowance of a modus certainly was alleged
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are therefore best taken as examples of cautious procedure -- ”playing it
safe” by laying disallowance, lest the adverse party take it into his head to
contend that at least a pro forma showing of misconduct on the part of the
ecclesiastical court is necessary to justify Prohibition. Price v. Mascoll
(discussed for procedural points in Vol. I)24 is a good example of the kind
of case in which the occurrence of a disallowance surmise is not surprising. The ecclesiastical action was a conglomerate suit covering several
products, in response to which the parishioner advanced five separate
modi, all of which were challenged in law upon demurrer. What we
know from the report is that plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s declaration laid disallowance of his modi. Of course nothing was said about the disallowance
in the discussion of the case, for the demurrer confessed that it had occurred. The point to be made is that the case probably represented a major showdown over a man’s liability for tithes on a substantial part of his
product -- a serious litigative investment, no doubt expected to “grow to a
demurrer.’’ The parishioner was trying to establish a number of legally
dubious modi, the parson to break them on the law, without running the
gamut of a jury. It is not surprising to see “cautious procedure’’ on the parishioner’s part. He had enough to worry about without inviting his adversary to object to the absence of any showing of disallowance; the
adversary was desperate to pick holes in his declaration. In sum, one can
see a reason for the allegation of disallowance in this case; in more routine cases, it may have been alleged pro forma more frequently than
meets the eye in the reports.
Less standard forms of prescription are somewhat more problematic.
Greene v. Hunne,25 like Price v. Mascoll, was a conglomerate tithe suit
prohibited on different grounds for different products. The parson took legal exception to the Prohibition on all counts, but on motion for Consultation rather than demurrer. With respect to at least one product (wool)
plaintiff-in-Prohibition surmised disallowance. Being sued for the de jure
tithe, he claimed a customary right to pay his whole annual tithe at Lammas, instead of at the several times when it was sheared, and to have set
out the tithe at Lammas. The parson’s counsel (Bacon) argued that this
claim amounted to a mere plea of payment, as such determinable in the
24
25

T. M. 12 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 238.
M. 41/42 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.120; Add. 25,200, f.164b.
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ecclesiastical court. In reply, the Court appears to attach importance to the
disallowance surmise that accompanied the parishioner's claim: "...It is
due now by the law, because it is a good prescription to pay it at a certain
day, and if the spiritual court will not allow it (as it is alleged they will
not) it is reason to prohibit them." The suggestion there is that the ecclesiastical court must be given a chance to entertain a claim that tithes were
paid at a time or place defined by special custom; that Prohibition will not
lie on bare surmise that tithes are demanded de jure, whereas custom defines a special manner of payment, according to which payment was rendered. That implies that the ecclesiastical court may try the custom if it is
controverted, and if the ecclesiastical court is willing -- not only that it
may try whether performance according to the custom took place.
Quod nota, for there is the disturbing point in the Court's opinion. It is
entirely reasonable to say that a plea amounting to "I have done my duty"
should be tried in the ecclesiastical court in principle, but that the prescriptive element gives the common law a foothold to intervene if the plea
is disallowed (contrary to Bacon.) The presumptive reason for the disallowance would be ecclesiastical unwillingness to let usage vary the de
jure duty. But is it consistent to insure that any controverted commutation
may be tried at common law for the asking, while leaving the trial of customs going to the time, place, or manner of payment in kind to the ecclesiastical court? Are ecclesiastical methods and standards more
appropriate to the one than the other? Because these questions arise, one
might be reluctant to push the apparent meaning of the opinion in Greene
v. Hunne too far. In context, the opinion was addressed to Bacon's argument that no control could be exercised over ecclesiastical handling of an
"I have done my duty" plea. The Court fell back on the disallowance surmise that was at hand. If there had been no such surmise, I would not be
confident that the judges would have granted Consultation quoad the
wool. A Prohibition had been granted; in the event, the judges knocked
down all of Bacon's objections to it; how ready they would have been to
listen to a complaint about the absence of a disallowance surmise, if such
had been possible, seems questionable. The effect of upholding the Prohibition on motion for Consultation would in all probability be to put the
whole of a complicated wrangle over custom before a jury. The judges
might well have preferred to include the custom concerning the wool in
the common package. If they had no disallowance surmise to justify doing so, the mere presence of a prescriptive claim might have served.
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In Fosse v. Parker et al.,26 the disallowance surmise occurs in connection with a parishioner's attempt to escape tithes on a by-product via an
exiguous modus. I doubt whether the surmise helped the parishioner, but
it may have been used in the deliberate hope of saving a weak cause. The
ecclesiastical suit was for neck-wool of 800 sheep -- i.e., wool cut from
around the animal's neck and head, as distinct from the main fleece. The
parishioner alleged that it was customary to trim this wool from the sheep
in the autumn to protect them from vermin; that this operation improved
the quality of the fleeces; that the custom was to pay one fleece out of ten
at shearing time; that the neck-wool was of "no value" (meaning, presumably, in strictness, no merchantable value, or so little that one tenth of it
could not possibly be worth more than what the parson gained in verminfree fleeces.) This matter was allegedly pleaded in the ecclesiastical court
and disallowed. Nevertheless, the King's Bench refused unanimously to
prohibit. The judges took the position that cutting off a little too much in
the name of neck-wool was an all-too easy form of deception. They saw
no consideration for the exemption of the neck-wool in the improved
quality of the fleeces and gave no sign of willingness to let the parishioner off his customary hook by holding that non-fraudulent neck-wool
was exempt de jure. Obviously the same result would have come about if
there had been no disallowance surmise. Subsequently, the parishioner
came back with a good modus -- that the fleeces were wound at shearingtime, in consideration of which extra labor the neck-wool was exempt -and got his Prohibition without controversy. If the judges had seen good
consideration as the custom was originally laid and had not been worried
about encouraging fraud, they would surely have prohibited without the
disallowance surmise.
I would conjecture, however, that the parishioner had a calculated reason for including it. The parishioner was obviously in the sheep business
in a pretty big way. Judging by the ease with which he came up with an
unexceptionable modus in the end, it looks as if he may have decided to
take a shot at a better thing in the first instance, falling back on the extrawork modus if necessary. That is, that it was really customary to wind the
wool would perhaps not be so easy to prove. Anyhow, it would be nice to
26
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escape that extra duty. So why not have a crack at establishing a modus
involving no extra work, or even, with luck, a de jure exemption for the
neck-wool? But then the parishioner wonders, correctly enough, whether
his preferred modus really has much of a chance. Wanting to gamble, one
might figure that it was at least worth trying in the ecclesiastical court.
With a bad enough claim, one might as well try to persuade an ecclesiastical court first, using the common law as one's fail-safe device and in the
meanwhile afflicting the other party with protracted litigation. (The report
tells us that the ecclesiastical court gave sentence for the parson. That
proves that the disallowance surmise was not fabricated and suggests that
the parishioner made a serious effort before seeking a Prohibition.)
Secondly, there was always some chance that the absence of a disallowance surmise would be held against one, the more so if the judges suspected one's honesty and motives and needed an excuse for refusing
Prohibition. Finally, the parishioner in our case did a little more than allege his purported modus; he alleged that the neck-wool was of "no
value." That claim was included in what the ecclesiastical court had disallowed. Might the parishioner not have figured that disallowance of that
factual claim would provide an outside basis for Prohibition if, as it
turned out to be, the modus was held bad on its face? I.e.: Might one not
argue for a Prohibition on the theory that the ecclesiastical court had unreasonably refused one an opportunity to show that the neck-wool, though
neither generically exempt by law nor sufficiently contributory to the
value of the main crop to sustain a considerate modus, was, in fact, taken
in such form and amount as to constitute a waste-product, which a man
should not have to go to the trouble of setting out for the parson and
which, even if it should have some sort of incidental use, cannot be considered part of the regular profits of agriculture wherein the Church is entitled to share? There is no sign that any such argument was made in the
face of a thoroughly unreceptive Court, but it could conceivably have figured in the original design of the surmise. In sum, thought my points are
speculative, it seems to me that the disallowance surmise in Fosse v.
Parker can be sufficiently explained by the peculiarities of the case to deprive it of precedential value.
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Finally, in the Caroline Halsey v. Halsey,27 disallowance of a prescriptive claim was alleged in a suit for obstructing the parson's access to his
tithes. Such suits were appropriate to ecclesiastical courts by virtue of the
statute of 2/3 Edw.6, c. 13, sect. ii, and perhaps at common law as well.
A parson was not confined to protecting his right of way to carry off
tithes by common law proceedings; he could sue a parishioner in the ecclesiastical court for closing the usual or most convenient access-way,
even though he had not been absolutely shut out and hence denied the
tithes themselves. In this case, the parishioner claimed that he had not obstructed the true customary access-way. In other words, by prescription
Route A was the way to which the parson was entitled, and that route was
not obstructed; the parson was improperly claiming free passage by Route
B. The parishioner sought a Prohibition on what looks like a deliberately
double-barrelled surmise: (a) because the matter above was pleaded in the
ecclesiastical court and disallowed; (b) because cognizance of a prescriptive right of way (as opposed to a merely "usual or most convenient" way,
in the absence of any strictly prescriptive rights) belongs to the common
law. The Court overruled the Prohibition on demurrer, on the ground that
cognizance over ways to carry tithes belonged to ecclesiastical courts.
I.e.: So far as the report indicates, the judges simply took the position that
the common law had no business interfering in access-way suits, even
when the conduct of the ecclesiastical court in handling a prescriptionbased defense was complained of. I assume that the ecclesiastical courts'
statutory authority to entertain such suits was relied on primarily, though
the report is too brief to show that.
Obviously, the Prohibition would have been held all the less justifiable
by this Court if there had been no disallowance surmise. I have considerable doubt whether most earlier courts would have made the same decision. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition himself may have thought that his claim
would be just as good if it had rested solely on the theory that disputes
about customary rights of way should be determined at common law (for
judging by the scanty report, it looks as if that theory was emphasized in
his declaration and the disallowance thrown in.) The case for prohibiting
on bare surmise that a prescriptive right of way was at issue in an ecclesi27
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astical suit might be especially good because exactly the same facts would
generate common law rights in the strong sense of "rights assertable in
common law proceedings." If parson has in fact used Route A (and not
used Route B) from time immemorial he ought not only to lose his ecclesiastical suit for passage via Route B (as a parson who has in fact always
taken 6d. should lose his suit for tithes in kind); he has a common law easement over Route A and lacks one over Route B. On the other hand, the
statute would be a good reason for insisting on the disallowance surmise
even if, contrary to the Court in Halsey v. Halsey, one were disposed to
prohibit.

(2) De jure exemption from tithes
I would expect surmises of disallowance to be unnecessary and untraversable when plaintiff-in-Prohibition's claim was the de jure exemption
from tithes of the product sued for. That case seems even stronger than
the modus case in some ways. The surmise of disallowance makes no appearance in the vast majority of cases of this sort. The claim of de jure
exemption could take two forms: A pure legal claim (the object actually
named in the libel ought not to pay tithes by the law), and a partially factual claim (the libel speaks generically of a product which does owe
tithes, but the special form of the product which the parishioner has in
fact belongs to an exempt sub-category.) A case of 160928 illustrates the
second kind: A man was sued for herbage consumed by cattle (generically tithable), pleaded that the herbage was entirely consumed by draft
animals (exempt de jure), and got a Prohibition on surmise that the plea
was disallowed. A argument could perhaps be made for the necessity of
putting in a plea and waiting for it to be disallowed because of the factual
component in the claim. If the ecclesiastical court is perfectly willing to
respect the legal rule (draft animals exempt), why should it not be left to
try a simple matter of fact (were all the beasts who ate this grass draft animals?) and, if the claim is false, to award recovery of tithes? It is more
cumbrous to prohibit whatever the ecclesiastical court has done, to try the
factual issue at common law, and, if the parishioner's claim is falsified, to
remit the suit by Consultation. Nevertheless, I would guess that a Prohibition could have been had without surmising disallowance.
28
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Pothill v. May29 was of the same form: Suit for herbage consumed by
geldings; partially factual response (the geldings were saddle horses used
purely for pleasure, hence not tithable); Prohibition granted, disallowance
having been surmised. The only difference between this case and the last
one is that the legal issue was more debatable. Whereas grass used to sustain "means of production" was clearly exempt, and grass turned to profit
-- grazing for sale or hire -- was clearly taxable, the status of grass supporting means of recreation was rarely discussed. If that rather interesting
and tricky question had been raised by a surmise making no reference to
the ecclesiastical court's conduct, would the Court have been tempted to
put it off on the ground that the ecclesiastical court should have the first
crack? Quite the contrary, I would expect the judges to take it for their
duty to settle any genuinely problematic question on tithability however
the problem presented itself. (Although extensive debate is not reported,
they did so here by endorsing a profitability theory -- as it were, grass is
not tithable because the earth yields it, but because it is a source of income, as opposed to both capital and consumption.)
A final case 30 presented two legal problems. (i) Does a parishioner
owe tithes on apples stolen from the trees? May he be held to insure the
parson against loss of tithes by theft, when the theft occurs before harvest
and the parishioner never realized his nine-tenths of the product? The
Court said "No" in the case of a straight theft, but added that the parishioner is liable for tithes on his apples if he suffers a stranger to pick them
-- i.e., I take it, gives them away or stands by knowingly while the neighbor boys take their fill, even though he realizes no profit by harvesting or
by selling the crop on the trees. Justice Yelverton went a step further: One
who lets apples hang on the trees past the time when they should be
picked, thus inviting thieves, is liable for tithes if thieves accept the invitation. (ii) An involved problem concerning old cows who had gone dry:
The parishioner was apparently sued generically for herbage consumed
by cattle. According to him, the cattle in question were all "ancient" milk
cows, the feeding of which had followed a somewhat complicated course.
They were pastured with heifers (exempt "replacement stock") for a

29
30
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month, then moved to a harvested hay field, then fed on hay in the barn.
The parishioner presumably wanted to claim that under these circumstances no tithes were due, while the parson wanted to argue that all the
feed eaten by such "dry cattle" outside the exempt categories of breeding,
replacement, and draft stock was tithable. The Court held clearly that
nothing was due on the post-harvest meadow-grass or on the fed-out hay,
because the first was within the exemption for by-products or secondary
uses, while the latter had obviously already been tithed. The grass eaten
by the old cows when they were mixed in with the heifers gave the judges
pause, but they were inclined to hold it tithable.
The parishioner in this case said that he had made his plea on both
points in the ecclesiastical court and had been disallowed. It is easy
enough to believe that he had actually done so, for he wanted to raise
rather detailed points of law (rather than general questions on the principles of tithability), on which the ecclesiastical court would perhaps have
been as likely as not to rule in his favor. My guess would be that a bare
surmise would have sufficed to get the Prohibition considered, but there
might have been incidental danger in that course. The report does not give
the disposition of the case. For the cows, a partial Prohibition would seem
clearly the right solution, give the Judges' inclination on the merits; even
for the apples, a qualified Prohibition cannot be ruled out -- ita quod they
were stolen without the parishioner's fault (the ecclesiastical court being
left to determine the fact.) That result (assuming it to be the one that conforms to the judges' opinion) might conceivably be harder to get to without the surmise of disallowance. With that surmise, the record showed
that the ecclesiastical court had rejected the parishioner's justifications altogether (i.e., had held by implication, as to the apples, that regardless of
fault the parson should not bear the loss from theft and, as to the cows,
that new-growth grass after haying is tithable if grazed.)
Those were plain errors, correctable by an appropriately tailored Prohibition. If the parishioner had come with a bare surmise, as to the apples -"I am sued in respect of apples stolen before they were harvested, which
are not tithable by the law" -- the Prohibition could conceivably fail on
demurrer, for, construing the claim against the plaintiff, it might be that
the theft resulted from his negligence, In other words, a bare surmise runs
some risk unless it states the law as the judges hold it to be with full accuracy; a surmise of disallowance will get a least a partial Prohibition if it
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shows the ecclesiastical court to have erred in any controllable way. For
the cows, a bare surmise would have done the job the parishioner was entitled to have done ("I am sued in respect to new-growth and fed-out hay,
non-tithable products"), but he was probably shooting for total exemption.
If he was careful to specify the three separate categories of feed as such,
he could have made his bid and been give the two-thirds of a loaf he deserved. But if he was careless about his theory -- saying, perhaps, "I am
sued in respect of 'ancient' milk cows" -- he might be in trouble, for the
judges clearly thought that class of cattle tithable as such. The alternative
theory making for total exemption -- that tithable grass eaten for a short
time by animals generally nourished on non-tithable feed and representing an incalculable fraction of pasture generally exempt because used
for heifers should not count -- is hard to state crisply. Showing that facts
in at least some degree favorable to the parishioner had been pleaded, and
that the ecclesiastical court had improperly refused to consider them justificatory in any degree, was the easier way to raise the question of what, in
somewhat complicated circumstances, the parishioner was entitled to.

(3) Bounds of parishes
It was sometimes claimed in response to tithe suits that the produce
sued for was not grown in the parish of the parson suing. There is plenty
of authority that a bare surmise -- "I am sued by the Parson of A.,
whereas my land is in B." -- would get a Prohibition in that case, without
a showing of disallowance. If the Parson of A. wanted to contest the Prohibition, he should traverse the factual statement, for the bounds of parishes were triable by jury at common law. That principle also held when,
less frequently, parish borders came in question in litigation over matters
other than tithes.
I have two cases in which disallowance of a plea respecting the bounds
of parishes was alleged. The first31 is clearly to be accounted for by its
early date (1585), for the reports show the judges in doubt as to whether
Prohibition would lie even with the disallowance. The facts were straightforward: One was sued for tithes purportedly produced in A., pleaded that
they were actually produced in B., and sought a Prohibition because the
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plea was disallowed. The Court was reportedly in great doubt, inclining to
the generalized view that since the tithe suit was properly begun in the ecclesiastical court, there was no common law power to regulate its handling. (So, tout court, says the report. It is hard to see the disallowance as
at all reasonable, unless on evidentiary grounds which the ecclesiastical
court was entitled to. But then, if the decision was utterly unreasonable, it
might be controllable by appeal. The church could have no conceivable
interest, across the board, in permitting Parson A. to collect Parson B.'s
tithes, though in particular situations one can easily imagine ecclesiastical
courts' preferring that boundaries not be disputed. For example, Parson
A. is a hardworking clergyman in a none-too rich parish, while Parson B.
is a wealthy impropriator, or a comfortable non-resident who is unlikely
to press for the full value of his tithes. In our actual case, it is interesting
to note, plaintiff-in-Prohibition was farmer of a neighboring parish -- i.e.,
a layman who, as lessee of the tithes in one parish, would probably contribute not a penny to the Church if the bounds question fell out in his favor. The rent paid by such a farmer to his lessor might, depending on
countless local realities, represent an excellent bargain. Ruling out a
bounds plea flatly is too overt a means to an administrative end to attribute even to a court convinced that the end is just; demanding a proffer of
strong evidence when a bounds plea is introduced is the obvious way to
redraw parish lines sub rosa.)
The Court thus doubting, Tanfield, of counsel for plaintiff-in-Prohibition, cited a recent case in his favor -- Briges v. Massye (not independently reported.) Tanfield said that he himself had been a lawyer in
that case; that a Prohibition had been granted there on the same matter as
was shown in this case; that the Court in Briges v. Massye had said that
the bounds of parishes are "merely temporal" and triable at common law;
and that he personally knew that the bounds question in that case was
tried by jury at the last Assizes. Confronted with this evidence, the Court
assigned a day for production of precedents. There is no further report.
As Tanfield described it, Briges v. Massye appears to have been based
on reasoning that would make surmising disallowance pointless. If the
question "Is Blackacre in A or B?" intrinsically demands common law
trial, an ecclesiastical suit in which it arises should be prohibited, whatever the policy of the ecclesiastical court and whether or not the defendant there has gone through the motions of pleading his version of the
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truth. The principal case shows, however, that that point was by no means
settled in 1585. It is no wonder that plaintiff-in-Prohibition surmised disallowance, and even with that surmise he may not have succeeded.
The other case in which disallowance of a plea respecting parish
bounds was certainly alleged32 did not originate from a tithe suit. Rather,
a man was prosecuted criminally in an ecclesiastical court for failure to
attend services at his parish church. He pleaded that the church he was
accused of not attending was not his parish church, and that he did regularly attend another church. Then he sought a Prohibition by a twofold
surmise: (i) that he had not been allowed to plead his justification; (ii) that
ecclesiastical courts do not have authority to determine the precinct of
parish churches. In other words, plaintiff-in-Prohibition did not rely on
disallowance essentially. Because of the second element in the surmise,
the case counts in favor of the rule that disallowance need not be shown,
even fictitiously, to prohibit ecclesiastical courts form determining the
bounds of parishes. (The Court granted the Prohibition unanimously.)
The occurrence of the disallowance claim is not surprising. Possibly a
Prohibition could have been obtained on the bare surmise that parish
bounds were in question, but it is understandable that the accused chose
to plead and pleaded as he did. He might have hope of defeating the
charge against him by showing that he frequented some church, even
waiving his claim about the parish boundaries. (As to whether it would
have been a justified hope, cf. Browne’s Case in Section II above.)
Nevertheless, a man might suppose that attendance elsewhere would
be an excuse. He might also suppose that his chance for a Prohibition
would be reinforced by the ecclesiastical court’s rejection of “substitute
performance,” especially in the light of its acceptability for the purposes
of statutory recusancy. Prohibiting on the bare surmise that bounds were
in question might conceivably be objected to in this sort of case (as opposed to tithe suits) on the ground that criminal liability for non-attendance at church would not necessarily depend on the resolution of the
bounds question. It would not depend thereon if the ecclesiastical court
were willing to accept habitual attendance at any church, or any reasonable church, as an excuse. By pleading and surmising as he did, plaintiff32
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in-Prohibition made it appear that the ecclesiastical court did insist on the
parish church, and therefore that it would have to try the bounds, as it
ought not. Finally, absence of a disallowance surmise might be objected
to in more general terms in this sort of case, simply because ecclesiastical
courts had express authority by the Uniformity Act to punish failure to attend church.

(4)Incumbency
A couple of cases on the ecclesiastical plaintiff's incumbency -- hence
his title to sue for tithes -- involve possibly superfluous claims of disallowance. In general, I think it is clear that a parishioner who wanted to
claim that his adversary was not parson of the parish in question needed
to make such a plea in the ecclesiastical court. (Cf. Pendleton v. Green,
above.) But the circumstances of the present cases were special. In
Glover v. Shedd, 33 the parishioner pleaded that one Morgan, rather than
his adversary (Glover), was rector. The plea was disallowed and sentence
given for Glover. A Prohibition was granted, not simply because of the
disallowance, but because a verdict in a recent common law suit concerning the living found Morgan the true rector. The disallowance would have
been enough (following Pendleton v. Green); but so, perhaps, was the
verdict. It is entirely natural that the parishioner pleaded Glover's non-incumbency, intending, presumably, to rely on the verdict as evidence. Suppose, however, that he had relied on the verdict as the sole grounds for
Prohibition. ("I am sued for tithes by G., who pretends to be parson of X.,
whereas it appears by verdict that M., specifically rather than G., is parson.") I am not sure that Prohibition would lie on that surmise, without
any showing that an attempt to defeat Glover's incumbency and to use the
verdict to that end had been made in the ecclesiastical court, but I would
not be confident the other way either. The discussion of the case does not
help resolve that question, for as things stood the plea had been pleaded
and sentence given. The judges (Coke and Dodderidge speak in the report) needed only to say that the sentence against the verdict was wrong,
that it resulted from a technicality of the ecclesiastical law on livings that
conflicted with the common law, and that the common law was fully
competent to decide the issue of "Parson or not parson?" (The last point, I
33
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think, was by way of saying that "Parson or not parson?" is not primarily
or essentially an ecclesiastical question, so much so that the ecclesiastical
court would be free to go its own way even in the face of a verdict. I
would not take the judges as saying that "Parson or not parson?" was triable at common law whenever a party wanted it tried there -- like a modus or the bounds or parishes -- but that if the issued happened to be tried
in connection with common actions (normally Quare impedits) the verdict would conclude ecclesiastical courts, as a verdict on a modus
would.)
In Reynolds v. Dr. Lockett,34 Prohibition was denied because it was
not sought until after two appeals (see the case in Vol. I.) If plaintiff-inProhibition had moved sooner, he could clearly have had a writ, possibly
without the allegation of disallowance which he made. In this case, a parishioner sought to defeat a tithe-suit by disputing his opponent's incumbency on two grounds: (i) he had not read the articles as required by 13
Eliz., c. 12 (wherefore he was ipso facto deprived even if he was otherwise lawful parson); (ii) He was instituted and inducted before the living
was legally vacant (hence was not lawfully instituted and inducted.) The
parishioner pleaded this matter and was disallowed. (Presumably his appeals disputed the disallowance, unless he had some further defense.)
While turning the Prohibition down on procedural grounds, the Common
Pleas said that in substance the writ lay because both the reading of the
articles and the induction were temporal matters, triable at common law.
Putting it that way suggests that the disallowance need not have been alleged (though of course it is not surprising that it was, since the parishioner had pleaded in the ecclesiastical court, not nominally, but with the
purpose of litigating there, as the appeals show.) (Ironically, his "purpose
of litigating there" -- genuine acquiescence -- may have counted against him
on the procedural point, yet not alleging disallowance might have counted
even more heavily against him on the same score. For his appeals may, at
least, have been to contest the disallowance that appeared of record. If he
had come with a bare surmise -- i.e., showing no attempt to use the failure
to read the articles, etc., in the ecclesiastical court -- his delay would perhaps seem more unaccountable.)

34
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The Court's language seems to point to the sufficiency of either of two
bare surmises: (i) "I am sued for tithes by one who is not parson because
he has not read the articles." (ii) "I am sued by one who is not parson because his purported induction took place before the living was vacant."
The justification for the first would be that reading the articles is a statutory duty, the consequences of non-performance being created and defined solely by statute, therefore within common law jurisdiction by
virtue of the common law courts' responsibility for the interpretation and
enforcement of statues. (Serious questions can be raised about this reasoning, as we have seen Should non-common law courts be prohibited
before they have actually misapplied a statute -- as the ecclesiastical court
in this case would not appear to have done -- without the allegation of disallowance? To put it another way, does common law authority to enforce
statutory rights entail authority to try questions of fact arising in connection with such rights? Admitting that the ecclesiastical court in this case
should be prohibited for a disallowance that seems to imply disrespect
for, or misunderstanding of, the statute, is it so clear that an ecclesiastical
court which, so far as appears, perfectly understands and respects the statute should be prohibited from trying whether a parson did read the articles -- a "simple" fact, hardly requiring communal knowledge beyond the
information witnesses could supply?)
As for the second element: it was always recognized that induction
(though performed by ecclesiastical officers) was the "temporal" part of
installation in a benefice -- "investiture with the temporalities," as institution was "investiture with the spiritualities." In our case, the claim was
that both the institution and induction were void, but is was no doubt the
induction that gave the common law its stake. (The ecclesiastical court
could probably not have been controlled if it chose to hold that the parson's institution was good even though it was premature.) I wonder, however, whether the induction gave the common law enough of a stake to
warrant the rule which the court's language in our case seems to suggest - i.e., that ecclesiastical courts could be prohibited merely in order to insure that factual and legal questions about an induction (here, whether it
took place before the living was vacant and whether that mattered legally)
be determined at common law. If Prohibition should lie on bare surmise
that there was an issue concerning induction, "Parson or not parson?" in
effect becomes a "common law issue" in the same sense as a modus or
bounds of parishes (malgré my remarks at the end of the last case.) For

162

Problems of the Disallowance Surmise
"Parson or not parson?" inevitably involves the question "Was X. duly inducted into the living" (as it also involves whether the non-temporal acts
of admission and institution duly occurred.) Dodderidge in Glover v.
Shedd said in so many words that "Parson or not parson?" includes induction (whence, in that case, it followed that there was enough temporal "interest" in "Parson or not parson?" to justify insisting on the verdict.) As I
argued, I doubt that any more follows. By the same token, I am skeptical
about taking Reynolds v. Dr. Lockett as far as the language of the Court
suggests. I would be inclined to read it as saying that a question about induction gives the common law enough interest to scrutinize a disallowance, but probably no more. In other words, though the Court accepted
the language urged by the plaintiff (" ... because the not-reading of the articles and the induction are both temporal things and ought to be tried by
the common law"), I would wonder whether that is not shorthand for "apparent failure to respect the statute, combined with apparent endorsement
of the strange rule that induction before the living was vacant is good,
gives quite sufficient grounds for Prohibition, in the light of our guardianship over statutes and our primary authority to determine questions about
induction." The disallowance, in short, is more likely than not to have
been essential, though the opposite possibility exists.

(5)Parson and vicar
Several cases concerning the rival claims of parsons and vicars to
tithes touch on the need to allege disallowance. There is authority that the
right of tithes as between parson and vicar was a purely ecclesiastical
question, so strictly so that ecclesiastical courts could not be prohibited
however they handled it. But some cases dispute that authority.
In Blinco v. Marston,35 a vicar sued the parson himself for tithes.
There is nothing strange about such a suit, for a parson might own land in
the parish as a private person, from which he would owe the vicar any
tithes with which the latter was endowed (typically, "small tithes.") In
this case, the parson pleaded that the land from which tithes were sought
was his glebe (i.e., land constituting part of living and held by the parson
in his corporate capacity.) He sued a Prohibition upon surmise that the
35
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plea was improperly disallowed. After perhaps a moment's hesitation on
Justice Fenner's part, he and Justice Gawdy (alone in court) granted the
Prohibition. It was subsequently confirmed by the Court as a whole. All
that the judges and counsel talked about was whether glebe owes small
tithes as a matter of law where the vicar's endowment gives him such
tithes but does not specify whether the glebe is liable. The Court decided
that small tithes are not due from the glebe so long as it remains in the
parson's own hands, contra if he leases it. On the first motion, Fenner
was inclined to think that prescription would prevail against general rule.
(If the vicarage went back before the time of memory, and through all
that time the glebe had paid vicarial tithes, it was liable.) If Fenner had
any doubt about the Prohibition, it was because of that point -- because
nothing on the record excluded the possibility that the vicar was suing by
virtue of a prescriptive title over and above his endowment. That idea
might relate to the surmise of disallowance. Fenner may have been wondering, "Can we be absolutely sure that the ecclesiastical court did not
rule out the parson's defense because the vicar's claim was based on prescription?"
Otherwise, however, nothing said in the case suggests that the judges
had any doubt about prohibiting with the surmise of disallowance. One
may therefore wonder whether they would have had any more hesitation
without it. Nothing, that is to say, lends countenance to the view that construction of standard vicarial endowments (for such purposes as whether
small tithes from glebe land are included within general language referring to small tithes) is strictly an ecclesiastical problem. Why it should
not be is hard to see, in view of the frequently-stated doctrine that parsonvicar contentions (normally over the construction of particular endowments) belonged exclusively to ecclesiastical cognizance. One suspects
solicitude for typical lay economic interests in the general case: fear lest
ecclesiastical courts make a general rule that glebe owes vicarial tithes in
the absence of express provision to the contrary, to the detriment of impropriators and benefit of working clergymen. In any event, if the common law had interest enough to insist on its construction of standard
endowments quoad the liability of glebe, it is perhaps arguable that the
common law's right to make and enforce the general rule should be assertable without regard to the ecclesiastical court's conduct. A bare surmise, in other words -- "I am sued for vicarial tithes in respect of my
glebe" -- perhaps ought to fetch a Prohibition. There is of course no way

164

Problems of the Disallowance Surmise
to be sure whether it would, and Blinco v. Marston is a precedent for surmising disallowance.
In Ryver v. Pell,36 at least Justices Gawdy and Fenner (who originally
granted the Prohibition in Blinco v. Marston) held out stubbornly against
a formidable defense of the ecclesiastical courts' exclusive jurisdiction
over the tithe-split between parson and vicar. They did so in such a way,
however, as to suggest that only ecclesiastical misconduct would justify
common law intervention. In this case, a parson sued for tithes of wood
and furze. The parishioner pleaded that those tithes belonged to the vicar
by prescription. A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the plea had
been disallowed. Consultation was then moved for, on the ground that the
distribution of tithes between parson and vicar was up to the ecclesiastical
courts, whether prescription or anything else was claimed as the basis for
the distribution. On the first bearing, Gawdy and Fenner opposed Consultation. (They were probably alone in court. At any rate, nothing is reported from other judges.) The two Justices claimed to have previous
practice on their side. Fenner said that prescriptions (and compositions to
boot) ''are more properly triable here than in the spiritual court." He and
Gawdy did, however, expressly give the disallowance as their reason for
thinking the Prohibition good -- as if to say, "Even though the issue is
'more properly triable here,' we could not claim it unless the ecclesiastical court had demonstrated unwillingness to try the same." Since it was a
motion for Consultation that was before them, the two judges would have
been obliged to deny it if their state of mind had only been one of doubt.
They told the parson's counsel he could plead to the Prohibition, as it was
of course his right to do whether he was invited or not. I suppose the
judges "issued an invitation" in order not to be altogether discouraging
about a demurrer, but it is not clear from the report that that was their intention, and they were hardly encouraging.
Under the circumstances, the parson was well-advised to stick with his
motion as the means of raising legal objections to the Prohibition. The
motion for Consultation was introduced again on two subsequent occasions, and big guns, in the persons of both Coke and Tanfield, were
36
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brought on to argue for it. On the first occasion, Coke stated his side's
analysis of the case in general terms -- that there was nothing at issue except the right of tithes between vicar and parson, and that exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction over that issue was well-warranted by authority -then cited the case of Hunt v. Bushe as an exact judicial precedent in his
favor. His success was indifferent, for the Clerk of the Court affirmed
Hunt v. Bushe but added that "since then it has often been ruled to contrary," and Justice Gawdy (who alone speaks from the Bench) said "we
want to advise," whereupon the case was adjourned.
The next term, Tanfield came on with some Year Book citations, and
again with Hunt v. Bushe (which he said was like the present case in form
-- similar surmise, motion for Consultation granted after argument.)
Then, Tanfield made a semi-concession: If a parson sues for tithes and the
parishioner claims an immemorial practice of paying a commutation to
the vicar, then "perhaps" Prohibition will lie; contra here, where the parishioner admits the duty to pay tithes in kind and seeks to avoid paying
the parson only by raising the ecclesiastical issue of the parson-vicar split.
(One wonders whether the precedents contrary to Hunt v. Bushe mentioned by the Clerk on the earlier occasion could be swept away by this
distinction -- i.e., whether they were all complicated by modi. Tanfield
did not say so expressly, though that may have been the possibility he
wanted to suggest.) Coke followed with more citations and the same general arguments. Interestingly, however, he took back what Tanfield had
conceded. (Counsel on the same side sometimes disagreed with one another. I think the basic explanation is that they took their role as "officers
of the Court" and periti seriously, and did not altogether suppress what
they thought in the interest of concerted strategy. However, intended or
not, the effect might not be entirely unstrategic: Tanfield concedes a
point by way of saying that this case should not be confused with the related one, where the modus is "perhaps" the heart of the parishioner's defense. Then Coke says, "No, not even in the modus case does Prohibition
lie, a fortiori here." In any event, Coke analyzed the modus case the other
way around: " ... for although a modus decimandi is triable at common
law, yet it is not material in the said case, nor comes in question. For
whether the vicar should have tithes in kind or a modus decimandi is not
material when the suit is between the parson and the parishioner, but the
debate there is whether the parson or the vicar should have the tithes.
[Hence the 'debate' is a purely ecclesiastical as in the instant case.]")
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Justices Gawdy and Fenner were jarred enough to retreat a step in general principle, for they conceded exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction
when the "debate" is between two clergyman. But if one party to the "debate" is an impropriator, they said, things are different. Coke immediately
corrected them on that, but to no avail. (Indeed, the relevance of the concession for the case at hand is unclear. Here the "debate," in the sense of
the litigation, was between parson -- lay or clerical -- and lay parishioner.
Would the Justices' principle give the common law jurisdiction because
at least one party to the suit was lay, or would it make the jurisdiction depend on whether the parson in this case was a clergyman or an impropriator -- a fact we are not given?) The case was again adjourned, to be heard
of no more, but the reporter concludes with his impression that the Court
was still inclined to uphold the Prohibition. (Specific judges other than
Gawdy and Fenner are not mentioned, but until those two were won over
the motion for Consultation could not get a majority. The parson would
be foolish to demur after trying so hard and so unsuccessfully to put his
motion across. If he still wanted to contend he presumably took issue on
the prescription, resigning a good case to the limbo of fact.) To the merit
of the positions in Ryver v. Pell we shall return when we take up other
cases on the parson-vicar problem. For present purposes, it is enough to
note that disallowance was surmised, unsurprisingly in the light of the obvious unsettlement of the substantive question; that Gawdy and Fenner
gave a hint that surmising disallowance may have been essential to the
parishioner's case; on the other hand, that at least those judges were
strong enough for keeping a prescriptive claim against the parson in common law hands to permit the speculation that they would have favored the
Prohibition even without the disallowance.
One early Jacobean report37 is both garbled and inconclusive, but it
provides a further scrap of evidence of the disallowance surmise used to
37

H. 2 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,213, f.58b. No decision reported. A parson was trying to stop a vicar
from recovering tithes by showing a composition, while the vicar was relying on prescription.
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claim common law intervention between parson and vicar. It was used
again in the somewhat special circumstances of Horne v. Tuke.38 Tuke
was vicar, Horne lessee of the rectory. Tuke sued Horne for tithes of a recently erected cornmill (ten per cent of the "toll" taken for grinding
people's corn.) Horne pleaded a "composition-real" made in 1566, before
the mill existed, whereby the parson was assigned the standard "great
tithes" (hay and corn) and the vicar the rest. (This species of composition-real was a permanent settlement of the distribution of tithes between parson and vicar arrived at by the agreement of those two parties
and the bishop, who made a sealed instrument incorporating the same.
It is to be distinguished from a mere bargain between the parson and
vicar for the time being, and also from the other sort of composition-real,
whereby clergyman, bishop, and patron assented to a commutation.)
Horne's position, spelled out in his ecclesiastical plea, was that tithes
from a corn-mill would go to the parson by the terms of an agreement
simply assigning him great tithes, and that any ambiguity on that score
was removed by the fact that the mill was erected after the composition.
(I.e.: If there could be any doubt as to who got corn-mill tithes in existence at the time of the composition by an instrument that made no specific reference to them, there could be no doubt with respect to
intrinsically "great" tithes which the makers of the composition could not
have contemplated assigning to the vicar.) A Prohibition was granted on
surmise that this plea was disallowed, and Consultation was subsequently
moved for.
On the occasion when the reporter heard discussion of the case, a judicial division appeared. Justice Tanfield opposed the Consultation on the
ground that the case depended entirely on the exposition of the composition, which belonged, he said, exclusively to the common law. Justice
Williams differed, but his reasons are not reported. The case was then adjourned. Later, the judges held a conference and decided to grant the
Consultation. The reporter necessarily had this at second-hand, since
there was not another discussion in open court. He had heard ("ut
audivi") that the final decision was based solely on the old statute of Ar-
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ticuli cleri, which had been urged in favor of the Consultation. A clause
of that statute read, "Prohibition does not lie if anyone erects a new mill
on his property and afterwards tithes are demanded from the same by his
rector." It was apparently argued that this provision categorically excluded a Prohibition in the specific case of a new mill, and the judges apparently bought the argument. The reporter was surprised, since he found
Tanfield's argument against Consultation impressive.
Surely the surprise was justified. The handling of the case looks suspect. I would make the following observations: (a) The argument from
Articuli cleri is shaky. The purpose of the provision is surely to keep parishioners from evading all tithes on the produce of new capital investment in mills -- not to exclude Prohibitions addressed solely to disputes
between vicar and parson over new mills. The statute in its very words
speaks of the rector; here it was used to keep a rector from enjoying the
tithes, for a vicar's benefit. Relying on the statute, rather unintelligently,
looks like a way to help the vicar in this case without denying Tanfield's
point -- i.e., without impugning the common law's title to interpret compositions. The case occurred at a time when the ecclesiastics were aggressively defending their interests against Prohibitions. The "Church
interest" was pretty clearly on the vicar's side: The rectory here was actually not impropriate, but owned by the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's.
But Horne was a lay lessee and enough of a capitalist to build a new mill.
Perhaps he was enough of an "operator" to arrange the lease before opening the mill for the precise purpose of "writing off" several years' profit
tithe-free. (The pleadings showed that the rectory was farmed and the
mill built six years ago.) Political pressure, and plain human charity, may
well have recommended leaning in the working vicar's favor. Yet consciousness of political pressure might account for reluctance to concede
anything "in derogation of the common law." Disposing of the case without open argument on a dubiously narrow basis points to a desire to avoid
airing the larger issues of jurisdiction.
(b) Tanfield's argument does not seem to me entirely persuasive,
though by deciding the case without contradicting it the Court gave it a
kind of sanction. In the light of other holdings and the line of reasoning
represented by Tanfield himself in Ryver v. Pell, it seems to me arguable
that construction of a composition solely concerned with distributing
tithes between vicar and parson ought to belong to the ecclesiastical court.
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A composition-real effecting a commutation of tithes is a different matter
-- laicized both by the involvement of the patron and by the interest of the
parishioners. The composition-real in this case, being wholly by and
among churchmen, would seem as proper to ecclesiastical jurisdiction as
ancient endowments and tithe-splitting usages. Did Tanfield perhaps
over-identify the two kinds of composition-real in arguing that the one
was as much common law business as the other? As the case stands, we
simply cannot know whether any other judge disagreed with Tanfield on
the fundamental question, though the bare report that Justice Williams
spoke "contra" is perhaps more likely than not to mean that his remarks
were on Tanfield's level, rather than addressed to the bearing of Articuli
cleri. In any event, Tanfield's emphasis was sufficiently on the common
law's "mere title" to judge compositions to suggest that for him the surmise of disallowance was not essential. I.e.: The bare surmise -- "I am
sued for tithes assigned to me (or the parson, the vicar being my adversary) by a composition-real" -- might have sufficed.
(c) The reporter adds one further feature. Several certified opinions of
civilians were shown to the Court in this case. At least one of them held
that tithes of a corn-mill were defined as "great tithes" by ecclesiastical
law. I think the reporter cites that opinion by way of reinforcing his dissatisfaction with the decision, for if the opinion was right the ecclesiastical court had probably erred in holding -- by the implication of the
disallowance -- that the vicar was entitled. (Not necessarily, in that the
disallowance might reflect only construction of the particular composition
in question, but probably, since the most obvious line of reasoning would
have been, "The composition gives only great tithes to the parson, tithes
from corn-mill are not great tithes, ergo the composition gives these tithes
to the vicar.") For our purposes, it is worth noting that civilian opinions
were offered, which shows that counsel, at least, considered them relevant. In what sense would they have been? If the Court were convinced
that the ecclesiastical judge had probably erred by his own standards,
should Prohibition be denied (by what I have called "Tanfield's principle")? Or does Justice Tanfield's position on the particular problem of
this case entail the opposite: Prohibition lies because it appears that the
ecclesiastical court has erred on a matter (construction of compositions)
for which the common law courts are primarily responsible, even thought
the ecclesiastical law is a relevant source of information on such questions as the meaning of "great tithes"? (Prohibiting for that reason is dif-
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ferent from prohibiting without regard to the ecclesiastical court's conduct.) In sum, Horne v. Tuke is an anomalous case, which raises more
questions than it answers on the possibility of using the disallowance surmise in parson-vicar cases.
Three years later,39 another parson tried to invoke a composition
against his vicar. It is not clear from the report whether the vicar sued the
parson himself, or whether he sued a parishioner and the parson "came in
for interest" (as was permitted) to defend his right to the tithes in question. In any event, the parson pleaded his composition and showed it in
the ecclesiastical court, then sought a prohibition again showing this
document, on surmise of disallowance. The King's Bench responded by
promising a Prohibition if by a certain day the parson would produce an
affidavit that the composition had in fact been pleaded in the spiritual
court and disallowed. That is all the report says directly about the case.
The decision is clear-cut: The common law is entitled to interpret and enforce a composition solely concerned with the parson-vicar split; however, the common law's title does not accrue, as it were, until the
ecclesiastical court has failed to respect the composition as the common
law understands it. By insisting on an affidavit, the Court made sure that
disallowance had actually taken place, avoiding the trouble that could ensue from not making sure -- the possibility of a traverse to the disallowance and consequent need to decide whether to admit a fiction; the
stronger possibility that the vicar would be forced to litigate at common
law by a feigned surmise when the ecclesiastical court was in fact perfectly willing to do justice to parson. (That was the least, surely, that the
common law could do for "poor vicars.")
The reporter expresses surprise at this decision with "Quod nota, although between vicar and parson, two spiritual men." He proceeds to recount an apparently contrary holding from the same term: A suit between
vicar and parson for tithes of toll from a mill; Prohibition refused, because vicar-parson contentions belong to the spiritual court. While it is
true that the decision in the principal case clashes with the theory that
tithe-splits are intrinsically ecclesiastical business (i.e., raises a question
as to whether that theory is meaningful as a generality if subject to such
39
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qualification), the second case can be distinguished from the principal one
in two ways: (a) There is no sign of the disallowance surmise in the second case as stated, whereas that surmise was expressly held essential in
the principal case. (b) The second case resembles Horne v. Tuke, which
means that the mill-tithe provision of Articuli cleri may have been relevant. In general, we have by now seen enough evidence to suggest that
the theory of exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction over vicar-parson disputes requires a somewhat indeterminate degree of qualification, short,
perhaps, of qualification-to-death.
A few reports involving the disallowance surmise touch on the question over which Coke and Tanfield differed in Ryver v. Pell: If a parishioner sued by the parson for tithes in kind claims the right to pay a
customary commutation and to pay it to the vicar, does Prohibition lie? If
the answer is "Yes" in principle, a further question arises: Does Prohibition lie without a disallowance surmise, or only after the ecclesiastical
court has been given first crack and erred?
Baker v. Hulett40 was complicated by a problem concerning preliminary proof of the surmise, but for present purposes may be stated as follows: Parson sued for wood tithes; parishioner sought a Prohibition on
surmise that he customarily paid the vicar a sum of money in lieu of those
tithes; there was no surmise of disallowance. Justices Walmesley and
Beaumond were ready to prohibit because the wood tithes were surmised
to belong to the vicar (not because a modus was in question.) They put the
emphasis that way partly because of the problem upon 2/3 Edw.6: The
procedural difficulty was that the surmised modus was arguably not adequately proved; Walmesley and Beaumond proposed not to worry about
that, on the ground that the vicar's title, with respect to which the surmise
was adequately proved, was sufficient reason to prohibit the parson's suit,
so that the modus could be treated as surplusage. Had there been no motive to get around the preliminary-proof requirement in an ambiguous
case, it is possible that the two judges would have been less ready to step
into a parson-vicar contention. Walmesley and Beaumond having taken a
position, counsel objected that plaintiff-in-Prohibition had not made the
30
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same claim in the ecclesiastical court as the surmise stated, but had stood
on the modus alone. He had not by-passed the ecclesiastical court altogether, but he had not invited it to decide the question that was generally
considered appropriate to ecclesiastical jurisdiction -- the right of tithes as
between parson and vicar. Rather, he had invited it to dismiss the suit for tithes
in kind because a commutation was customary. (Motives for his conduct are
imaginable. The likely one is that he went through the motions of putting in a
plea in the ecclesiastical court, just in case failure to do so should be held
against him, but hoped to get his Prohibition on bare surmise of the modus.
Having that intention, he would not want to introduce the parson-vicar issue,
because if that was the issue the ecclesiastical court would have more
color of jurisdiction, even though the simultaneous presence of the modus
created an ambiguity. When it came to making his surmise, however, he
thought he had to tell the full story, lest discrepancies as among his surmise, a formal pleading, and jury-evidence come out in common law proceedings. Alternatively, a man might be ignorant or indifferent as to
whether the parson or vicar took his money, so long as one or the other
took that instead of full-value tithes. However, in this snarled-up and
mishandled case, inadvertence rather than strategy might account for the
parishioner's steps.)
When the judges were told that plaintiff-in-Prohibition's ecclesiastical
plea did not correspond exactly with his surmise, they all agreed that if
that was so Consultation would lie. (How would they ascertain whether it
was so? "Informally" is probably the answer.) Walmesley and Beaumond
were in accord with that conclusion. That means in effect that their earlier opinion was "in principle": In principle, a parishioner may prohibit
the parson's suit if the tithes in question belong to the vicar, but he must
plead that claim in the ecclesiastical court first. In other words, a disallowance surmise is required. Baker v. Hulett amounts to good authority
for that proposition. Its bearing on cases involving both a parson-vicar issue and a modus is more complicated. When the judges agreed that failure to plead the vicar's entitlement in the spiritual court was a fatal
obstacle to Prohibition, they were constrained to pretend that there was no
modus involved, because it had not been properly proved. Later on (according to Harl. 1631), the defective proof was repaired, and a Prohibition was granted. Assuming that the parishioner had done nothing to
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improve his position on the other front (such as putting in a correct plea in
the ecclesiastical court and laying disallowance, or convincing the Court
that he had in fact done so originally), the decision would imply that parson-vicar cases involving modi are prohibitable more or less automatically.
I say “more or less” because in this case it was admitted that the parishioner had pleaded his modus in the ecclesiastical court. Therefore it was
not the most naked kind of instance -- Prohibition merely because one is
sued for tithes in kind whereas a commutation is due, without regard to
whether the ecclesiastical court has been given any chance to accept the
modus. However, there is no sign of a disallowance surmise. In its final
shape, the case would seem to boil down to a Prohibition on bare surmise
that the parson is suing for tithes in kind whereas the vicar is entitled to a
substitute payment by custom. On this construction, Baker v. Hulett supports Tanfield’s position in Ryver v. Pell, rather than Coke’s, with the difference that Tanfield did not maintain that the disallowance surmise could
be dispensed with. But it was a tangled case. If by any chance Coke and
Tanfield had it in mind, it would be no wonder if their memories clashed
on its significance.
Two Jacobean holdings in the King’s Bench on parson-vicar modus
cases flatly conflict in result, though both testify as precedents to need for
a disallowance surmise. Both reports simply state the case and give per
Curiam decisions. In Wintall v. Childe,41 the vicar sued for tithes in kind
and the parishioner pleaded a customary right to pay a commutation to
the parson, which plea was disallowed. The Court granted a Consultation
(probably on motion, a Prohibition having slipped through.) In Dugdale v.
Hillary,42 the parson sued, and the parishioner pleaded a prescriptive title
to pay the vicar 4d per acre. A prohibition was granted on surmise of disallowance. Wintall v. Childe falls in Coke’s last term as Chief Justice of
the King’s Bench (he was dismissed only about ten days before the end of
the term) and accords with the opinion he expressed from the Bar in Ryver v. Pell. The reversal of the positions of the vicar and the parson in the
two cases might not be without effect on the judges’ unconscious mo41
42
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tives, though it makes no difference in principle. The common law
judges, as well as ecclesiastical courts, may have sympathized with the
plight of impoverished vicars as against lay impropriators. Not to prohibit
parson-vicar modus cases meant to risk the parishioner’s interest in his
commutation to the ecclesiastical court; that risk might seem more tolerable when the beneficiary of any ecclesiastical bias would be a poor vicar
than when the likely effect of not prohibiting would be to deliver tithes in
kind to an impropriator, lay or well-endowed clerical, at the expense of
both the vicar and the parishioner. Since vicars were ordinarily endowed
with small tithes, their recovering in kind would not be likely to have a
ruinous effect on parishioners’ economic expectations (unless the parishioner had expanded a small-tithe product, such as animal-breeding, into a
major business, in which case his attempt to make out a nominal modus
due to the parson might not deserve much sympathy.)
One further case, Dullingham v. Kyfeley,43 should be considered
alongside the parson-vicar modus cases because, though different in
form, it raises the same kind of problem. Kyfeley, Parson of S., sued a parishioner for tithes. Dullingham, Parson of the neighboring parish of H.,
intervened for interest, as ecclesiastical procedure permitted. Dullingham
claimed that there was a custom in S. whereby certain lands in that parish
(including this parishioner’s) rendered 13 cheeses in the name of tithes to
the Parson of H.; in recompense, certain land in H. rendered 13 cheeses to
the Parson of S. in the name of tithes. The custom was alleged in the ecclesiastical court (necessarily in this case, for unless he came and stated
his claim, Dullingham could hardly be received as a party-in-interest);
Dullingham sought a Prohibition on the ground that his claim had been
disallowed (in effect, that the ecclesiastical court improperly refused to
receive him as a third party.)
The great lawyers Coke and Tanfield argued on opposite sides in this
case. Tanfield, for Kyfeley, opposed Prohibition on two grounds: (a) A
rejected applicant for reception as a party-in-interest has no standing to
obtain a Prohibition. I.e.: The nature of Prohibitions is to stop a suit
against oneself. Here, a stranger to the suit in being sought to prohibit it
because he was dissatisfied with the ecclesiastical court’s handling of his
43
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attempt to come in and defend a collaterally threatened interest. He might
have a rational complaint, but not every rational complaint against ecclesiastical courts is a cause of Prohibition ("Tanfield's principle".) (I expand a little on the bare words of the report, but I think legitimately. To
part of what Tanfield did say in so many words -- that it was odd to let a
person who was not sued prohibit a suit -- one might reply by invoking
the "public" theory of Prohibition and the cases on self-prohibition in Vol.
I. What does it matter who seeks the Prohibition, so long as it appears to
the Court that there is reason to prohibit? In this case, however, it seems
to me that one can come back with a good argument. If all that Tanfield
said or meant were known, I imagine he might have made it: Granted that
a non-defendant or even a non-party may bring a Prohibition -- still, the
purpose of Prohibitions is to stop suits improperly brought in "foreign"
courts, or else to prevent such courts from deciding issues inappropriate
to them which arise in their suits, or else to prevent them from deciding
issues by inappropriate substantive or evidentiary standards. In any event,
there must be an inappropriate suit, or inappropriate issue, or erroneously
handled issue before the "foreign" court. Here, there is nothing before the
ecclesiastical court (or no prohihendum) except a perfectly appropriate suit
for tithes. No issues have arisen in that suit within the normal meaning of
an "issue arising" -- i.e., the parties have not pleaded so as to introduce
an "incidental" matter in which the common law may take an interest. For
all the Court knows about the suit in being, Kyfeley has appropriately sued
one of his parishioners for tithes and the parishioner has as yet said nothing -or has confessed the tithes due, or pleaded payment. What the Court knows
in addition is not "about the suit in being," but only that a non-party tried to take
advantage of the ecclesiastical procedures for intervention and for some
reason failed, leaving the "suit in being" just where it was. What has the common law got to do with the operation of ecclesiastical procedures for intervention? If it had no such procedures at all, what business of ours would it
be? Or if parties seeking intervention were required to prove their factual
contentions by the testimony of twelve bishops? At most -- even conceding that the ecclesiastical court mistreated Dullingham in a controllable
way -- the remedy cannot be to prohibit Kyfeley's suit against X. Conceivably a Mandamus could be considered, requiring Dullingham to be
received as a party if the facts he alleges are true. But to prohibit Kyfeley
v. X., a wholly unobjectionable suit, is surely unreasonable. The crucial
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point is that the target of the Prohibition is an unobjectionable suit -- not
that someone other than the defendant has objected to it.)
(b) Dullingham’s claim goes to the right of tithes as between two parsons, which is a purely ecclesiastical matter (i.e., a matter which not only
belongs to the ecclesiastical court in the first instance, but which it may
handle without common law scrutiny.) Although Tanfield does not mention parson-vicar contentions in his reported words, I think there is no difference in principle. His premise is that any issue concerning the
allocation of tithes as between clergymen (or spiritual corporations, including lay rectors) is outside the common law’s sphere of interest, irrespective of the basis for the allocation (a vicar’s endowment, a
composition, or a custom.) (Tanfield’s second argument can stand on its
own feet, independent of the first argument. One can concede Dullingham’s capacity to prohibit the suit in being for sufficient reason, but contend that the alleged mishandling of a claim going to the allocation of
tithes is never reason for prohibiting an ecclesiastical suit. If that contention is correct, the parishioner in our case ought not to have a Prohibition
on the claim that anything he owed he owed to Dullingham--whatever his
right to a Prohibition on the claim that he owed 13 cheeses instead of
tithes in kind. However, Tanfield’s two arguments can also be synthesized. One can concede that the common law might have an interest in
protecting the parishioner’s right to pay Dullingham instead of Kyfeley
-- insofar, at any rate, as that right is based on custom -- but argue that it has
no interest in protecting clergyman against clergyman, hence no title to
concern itself with whether one clergyman is allowed to intervene to defend his right to tithes against another clergyman’s right. One can concede the general appropriateness of stopping X. v. Y. on Z.’s motion
solely because Z.’s attempt to intervene has been improperly frustrated,
but maintain that doing so is inappropriate when Z. is a clergyman seeking to dispute the right to tithes with another clergyman.)
Coke, for Dullingham, spoke to both points. (a) He took the position
that the parishioner could have prohibited the suit on the same surmise,
ergo an interested third party could prohibit it too. (I have said enough by
way of developing Tanfield’s argument to indicate how this may be answered. The answer is of course not conclusive, for the public theory of
Prohibitions is an ample reservoir. It appeared to the Court in this case,
subject to verification, that a man was in danger of being held liable for
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tithes in kind in the Parish of S. contrary to immemorial custom: never
mind how the Court found out, or what kind of interest plaintiff-in-Prohibition has, or whether the ecclesiastical defendant believes in or wants to
assert the right which custom is alleged to give him, or what the content
of the custom is. Alongside this broad justification for prohibiting until
the reality of the custom is verified at common law, Tanfield's arguments
may seem insufficient.)
(b) The premise of (a) is that the parishioner would have cause of Prohibition if he tried unsuccessfully to plead the custom which Dullingham
relied on -- in other words, that a man sued by Clergyman A who claims a
customary right to pay a commutation to Clergyman B may have a Prohibition if his claim is disallowed. Coke made this point by saying that a
modus, not the right of tithes, was what was essentially in question. Although it is true that a mere right-of-tithes question belongs to ecclesiastical jurisdiction and may be handled as the ecclesiastical court sees fit (as
where a parishioner sued by one clergyman claims, for whatever reason,
that the tithes in kind are due to another clergyman), the presence of a
modus utterly changes the case. As it were, the modus preempts the field;
a contest which, from one angle, is over the right of tithes becomes, in the
only aspect that matters, just like any other modus case -- a contest between one person asserting the de jure duty to pay tithes and another person asserting that immemorial custom has substituted another duty. (Two
points should be noted. First, Coke's argument for his client here contradicts his statement in Ryver v. Pell on parson-vicar modus cases and
what may be his later judicial opinion in Wintall v. Childe. Secondly, it
seems questionable whether, by the logic of Coke's argument, the disallowance surmise should be requisite in standard cases involving both
the right of tithes and a modus. For the argument tends to equate "A.
sues B. for tithes in kind, and B. says he owes A. 5d. by custom" with
"A. sues B. for tithes in kind and B. says he owes C. 6d. by custom."
If no disallowance surmise, or at most a pro forma one, is required
to prohibit the first suit, why should more be required to prohibit the
second? In the principal case, to be sure it is hard to see how the disallowance surmise could be dispensed with so long as any importance was
attached to Dullingham's interest in Kyfeley v. X. If one went whole hog
with the public theory of Prohibitions and regarded Dullingham as a mere
amicus curiae, then Kyfeley v. X. should perhaps be prohibitable on the
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bare information that an improper suit for tithes in kind was going on,
without regard to whether the custom had been pleaded and disallowed.
But if one sees Dullingham’s right to prohibit as a function of his right to
be received as a party to the ecclesiastical suit, then he would seem to
have no title to a Prohibition without showing that he had been denied reception. However, that is not a logical necessity: it would be possible to
hold that Clergyman A. may prohibit Clergyman B.’s suit against X. on
the ground that A. is entitled to a customary payment qua the equivalent
of the tithes for which B. is suing; that A. need not surmise an attempt to
intervene in the ecclesiastical suit and disallowance of his claim; and yet
that a mere stranger, neither a party nor a party-in-interest may not maintain a Prohibition.)
The implications of Coke’s position for our present concern (the need
to surmise disallowance) are of only theoretical interest, however, for
Coke lost in Dullingham v. Kyfeley. At least it is pretty clear that he lost.
The report ends with an adjournment, but the Court was inclined against
prohibiting. There is only an outside chance that the judges might have
changed their minds, if indeed Coke and his client thought another attempt to persuade them worthwhile. The only judge to appear individually in the report is Justice Gawdy, by no means the most rigorous
supporter of exclusive, uncontrollable ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the
tithe-split among clergymen. In this case, it is interesting to note, Gawdy
did not concede such “exclusive, uncontrollable” jurisdiction; he simply
rejected the vital step in Coke’s reasoning. For Gawdy expressly said that
the parishioner in the instant case could have a Prohibition by claiming
the customary right to pay 13 cheeses to Dullingham (whether without
disallowance surmise does not appear.) He thought, however, that Dullingham’s attempt to challenge Kyfelye’s title to tithes or the equivalent
from certain lands was the clearest case of a contest between clergyman
and clergyman over the allocation of tithe income, hence a purely ecclesiastical matter. If Coke could not make Justice Gawdy accept his inference
from the parishioner’s right to prohibit to Dullingham’s right, it is unlikely that he could have persuaded a majority of the Court upon further
argument. Gawdy’s acceptance of Coke’s premise, on the other hand (the
parishioner’s right) furnishes a scrap of further evidence for the proposition that Prohibition lies in standard parson-vicar modus cases. It is arguable that the writ should lie without disallowance surmise, but omitting or
feigning the surmise in such cases would be ill-advised. There was uncer-
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tainty as to whether Prohibition lay even with disallowance, and the ambiguity of parson-vicar cases is in any event a reason for suspecting that the
surmise might be demanded. It would soften the blow of prohibiting a suit
involving the right of tithes between clergyman to give the ecclesiastical
court first crack -- i.e., to give it a chance to settle the intra-Church contest, so long as the custom and the parishioner’s right to pay a commutation were respected.

(6)Prescriptive claims outside tithe-suits
In addition to the cases above on defenses to tithe-claims, there are numerous others in which the surmise of disallowance occurs, but in which
the necessity of that surmise seems at least open to question. Let us take
first those in which a prescriptive claim is asserted. One might argue that
every prescription--not only modi -- is intrinsically suitable to common
law trial, and therefore that the bare surmise, without an allegation of disallowance, will suffice. There are scattered cases on various subjects to
support that argument. Here we shall look at a little evidence going the
other way.
In a case of 1610,44 churchwardens sued certain parishioners for a rate
assessed to repair the church. The parishioners prescribed to contribute to
a chapel of ease in lieu of the parish church and sought a Prohibition on
surmise that their plea was disallowed. The Prohibition was unanimously
denied, the Court taking the position that it was the ecclesiastical court’s
business to decide whether such a substitute performance (prescriptive or
otherwise) should count against a repair-rate assessment. As usual in
cases where the Prohibition was denied, one can only say that surmising
disallowance is unlikely to have reduced the chance of success.
The report of Conduit v. Plumer45 leaves it nicely ambiguous whether
the surmise of disallowance was necessary. Conduit was elected parish
clerk by the parishioners, in the face of the minister’s pretense, by color
of the 1604 canons, to appoint that officer. When he was unable to make
Conduit step down, the minister had him cited into the ecclesiastical court
to the end of formally depriving or disciplining him. Conduit pleaded a
44
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prescriptive title in the parishioners to elect the clerk. A Prohibition was
granted on surmise that the plea had been disallowed and sentence of deprivation given. Chief Justice Coke, explaining the Prohibition, said: "For
it is a prescription, which is a matter belonging to the common law, which
they do not allow." By what seems to me the preferable interpretation of
those words, they would amount to saying that the disallowance was immaterial. I would "translate" as follows: "There is a prescriptive claim in
this case, which by its nature demands common law trial, at least when
the ecclesiastical court notoriously does not recognize the legal validity of
such a prescriptive claim [ergo, to have a Prohibition Conduit would have
needed only to say 'An attempt is being made to challenge my exercise of
the office of clerk, whereas I am entitled to exercise it by prescription']."
The alternative reading would be: "The presence of a valid prescriptive
claim, which is suitable for common law trial, gives us grounds for prohibiting, seeing that the ecclesiastical court is alleged to have disallowed
the plea." The first reading seems to me preferable partly because Prohibitions were issued in similar cases without apparent allegation of disallowance, and partly because the phrase "which they do not allow" ought,
in the context of the case, to refer to the notorious or regular practice of
the ecclesiastical courts, not the act of a particular court. For the reason
why cases like Conduit v. Plumer arose is that ecclesiastical courts
thought the canons entitled to prevail over other methods of choosing parish officers, including strictly prescriptive methods. Or, at the very least, I
think it is clear that the ecclesiastical courts were assumed to take that position. (One has to tread a little carefully here, for, as every Prohibition
issued in such cases says by implication, the position imputed to the
ecclesiastical courts was patently unlawful insofar as it preferred the
canons over custom in the strict, immemorial sense. That is true because new ecclesiastical legislation was required by statute to conform
with the laws and customs of the realm or fail. Though I have no evidence of it, ecclesiastics might have claimed that they did not dispute
the power of strict custom to prevail over the canons, but only sought
to enforce the canons against electoral usages which could not be
proved immemorial. Nonetheless, my impression is that the "patently unlawful" position was attributed to the ecclesiastics by common lawyers.)
If we take Coke's admittedly ambiguous statement to work against the
need to surmise disallowance, we should note the qualification in my
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"translation" above. I do not take him as saying that every prescriptive
claim is to be tried at common law, regardless of the ecclesiastical court's
willingness to try it; only that ecclesiastical suits should be prohibited,
pending common law trial of prescriptive claims, when there is good reason (via judicial notice) to suppose that ecclesiastical courts do not recognize the relevance of prescription and therefore are presumptively
unwilling to try such claims.
Our two remaining cases on miscellaneous prescriptions are briefly reported. In one,46 the ecclesiastical suit was for disturbing the plaintiff's
enjoyment of a pew. The defendant pleaded that the pew was his by prescription and sought a Prohibition on surmise of disallowance. The Court
was in doubt as to whether such a prescription was valid at all -- i.e.,
whether by the common law a man may prescribe to have the exclusive
use of a pew -- but Justices Foster and Walmesley said that they could see
nothing invalid about such an easement-like interest, and Foster thought
there had been a judgment to that effect. No decision is reported. My
guess would be that the surmise of disallowance may have helped here.
The courts are unlikely to have much fancied getting involved in petty
squabbles over pews, most of which were probably for the "seat of honor"
in local pecking-orders. "We will think about the rights and wrongs of
these cases only if it is claimed that the ecclesiastical court mishandled
one by failing to respect prescriptive claims or the like," is perhaps a
likely thought to put in the heads of judges hesitating in such a case, as
the Common Pleas judges were here. They were not always so hesitant
about protecting prescriptive interests in pews, however.
In our final case, 47 the ecclesiastical suit was for a 6d. Easter offering.
The defendants pleaded that the local custom required only a 2d offering.
A Prohibition was granted on surmise of disallowance -- so much and no
more is reported. On the one hand, it perhaps seems difficult to distinguish a customary sum due for an offering from a modus. If the latter
should be tried at common law regardless of the ecclesiastical court's
willingness to try it, should the former not be? On the other hand, there
are some distinctions. A modus is a considerate exchange, whereas the
46
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Russele v.
. T. 8 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f.218b.
P. 3 Car. C.P. Harl. 5148, f.120.
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custom here only went to make 2d due instead of 6d. That is probably
equivalent to saying that the issue was really custom against custom (Cf.
Goslin v. Harden, above). There was no de jure duty to pay a particular
sum for an Easter offering. The clergyman was probably seeking what he
thought was locally customary, the parishioners disputing his version of
the custom. (I suppose that where there was no settled custom, or offerings had been long-neglected, or accepted on a rough "ability to pay"
basis, the clergyman had a right to sue for a "reasonable" sum,
or the amount generally given in other communities, so that the case
would not necessarily be a strict one of custom against custom. Quaere.)
Though it could be believed or pretended that ecclesiastical courts
would not respect modi, could it be supposed with any plausibility that
they would not respect one custom going to the amount of an offering
against another, or a custom against the clergyman's claim that there was
no custom? Finally, important interests were involved with modi -- landvalues, the value of livings and hence of advowsons, the welfare of the
Church -- whereas the values in our case were petty. The report says that
plaintiffs-in-Prohibition were "servants" -- i.e., people of the class that
would not normally contribute to the Church though tithes. One can
imagine a certain pity for poor men whom the Church showed signs of
squeezing, but also a certain reluctance to interfere with the Church's efforts to get at the non-contributor so long as the ecclesiastical court gave
no evidence of injustice. Although the distinctions between tithes and offerings do not resolve the question of principle (should the common law
intervene merely because a prescriptive claim is on the board?) they probably go to suggest that surmising disallowance in the offering case was a
good idea. The pettiness of the controversy and the likelihood that ecclesiastical courts would usually behave reasonably in such cases would argue for not encumbering the common law machinery until the
ecclesiastical failed.

(7) Parish rates
The remaining cases on disallowance surmises I shall group according
to subject matter. Two cases concern parish rates, without involving the
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element of prescription. Jeffrey's Case48 raised the important question
whether a non-resident owning land in a parish may be assessed for a rate
to repair the church. Upon demurrer, the Queen's Bench said "Yes," insofar as the land is in the owner's hands (i.e., so long as double taxation, of
both the owner and a tenant, is avoided.) The Prohibition, which grew to
the demurrer, was granted upon surmise of disallowance. Jeffrey surmised that he was sued for the rate, being a landowner but not a resident,
and that he had unsuccessfully pleaded his non-residency in the ecclesiastical court.
Whether or not other cases on the same subject will support the rule,
there is positive evidence in Coke's report of this case that the disallowance was essential. For Chief Justice Wray said that the ecclesiastical
court had primary jurisdiction over parish rates, and therefore that is was
necessary to take civilian opinions. Civilians accordingly certified that
"non-resident landowner" was within the meaning of "parishioner" by ecclesiastical standards. The Consultation by which the case was finally disposed of expressed the judgment that the disallowance was correct by
ecclesiastical law, and that that law was relevant. It does not automatically follow that the opposite datum -- that the ecclesiastical decision
was wrong, or not clearly right, by ecclesiastical standards -- would have
led to the opposite conclusion via "Tanfield's principle." Nor, perhaps,
can we be sure that the Court would have refused to consider the case
without the surmise of disallowance. It is that note of doubt in my mind
that leads me to place Jeffrey's Case here, instead of in the section above,
among cases in which, without a disallowance, a Prohibition would not
48

M. 31/32 Eliz. Q.B. 5 Coke, 66b; Harl. 1633, f.88; Add. 25,196, f.237b. The MSS., virtually
identical with each other, are sub. nom. Geffrey v. Churchwardens of Halesham and dated P. 32.
Both are brief reports of the initial decision to grant Prohibition (despite the later date), not to be
compared with Coke's full report of the arguments and outcome. The MSS. have a bit of utility
on one point: They have the judges a little indecisive -- thinking the surmise showed good cause
of Prohibition, but not resolving anything. I suppose their questions might be: "Even with the
surmise of disallowance, are church-rates so purely ecclesiastical business that we must stay
out?" or "Can there really be enough doubt about the correctness of the ecclesiastical decision to
warrant Prohibition?" The very existence of doubts was sometimes a reason for granting a
Prohibition, for argument on motions for Consultation and demurrers was as a rule better
prepared and hence more helpful for resolving the doubts than argument on initial motions for
Prohibition. My suggestion in the text is that a similar response -- "Yes-no-we'd better prohibit
in order to make up our minds properly" -- might have been evoked by a surmise laying no
disallowance.
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have been colorable. The issue was pretty important -- a landowner
claiming he was illegally taxed, the Church seeking to impose a form of
tax-liability which could make a great difference for the resources of
many parishes and the tax-burden on inhabitants. Could a common law
court resist the temptation, or evade the responsibility, of settling that issue, however it was proposed and however relevant ecclesiastical law
was held to be for its resolution on mature consideration? It is notable that
the Prohibition was granted, though ultimately reversed, and reversed
only on demurrer, though there is of course no telling whether a motion for
Consultation would have had a chance. It is possible that the judges
wanted a full-dress decision and would have got one even if Jeffrey had
only said that he was sued for a repair rate in a parish which he did not
live in. On the whole, I think, the judges wanted to give tax-assessment
cases of various sorts their own hard look, and would prohibit in order to
do so, whatever the form of the surmise.
Jeffrey's Case is early, and on the whole one expects the surmise of
disallowance in early cases. It appears much later, however, in another
sort of parish-rate case49 Here, parishioners claimed that the rate had
been assessed by an illegal method -- by the churchwardens on their own
authority, instead of by majority vote of the parish. The Common Pleas
granted the Prohibition with simply the observation that the assessment
was illegal. Though the parishioners showed that they had pleaded the
facts and made their legal point both in the original ecclesiastical court
and on appeal, I would suppose from other cases on "parish democracy"
that they could have had their Prohibition on bare surmise that the rate
had been assessed without consulting the inhabitants. The surmise of disallowance is of course to be expected when the ecclesiastical defendant
actually intended to stick with the ecclesiastical courts if possible, as the
appeal shows the parishioners here wanted to do. Objection to delaying
until after sentence and appeal (of which there is no sign in this report)
might be removed by making it appear that one had tried to assert the
same claim in the ecclesiastical court as one was now driven to assert by
Prohibition.

49
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(8)Jurisdiction of the High Commission
A few cases involve both the surmise of disallowance and the jurisdiction of the High Commission. One such case, Partlet v. Butler, I have already treated in another aspect in Vol. I. The case clearly unfolded as
follows: A Prohibition was granted, with some discussion, but probably
without adversary debate. Later in the same term, it was reconsidered,
probably on a motion for Consultation, with fuller discussion and adversary debate. On the second occasion, the statement of the case was altered. It is intelligible what happened: defendant-in-Prohibition showed
the Court, or persuaded the plaintiff to admit, that the nature of the ecclesiastical suit was not exactly as the plaintiff had represented it in his surmise. On the first occasion, the Court had only the surmise before it. The
reports treated in Vol. I relate to the second occasion and give the case as
it then appeared; two other reports50 relate solely to the first occasion. It
was only on the first occasion that the matters we are at present concerned
with -- disallowance and the jurisdiction of the Commission -- had anything to do with the case. I shall now discuss Partlet v. Butler as it originally appeared, virtually as if it were a separate case.
Partlet was sued in the High Commission for defaming a minister. He
sought to justify the words he admittedly had spoken -- not as true in a literal sense, but as a warranted "value judgment" in the light of facts that
were alleged to be true. (The words were, "That he was fitter to stand in
the pillory than preach in the pulpit, and that he had taken two orders already, and that he lacked but taking the third, which was to have his ears
cut off." The justification was that the minister had forged an acquittance,
in commenting on which the speaker had so expressed himself. The
speaker pleaded the forgery in detail -- i.e., showed what the forged document related to, when it was forged, etc.). A Prohibition was sought on
surmise that the High Commission had improperly rejected the plea and
sentenced the speaker to apologize. The Court granted the Prohibition but
by-passed the theory on which it was sought. Without going into whether
ecclesiastical courts were bound to recognize the kind of "circumstantial"
justification for defamatory words relied on here, the judges simply held
50

M. 38/39 Eliz. Q.B. Moore, 460 Lansd, 1059, f.256. (Both reports, virtually identical, sub. nom.
Parlor v. Butler.)
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that the matter was outside the High Commission's jurisdiction. If the
words had been spoken during divine service, they said, the High Commission would have had a basis for proceeding (in consideration of the
disturbance of order in the church); as it was, there was no basis. It is not
clear form the reports whether this holding was intended to be specific to
the High Commission.
The judges eventually decided in this case that any ecclesiastical court
would have been prohibitable from proceeding against the speaker, because the words were actionable at common law. (They imputed worthiness of temporal punishment, though not a specific temporal offense.
Once the justification was put on the board -- that the words were by way
of accusing the minister of forgery -- the case for prohibiting was very
strong. It is perhaps worth asking whether the words without that explanation were sufficiently clear imputation of temporal wrongdoing to warrant a Prohibition.) But in addition, there was probably quite sufficient
reason to prohibit the High Commission specifically. Standard doctrine
(though this was a disputed subject) had it that the High Commission was
confined to ecclesiastical crimes of some magnitude, and that charges of
ecclesiastical defamation -- which were always considered partly, or indeed primarily, criminal, even when the suit was private in form -- belonged to the regular diocesan courts. I think it is probable that the
Prohibition in Partlet v. Butler could have been obtained merely by surmising the nature of the proceeding and arguing that it was beyond the
High Commission's jurisdiction. In a sense, the case is like those on misconceived surmises: Although it is possible that the theory implied in the
surmise was perfectly good -- i.e., that it was not literally misconceived -the Court felt free to dispose of the case on a simpler, more open-and-shut
theory (whether the Commission's authority or the common law actionability of the words).
A case of 160051 gave the Queen's Bench considerable trouble. A. was
sued in the Arches. When a pursuivant from that ecclesiastical court came
to serve process on him, A. beat the pursuivant and said some "opprobrious" things about the Arches. The High Commission then proceeded
against A. criminally for the "contempt and disorder" in his treatment of
51
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the Arches' process-server. A. pleaded that all he did to the pursuivant
was in self-defense. The High Commission disallowed the plea and went
on to sentence A. to pay the pursuivant £10 damages, plus a fine. A Prohibition was granted on surmise of this material and (the report says) on
pretense that assault and battery belong to the common law. The report's
way of putting it suggests that the theory of the surmise was not simply
that the ecclesiastical court should be prohibited for refusing to admit the
justification of self-defense in response to its charge of "contempt and
disorder," but also that the charge was in effect the temporal offense of
assault and battery, improperly disguised as "contempt of ecclesiastical
process and officers.'' In other words, the claim to a Prohibition was double-barreled, the surmise of disallowance serving the alternative theory
that even if contempt in the form of assault and battery was punishable
qua contempt self-defense ought to have been accepted as a plea.
The judicial discussion reported was on a motion for Consultation.
Counsel seeking the Consultation (Warburton) took the broad position
that contempt proceedings pursuant to proper ecclesiastical suits are beyond control -- whether a given defense to the charge is permitted or not;
whether or not the contempt takes a form that would also be punishable as
a temporal misdemeanor or tort; and also whether or not the court punishing the contempt (the High Commission here) is the same court that
suffered it (the Arches.) The court conceded all but the last point, concerning which it was in doubt. It was in no doubt about one thing: the
High Commission had no authority to award damages to the pursuivant -call it assault and battery or call it something else (these words are mine,
but I think the formulation is probably safe), the High Commission, as a
criminal court, could not give private amends. On the vexed question
whether the High Commission had authority to fine (as opposed to using
spiritual sanctions), Chief Justice Popham gave signs of a moment's
doubt, but he and his brethren were ready after brief reflection to concede
the Commission's power to fine. They were on the point of granting a
Consultation for all except the damage-award, had Popham not been disturbed by the implications of letting the High Commission punish contempts to other ecclesiastical courts. The report accordingly ends with an
adjournment. For our present purposes, the case may be taken as holding
that disallowing a defense to proper ecclesiastical contempt proceedings
is not controllable. On the other hand, the case illustrates the judges' willingness to look at all visible aspects of the High Commission's behavior
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-- whether in contempt proceedings or other matters -- and to prohibit if
that behavior was ultra vires -- whether or not the surmise was clearly
predicated on the optimum theory. (The damage-award, the fine, and the
High Commission's arrogation to itself of power to protect other ecclesiastical courts would have been the components of the "optimum theory"
here.)
One Jacobean decision52 reflects both caution about prohibiting the
High Commission and an unusual form of insistence on the surmise of
disallowance. A Prohibition was sought on the bare surmise that the High
Commission was about to proceed in a matter of incontinency. (The report is no more specific.) All the King's Bench judges agreed that it had
no authority to do so. (It was probably sound enough, in the light of other
cases, to hold that minor ecclesiastical misdemeanors, such as run-of-themill incontinency, were outside the Commission's jurisdiction, even
though criminal cases.) However, the Court denied the Prohibition for
the present, instructing the party to "suggest this matter there unto them."
If it was not allowed, the judges said, they would then grant a Prohibition.
In other words, the party was required to "except to the jurisdiction." If
unsuccessful, he must predicate his Prohibition on the High Commission's refusal to rule against its own jurisdiction as a matter of law. There
were practical advantages in that course. The judges said expressly that
"they conceived that they would not hold plea in such a case." Why grant
Prohibitions when there is practically no chance that a "foreign" court
will actually proceed with an inappropriate suit if the defendant makes
legal objection? The implications are disturbing, however, for if the principle of the decision were carried to its limits Prohibition would lie only if
(a) the "foreign" court committed a specifiable and controllable error, by
improper disallowance of a claim, erroneous sentence, or unlawful type
of award; or (b) it was notorious or highly predictable that the "foreign"
court would uphold its own jurisdiction on legal challenge. Prohibitions
on the bare surmise that a claim or issue outside the "foreign" court's
scope was before such a court would lose legitimacy. The more outlandishly inappropriate the matter -- say a suit to recover freehold in an Archdeacon's court -- the better reason to withhold Prohibition, pending
failure of an exception to the jurisdiction in the "foreign" court.
52
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Obviously the King's Bench in our case had no such far-reaching implications in mind. In all probability, the judges had no desire to prohibit
the touchy and politically potent High Commission gratuitously. Apart
from the practical situation, it is worth asking whether a special policy for
the High Commission, or for this kind of case, can be justified in principle. The answer, I think, is that it can be. (a) The High Commission was a
statutory court. For practical purposes, it had such powers as the Elizabethan Supremacy Act directly gave it or authorized the monarch to confer
on it. Therefore, to prohibit the High Commission was to interpret a statute. To prohibit it without evidence that it had misinterpreted the statute
in its own favor was to imply that a deliberately created and intentionally
"dignified" court could not be trusted to pursue its authority and was not
meant by the legislature to be so trusted in any degree. By contrast, most
ultra vires rules respecting "foreign" courts were "at common law" (i.e.,
non-statutory) and therefore exclusively appropriate to common-law interpretation and enforcement. To the extent that statutes defined the jurisdiction and directed the conduct of "foreign" courts other than the High
Commission, it is arguable (as we have seen in other contexts) that the
non-common law court ought at least to get first crack at applying the
statute to itself. But even if that is not conceded as a general principle,
there are grounds for seeing the High Commission as a special case -- its
exceptionally high status as an instrument of public policy in the affairs
of an Erastian Church; the fact that it was created by statute (as opposed
to regulated by statute) -- i.e., given from the start a delimited authority,
which it was presumably expected to follow (which contrasts with telling
an existing court to limit its authority in ways likely to go against its
"natural" bent.)
(b) In our case, the jurisdictional issue was intra-ecclesiastical. The
lower ecclesiastical courts had undoubted jurisdiction to proceed against
incontinency, while the High Commission did not (except on the theory,
which the judges in our case would not attribute to the Commissioners,
that all ecclesiastical causes, or at least all criminal ones, were within
their authority if they wished to take them.) It is perhaps arguable that no
ecclesiastical court should be prohibited on the ground that jurisdiction
belongs to another ecclesiastical court unless it is claimed that the former
has erroneously ruled in its own favor. In that situation, the jurisdictional
issue may be regarded as inherently appropriate to the ecclesiastical system -- a matter of "What is the lawful distribution of authority within our
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sphere?" (Cf. "What is the lawful distribution of revenue between vicar
and parson?") -- subject to common-law scrutiny for misapplication of
statutes (or other controllable errors, if any are conceivable -- realistically, statutes were involved in nearly all the "distribution" situations that
came up in Prohibition cases.) Sometimes, of course, whether the High
Commission had jurisdiction was not a question of the boundary between
that tribunal and other ecclesiastical courts, but of whether the suit was
appropriate to any ecclesiastical court. In that event, the rule I state here
would not apply, though the considerations under (a) above might. I
doubt that the rule stated here for "intra-ecclesiastical distribution" situations was generally recognized, but the instant case lends it countenance.
In Sutton's Case,53 our last one involving the High Commission, the
surmise of disallowance was used with the same kind of ambiguity as we
saw in the assault and battery case above. Sutton was proceeded against
in the High Commission to the end of depriving him of the office of
Chancellor of the Diocese of Gloucester. He was charged with lack of appropriate training in and knowledge of civil and canon law, the Commission relying on canons and recent royal directives for the theory that
persons unqualified in legal studies could and should be removed from such
offices. Sutton was also charged with being a clergyman holding a cure
of souls. (Whether or not that in itself made him ineligible for the Chancellorship, it was clearly alleged against him as an aggravating circumstance. He was a divine, not a civilian, by profession, whatever pretense
he could make to de facto competence in law; he was responsible for a
living, which at least created doubt as to whether his holding both positions was tolerable in view of possible neglect of the cure of souls.) Sutton admitted that he was a beneficed clergyman, but pleaded that the
Chancellorship had been duly granted to him for life by the Bishop and
Chapter, wherefore he had a freehold from which he could not be dislodged. He sought a Prohibition on surmise that this defense was disallowed. The Court turned him down, essentially because his having a
freehold was considered irrelevant: He might have one, and if unjustly
deprived of it he might have common law redress, but the ecclesiastical
court had every right to examine whether he met the qualifications for the
spiritual office he held, or failed to in such a way as to be deprivable by
53

H. 2 Car. C.P. Croke Car.. 65.

191

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
ecclesiastical law. After all, every holder of a benefice had a freehold,
yet clergymen holding benefices could be charged with various derelictions in ecclesiastical courts and deprived -- subject to common law remedies that would accrue to him and his patron if by color of a wrongful
deprivation someone interfered with their respective temporal interests in
the living.
In one sense, the surmise of disallowance in this case was straightforward: Sutton claimed that his duly acquired life-tenure in the office made
him immune from scrutiny, at least concerning his qualifications and the
compatibility of the office with his parochial responsibilities (perhaps if
he had been specifically charged with dereliction of duty or malfeasance
the case would be different); the High Commission overruled that legal
contention; the Common Pleas was invited, albeit in vain, to control the
High Commission's decision. The "matter of freehold," however, may
change the thrust of the surmise. Suppose Sutton had said merely that the
High Commission proposed to consider depriving him of an office in
which he had a freehold without charging specific wrong-doing, and then
had argued that the common law ought to protect freehold interests in offices against that kind of ecclesiastical interference. The argument would
not have succeeded, but it might have been listened to. It is notable, finally, that Sutton made no effort, and the Court made no move on its
own, to dispute the High Commission's jurisdiction specifically. Perhaps
that would have been unpromising in Charles I's reign. Whether it would
have been implausible I am not so sure. The High Commission was looking into the affairs of the Diocese of Gloucester. As an interested party,
perhaps, the Bishop would have no claim to exclusive authority, but the
Archbishop might have a persuasive one. The matter was hardly criminal,
as a charge of specific illegal acts on the part of an ecclesiastical officeholder might be considered (with deprivation the sanction.) The proceedings against Sutton are a good illustration of the High Commission's
utility as an administrative instrument: Diocesan Chancellors were high
officers; an incompetent, pluralistic one is likely to have gotten where he
was by the cozier sort of cathedral politics; a national supervisory body,
capable of cracking down on the localism that corrupted the Church as it
frustrated central government, was a useful institution. But is it at all clear
that the High Commission had the legal power to proceed against Sutton?
At any rate, its power was not questioned in our case.
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(9)General pardons
The surmise of disallowance also comes up in a few cases on general
pardons. The common law courts frequently prohibited ecclesiastical proceedings on the bare surmise that a pardon released the party from liability. Dr. Newman's Case54 is an express holding that the bare surmise is
sufficient. Newman was an ecclesiastical judge, who proceeded ex officio
against a clergyman (for what offense is not reported.) While the suit was
pending, a general pardon was granted. That it covered the offense in
question was undisputed. Newman nevertheless proceeded to sentence,
from which the clergyman appealed. Then he sought a Prohibition,
merely surmising the pardon -- i.e., without pretense that the pardon had
been alleged and disregarded, either in Newman's court or at the appellate level. Counsel opposing the Prohibition rested wholly on the argument that failure to allege the pardon in the ecclesiastical court was a fault
-- i.e., that there was no basis for Prohibition without a showing that the
ecclesiastical courts had improperly disallowed the pardon after having
been informed of its existence and urged to consider it relevant. The
Court rejected that contention expressly and granted the Prohibition.
The report is too brief to give a full impression of the Court's thinking,
but a couple of formulations are interesting. The judges said that even
thought the plaintiff had not tried to introduce the pardon in the ecclesiastical court, he could allege it here as amicus curiae. That expression
evokes the "public" theory of Prohibitions -- as if to say, "Granting that
qua private party one who raises an issue at a later stage than necessary is
in a weak position, we are here to prohibit such misconduct as prosecuting a pardoned man, however we find out abut it." Chief Justice Coke
said that he doubted whether the general pardon could be waived in a
criminal case -- by which he presumably meant to suggest, "If there is no
way for a man to disclaim the benefit of a pardon, failure to allege it at a
given point is no waiver; unless the plaintiff can in some sense be said to
have waived the pardon, there is no reason to deny him the advantage of
it when he brings it up." However the point is put, the Court's ground
54
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seems solid: Be the law as it might with respect to the need to allege other
defenses and objections in the ecclesiastical court, a pardon was a public
act, whereof the ecclesiastical judge should take notice (in at least a moral
sense, seven if in a narrowly legal one he was not bound, under pain of
reversal for error, to observe an unalleged pardon.) A pardon was a wonderful manifestation of royal mercy, to be appreciated and to be given its
intended effect, though an ignorant or negligent party failed to claim it,
though an ecclesiastical judge were excusably or inexcusably uninformed
of it, or were unwilling to implement it on his own motion.
In Elizabeth Davis. v. Hawkins,55 the suit was for defamation. The
original ecclesiastical court gave sentence for the defendant (speaker.) On
appeal, the Arches reversed the sentence and gave the plaintiff (defamee)
12d costs. A general pardon was then granted. (Acts of "spiritual" defamation, being considered primarily crimes, were consistently held to be
within the terms of general pardons.) Then the speaker appealed to the
Delegates, who upheld the Arches' judgement and granted further costs to
the defamee. Then, after losing again on the merits, the speaker alleged
the pardon in the Delegates. He sought a Prohibition on surmise that his
attempt to plead the pardon had been disallowed. The Court's discussion
of the case is obscurely reported. It is in any event of no importance here,
for it turns on the problem (common in pardon cases) of how to deal with
the two cost awards where the substantive offense was pardoned. The
only point to be noted at present is that disallowance was alleged. Need it
have been? Would exactly the same discussion have taken place on bare
surmise that the Delegates had affirmed the "guilty" sentence plus the
cost award below, and then assessed further costs, after the pardon had
wiped out the offense? I can only say that in the light of Newman's Case
and general practice I can see no reason to suppose the disallowance surmise was essential. One might conceivably argue that a man who takes
appeals ought to try to use the pardon at some point in the ecclesiastical
courts. I.e.: It is easy to forgive a man who is pardoned while being tried
and says nothing about the pardon until, having lost, he seeks a Prohibition. For people will understandably want to try for vindication on the
merits in criminal causes.
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But when that effort fails once, perhaps the equities are altered. If it is
no fault to appeal on the merits instead of seeking a Prohibition based on
the pardon after one loss, and if it is no fault to delay bringing in the pardon until the last appeal on the merits is lost, perhaps it should be considered a fault even then to keep quiet about the pardon. One who keeps
quiet all the way through takes advantage of very liberal facilities for vindication, and then stands back and permits the assessment of costs to get
more snarled-up than it might if the ecclesiastical court’s notice of the
pardon were assured by the party best able to call attention to it. However, the principle of Newman’s Case is broad, and Davis v. Hawkins is
hardly distinguishable from that case. (There was an appeal on the merits
in Newman’s Case, and the pardonee kept quiet even after losing the second time. The only difference is that there could have been another appeal
in Newman’s Case, whereas the pardonee in Davis v. Hawkins was at the
end of the road when he brought up the pardon in the ecclesiastical
courts. He could probably have brought it up for the first time in his Prohibition without hurting himself.)
Further cases on pardons merely illustrate the occasional, probably superfluous, occurrence of the disallowance surmise. Smith v. Sherborne56
antedates Newman’s Case. A beneficed clergyman was sued to the end of
deprivation on the ground that he had acquired his living by simony. He
pleaded that simony had been forgiven by an appropriately timed general
pardon and got a Prohibition on surmise that he was improperly denied
the benefit of the pardon. The reports relate to a motion for Consultation.
The case presented difficult problems and was argued at length. The Prohibition was eventually upheld because the judges did not think that the
transaction involved amounted to simony. With respect to the pardon,
they did not think it affected the parson’s deprivability for simony. (Pardoning the offense meant removing criminal liability, but did not, in the
case of simony, remove the offender’s disqualification for holding a benefice.) At least in the retrospective light of Newman’s Case, I can see no
reason why the Prohibition could not have been obtained merely by sur-

56

H. -P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Moore, 916; Lansd. 1065, f.4; Harl. 4817, f.180b. (Moore is a bad report, the
MSS. taken together excellent.)

195

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
mising that the clergyman was sued contrary to general pardon. The same
debate and conclusion would have followed.
The character of the litigation in Dr. Brikenden's Case57 is not clear to
me, but it does not matter here. A party tried to take advantage of a pardon to escape a costs award. He made an attempt in the ecclesiastical
court and sought a Prohibition on surmise of disallowance. The Common
Pleas turned him down on the substance. (a technical question, having to
do with the timing of the pardon in relation to the judgment for costs and
the subsequent "taxing," i.e., quantifying, the costs held due in principle.)
Plaintiff-in-Prohibition had a weak claim, but I see no reason to suppose
it would not have got a hearing without the disallowance-surmise.

(10)Testamentary cases
There are not many testamentary cases in which the surmise of disallowance is likely to have been superfluous. A couple may be noted. In
Goram v. Fowks,58 an administrator sued a man for detaining "jura et
credita" belonging to the estate and thereby preventing the administrator
from putting in a true inventory, as he was legally obliged to do. I take
this suit to be in effect for discovery, like the innumerable equity bills for
detention of deeds. If the administrator wanted to recover property belonging to his intestate, he could only sue at common law. An ecclesiastical suit would have been utterly inappropriate. I think it is plain that the
administrator was trying to get the other party examined in the ecclesiastical court as to whether he held "jura et credita" which the administrator
suspected him of having, after which there would be enough information
either to enter those items on the inventory as possibly recoverable assets
or claims, or else to leave them out. The alleged detainer appeared in the
ecclesiastical court and claimed property in the goods in question. (What
kinds of things they were does not appear -- probably bonds, negotiable
paper, or the like, the ultimate question probably being whether they were
held as deposits or had been assigned.) A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the claim was disallowed.
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P. 1 Car. C.P. Croke Car., 9.
M. 32 (31/32 or 32/33) Eliz. Q.B. 4 Leonard, 150.
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The report is too skimpy to permit one to get a hold on this potentially
interesting case. I would guess that the detainer admitted that he had
goods of the sort roughly described by the administrator. (In the nature of
discovery suits, the description would be rough. If the administrator knew
precisely what was detained and believed it to belong to the estate, he
should inventory it and sue to recover.) Then, I would suppose, the detainer said that the goods were his and took the position that the ecclesiastical court had no power to investigate the truth of that claim or otherwise
to interrogate him further. Perhaps it could make him answer questions to
the end of discovering whether he had anything of the sort mentioned, but
once he had admitted that he did, the ecclesiastical court must surcease,
for the ownership of goods is exclusively common law business. The ecclesiastical judge rejected that legal contention, whereupon a Prohibition
was sought. If this reconstruction is correct, the occurrence of the disallowance surmise is unsurprising. The detainer quite naturally went into
the ecclesiastical court in order to say, "Under the circumstances -- because this is really a property-dispute -- I am not examinable here, though
the suit against me as such -- merely as an effort to get information
needed by the administrator from someone suspected of having it -- is unobjectionable." But it does not follow that the disallowance surmise was
necessary. Suppose the detainer had said merely, "I am sued for discovery with respect to goods in which I claim the property." I can only conjecture that the chance for a Prohibition would still have been pretty good.
The report, indeed, suggests that the surmise here did not rely unambiguously on the disallowance, but sought also to say that the mere existence
of a property claim took away ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Confronted with
an unambiguously "bare" surmise, a common law court would be likely to
say that ecclesiastical courts must be kept from asking questions that
might touch on the rights of a property dispute, even if they would not
necessarily do so. (Not necessarily, because the detainer could be asked
only for a description of goods which might concern the administrator,
without being asked in any way to explain or justify his claim to the property. But it is difficult to keep the two apart, and it is in the nature of discovery proceedings that potential litigants will in some measure be hurt
by disclosure of even comparatively neutral facts.)
Insofar as prohibiting at all is not the happiest solution -- well, as much
harm was done by prohibiting with the surmise of disallowance as would
have been done by prohibiting without it. The administrator is left in the
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dark as to what exactly he should inventory as possibly recoverable property, and he may not have sufficient information about the goods to sue
for them at common law. He should probably be advised to go to a court
of equity. There, indeed, is where he should perhaps have gone in the first
place. The decision in Goram v. Fowks does not, however, mean that ecclesiastical suits for discovery are invalid as such.
A second testamentary case, Goodwyn v. Goodwyn,59 was as follows:
A man left a £20 legacy to his daughter. The executor entered into a bond
to pay the legacy (i.e., promised to pay and bound himself to forfeit £40 if
he failed to.) When subsequently sued for the legacy, the executor appeared in the ecclesiastical court and pleaded payment "according to the
bond." He obtained a Prohibition on surmise that the plea was disallowed. On motion for Consultation, Tanfield, of counsel, argued that the
executor had merely pleaded that he had paid the legacy. That was an obviously appropriate ecclesiastical plea to a suit in indisputable ecclesiastical cognizance. If it was really disallowed (or disallowed for some
plausible but insufficient reason, such as defective evidence), the error
should be corrected by appeal. Justices Gawdy, Fenner, and Yelverton
(only their opinion is reported, but they make a majority) overruled Tanfield's argument. As they put it, the bond "extinguished" the legacy and
converted the £20 into a common law debt. Taken strictly, that should
mean (a) that the legacy suit would be prohibitable even though there
were no claim that the money had been paid; (b) that with or without a
claim of payment, disallowance need not have been surmised. For if the
making of the contract utterly "extinguished" the legacy, there was nothing within ecclesiastical jurisdiction to sue for. Therefore a surmise saying, "I am sued for a legacy altogether inappropriately, because the
pretended legacy was converted into a debt" should get a Prohibition.
It is of course unremarkable that the executor responded to the ecclesiastical suit with his straightforward claim to have satisfied his duty, however the duty is to be classified. It seems to me worth noting that there
would be a good answer to Tanfield's argument without holding the legacy flatly "extinguished." The executor did not plead payment simpliciter,
but "according to the bond." He called attention to his contractual duty
59
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over and above his ecclesiastical duty (note that the contractual duty was
a heavier onus owing to the penalty in the bond), and professed to have
paid by way of satisfying the contract -- though that was also to satisfy
the ecclesiastical duty if the latter could be said (contrary to the Court) to
retain any life. In rejecting that plea, the ecclesiastical court did not in the
simplest sense commit the unaccountable (hence appealable) error of disallowing a plea of payment. It disallowed the plea that another duty had
been substituted for the legacy by agreement and performed, wherefore
proceedings to recover the legacy were manifestly unjust; At least in theory, the ecclesiastical court could have taken the position that the substitution does not extinguish the legacy, and therefore that the only
acceptable plea is mere payment. "Payment according to the bond" is
bad form because it implies the false premise that making the contract
wipes out the ecclesiastical duty to pay the legacy. That position would
perhaps not be manifestly erroneous by ecclesiastical standards (though
pretty silly); common law intervention could be justified as protecting one
whose performance of a common law duty would not be straightforwardly accepted as discharging any remaining ecclesiastical duty, contrary to the plain intent of the parties and all justice. If we tacitly assume
what we must if the ecclesiastical decision is to make any real sense -that the disallowance was evidentiary -- then clearly ecclesiastical standards of evidence should not be applied to the claim that a common law
duty had been satisfied, whereas they would be appropriate (at least arguably) to a claim of mere payment (=satisfaction of a purely ecclesiastical
duty.)
The advantage of this tortuous alternative route to a Prohibition is that
it avoids the starkest implication of the Court's "extinguishment" theory - that making a contract to pay a legacy ipso facto destroys the ecclesiastical right, whether or not the contract is performed. Is that really just? If
an executor enters a penalty-bond to satisfy a legacy and pays nothing,
should the legatee be prohibited from suing for the legacy? Must he sue
on the bond, even though he is willing to give up the penalty and rely on
the weaker sanctions of ecclesiastical law to get his money? Should one
not worry about the motives of an executor who seeks to prohibit a suit
for a legacy he has admittedly not paid, on the ground that an equivalent
common law action lies against him? If he can avoid being harried by ecclesiastical sanctions for the moment, he will perhaps be hard to find
when a suit on the bond has ripened to execution. The Court in Goodwyn
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v. Goodwyn appears to have taken the stronger position, which tends to
remove the need to surmise disallowance. I argue that it need not have
taken so strong a position to uphold the Prohibition, and that perhaps it
should not have. Ultimately, I wonder if it did take that position. Could
"The bond extinguished the legacy" not be taken as shorthand for "The
ecclesiastical court had no business treating the right to a legacy as in any
sense alive when performance of the bond was claimed -- no business doing anything but letting the executor try to prove satisfaction of the bond
by common law standards -- no business, if this is what happened, forcing
the executor to plead payment simpliciter and hence to subject himself to
ecclesiastical standards of proof"? If such a reading is permissible, the
behavior of the ecclesiastical court would have been essential to the right
to a Prohibition.

(11)Courts of Equity
The surmise of disallowance almost never occurs in Prohibitions to
courts of equity. Such Prohibitions were usually based on the theory that
the suit should never have been brought in equity -- either because a common law remedy was available, or because the judges thought that equitable relief was simply unjustifiable in the circumstances. We may
conclude this section however, with an exceptional case in which disallowance was alleged, Moss v. Browne,60 and a dictum on the disallowance surmise in relation to courts of equity. B. was badly in debt to M.
and "decayed in estate." They made a settlement whereby B. paid 25 per
cent of the debt and M. released the whole. B. then promised to pay the
rest when "God should please to make him able." Later B. came into a
large estate. M. sued him in the Court of Requests because he would not
honor his promise in his changed fortunes. B. first pleaded that he had
made no promise. When the Requests found against him on that point, he
pleaded the Statue of Limitations. He sought a Prohibition in part because
the plea of the Statute was disallowed. (His other claim was that he was in
effect being sued on a contract, for which an Action on the Case at common law was the appropriate remedy.) After argument, the Common
Pleas refused the Prohibition. (The suit was not on an enforceable contract, since after the release of the original indebtedness there was no con60

H. 17 Car. C.P. March, 151.
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sideration to support the promise to pay the forgiven sum if possible. On
the other hand it was legitimate to take B.'s promissory language as raising a trust for M's benefit, and hence to take the suit as an effort to enforce a trust, even though it was not expressly cast as such. The Statute of
Limitations did not apply to a trustee's duties.)
For our present purposes, I would only suggest that the surmise of disallowance is unlikely to have been necessary, even if the claim to a Prohibition had depended wholly on the Statute of Limitations. "I am sued with
respect to a duty no longer enforceable by reason of the Statute of Limitations" would probably have led to the same discussion and decision.
There were problems, as we have seen, about the proposition that common law courts were exclusively competent to construe statutes, situations in which it was perhaps correct to insist that statute-based claims
be advanced in the court that had lawful possession of the suit to which
such claims were alleged to be relevant. I doubt, however, that the Statute
of Limitations in a Requests suit would have seemed such a situation. Of
all the prohibited courts, the Requests was probably the least trusted and
the least regarded as a legitimate member of the system. The judges
would probably have been ready to assume that minor equity courts (unlike the Chancery) were predisposed to mistake the force of statutes in
general (as distinct from misapplying a particular statute). That is to say,
they would have been suspected of an inclination to mitigate statutes,
contrary to the good doctrine (reiterated in Moss v. Brown) that "there is
no remedy in equity against a statute." (That is, equity relieved unconscionable abuses of the letter of the common law; it could not prevent
people from taking unfair advantage of their statutory rights.) The Statute
of Limitations would probably have seemed especially tempting. People
like Browne in our case (had the statute applied to him) could maneuver
themselves behind the protection of the statute in very bad conscience indeed. For these reasons, I suspect that any common law court asked to
stop a suit in the Requests allegedly barred by the Statute of Limitations
would immediately take a look for itself, without regard to whether the
statute had been pleaded and disallowed.
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In an earlier Requests case,61 no disallowance surmise was made, nor
was one needed to justify a Prohibition, but a dictum relating to disallowance occurs. In this case, Edith More made Trott her executor and made
the Taylor brothers residuary legatees, each to have half of the residue.
Trott accounted for the estate in an ecclesiastical court, after which he
paid what that accounting showed to be the residue to one of the Taylors
-- half in his own right and half as executor to his now-deceased brother,
the other legatee. Taylor gave Trott two separate acquittances, one for
each moiety. Trott then died, making X., the present plaintiff-in-Prohibition, his executor. Taylor sued X. in the Requests for a new accounting
(no doubt because he contended that a proper view of More’s estate
would show a larger residue than appeared by the ecclesiastical accounting.) X. pleaded the above matter (the ecclesiastical accounting plus the
acquittance) in the Requests; Taylor demurred to his plea there. X. sought
a Prohibition, through Coke as counsel, simply reciting all this. He did
not say that the Requests had erroneously ruled against him, but claimed a
Prohibition on the theory that the Requests ought not to consider giving
Taylor relief under the circumstances as they were alleged to be. It is notable, however, that X. did plead in the Requests. Quaere whether his
chance for a Prohibition would be any less if he had not pleaded, or if it
had not appeared of record that Taylor had demurred (that is to say, if so
far as appeared questions of mere fact -- whether the prior ecclesiastical
proceedings had occurred, whether the acquittance were made -- had been
open in the Requests.)
The Court granted a Prohibition: “For it was said that an executor’s executor will not be compelled to account in a Court of Conscience, but the
executor himself may. And an executor’s executor may be sued in Court
Christian for a legacy of the first testator. And it was also said that if the
acquittance will not be allowed there, that is another cause to grant Prohibition.” It is the last sentence of the Court’s opinion that concerns us here.
As it stands, it would seem to insist on the disallowance surmise. As the
case was, the Requests simply had no jurisdiction to call an executor’s executor to account. (Whence one may infer that the surmise said more than
it needed to even in reciting the prior ecclesiastical accounting, not to
61
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mention the acquittance and the pleading in the Requests. Enough to
show that the accountant was an executor’s executor. I should suppose
the reason for his non-accountability in equity was that his conscience
was not chargeable with anything his testator had done as executor. Sed
quaere whether cases in which a charge could be put on an executor’s
conscience are not imaginable, though this would not appear to be one of
them, for X. would surely be entitled to assume that Trott’s ecclesiastical
accounting was honest, whether it was or not. Reciting the prior events
would seem to be helpful for clearing X. of any dereliction in persona.) If,
however, the first executor had been called to account (or, speculating
that it might be too flat to say that an executor’s executor can never be liable in equity, if the prior ecclesiastical accounting had not taken place or
not been alleged) the acquittances themselves would be grounds for Prohibition, provided they were disallowed. But if they were not disallowed
-- if X. said nothing more than that he had the acquittances in hand -Prohibition would not lie. So the Court’s opinion, taken literally, implies.
I wonder whether it ought to be taken that literally. It is perhaps arguable
in theory that a court of equity ought not to be concluded by the acquittances -- i.e., ought to be free to investigate whether they were predicated
on a false accounting which the legatee unwittingly accepted at the time.
But the King’s Bench in our case does not seem to have taken that position -- rather, the position that the Requests must not go behind the acquittances and is not free to try their factual reality. Therefore, should the
acquittances be barely surmised -- without any allegation of an unsuccessful attempt to show them in the Requests and persuade that court to
tell Taylor that he could not have relief in the face of his own releases -- I
should not be surprised to see a Prohibition granted. This point is speculative, however. In terms, the opinion goes to show that the disallowance
surmise was a possibility, and perhaps in some circumstances a requirement, in cases concerning courts of equity.

ENDNOTES
FN 6. Lest this situation seem improbable, imagine the following situation: There is little or no sign
of a custom of commuting tithes -- certainly not enough evidence to sustain a modus at common law.
However, Parson would prefer money to the trouble of handling tithes in kind. He persuades most of
the parishioners to agree to a commutation representing more or less fair value. But Parishioner A.
won’t deal. He thinks the parson’s figure is too high, prefers paying in kind to meeting that price. SO
Parson sues A. on a feigned, or at least weakly-evidence modus hoping that the ecclesiastical court
will sympathize with his project, if A’s unwillingness to accept a commutation is strong enough to
make him contest the suit. (Just bringing a suit is of course one way to make a recalcitrant bargainer
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think twice.)
Perhaps the ecclesiastical judge will see advantage to the Church in a fair-value
commutation, where most of the parishioners are ready to accept one. Perhaps the judge will at least
exercise pressure on A. If the judge is not dishonest enough to find the parson's modus good against
all the evidence, perhaps he will at least be willing to uphold it by combining a little evidence in its
favor with easy-going ecclesiastical standards of prescription. In these circumstances,
A.'s only
honest response is that there is no such modus, but that tithes in kind are admittedly due. In terms of
Dodderidge's principles, I find this imaginary case tricky. On the one hand, it would seem that
common law standards of prescription, rather than ecclesiastical standards, ought to determine
whether A. has any other duty towards the parson than to pay tithes in kind. The question would
seem to be whether the governing local law, based on immemorial usage, calls for tithes in kind or a
substitute performance.
On the other hand, should it be presumed that an ecclesiastical court would handle a contest between
a modus and tithes in kind in such a way as to offend common law standards? I have deliberately
stated a case in which the ecclesiastical court might have a motive to lean in the direction of the
modus. perhaps using its easier rules on prescription to do so. But basing a presumption of law on an
imaginable motive is dubious. If one thinks in the somewhat abstract terms perhaps appropriate to
presumptions of law, it would seem that ecclesiastical law in general has a bias in favor of tithes in
kind. (Why are ecclesiastical courts not trusted to try modi alleged by parishioners in suits for tithes in
kind?) Should one not presume that across the board -- including the appellate level, where the judges
would be remote from any knowledge of local conditions which might make it desirable to uphold the
parson's modus -- ecclesiastical courts would look hard at any attempt to destroy the right to tithes in
kind, whoever initiated it? Would they be likely to let such an attempt through unless the prescriptive
claim was a good candidate by common law standards?
Secondly, is it self-evident that common law standards should govern a contest between tithes in kind
and a modus? Is it not arguable that the Church has a right to make people pay a commutation instead
of tithes in kind if in fact they have done so for long enough to satisfy ecclesiastical standards of
prescriptions? is doing that not equivalent to holding that usage over a reasonably long time amounts
to consent, or a kind of "implied composition-real?"
Of course such usage should be genuine;
ecclesiastical courts ought not to do what the parson in our imaginary case hopes for -- cheat a little to
uphold a weak or feigned modus. But the legal presumption must be that "foreign" jurisdictions will
apply their own law honestly.
Finally, there is an incidental reason against prohibiting ipso facto when a parson sues on a modus
relating to a tithable product. For prohibiting in that case would spare the parishioner admitting
anything against himself. I.e.: If A can have a Prohibition by surmising that, whereas he is sued for
10d by virtue of a pretended modus, there is no such custom, he will not have confessed that tithes in
kind are due. If he wins with a jury and the parson sues him for tithes in kind, he can get a new
Prohibition by surmising a 6d. modus. If, on the other hand, A must plead in the ecclesiastical court,
he must either allege his 6d modus now if he is serious about it or admit that tithes in kind are due. The Admission
migh be advantageous to the parson in various ways, both in ecclesiastical and common law litigation.

In sum, the case can be argued both ways. Perhaps the very fact that it can be is reason for insisting
on a disallowance surmise. The last consideration above argues against an ipso facto Prohibition; the
other considerations at least make difficulty, suggesting that the chance of common law standards'
being violated in practice may not be so great, and that perhaps those standards are not even relevant.
Under these circumstances, "wait and see" makes sense -- insist that the ecclesiastical defendant at
least make a plea in the ecclesiastical court and come with a concrete complaint (e.g., that he offered
specified evidence that tithes in kind were always paid, or paid up to a time so recent that a modus
could not possibly be established by common law standards, and that such evidence was disallowed,
or else that sentence was given without paying proper attention to it.)
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As for the contest between alternative modi: If all the common law court can see is that such a contest
is joined, has it the interest in making sure that common law standards are observed to justify
intervention? Surely it must be assumed that the ecclesiastical court will apply the same standard of
prescription to both of the rival modi. If it does so, it is at least not presumable that the ultimately
governing common law standard will be flouted.
For even if non-immemorial usage is taken to
establish rights, it does not follow that the older of the two modi will not be upheld. By the ultimately
"right" -- common law -- standard, it may be that neither modus ought to prevail over tithes in kind
(or, in the case of non-tithable products, total exemption), but it would be strange to impose a "better"
solution on the parties than either seeks. It is possible that application of the ecclesiastical standard of
prescription could lead to an unacceptable result -- as if Parson's 10d modus were upheld on the basis
of continuous usage over the last ten years, in the face of at least equally good evidence of
Parishioner's 6d modus over the ten or more years preceding the last ten. If Parishioner made a
surmise bringing out such a story, no doubt Prohibition should lie. But a surmise showing only that a
contest between two modi exists is no basis for presuming that an unacceptable result is at all likely.
Dodderidge's bringing up the conflicting standards of prescription -- in effect qualifying his earlier
suggestion that only disallowance of a counter- modus reflecting variant evidentiary standards would
justify prohibiting suits founded on modi -- only reinforced Justice Houghton's convictions. There is
so much conflict between common and ecclesiastical law, Houghton said in effect, both on standards
of evidence and standards of prescription, that a strong common law hand is necessary -- certainly
automatic intervention when a contest of modi is joined. Presumably he would have argued that the
likelihood of something's going wrong if ecclesiastical courts were left to try prescriptive
counterclaims was quite enough to justify "preventive" control. When you have recognized that
standards of prescription conflict and that the common law standard must prevail, why lean over
backwards to avoid prohibiting until it is altogether certain that the governing standard will be
violated?
Rolle and Harl. 4561 expressly associate Chief Justice Montagu with the final, unanimous decision to
prohibit, whereas he does not seem to have participated in either of two previous hearings. Bulstrode
makes it clear that there were two, and that the second ended in a temporary stay. That was an
appropriate step when the puisne Justices were 2- I for a Prohibition, but the Chief Justice had not had
a chance to express himself.
In addition, Bulstrode shows that the judges were confused about exactly what the surmise said and
what the rival customs were alleged to be. Though the reporting is somewhat obscure, my impression
is that their difference of opinion was rather in the abstract -- none of them being quite sure what the
stated case before them was. Perhaps their differences disappeared when they got the case straight
(e.g., Dodderidge could have become convinced that the disallowance was evidentiary); perhaps
Dodderidge changed his mind on the principles and decided that counter- modus cases should be
prohibited ipso facto after all. (The reports of the final outcome emphasize his point about conflicting
standards of prescription. Perhaps Dodderidge himself came around to the view that, given such
conflict, it was just as well to prohibit on bare surmise that modi were pitted against each other.)
Whatever the exact story of one reluctant judge's thinking, it seems safe to suppose that three
members of the Court favored prohibiting just because rival modi were in question -- in other words,
that the disallowance surmise in this case was not essential. Goslin v. Harden may be taken as
authority that alleging an alternative modus when the ecclesiastical suit is based on a modus will fetch
a Prohibition as reliably as alleging a modus when the ecclesiastical suit is for tithes in kind. If, as in
Goslin v. Harden itself, plaintiff-in-Prohibition says that his counter- modus was disallowed, the
disallowance surmise should be untraversable.
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IV.
EVIDENTIARY DISALLOWANCE SURMISES:
THE TWO-WITNESS RULE
Summary: Judicial opinion on Prohibitions to block enforcement of
ecclesiastical evidentiary standards was in one respect sharply divided.
One vein of opinion, represented primarily by Coke, was opposed to such
Prohibitions, apparently without exception. (Conversely: in favor of allowing ecclesiastical courts to apply their own standards to the determination of facts, once it was conceded that a case or issue was within their
jurisdiction and that no controllable error of substantive law had been
committed.) Coke's position on this matter is the clearest instance, though
not the only one, of his relative restraint in the use of Prohibitions and regard for the integrity of the ecclesiastical system. Across the board however, the Cokean position was the dissenting opinion. Elizabethan
authority strongly supports evidentiary Prohibitions in general and draws
no very clear lines between circumstances in which they are and are not
justifiable. The low point for such Prohibitions was the period of Coke's
predominance on the Bench. Coke's Common Pleas explicitly adopted
his position in a couple of strong decisions; his King's Bench appears, so
far as reported cases show, to have granted no evidentiary Prohibitions;
nor were they freely granted by the King's Bench under his predecessor
there, Sir Thomas Fleming. After Coke's fall, both courts were readier to
grant such Prohibitions, at any rate up to ca. 1630.
Within the majority vein -- which recognized the general legitimacy of
evidentiary Prohibitions -- there was considerable difference of opinion
on a more detailed level. Alongside Coke's pronounced reticence to interfere with ecclesiastical evidentiary practices, it is possible to make out another "judicial restraint" position, the latter most clearly associable with
Chief Justice Popham. This position comes to insisting on rigor in distinguishing matters of essentially ecclesiastical concern -- which ecclesiastical courts should be free to try by their own standards -- from matters in
which the common law had a particular interest and which ought therefore to be tried under rules as little at odds with the common law as possible.
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Most judges would have accepted that distinction in the abstract; their
differences were over the rigor with which it should be applied -- i.e., the
way the common law’s “interest” should be defined in various circumstances; the kind and degree of “interest” required to justify Prohibition.
The clearest intra-court division in those terms appears in the early-Jacobean King’s Bench. In the main test of strength between Popham’s advocacy of restraint and greater willingness to intervene in ecclesiastical
suits (Brown v. Wentworth), the Chief Justice was narrowly defeated. Popham’s influence may have joined with Coke’s, however, to keep evidentiary Prohibitions within somewhat stricter bounds in the 17th century
than they had been confined to in the 16th. That is a very net sort of generalization, however, for the late-Jacobean and early-Caroline courts departed to a degree from the mood of restraint. No settlement of the scope
of evidentiary Prohibitions, cutting through the great variety of cases, was
ever arrived at.
* * *
In the preceding two sections, we have been concerned with disallowance surmises which, at least ostensibly, complain of the substantive conduct of ecclesiastical courts. That is to say, plaintiff-in-Prohibition alleges
an act of disallowance which, he claims, implies an erroneous legal holding subject to common law control -- e.g., that a husband’s release does
not bind his wife. (Such surmises may sometimes be only ostensibly substantive, in the sense that the real explanation of the disallowance might
be evidentiary. E.g.: An executor claims that he was wrongfully prevented from relying on a husband’s release against the wife’s legacy suit.
The factual explanation for the ecclesiastical court’s holding might be that
the release was supported by only one witness. So long, however, as the
executor does not allege that explanation, his surmise is substantive. If,
knowing that the release was ruled out for deficiency of supporting evidence, the executor alleges that it was ruled out tout court, he stakes his
case on the hope that Prohibition will lie whatever the reason for the disallowance. He hopes that the common law court will take an erroneous
and controllable substantive rule as implied in the unexplained disallowance, or else that it will regard the explanation as immaterial. He hopes,
should the act of disallowance come to trial and its evidentiary basis come
to light, that the Prohibition will hold up -- i.e., that the judges will consider exclusion of the release by virtue of the two-witness rule just as
wrongful as its exclusion by virtue of its rules on married women’s capacity.)
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We turn now to evidentiary disallowance surmises -- i.e., cases in
which plaintiff-in-Prohibition complains expressly and solely that ecclesiastical evidentiary standards have been improperly put in his way. In
other words, one does not allege that one’s legal contention has been erroneously ruled out, but that one has been prevented from establishing facts
necessary to sustain one’s admittedly recognized legal contention. In almost every case the culprit was the two-witness rule: people claim that
they cannot establish Fact X. because the ecclesiastical court insists arbitrarily that two witnesses be produced to affirm it. Once in a while, however, other rigidities in ecclesiastical evidentiary standards are
complained of. Like other disallowance surmises, evidentiary ones should
not always be taken at face-value as descriptions of reality. The cases provide a certain amount of incidental evidence that ecclesiastical courts
were not altogether rigid in their proof standards. Plaintiffs-in-Prohibition
who say they have been prevented from establishing Fact X. by a single
witness may be feigning utterly -- simply figuring that an evidentiary disallowance surmise is a safer route to a Prohibition that alternative claims,
and assuming that issue will not be taken on disallowance or the reason
for it; short of that, plaintiffs may sometimes falsely attribute disallowances that actually occurred to the two-witness rule because that rule was
well-known and more objectionable than less unbending standards. (E.g.:
A man offers one witness to prove Fact X. His proof is rejected, not because the ecclesiastical court actually insists on two witnesses, but because it regards the proffered witness as incompetent, or because it
requires documentary or circumstantial evidence to back up the single
witness. The man may nevertheless say or imply that he is a victim of the
two-witness rule -- taking that to be the safest way to a Prohibition, hoping that the reality will not be controverted or, if it is, that the evidentiary
standards actually applied by the ecclesiastical court will ultimately be
held objectionable in their own right.)
For analytical purposes, however, such realities can largely be ignored: Evidentiary disallowance surmises on their face raise the question
whether ecclesiastical courts are free to apply their own evidentiary
standards to matters which are admittedly within their jurisdiction and
which they give no sign of mishandling from the point of view of substantive law. That is the pervasive question of this Section.
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In the Introduction above, I ask in the abstract whether substantive and
evidentiary disallowance cases can be distinguished as classes -- whether
the reasons for prohibiting on the one type of surmise seem notably
stronger than the reasons for prohibiting on the other. The answer, I think,
is that arguments can be made in several directions on that question. But
the difficulty of segregating the two classes of disallowance surmises is
perhaps what emerges most clearly from the process of working out those
arguments. In point of form and as a matter of convenience, the two
classes must be looked at separately; a common set of jurisprudential issues permeates both categories. Anticipatory discussion of the evidentiary
cases beyond what I have provided in the Introduction seems to me unnecessary. We shall see that in a historical sense the evidentiary cases
show more coherent patterns that the substantive cases -- if anything, less
legal certainty or consensus, but more clearcut divisions of opinion and
more discernible changes of approach from time to time and court to
court.
In the early and leading Bagnall v. Stokes (1588),1 an executor was
sued for a legacy. He obtained a Prohibition by surmising that the legatee
had released the legacy and that his offer to plead and prove the release
had been rejected. Consultation was then moved for on the ground that
the release was an incident of the properly ecclesiastical suit for the legacy and in itself a good defense by ecclesiastical standards. Therefore the
suit was not prohibitable without regard to how it was handled, and the
handling of the plea was beyond common law control. The executor's
counsel (Owen) then said that "the truth of the case" was that there was
only one witness to authenticate the written release, "and for that reason
he will not have benefit of it in the spiritual court, whereas by the law of
the land here it ought to serve him although he has only one witness."
Counsel did not ask the Court to take that as truth merely on his word, but rather
argued that it was implied in the surmise. I.e.: The surmise said "offered to plead
1

H. 30 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 89; Moore, 907; Add. 25,194, f.58; Add. 25,196, f.109B. The
MSS., very similar to each other, are both much superior to the printed reports. It is of interest to
note that defendant-in-Prohibition in this case was represented by the "radical" lawyer Fuller (see
other references.) It is of course a perfectly normal fact of a practitioner's life, but an amusing
one, that the lawyer whose persecution by the ecclesiastical authorities a decade and a half later
was a cause celebre on at least one occasion argued in favor of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
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and prove" (with the additional words -- if Owen's speech reflects the surmise
accurately -- "according to the law of the land".) Owen asked that that
language, combined with the allegation of disallowance, be read as
amounting to a claim that the release was ruled out for evidentiary reasons. In effect, he urged the Court to presume that the release would be
excluded if it was not supported by two witnesses, and therefore to take a
somewhat inexplicit surmise as saying that it was excluded for the lack of
two witnesses. Owen's premise was that the ecclesiastical court's handling of the case was certainly controllable if inappropriate evidentiary
standards had been insisted on, assuming that the suit was not prohibitable on any other basis.
The judges accepted Owen's premise but rejected his construction of
the surmise. Prohibition would lie, they said, if the truth was as Owen
said it was, and if the surmise had spelled that "truth" out. They would
not read the surmise as laying an unexplained disallowance, over and
above the bare fact that a release was in question. Neither the bare fact
nor the unexplained disallowance would warrant prohibiting a legacy suit,
in the Court's opinion. Nor would the judges take it as true, on Owen's
word or by presumption, that the lack of two witnesses was the reason
why the plea was ruled out. That must be stated clearly to have been the
reason, and must actually have been. In other words, the legatee would be
free to dispute a properly formulated surmise as to fact -- to deny that the
plea was disallowed for evidentiary reasons and go to trial thereon. (So I
take the Court's hypothetical language, "if the truth is as alleged." One
has to be careful on this point, because there were circumstances in which
the courts would hold that allegations that a plea had been disallowed -or for a particular reason -- could not be traversed. So holding is compatible with insisting that disallowance, or disallowance for a reason sufficient to justify a Prohibition, be alleged as a matter of form. The
possibility that the Court in this case was only concerned with tight pro
forma pleading cannot be absolutely excluded. That bridge would not
have to be crossed until, in another case on a correct surmise, the legatee
tried to take factual issue on the reason why the release was disallowed -an eventuality unlikely to come about.)
In accord with this opinion, the Court granted a Consultation in Bagnall v. Stokes. For our present purposes, the chief significance of the case
lies in what was strictly speaking a strong dictum: Insistence on two wit-
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nesses to prove a written release of a legacy will not be permitted. I say
"strong dictum," because the Court told Owen clearly that all he need do
to get a Prohibition was to rewrite his surmise. (Had the judges wanted to
discourage jumping to conclusions as to what would happen in another
suit, they could have confined themselves to negating the present surmise.) He was positively encouraged with respect to one possible misgiving, for the judges assured him that an ecclesiastical sentence would not
bar the Prohibition he claimed to be entitled to in substance. (Another
possible misgiving was not mentioned: Would 50 Edw. 3 bar a new Prohibition in the same case after Consultation? Perhaps silence on that score
was assurance enough.)
Sir Edward Coke recorded Bagnall v. Stokes in the notebook he kept in
margins and interleaves of a copy of Littleton.2 (Anonymously, but the
date and summarized facts make it clear that the note relates to that case.)
To his summary, Coke appended a criticism: "Ex hoc nota that by such a
surmise all matters could be removed out of the Court Christian, although
the party had many witnesses. For when he surmises that he has but one
witness, the other cannot say that he has two or more. For then he alleges
something against himself. And thus it was adjudged M. 4 Jac in C.P., that
no Prohibition lies on such a surmise." The passage is all in Coke's hand,
but a slight change in the writing shows that the last sentence was added
later. In other words, when Coke's Common Pleas, shortly after his appointment as Chief Justice, reversed what he regarded as an unfortunate
holding, he went back and "rounded out" the note he had presumably
made much earlier. The addition tends to establish that the note was
meant to be critical. Standing alone, it could be taken as a lawyer's
memorandum of a handy device -- as it were, "If you want a Prohibition,
surmise wrongful insistence on the two-witness rule, for the other party
will hang himself if he tries to contradict you." Coke's taking the trouble
to complete the note with the citation of a contrary holding by his own
court confirms the more natural reading of the original words: They say
in effect, "The holding in Bagnall v. Stokes has alarming implications" -for later Coke remembered that he had once so observed and added, as it
were, "but now my court has corrected the law."

2

Harl. 6687, f.739.
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The exact meaning and justification of Coke's criticism require a little
reflection. It would seem to say in effect that the surmise of improper insistence on the two-witness rule is almost bound to be fictionalized and
abused. That is, A. sues B. in an ecclesiastical court. B. has some sort of
defense which he prefers to have evaluated and tried at common law, but
is unsure whether he can get a Prohibition. If, for example, his defense is
release of a legacy, he certainly cannot get a Prohibition -- going by Bagnall v. Stokes -- on either the ground that releases are intrinsically "common law issues" or on the general surmise that the defense was
disallowed. Therefore B. surmises that he has one witness to prove his defense, but that the ecclesiastical court improperly insists on two. He
makes his surmise up out of whole cloth. He may have plenty of witnesses to satisfy ecclesiastical standards; he may have made no attempt to
plead his defense or offer evidence of any sort.
How is A. to respond? According to Coke, he can only plead to the
merits -- deny, say, that he made the release which B. alleges and let the
issue be tried at common law. For how can he traverse the disallowancefor-evidentiary-reasons, even if he is quite free to in principle? If he traverses, B. will want to convince the jury that he has only one witness. If he
in fact could produce a dozen, he will make every effort to repress them.
A. will have to round them up in order to prevent the jury from concluding that B. does in fact have only one witness, and inferring from that that
B. is telling the truth when he says that he offered his single witness to the
ecclesiastical court and was turned away. But what will be the effect if A.
finds several people who will swear, "Yes indeed, A made such a release;
I saw him write this document out and hand it over to B with my own
eyes.?" In the first place, will the jury be likely to find for A. if it can
avoid it? It ought to, perhaps, but it now has overwhelming evidence that
B.'s defense is true. If it finds for A., it will cause the suit to go back to
the ecclesiastical court, where the plainly justified B. will have to spend
his time and money justifying himself all over again. It is hardly a favor
even to A. to bring further useless litigation upon him -- or at least litigation which ought to be useless, if the ecclesiastical court is honest. So the
temptation to do rough justice by verdict will be considerable.
But perhaps the jury can be controlled. Can the jury be told to find for
A. because the evidence shows there are several witnesses, when the issue is not how many witnesses there are, but whether the ecclesiastical
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court refused to accept B.’s proffer of proof by one witness? Hardly, for
what the ecclesiastical court did does not follow from how many witnesses there are. The number of witnesses there are only goes to verify
other evidence or permit a constructive picture in the absence of direct
evidence. If the jury thinks there is only one, it may tend to disbelieve testimony to the effect that the ecclesiastical court was willing to accept the
proffered evidence, in the light of other testimony that ecclesiastical
courts frequently or usually demand two witnesses. Or if there is no direct testimony on the ecclesiastical court’s actions, the jury may figure
that B. is probably telling the truth: he would probably have offered his
single witness, and the ecclesiastical court (given its normal habits) would
probably have rejected the offer. If, on the other hand the jury thinks there
are several witnesses, it may be skeptical of B.’s claim (why shouldn’t he
have offered such formidable evidence in his favor?), or at least inclined
to punish him for failing to offer it (to the obvious end of having a Prohibition.) But it cannot be said that the jury must find for A., though it were
clear that a hundred witnesses could have been produced.
If we assume a verdict for A., further tangles are imaginable. Will the
common law necessarily deny a motion in arrest of judgment and grant a
Consultation, if it is informed that strong, uncontradicted evidence shows
that B. owes A. nothing? Will A. now be permitted to go into the ecclesiastical court and discredit the witnesses he has used in his behalf at common law? At best, assuming he gets a Consultation, A. is not going to be
in very promising position. He may have helped B. discover evidence,
and the attempt to impeach his own former witnesses will look exceedingly odd. Finally, the scenario I imagine will only take place on the assumption that A. can get to a jury with the issue, “Was the ecclesiastical
court offered proof by one witness, and did it reject the same?” There
might be pleading-hurdles in the way of that. If B.’s claim includes the
statement “there is only one witnesses who can authenticate the defense I
want to rely on,” can A. traverse B.’s claim as a whole (going to the acts
of the ecclesiastical court) without being held to have contradicted that
statement? And does contradicting it entail admitting that there are at
least two witnesses and that they are credible (can in fact authenticate the
defense, as alleged)? Maybe not, but perhaps there is at least a problem. If
A. has admitted on the record that he has no case in substance, should
there even be a trial on the logically separate question whether the ecclesiastical court in fact disallowed the proffered evidence? Should A. be
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sent back to the ecclesiastical court to deny what he has admitted? That is
rather worse than sending him back to discredit witnesses whose testimony adverse to himself he has elicited.
In sum: Taking issue on a general surmise of disallowance was unpromising enough. Taking issue on a surmise of disallowance for evidentiary reasons would be even less promising. A party must be desperately
desirous of having his case settled by an ecclesiastical court to risk the
possibly -- if not certainly -- self-destructive course of trying to prove
that no disallowance by reason of defective proffered evidence took
place. Anyone with normal faith in his cause would prefer to go directly
to trial on the merits (e.g., "Was the legacy released or was it not?"), hoping for a fair and successful common law determination, followed by a
Consultation and clear sailing in the ecclesiastical court. Under these circumstances, there would be no effective check on feigned surmises, and
ecclesiastical courts would be unjustly deprived of business which belonged to them and which they may have been willing to handle by evidentiary standards acceptable to the common law. Coke's reputation as no
particular friend of ecclesiastical jurisdiction is well-enough deserved, but
he did not want to see gross infringement of the traditional "diversity of
courts." Sir Christopher Wray's King's Bench, which decided Bagnall v.
Stokes in favor of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, probably did not think
through the implications of the dictum by which it complemented the decision.
The implications of Coke's position are fairly radical. The position
would come to saying, "Forget about two-witness-rule disallowance surmises." Such surmises being subject to fictionalization and abuse, the
courts ought to confine themselves to prohibiting (a) when an issue that
ought to be tried at common law arises in a properly ecclesiastical suit -on bare surmise that the issue has arisen, without disallowance surmise;
(b) when the ecclesiastical court is alleged to have disallowed a plea and
the act of disallowing it appears to imply an untenable legal position
within common law control (plus, of course, the strongest case, (c) when
the suit ought never to have been brought in an ecclesiastical court.)
Once a case is excluded from category (a) (i.e., once the issue in question
is held an "incident" of the ecclesiastical suit, triable by ecclesiastical
methods) and also excluded from (b) (by "Tanfield's principle" or some
alternative) the ecclesiastical courts are free to apply their own eviden-
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tiary standards. This statement of principle of course says nothing about
the content of (a) -- the list of issues that ought to be tried at common law.
Presumably releases of legacies would not be on the list, as Bagnall v.
Stokes decided. Coke might have said, however that it would have been
better to prohibit in that case on the straightforward ground that ecclesiastical courts ought not to meddle with releases, than to refuse Prohibition
and then open he door to abusive two-witness-rule surmises. (Taking the
ecclesiastical decision to imply the untenable legal position that a legacy
is not releasable would be entirely unconvincing. Contrast the case of a
husband’s release pleaded in his wife’s suit, where at least it is arguable
that the ecclesiastical courts would not recognize the binding common
law conception of the marital relationship.)
I have independent confirmation of Coke’s statement that the dictum in
Bagnall v. Stokes was overruled by the Common Pleas in M.4 Jac., in Peppes’s Case.3 The decision is strong, for the party seeking a Prohibition
was probably an honest man with a hardship. An executor being sued for
a legacy surmised that the legatee had released, and that the release was
witnessed by three people. In the meantime, however, two of the witnesses had died, and the ecclesiastical court would not allow the testimony of the survivor.
The Common Pleas refused the Prohibition, with the remark "... if
witnesses die it is the party’s misfortune.” The report also contains one
further statement by Coke, which is marred by a hiatus in the MS. but appears to say in effect that people who take releases ought to have them
witnessed by a public notary, and that a precedent to encourage that form
of prudence would be useful. Presumably Coke thought that a notarized
release would have no trouble gaining acceptance in ecclesiastical courts
and had no objection to ecclesiastical rules which punished sloppy habits
3

The name Peppes’s Case comes from the Lansd. 1111 report of Browne v. Wentworth
(discussed below in this section). A brief report of Peppes, properly dated M. 4 Jac. C.P., is
appended to Browne v. Wentworth and given as a general holding that Prohibition does not lie
to block application of the two-witness rule in a legacy-release case. The case is cited as Alcock
v. Peppes in Devenish v. Downes (below.) The particulars as I give them in the text are reported
in an anonymous entry under M. 4 Jac. C.P. -- Add. 25,215, f.36b -- surely the same case. Noy,
12, under Chadron v. Harris, reports the holding briefly sub. nom. Peppes Case, but misassigns
the case to the King’s Bench.
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of business. The decision is tough, in that the executor told a likely
enough story with some particularity (as opposed to speaking so generally
as to raise suspicion of a feigned surmise). He was the victim of bad luck
as well as fairly mild imprudence, and of harsher evidentiary rules than he
would have encountered in a comparable common law suit.
We shall see below that Coke on the Bench observed the principle of
his note on Bagnall v. Stokes in other cases than that of the legacy release. But before looking at Jacobean cases generally, let us round out the
Elizabethan picture. Very shortly after Bagnall v. Stokes, another Prohibition was granted to prevent enforcement of the two-witness rule in a legacy suit, thought not with respect to a release.4 Here the executor's
substantive claim was simply that he had paid the legacy. However, he
had taken a written acquittance from the legatee and purported to have
only one witness to authenticate it. As the brief reports state the case, it
would appear that the executor did not even pretend to have proffered his
acquittance and single witness, but merely said that the ecclesiastical
court would not (notoriously) count one witness as better than none. The
Prohibition was nevertheless granted (apparently regardless of the insistence in Bagnall v. Stokes on a clear surmise of actual proffer and disallowance.) In substance, this case is stronger that the dictum on the release
case in Bagnall v. Stokes. A release, even of a "merely ecclesiastical"
legacy, should probably be conceived as a common law transaction, a
conveyance by way of extinguishment of an unrealized right to property.
Arguably, at any rate, an ecclesiastical court trying a release ought to
apply evidentiary standards as close as possible, given the difference of
methods, to those that would obtain at a common law trial of the same
transaction or type of transaction. (If, instead of releasing a single legacy,
one released all claims or suits, including legacies, exactly the same transaction could come in question in separate common-law litigation.) But
mere payment of a legacy could never be a common law issue. What interest, however indirect, do common law courts have in the evidence ecclesiastical courts demand to support a claim that a purely ecclesiastical
duty has been satisfied? If anyone can intervene to prevent unjust double
payment resulting from rigid or formalistic standards or proof, is it not a
4

T. 30 Eliz., Court not given. Harl. 1331, f.47b.
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court of equity? So the reporter of this case thought, for he adds a note
expressive of surprise at the decision: "... and yet he has no remedy for it
except in Chancery. Nota." Whether the Chancellor would actually intervene to protect the executor against the consequences of the ecclesiastical
two-witness rule I do not know. His doing so would be analogous, however, to a common form of equitable intervention: to protect debtors on
sealed obligations from double payment when they neglected to take a
sealed acquittance. One might question the common law's standing to object to the evidentiary formalism of the two-witness rule, in view of the
common law's own insistence on support under seal for the claim that a
sealed obligation had been paid.
Over against the last case and Bagnall v. Stokes -- both essentially favorable to two-witness-rule Prohibitions -- there is an early Queen's
Bench decision leaning the other way. This case presents several complexities, however. The first problem concerns the reports. I have two virtually identical MSS.5 sub. nom. Foster (or Footer) v. Whiscarre, dated T.
32 Eliz. Q.B. In that report, Coke and Tanfield argue on a motion for
Consultation -- Coke for the motion, Tanfield against it. The other reports
-- sub. nom. Fuller (or Futter) v. Clemens and Whiskare (or Whiskin) -occur in two printed versions of the Jacobean Robert's Case,6 where it
was cited and apparently narrated at length by Coke, then Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas. These reports, substantially the same, date the case P.
35 Eliz. That date must be erroneous, however, since Chief Justice Wray,
who is expressly associated with the decision, died a year earlier. Three
years between argument on a motion for Consultation and the final disposal of the case on demurrer which the printed versions report would be
a long time; that the time was actually shorter reinforces the conclusion
which the names of the parties and the facts clearly point to -- that we are
dealing with a single case. Its history can be constructed as follows: A
Prohibition having been granted, Consultation was sought on motion. The
motion either failed with a majority of the Court, or else Coke dropped it
when he saw (as the MS. attests) that at least Justice Fenner could not be
persuaded. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition proceeded to declare; Coke put in a
plea; the plaintiff demurred, as Coke probably expected him to. If his rec5
6

Add. 25,296, f.243b; Harl. 1633, f.98.
12 Coke, 65; Croke Jac., 296.

218

Evidentiary Disallowance Surmise: The Two-Witness Rule
ollection of the outcome can be trusted, he was successful, for the Court
is said to have decided unanimously against the Prohibition, meaning that
Fenner was converted after hearing full-scale argument.
I do not think there is any reason to doubt what Coke says about the
outcome. His memory, to be sure, could be affected by his pride and predilections. The case was among his personal victories at the Bar, and it
supported views which he held as a judge (whence his use of it in
Robert’s Case.) There may be an element of interpretation in the generalizations which Coke attributes to the Court, but he states the facts in detail (as if he had the record at hand), so I doubt that there can be any
mistake about the result. The real question of concern to us here is
whether the case counts for much against two-witness rule Prohibitions.
Coke may have been too eager to use it that way.
The facts of Foster v. Whiscarre (as I shall refer to it) were as follows:
Foster sued Clemens for tithes, pretending to be owner of the rectory.
Whiscarre intervened for interest, alleging that the rectory was his, not
F.’s, via a specified chain of conveyances. The ecclesiastical court of first
instance gave sentence against F., who appealed and set forth a chain of
title intended to show that the rectory was his. Towards establishing one
link in the chain, F. offered to prove delivery of deed by one witness. Not
being allowed to establish that conveyance by the proffered evidence, F.
lost again in the appellate court, whereupon he obtained a Prohibition.
The motion for Consultation followed, then the pleading eventuating in
the demurrer.
The crucial wrinkle in this case -- and the reason why it does not present a simple two-witness-rule problem -- was that the fact which the single witness was offered to prove was apparently insufficient to support a
conclusion in F.’s favor. To establish that F. was owner of the rectory, a
conveyance from X. to Y. had to be established. Towards establishing
that conveyance, F. offered one witness to prove that X. made and delivered a deed to Y., purporting to give him a life-estate in the rectory. But if
that act (delivery of such a deed) were established -- if, in other words,
the single witness were accepted -- it would still not be established that X.
conveyed the rectory to Y. for life. For conveyance of life-estate in a rectory required livery of seisin. (That is to say, a rectory was a piece of realestate, freehold interests in which could only be transferred by the
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ceremony of livery or an equivalent solemnity; such interests could not be
transferred merely by handing over a deed; the role of the deed which
usually accompanies such transactions was only to furnish evidence of
and to explain the conveyance actually effected by livery.) In the abstract,
then, the form of Foster v. Whiscarre would seem to be: An ecclesiastical
court disallows proof by one witness of a fact which, if true, would not establish what the party seeking to take advantage of that fact needs to establish to win. Should a Prohibition to block the two-witness rule ever be
granted in those circumstances, however liberally such Prohibitions
should be granted in general?
One consideration, however, might undermine that way of stating the
problem To maintain his suit against C., F. needed to be owner for the
time being of the tithes, not necessarily of the rectory as a whole. Tithes
could be detached from the rest of the rectory, and, as an impalpable species of property, they could be conveyed for life without livery of seisin.
If, therefore, the conveyance from X. to Y. could be interpreted as a transfer of the tithes alone, establishing the deed would establish that the tithes
passed. On this construction, we would have a simple two-witness-rule
problem: Should ecclesiastical courts be permitted to use that rule to prevent conveyances of tithes from being established, when properly ecclesiastical litigation over tithes depended thereon? In the event -- upon the
demurrer -- the Court held that the X.-Y. conveyance should not be taken
as a transfer of the tithes detached from the rest of the rectory. It was held
that no such intention appeared -- i.e., that X. meant to convey the whole
rectory, and so far as the record showed had failed to. In the earlier stages
of the case, however, the construction of the conveyance may have been
an open question. Its openness would be a good reason for denying Consultation on motion. The case was complex; it was hard enough on either
alternative statement of the problem; a choice between those alternatives
had to be made before the problem could be defined. Under such circumstances it was clearly good policy to insist on formal pleading.
The first reported discussion -- on the motion for Consultation -- was
predicated on my first formulation. Coke, arguing for the motion, said
that the X.-Y. transaction must be taken as an attempt to convey the
whole rectory; Tanfield did not contradict him on this occasion. Rather,
he argued in effect that establishing the deed, while not sufficient to make
out F.’s title to the rectory, was still highly relevant or perhaps essential.
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Therefore the ecclesiastical court ought not to use the two-witness rule to
prevent the deed from being established. ("The seisin alone is not to be
proved where livery is made secundum formam chartae, but the deed is
also to be proved.") In the abstract, Tanfield was taking a loose view of twowitness-rule Prohibitions, Coke a tight one. Tanfield was saying that improper
disallowance of a single witness was grounds for Prohibition even though the
disallowance might not appear in all strictness to be the cause of the
plaintiff-in-Prohibition's lack of success. The ecclesiastical court ought
not to rule out evidence acceptable by common law standards when that
evidence went to establish such "temporal" facts as a deed purporting to
convey a rectory, or describing the conveyance of one. A litigant seeking
to establish such a conveyance is entitled to establish the deed and needs
to in order to make his case complete. The deed, after all, goes to prove
that the conveyance took place and is necessary to make out the nature of
the conveyance -- what exactly was comprised, what estate was conveyed, whether any conditions or future interests were attached, etc. Since
establishing the deed is a vital part of the job, it is beside the point
whether anything more would have to be established to make out a perfect conveyance and settle the present state of the title.
Coke's contrary view, though he was arguing for his client, fits his
personal opinion on two-witness-rule Prohibitions. For it comes to saying
that if such Prohibitions are ever legitimate they should be approached in
a "strict constructionist" spirit. If disallowance of evidence in a properly
ecclesiastical suit is ever grounds for Prohibition, the act of disallowance
must appear to be the necessary explanation of a unacceptable result.
Here, so far as appeared, the disallowance only explained F.'s inability to
establish a deed which, in the strictest sense, he perhaps did not need to
establish to make out his title, and which would not, if established, suffice
to make it out. (If F. proved beyond doubt that X. delivered seisin of the
rectory to Y., it would be at least doubtful whether F. would lose, even
though the deed were held unproved, and hence as good as nonexistent.
I say "at least doubtful" because it is probably in some degree unpredictable what would happen in an ecclesiastical suit where a man claimed
that seisin was delivered secundum formam chartae -- i.e., with the express intent of conveying such an interest as a specified, simultaneously
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delivered deed described -- and then failed to prove that any deed relating
to the transaction existed. That man might lose, even thought he proved
overwhelmingly that the act of livery took place. But surely it is possible
that he might win. Unexplained livery of seisin conveyed a life-estate. If,
as in our actual case, only a life-estate needed to be established, the livery
by itself might be regarded as enough for the ecclesiastical purpose of ascertaining whether the person suing for tithes was the person entitled to
them. If the ecclesiastical court went the other way -- holding against a
man who claimed livery secundum formam chartae, proved the livery,
and failed to show that there was any such deed -- then perhaps it ought to
be prohibited, whether or not the situation resulted from the two-witness
rule. Whether it should be prohibited in that case would presumably depend on the niceties of analogy with common law situations. The Prohibition, if appropriate, would lie because the ecclesiastical court ignored or
misunderstood governing common law standards. In the principal case,
there was nothing to suggest that the one categorically binding common
law standard -- that conveyance of a freehold requires livery -- had been
violated. On the contrary, the ecclesiastical court may well have respected
that rule, for nothing on the record -- at this stage, the surmise -- suggested that livery was claimed, much less that it had occurred. The ecclesiastical court might have refused to accept proffered evidence of the
deed because no claim of livery was made, nor evidence thereof offered.
For all the Court could tell, the ecclesiastical judge would have been glad
to accept proof of the deed by one witness, had there been anything beyond a deed and a single witness to support the claim that an X-Y conveyance took place.)
Justice Fenner accepted Tanfield's position, but with a twist of his
own: "Although the deed and livery are at the same time, still there is priority in the deed, and he must begin with that, and it must be proved first,
which he has offered, and the judges of the Court Christian have refused,
wherefore the Prohibition ... will stand." Two slightly different positions
in favor of the Prohibition can be stated: (a) The ecclesiastical court ought
not to have insisted on the two-witness rule for purposes of proving a
"temporal" deed. That isolated "ought not" is reason enough to prohibit -provided establishing the deed was relevant for the party's purpose, provided failure to establish it might have a fatal, or at least adverse, effect
on the party's cause. It need not appear that the plaintiff-in-Prohibition
had an airtight case save for the deed. (b) Prohibiting the ecclesiastical
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court cannot be justified merely because it made an intrinsically improper
evidentiary ruling with respect to a relevant fact. It must appear that disallowing the single witness took place at such a time that it was fatal to
plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s cause. As it were, the disallowance must have
obstructed the party’s path so as to insure his downfall.
To be sure, it need not appear here that the party’s case would turn out
to be airtight except for the deed. But it must appear that the party was
blocked while proceeding in the proper order, so that he was prevented
from establishing any further facts necessary to his cause. Justice Fenner
plainly adopted the second position and supplied the minor premise -viz., that the party was proceeding in the proper order. He was not only
entitled -- having pleaded a lease by deed -- to proffer his evidence to
prove the deed before making any attempt to show that seisin was delivered; that was the correct things to do. Therefore, at that moment, the ecclesiastical court had a duty to let the deed be proved by common law
standards; it had no right, if that was its intention, to rule out the deed until evidence of livery had been given, or because none had been offered;
at that moment, the party’s ultimate burden of showing livery was unaccrued.
Tanfield’s position may have been identical but his scantily reported
words are at least compatible with the looser position (a). Both positions
contrast with Coke’s view that the evidentiary disallowance, if grounds
for Prohibition at all, must be the sole possible cause of a man’s inability
to establish a claimed common law conveyance. It is not clear to me why
Justice Fenner was so confident of the deed’s “priority.” If one is thinking
in interjurisdictional terms, it would be more sensible to give the livery
priority -- i.e., to say that parties seeking to establish freehold conveyances in ecclesiastical suits should first give evidence of the sine qua non,
livery. If the two-witness rule was used to prevent the livery from being
proved, the case for Prohibition would be strong; if the livery was successfully established, the problem raised by any subsequent trouble about
proving the deed would at least be simpler -- i.e., a Court asked to prohibit would not be, as here, in the dark as to whether there was any livery
of seisin, hence any conveyance. (The chance that no livery ever took
place would be quite good in the circumstances of our case. An unadvised
person intending to convey only a life-estate in a rectory -- the whole real
value of which might be in the tithes, as to which no livery was required -
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- might well assume that the property would pass by deed alone.) Perhaps Fenner was thinking of some analogy from common law practice.
Perhaps he was making a rather more confident assertion about "priority"
than he was strictly entitled to in order to have a plausible reason -- one
not based on too "loose" a theory of the right to intervene in ecclesiastical
affairs -- for opposing Consultation on motion. It seems to me that the
motion clearly ought to have been denied, if only on the procedural
ground that the case was difficult. Perhaps Coke would have acknowledged that his motion was a gamble on a shortcut.
Upon demurrer, the facts in full, as I recite them above, became part of
the record. (The circumstance that Whiscarre was a third party received
for interest figured centrally in the formal argument of the case. Although
the surmise probably showed that fact, no attention was paid to it when
the motion for Consultation was discussed.) The demurrer was not to the
Prohibition (plaintiff's declaration), the sort of demurrer that normally
constituted the formal alternative to motion for Consultation. Rather, the
demurrer was the plaintiff's move, in response to an absque hoc traverse
of the declaration. F., that is, pleaded that he had been prevented from
proving the deed by one witness, and that the ecclesiastical court in consequence of the wrongful disallowance had given sentence against him.
W. pleaded that the deed was proved, but that because F. could not prove
livery of seisin sentence was given against him -- absque hoc that the ecclesiastical court would not let the deed be proved by one witness. Thereupon, F. demurred.
Why did the pleading take this form? I suggest he following interpretation: Having failed or been discouraged on motion for Consultation,
Coke was reluctant to demur to the Prohibition. For that would mean admitting that proof of the deed by one witness had been disallowed and arguing that the sentence against F. was not necessarily a consequence of
the disallowance (rather that it should be considered a consequence of
the absence of any indication on the record that livery had taken place) -the same argument that had not fared so well on motion, at least with Justice Fenner. Indeed, the argument might be harder to sustain on demurrer,
since F. had said that the disallowance was the cause of the sentence
against him. It might be contended, whether or not successfully, that a
demurrer amounted to an admission of that causal statement (in addition
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to the barely factual ones that the deed was disallowed and sentence given
against F).
In other words, demurring might arguably be taken to concede that the
ecclesiastical court had proceeded to sentence immediately after disallowing the deed, without giving F. a chance to establish livery. (By contrast,
moving for Consultation involved no admissions -- solely the claim that
the surmise failed to state a sufficiently tight reason for Prohibition, if
only because it neglected to cover plausible "might have beens" which
would undermine the grounds for a writ.) Therefore, Coke decided to
deny the disallowance of the deed in such form as to drive the plaintiff towards an admission that livery of seisin could not be established. He did
not simply deny the disallowance of proof by one witness. To have done
that would have been to expose himself to a two-sided danger: If the other
party was content to go to trial on the fact, who would want to predict that
a jury would find that the proof had not been disallowed? Even if it had
not been, the most honest jury would be profoundly confused by such a
case; in fact, the proof probably had been ruled out in some sense,
thought perhaps for the excellent reason that no evidence of livery had
been proffered. On the other hand, straight traverses of disallowance surmises were legally questionable, at least. Therefore, Coke took the narrow
way between a plea and a traverse--introducing new material, in the form
of a statement that livery could not be proved (plus the causal assertion
that the sentence resulted from that fact), but casting the same as a negation of the plaintiff's central claim that proof of the deed had been disallowed. If, instead of demurring, the plaintiff had been content to go to trial,
the question for the jury would be focused on whether livery had taken place.
("Would be focused": I do not mean that would be the strict question, for
the jury would be free to find that the deed had been disallowed. But having been required by the pleading to find whether livery could be proved,
the jury would in practice be unlikely to look into the murky questions of
what had happened in the ecclesiastical court and why. I would expect the
practical upshot to be a special verdict finding that livery had or had not
taken place in reality. Legal argument upon such a special verdict would
be based upon one rock or the other: certainty that no conveyance took
place, owing to want of livery, or else certainty that livery could be
proved by common law standards.)
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The demurrer set the case upon a rock without the fuss of a trial. The
plaintiff presumably had no practical hope of proving that seisin was ever
delivered; therefore he admitted it had not been and staked his case on the
legal argument that Prohibition nevertheless lay. His serious goal, let us
recall at this point, was to stop his own ecclesiastical suit in order to prevent sentence upholding W.’s title to the rectory from being given. One
can only imagine why, if his own title was disastrously weak owing to the
want of livery, that objective seemed worth considerable trouble. “Fairly
rational litigative warfare” would be my guess. If F. now got a Prohibition
upon demurrer, he could demand tithes of the parishioners with a good
deal of confidence. Most parishioners would not care which impropriator
or impropriator’s lessee -- for the rectory in question was impropriate -they paid their tithes to.
One parishioner, Clemens, held out against Foster, either for reasons
of his own or because he agreed with Whiscarre to force a suit and give
the latter a chance to defend his interest. Having had that chance, and
having failed after protracted and expensive litigation in both ecclesiastical and common law courts, how likely would he be to try again? On the
assumption that Foster’s title was disastrously weak, I think there can be
no doubt that Whiscarre could establish his own by one form or another
of litigation, The Prohibition might be thrown in his face, but I do not
think it would stop him. But between the legal possibility and the real will
to litigate after a costly defeat moves a considerable shadow. A victory,
however technical, might put Foster in a favorable position to collect several years’ worth of tithes to which he had no title. He had only an estate
pur auter vie in any case, an interest whose value, apart from any speculative investment in a lump fine, comes to annual value -- income minus
rent. A life-tenant who stays in possession on a weak title for a year or
two is so much closer to realizing what he could expect from the lease. A
Consultation in the instant case would “dispossess” Foster at once -- and
worse, for the ecclesiastical courts had already taxed about £22 of costs
against Foster, part to Clemens, part to Whiscarre. These equities should
be considered as possible reinforcing motives for the Court’s decision
against Foster. To decide in his favor would be to deprive the probablyentitled Whiscarre of his cost-award, as well as the immediate enjoyment
of that which he was entitled to.
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Coke's account of Foster v. Whiscarre gives four arguments on the losing (pro-Prohibition) side upon the demurrer, but the first three together
come to the following: Whiscarre's standing as a third party received for
interest was urged against him. As I understand the argument, it was contended that his role undercut an intrinsically dubious right to have a property
controversy settled in an ecclesiastical court. " ... This is the birth right
of the subject to have his inheritance and freehold tried and determined
by common law; for the civil law differs much in deciding of inheritance."
counsel said. But that remark stands in the context of insistence on the
special weakness of Whiscarre's position as third party. Counsel were not
maintaining that the mere existence of a question about "inheritance and
freehold" in an ecclesiastical suit would justify Prohibition in the far-gone
circumstances of this case as it stood -- where one party to the property
controversy had admitted that he had no title to the property! Letting a
property question be settled by an ecclesiastical court is "intrinsically dubious," but perhaps there is no helping it when one party has made admissions on the face of the record which in effect settle the controversy -- as
a rule. Thus, if Clemens, the original ecclesiastical defendant, had challenged Foster's title to the rectory and Foster admitted in pleading pursuant to a Prohibition that he had no title, the ecclesiastical court would
perhaps not be prevented from giving judgment for Clemens, even though
in a rarefied technical sense a Consultation would imply leaving a question of freehold to ecclesiastical determination. But the present case is
special. Clemens might have a kind of "natural right" to be dismissed
from liability for tithes by the ecclesiastical court, if he was manifestly
entitled to be and the ecclesiastical court was manifestly ready to dismiss
him. But Whiscarre has no such claim. For look what he has done: He has
taken advantage of a facility which ecclesiastical law happens to provide - third-party intervention -- to put a property dispute in the ecclesiastical
court. Nothing on the record suggests that Clemens wanted to raise a question about title to the rectory. Whiscarre wanted to, and he saw his chance
to litigate about that question in an ecclesiastical court when Foster sued
Clemens. Whereas Clemens is only a man seeking to defend himself
against tithe liability, on whatever good or bad grounds he may have,
Whiscarre is up to something objectionable. He could have brought a
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common law action to try the title to the rectory; he ought to have. Instead, he insinuated his case into the ecclesiastical court by way of intervention procedure. That procedure is legitimate enough, if ecclesiastical
courts want to provide it for purposes plainly within their jurisdiction
(e.g., if a parson sues for tithes and a vicar comes in for interest in order
to dispute the terms of a vicarial endowment.) But the procedure deserves
no respect if it is made a means of bringing common law questions before
an improper tribunal. There is perhaps a sense in which ecclesiastical courts
have a right to suits which the law recognizes as valid suits proper to those
courts -- a right that is only defeasible if the case is mishandled in certain ways
and so as to cause results which the common law cannot accept; there is no
sense in which ecclesiastical courts have a right to handle issues intrinsically inappropriate to them via the intervention procedure they provide
for their own business. Therefore, the ecclesiastical court should be prohibited in the instant case even though plaintiff-in-Prohibition has made
admissions fatal to him in substance, even though it appears that Whiscarre would be sure to win in the proper tribunal. If you like, the Prohibition should be upheld on public grounds -- to dissuade people from doing
what Whiscarre has done. (And note: prohibiting will only help the "innocent bystander," Clemens. By Foster's admission, he has no business
claiming tithes -- prohibit and Clemens will not have to pay him.)
By the time the case had "grown to demurrer," I think plaintiff-in-Prohibition's counsel had put their trust largely in the above argument. I say
that partly because three of the arguments Coke states as separate ones
come to different aspects of it, partly because it seems to me quite persuasive. Confidence in that argument helps explain the demurrer itself. In
one way, Coke left his opponents with no choice except to demur, assuming they had no serious hope of proving the livery of seisin. But it would
be better to try to prove it against all odds than to "give away the ballgame" by admitting everything, had hope not been placed in an argument
that despite fatal admissions in substance Prohibition should still lie. It is
notable that as far as the reports show there was no attempt to make a
pure pleading argument against Coke's absque hoc traverse, though such
pleas were rather open to cavil. I infer that Foster's counsel thought, quite
reasonably, that they had a strong case in substance.
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Their last argument, as Coke reports it, is a generalized objection to the
two-witness rule. Since it was apparently admitted that the rule had not
been insisted on, perhaps the point of objecting to it was only to suggest
the notorious incompetence of ecclesiastical courts to try property questions, As it were: Ecclesiastical evidentiary formalism, whereby a fact is
treated as unproved and unprovable unless it is supported by two witnesses, is so at odds with the common law that ecclesiastical courts
should simply be prevented from handling matters in which the common
law has as interest, as it undoubtedly has in whether a conveyance of a
rectory took place. That is true whether or not a particular ecclesiastical
court actually insisted on the two-witness rule. It is especially true when
the matter in question has not come before the ecclesiastical court in the
normal course of its business, but by way of interventionary procedure for
which a straightforward common law action to try the title to the rectory
could and should be substituted. So stated, the last argument for Foster reinforces the others. Standing by itself (as if it had been made against Clemens
rather than Whiscarre), it would come to an argument for the legal untraversability of some evidentiary disallowance surmises: If a plea of sufficient interest
to the common law -- e.g., a conveyance of freehold -- is introduced into
an ecclesiastical suit the suit should, in effect, be prohibited on request; the reason it should be prohibited, however, is that ecclesiastical
evidentiary canons are inappropriate to such "common law matters";
therefore, disallowance owing to the two-witness rule should be alleged
pro forma, but only pro forma. If untraversability were conceded, then
the demurrer in our case would come to saying, "The defendant-inProhibition may not deny that the plaintiff was prevented from proving
the deed. His plea is not good insofar as it seeks to deny that, if indeed the attempt to traverse an untraversable claim does not vitiate it
altogether. The absque hoc clause of the plea must be disregarded, at
any rate. Disregarding it, the plea would amount to an admission that
the deed was improperly ruled out, offset by a claim that livery of seisin
did not take place. But then -- along the lines of the plaintiff's argument
on the motion for Consultation -- a Prohibition on disallowance surmise
is not ill-granted just because the plaintiff may lack an airtight case. The
only issue upon a formally pleaded Prohibition is whether the writ ought
to have been granted -- the same issue as upon motion for Consultation
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Whether plaintiff-in-Prohibition ought to win on the underlying matter
cannot be raised unless, in effect, plaintiff consents to have it raised -here, by traversing the claim that there was no livery of seisin. The
plaintiff has a right to do what he has done here by demurring -- stand
on his contention that the Prohibition was properly granted in the first
instance." In short, by this putative theory, ecclesiastical suits in which
such issues as property transactions arise should be prohibited; the truth
about the property transaction as a whole -- as opposed to the immediate
matter (here, the deed) to which a fictitious evidentiary disallowance
surmise relates -- may not be tried pursuant to the Prohibition -- with the
probable result that Whiscarre would "land on his feet" (and collect his
ecclesiastical costs in the end.) Perhaps he ought to be driven to the separate common law remedy which he should have resorted to originally.
In the event, however, nothing that was urged in Foster's behalf
availed. Coke reports four resolutions on the Court's part. (a) The Court
affirmed the rule that an ecclesiastical court with jurisdiction over the
"principal" may also determine the "incidents." I.e.: The judges would not
hold that the mere existence of a dispute over a conveyance was reason to
prohibit. (b) Accordingly, the ecclesiastical court is prohibitable only if it
makes an error with respect to a matter governed by common law rules.
In this case, the ecclesiastical court handled the common law matter correctly -- by holding that the conveyance in question extended to the whole
rectory, that therefore livery of seisin was required, and therefore that no
conveyance took place, owing to the want of livery established as a fact
by the pleading. (c) It is improper for the common law courts to question
ecclesiastical interventionary procedure as such. I.e.: Ecclesiastical law
does permit, and is entitled to permit, one in Whiscarre's position to come
in for interest; in the absence of any mishandling of matters governed by
the common law, the operation of the interventionary system is controllable only by ecclesiastical appeal, not by Prohibition (In effect: Foster v.
Clemens and Whiscarre is no different that Foster v. Clemens. Whiscarre
is as much entitled as Clemens to have the suit determined by the ecclesiastical court, so long as that court does nothing wrong.) (d) Surmising
that only one witness is available to prove a fact which the ecclesiastical
court is entitled to determine does not state a cause of Prohibition. Such
surmises cannot be effectively denied by the other party and would therefore, if admitted, be the means to deprive ecclesiastical courts of their jurisdiction indiscriminately,
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The first two holdings take care of the case as pleaded, unless the involvement of interventionary procedure is a basis for making an exception from general principles. The third holding is a clear refusal to make
such an exception. The first two holdings are strong authority against recognizing the category of ''common law issues" -- or, converseIy, for insisting on bona fide disallowance surmises except, perhaps, in the special
case of modi. The fourth holding -- the one that is relevant for our immediate concern -- is problematic. It appears to be a general repudiation of
two-witness-rule Prohibitions -- i.e., a holding that ecclesiastical courts,
which must err before they are prohibited, cannot err by insisting on their
evidentiary canons for the establishment of facts within their jurisdiction,
even when those facts are "incidents" which must be substantively handled by common law standards. We have seen that Coke apparently subscribed to such a "general repudiation."
One is, I think, entitled to suspect Coke of sometimes reading his own
views into the courts' holdings by the subtle process on interpretation and
stress, but there is no basis for supposing he did so in this case, since
there are no other reports to check against his version. Therefore we are
confined to asking whether the fourth holding in Foster v. Whiscarre
should be regarded as a dictum. Assuming the Court did repudiate twowitness rule Prohibitions generally, did it need to in order to fill out its
disposition of the case? I think it is justifiable to say "No" almost flatly,
for on the pleading it was admitted that the two-witness rule had not been
insisted on.
However, as I speculate above, it may have been argued (a) that ecclesiastical courts are not entitled to their evidentiary standards for the purpose of trying "common law incidents" and (b) that ecclesiastical courts
so notoriously have discrepant standards that it makes no difference
whether a particular court actually insists on two witnesses (and likewise
no difference whether accepting one witness would insure plaintiff-inProhibition's victory.) This argument can be rebutted by rejecting proposition (a) as well as by rejecting the rest. To that extent, it was relevant to
hold generally that ecclesiastical courts are entitled to their evidentiary
standards. In sum, Foster v. Whiscarre is legitimate authority for the
Cokean view of two-witness rule Prohibitions, but the case is too special
to count strongly against contrary precedents.
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In a case of 1595,7 the Queen’s Bench refused a Prohibition based on
the two-witness rule, but laid down a dictum for a related situation upholding such Prohibitions. An administrator was sued by the intestate’s
child for the share of the estate he was entitled to by law. The administrator pleaded that the father had made a nuncupative (oral) will, in which no
executors were appointed; that by that will he had devised a term of years
to the administrator, by reason of which he had taken administration (presumably the term was the greater part of the estate); and that he had only
one witness to prove the nuncupative will. As in some other cases, it is
not clear from the report whether the surmise said that the ecclesiastical
court actually had disallowed, or surely would disallow, the proof by one
witness. In any event, Chief Justice Popham and Justices Clench and Fenner opposed a Prohibition. Their reason was that the common law took no
notice of wills without executors.
In other words (I take it): As far as the common law is concerned, this
case present a mere intestate estate, committed to an administrator and
subject to such claims as the child’s portion sued for here. Whether the
ecclesiastical court is free to take account of a nuncupative will without
executors is a question that does not arise. It is certainly free to impose its
own evidentiary requirements on such a will -- i.e., not to take account of
the will unless it is supported by at least two witnesses. (I put it this way
because there might be a question as to the ecclesiastical court’s liberty to
prefer a nuncupative devise over a child’s portion, if it had proposed to do
so and if the child had objected. It did not propose to do so here, because
the administrator failed to clear the hurdle of the two-witness rule.)
The decision makes such overwhelming sense that it cannot be said to
go against the grain of the contemporary cases favoring two-witness-rule
Prohibitions. Even if a nuncupative devise ought in principle to be preferred over ordinary claims to an intestate’s estate, the two-witness rule
would be highly defensible as a protection against fraud. What more
likely that someone will appear claiming that an apparent intestate made
an oral will on his deathbed, seeking thereby to defeat the interests of
those entitled to de jure shares of the estate? Surely it is wise to insist
7

H. 37 Eliz. Q.B. Lansd. 1073, f.153b; add. 25,200, f.l16.
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that he have two witnesses to back him up before his claim is taken seriously. A single confederate is too easy to find. By dictum, however, the
judges reindorsed their general proclivity to block enforcement of the
two-witness rule: If a man makes a will and appoints executors, and the
estate is subsequently committed to an administrator because the executors refuse to serve, Prohibition lies if the two-witnesses rule is used to
prevent payment of legacies. If A. sues for a legacy allegedly given him
by the will and cannot prove the will by two witnesses, A. may (apparently) use the Prohibition to force acceptance of the single witness, even
though he would be prohibiting his own suit. (A strong rule, not because
of the element of self-prohibition, but because it would seem to entail that
two witnesses cannot be insisted on for ordinary purposes of probate by
an executor. For if an administrator appointed because the executors refuse must pay legacies on a one-witness will, surely an executor ought to
pay legacies on such a will. Quaere.)
The reports end with a puzzling remark by Justice Fenner, which apparently contradicts the position he had just concurred in. Fenner says
that a common law suit Pro rationabile parte bonorum could be brought
for the child's portion, and therefore that Prohibition lies. Whether his
premise is right I cannot judge (the writ Pro rationabile parte lay against
administrators in some circumstances, not universally.) I can only take
his reasoning to be that the child could protect himself at common law
and therefore did not need to be protected in the ecclesiastical court
(which was the effect of denying the Prohibition.) The reports say expressly that no one answered Fenner. If he was serious about his point, he
must have had second thoughts. Their tendency would be to extend the
scope of Prohibitions to block the two-witness rule.
Save for one unlabelled report, all the Elizabethan cases considered so
far are from the Queen's Bench. The two-witness rule also came in question in three Common Pleas cases, with mixed results. In the first case,8
plaintiff-in-Prohibition neglected to allege disallowance. Being sued for
tithes, he surmised simply that the tithes had been leased to him for term
of years. The Court refused to grant a Prohibition merely because a "common law transaction'' was in question. If the ecclesiastical court will al8

H. 39 Eliz. C . P . Add. 2 5 , 1 9 9 , f . 2 8 .
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low the plea, it may try it, the judges said, but Prohibition lies if the plea
is disallowed. Justice Owen (perhaps remembering what the had learned
as a lawyer in Bagnall v. Stokes) added that Prohibition would lie if the
ecclesiastical court insisted on two witnesses to prove the lease. No one
contradicted him. (The Court as a whole spoke in general terms -- as if to
say, "If the ecclesiastical judge will accept the plea as a matter of law, he
may try it as to truth." I take it that Owen spoke up to correct the possible
misunderstanding -- as if to say, "Yes, the ecclesiastical judge may try it
as to truth, provided he accepts proof by one witness." There is no guarantee that the other judges agreed with the proviso, but no reason to think
they disagreed.)
In Mallary v. Marriot9 a parishioner being sued for tithes of pigeons
pleaded mere payment. He sought a Prohibition on surmise that the ecclesiastical court insisted on two witnesses. The Common Pleas granted the
writ, "for it would be greater [sic] inconvenience to bring two witnesses
to prove payment of every sort of tithes" (Croke). The common sense of
that statement is obviously strong. It is rational to demand two witnesses
to authenticate transactions of some value and deliberateness -- wills, releases, and the like. It is abusive to impose a formal, archaic witnessing
requirement on trivial and routine acts. A man raises enough pigeons to
owe two or three to the parson; he gives them to him, or at least does something intended as an act of donation, such as telling his servant to leave
them off at the kitchen door of the parsonage; something goes wrong -- the
parson doesn't think he has received as many pigeons as he ought to, or they
are left at the kitchen door in a defective coop and escape -- hence litigation:
Whoever may be in the right in such situations, it is burdensome to hold
the parishioner liable for the tiniest payment unless he goes to the trouble of
finding two transaction-witnesses to accompany him every time he renders
a tithe. The parties should be allowed to fight out such petty disputes
with whatever evidence they can produce. On the other hand, as I argue in
the case of "mere payment" of a legacy above, it stretches the two-witnessrule Prohibition farther to use it in this type of case than where the
authentication of "common law transactions" is in question. Foolish rule
9

P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Croke Eliz., 667; Moore, 909.
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it may be, but why should the ecclesiastical courts not be free to make a
rule whose practical effect is to require a degree of formality and publicity in paying tithes, the parishioner bearing the risk if he fails to observe
that standard of care? It is easier to say why ecclesiastical courts should
not be free to impose super-standards of formality and caution on men
who make leases and releases, for they have a right to base their expectations on common law standards. In one way, it is unnatural to demand
two witnesses to petty tithe payments; it is perhaps unnatural in a still
more serious way to ask a man to remember that he must get two witnesses today, when he releases a legacy, whereas yesterday, when he released an obligation worth twice as much, no such caution was necessary.
The third Common Pleas report, Blackwel's Case,10 turns the other
way. Here, a parson claimed that a parishioner denied him access to
tithes. A number of cases involve this substantive point. The parishioner's
duty was basically to cut and set out tithes in the field; it was the parson's
responsibility to come and get them. But the parishioner also had the obvious ancillary duty not to deny the parson reasonable access to the field.
In the instant case, the parson did not claim that the parishioner had failed
to "sever and expose" the tithes, but maintained that he had locked the
gate so as to make them unreachable and thereby had in effect failed to
render the tithe. The parishioner sought a Prohibition on the theory that
set-out tithes are turned into chattels and therefore removed from ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In other words, having admitted that the tithes were
set out, the parson's only complaint, on the score of the locked gate, was
wrongful detention of his goods, for which he must sue at common law.
The Common Pleas denied the Prohibition (in accord with the best opinion on this sort of case.) Though the premise (that severing tithes converts
them into the parson's secular property) was indisputable, the Court held
that an ecclesiastical suit for non-payment could still be brought. This
conclusion was based on the statute of 2/3 Edw. 6, c. 13, section ii, which
affirmed the parson's right to demand tithes as unpaid when the parishioner
had "paid" in a nominal way and then made it impossible to get physical
possession.

10

T. 43 Eliz. C.P. Croke Eliz. 844.
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Having lost on the theory he elected, the parishioner told the Court that
his proofs had been disallowed. The surmise said nothing about that.
Counsel perhaps hoped that the Court would go outside the record to ascertain whether any disallowance of evidence had occurred, or would presume that it had; perhaps counsel only wanted an indication as to how a
two-witness-rule surmise might fare. The Court was in any event discouraging. If the proofs were disallowed, the judges said, the remedy
would be by appeal. Not too much can be made of this dictum, for the judges
were not facing the hard fact of alleged. insistence on the two-witnesses
rule. In all probability, they did not believe for a moment that two witnesses would be demanded in this case. The parishioner's defense would
presumably be that the gate was never locked, or not locked for a reasonable time after the tithes were set out, or not so locked as to constitute a
real obstruction (locked only at night or at other times when there was
reason not to expect the parson, the parson could have had the key if he
had only asked, etc.) Would the ecclesiastical courts insist on two witnesses to back up every statement the parishioner made about the condition of the gate over a stretch of time? It seems unlikely. In most
situations where the two-witness rule came in question, it had a clear flavor of "transaction formalism": ecclesiastical courts "arbitrarily" refused
to consider that certain transactions had occurred, or that certain documents were authentic, unless care were taken to have the transaction or
documents witnessed by at least two people. It is quite conceivable that
ecclesiastical courts would have actually done what one was accused of doing
in Mallary v. Marriot above: extend the scope of "transaction formalism"
to such transactions as tithe payment, in furtherance of typical ecclesiastical
interests. Blackwel's Case presents the kind of situation in which it is
meaningless to speak of a "transaction." It is burdensome, but rational, to
warn parishioners to take witnesses along when they pay tithes; a man cannot
possibly be expected to provide witnesses to the unlocked condition of his gate
over several days. An ecclesiastical court that actually insisted on the twowitness rule in the circumstances of Blackwel's Case might indeed by correctable
by appeal. In strictness, however, Mallary v. Marriot and Worth's Case go in
different directions: the former to say that the two-witness rule may not be
applied to a plea of payment of tithes; the latter to suggest that its application
to such a plea is not controllable by Prohibition -- for the parishioner's claim
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not to have denied access was a version of the claim to have "paid," or
satisfied his legal duty as a tithe-payer.
A further Elizabethan case, this one from the Queen's Bench again,
sheds an oblique light on the two-witness rule. Bray v. Partridge11 is not a
Prohibition case, but a common law tort suit (Action on the Case.) A parishioner claimed to have paid his tithes in the presence of two witnesses.
After one of the witnesses died, the parson brought a suit for the tithes, intending to take advantage of the two-witness rule. Whether he had actually succeeded in recovering when the parishioner brought his Action on
the Case is not clear. (Noy says the Parson had recovered; the other reports do not say so expressly.) The theory of the Action of the Case, in
any event, was that the vexation of bringing an ecclesiastical suit for duly
paid tithes was an actionable wrong. The parties went to trial on the general issue, and the jury returned a special verdict: The parishioner had
paid the tithes, but he had not paid them in the presence of the two witnesses named in his declaration, because one of those men had died before the tithes were paid.
Happily, perhaps, for them (if a little unfortunately for the curious),
the judges could avoid debate as to which of the parties the verdict favored. For counsel were allowed to move that the action was ill-founded
to start with (i.e., to do by way of motion after verdict what probably
could have been done be demurrer.) One qualification must be put on
that, however. The truth as established by verdict was that the parson had
sued for tithes after receiving payment. The issue, accordingly, was
whether bringing the ecclesiastical suit after payment was a tort. It was
not the truth that the parson sued with the specific intent of taking crafty
advantage of one witness's death. A court could conceivably hold that it
is not a tort to sue after payment (with the vague hope of recovery and
double payment), but that it is a tort to sue because one sees a specific
opening for a fraudulent trick.
I doubt, however, that the judges in our case would have made such a
distinction. Their decision was cast in general terms: It is no tort to sue in
the proper court without cause, and that is all that happened here. (That
11

T. 43 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.341; Noy, 38; Croke Eliz. 836, sub. nom. Bray v. Patrid.

237

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
does not quite say it is no tort to sue without cause and with a specific
fraudulent scheme in mind, but the Court's thinking was probably general
enough to cover that variant. The line between vague and specific fraudulent intent is a shaky one, certainly in morality -- e.g., between suing a
man who has paid his tithes because you know he brought no witnesses
along and suing him because you know his witnesses just died.) The
judges conceded that there might be circumstances in which bringing an
ecclesiastical suit would be tortious. Chief Justice Popham thought it
might be actionable to bring an utterly inappropriate ecclesiastical suit
(precisely what the tithe suit here was not, however unjust it was.) Justices Gawdy and Fenner cited a Year Book case (8 Edw.4, pl. 13) in
which it was claimed (though not held) that a tithe suit was tortious because it was brought in the face of a composition discharging certain land
from tithes in exchange for the settling of other land upon a parson. The
judges thought that case distinguishable (presumably by the theory that a
suit for tithes from land discharged by a formal composition is bad ab initio, hence no different from Popham's case of a utterly inappropriate suit
for a "temporal matter".) In the principal case, the Court had no real
trouble reaching the conclusion that there was no cause of action -- surely
a benign conclusion, for the spectacle of common law courts awarding
damages for causeless ecclesiastical suits, as if the ecclesiastical courts
could not do justice, would be unbecoming in a mixed legal system.
What does Bray v. Partridge tell us about the law of Prohibitions? It
raises the question why the parishioner did not simply seek to prohibit the
ecclesiastical suit, instead of embarking on a novel, high-risk tort action.
There might be an incidental explanation (e.g., the parishioner was angry
enough or greedy enough to "have a go" at sticking the parson for damages), but the most likely one is that the chance of getting a Prohibition
looked gloomy to a lawyer. And so it might have. Generally speaking, the
Queen's Bench was pretty ready to block enforcement of the two-witness
rule. But our only instance of such intervention in a case of mere payment
of tithes was from the Common Pleas. A lawyer may have been aware of
such misgivings as Coke had about two-witness-rule Prohibitions. Knowing of such misgivings, on the one hand, and perceiving the obvious potentialities for abuse in the two-witness rule, he may have calculated that
the moment was ripe for the "new approach" of a tort action. Might it not
be promising to say to the judges, "Look, there are admittedly drawbacks
to prohibiting ecclesiastical courts from applying their own evidentiary
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rules in their own cases, most of all when there are 'common law issues'
involved. Prohibition to that intent is questionable in principle, not to
mention the danger of uncontrollable fictitious surmises. So let us grant that
Prohibition will not lie to block the two-witness rule, at least where mere
tithe payment is in question. But then, what becomes of people who are
actually victimized by the two-witness rule? Would allowing a tort action
not be clean solution? Such actions would be directed at the party, not the
ecclesiastical court -- at 'bad men' who sue when they have already been paid,
not at ecclesiastical courts. Ecclesiastical courts have every right to their twowitness rule; as an inducement to care and publicity in transactions, including
tithe payment, the rule is socially useful. But surely there must be a remedy
against those who take dishonest advantage of useful formalism. (Cf. the
exactly parallel argument that courts of equity act only against the corrupt
conscience of the party and respect the general utility of the common law
rules whose strict application they frustrate.)"? Well, if such was the
thinking, it was unpromising in the event. Bray v. Partridge stands as indirect evidence that two-witness Prohibitions in tithe payment cases were
unlikely to be granted. (Note that the Common Pleas turned one down in
Blackwel's Case the same term.)
My last Elizabethan case bearing on the two-witness rule is Agarde v.
Porter. 12 We have already discussed this case in connection with
substantive disallowance surmises, because it was the occasion for
Tanfield's important argument that misapplication of ecclesiastical law,
or "injustice" by universal standards, can never be the basis for Prohibition. Actually, the surmise in Agarde v. Porter was evidentiary, though
in a special sense. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition, an executor being sued for
a legacy, claimed that the estate was insufficient to support legacies.
He did not surmise simply that the plea of "No assets" had been disallowed, nor did he allege that he had been prevented from establishing specified facts about the estate for want of two witnesses. Rather,
he said that he had pleaded the condition of the estate -- showing its
insufficiency to bear legacies -- and offered to prove what he asserted
12

P. 44. Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.467 (good report); Add. 25,213, f.31 (brief.)
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by "reasonable testimony," which had been rejected. The Prohibition
having been granted, Tanfield moved for Consultation. For one thing,
he said, the ecclesiastical court had not refused to allow "reasonable
testimony" to prove what plaintiff-in-Prohibition claimed. For the rest,
he relied on the theory that disallowing a plea of "No assets" is an error
by ecclesiastical standards, and hence not controllable by Prohibition.
What concerns us here is how Tanfield extended that theory to evidentiary cases. He conceded the general legitimacy of two-witness-rule Prohibitions. He did not argue that ecclesiastical evidentiary standards
(unlike substantive rules) can never conflict with the common law, being
functions of a incomparable system of fact-finding: quite the contrary. He
conceded that any instance of insistence on two witnesses to establish a
fact which could be established without two witnesses at common law
represents a conflict, and hence a cause of Prohibition. ("And therefore if
the defendant pleads a thing which by their law must be proved by two
witnesses and the party offers to prove it by one witness or by other proof
allowable in the common law, which they of the Court Christian refuse, a
Prohibition lies." In the instant case, however, Tanfield maintained simply
that ecclesiastical evidentiary standards did not conflict with the common
law. The surmise did not say that two witnesses had been insisted on to prove
any particular fact, only that "unreasonable" evidentiary demands had been
made; Tanfield maintained that the ecclesiastical rules applicable to the
case at hand were perfectly compatible with the common law. If they had
somehow been unreasonably applied, the remedy was by ecclesiastical
appeal. Specifically, in this case all the executor wanted to prove was that
the estate owed certain debts which, added up, rendered it insufficient to
pay legacies. According to Tanfield, ecclesiastical courts would let debts
under 40/ be proved by the executor's own oath; for debts over that
amount, they would accept one witness plus the executor's oath. "And
that" said Tanfield, "is reasonable proof as the common law would allow."
(N.b. There is no exact way of comparing rules suited to the jury system
with rules suited to the witness system. It cannot be said that the common law required one witness plus the oath of the party to prove that A. owed
B. £10. A strict statement of Tanfield's position would be: "Ecclesiastical
courts may not erect serious formalistic barriers to establishing facts,
but that does not mean they may not have any 'minimum evidence' re-
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quirements. A common-sense test should be applied to ecclesiastical requirements. If it is pretty unlikely that less evidence than the ecclesiastical
courts will accept would convince an honest jury without knowledge of its
own, then ecclesiastical standards should be considered sufficiently accordant
with the common law. A jury would be more than justified if, say, it refused
to believe that A. owed B. £10 when only one man so testified and the party
claiming that the debt existed was known to be unwilling to verify his
claim under oath. Therefore the ecclesiastical requirement of one witness
plus the oath of the party is fair enough. In the case of a very petty debt,
of the sort people are likely to contract without bothering to have witnesses present, a jury might justifiably have lower expectations -- enough,
as it were, that the party claiming that the debt exists has an honest face or
reputation. Ecclesiastical insistence on the bare check of an oath obviously does not interpose an added formalistic hurdle -- if you like, it only
scratches the surface of a specious face or inflated reputation.")
To substantiate his version of the ecclesiastical law, Tanfield produced
a signed certificate of the ecclesiastical judges (probably the Delegates, to
whom plaintiff-in-Prohibition had already unsuccessfully appealed) testifying to its accuracy. The certificate also said that the rules described by
Tanfield had been applied in this case. Therefore, if the Court was willing to take the certificate as conclusively true, it could see that the twowitness rule had not been applied. Tanfield clearly hoped that the Court
would step outside the record to the extent of accepting the certificate as a
definitive account of what had happened in the ecclesiastical court, not
only as a authoritative statement of the law. He clearly hoped that knowledge that the two-witness rule had not been applied would be enough to convince the judges that plaintiff-in-Prohibition had no serious case, that the
vague claim that "reasonable testimony" had been offered and rejected
was a cover for vexations intentions -- for the certificate went to show
that the standards by which any proffered evidence had been disallowed,
if it had been, were perfectly "reasonable." But the stratagem did not
work. The judges did not disbelieve Tanfield's certified statement of the
ecclesiastical law, but they still refused a Consultation on motion: "For
though their law be such as has been said, yet they have so many exceptions to witnesses for blood, alliance, and other presumption of favor that
it is a very difficult thing to prove anything by witnesses of which they will
allow. And therefore the Court ordered Tanfield to plead something of record to have a Consultation."
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Two observations should be made on this decision. (a) In one sense, it
stretches the disallowed-evidence Prohibition beyond its usual limits. Prohibitions were frequently granted because two witnesses were demanded;
the Cokean vein of opinion questioned whether Prohibitions should be
granted solely for that reason, once a matter was admitted to be within ecclesiastical jurisdiction and no error of substance was laid to the ecclesiastical court. In Agarde v. Porter, the Court was far from doubting
two-witness-rule Prohibitions; it embraced a looser form of disallowedevidence Prohibition. Strictly on the record, the Court was willing to prohibit upon a generalized complaint that "unreasonable" evidentiary
obstacles had been put in a litigant's way. The judges were ready to presume until the contrary was established that ecclesiastical requirements
were "unreasonable" one way or another -- if not because of the formalism of the two-witness rule, then because of over-strict rules on the competence of witnesses. The implication is that ecclesiastical courts have no
more right to their own position on such questions as the competence of a
party's kinsmen to serve as his witnesses than to the two-witness rule. If
we take into account the matter beyond the record introduced by Tanfield,
we may say that the Court was willing to prohibit on a generalized evidentiary disallowance-surmise even though the surmise clearly did not refer to insistence on the two-witness rule, and even though there was no
positive reason to suspect that evidence was excluded by questionable
standards. I.e.: There was no reason to suppose that it was excluded because of rigid rules on the competence of witnesses. The certificate suggested, though it probably did not establish definitively (even on the
assumption of its truth), that any exclusions that occurred were based on
the single-witness- cum -oath standard. The judges at least gave no sign of
disputing the propriety of that standard.
(b) On the other hand, all the Court decided was to deny Consultation
on motion. Tanfield was encouraged to plead formally. (When the report
says he was "ordered" to, I suppose it means he was told "If you want a
Consultation, you must plead." The word "ordered" perhaps suggests that
he was not so told in a hostile tone, as if to say "We do not see any likelihood of defeating this Prohibition unless by trial of the real dispute -- i.e.,
by proving at common law that the condition of the estate is such that it
can bear legacies -- but of course we cannot stop you from trying to defeat it otherwise by way of formal pleading." However, the "tone" in
which motions for Consultation were turned down is sometimes hard to
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detect.) Tanfield would presumably have several options other than taking issue on the underlying dispute. (i) Traverse the disallowance. Significantly, the report ends with a remark by Justice Yelverton: "In some
cases, the refusal of the plea or proof by the judges of the ecclesiastical
court is issuable." That is indefinite enough, but it suggests that Yelverton was
reflecting as to whether the effect of denying the motion would be to cut
off any real chance of returning the suit to the ecclesiastical court before trial
on the merits. I wonder whether he was not asking that question and answering it with the thought, "Well, defendant-in-Prohibition might deny that
plaintiff's evidence was in fact ruled out -- though disallowance surmises
have sometimes been held untraversable, it is not at all clear that they can
never be contradicted." (ii) Demur. This would probably be the least
promising course in view of the failure of the motion, but perhaps the
Court would listen to a full-dress contention that disallowance of "reasonable" proof was too vague a complaint, assuming the declaration showed
no more specifically than the surmise what evidence was offered. If it was
more specific, the Court might hold on demurrer that there was nothing
unreasonable about the standards implied by rejection of the evidence allegedly offered. (iii) Plead essentially what Tanfield's certificate showed
-- that the single-witness- cum -oath standard had been applied and no evidence excluded by any other standard -- absque hoc that reasonable proof
had been disallowed. Such a plea might draw a demurrer, whereon the
reasonableness or conformity to common law of the ecclesiastical rules
admittedly applied could be adjudged. Otherwise, plaintiff-in-Prohibition
would have to deny that only the single-witness- cum -oath standard had
been applied. From such a factual dispute it would emerge whether the
two-witness rule had been enforced and whether any rules on the competence of witnesses figured in the exclusion of evidence. If competence
rules were found to have figured, perhaps their reasonableness -- or the
ecclesiastical courts' right to their own standards in that regard -- could
be brought in question by motion in arrest of judgment.
Since there are no further reports, there is no way of telling whether
Tanfield adopted any of those courses or stopped trying to block the Prohibition after the failure of his motion. The very possibility that the case
might assume various shapes upon pleading would be a good reason for
denying Consultation on motion. It was in any event in the Court's discre-
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tion to turn down such motions, and wise to do so if there was any serious
doubt about the law or the facts. In short, denying the motion is perfectly
compatible with the belief that the defendant (Tanfield’s client) probably
had a winning case in substance. If, however, the Court’s view of evidentiary disallowance surmises had been generally dim, a Consultation on
motion could have been justified. Denying the motion indicates receptivity to such surmises even when they were not specifically directed at the
two-witness rule -- a fortiori when they were so directed.
We may now turn to the Jacobean cases on two-witness-rule Prohibitions. I propose to look at the King’s Bench and Common Pleas lines
separately, taking the King’s Bench first. Two important testamentary
cases arose in the King’s Bench while Lord Popham was still Chief Justice. In the first, Harris v. Chadborne,13 a man made a nuncupative will
by which he left goods to Harris. Administration was originally granted
to Harris with the will annexed to the letters of administration. (Standard
procedure in cases where there was a will of some sort, but an administrator instead of an executor. Nuncupative wills were ordinarily reduced to
writing after being made orally. They remained nuncupative if they were
not written out by or for the testator and signed or sealed by him.) Subsequently, administration was transferred to Chadborne. (Why does not
appear, probably because a nearer kinsman turned up. Such cancellations
and regrants of administration were common, though constrained by statute.) Chadborne then sued Harris for the goods which he retained in the
name of his legacy by the nuncupative will. The new administrator
sought to get possession of all the goods of the estate which the old administrator had; the old administrator claimed that he was not liable to
hand over such of the goods as represented his legacy. Harris sought to
prohibit Chadborne’s suit largely on the ground that the ecclesiastical
court would not recognize the nuncupative will because it was supported
only by one witness. (“Largely”: Harris also raised a technical objection
13

T. 3 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,209, f.49; Add. 25,205, f.15b; Lansd. 1111, f.92; Noy, 12. The first two
MSS. are full reports, the slight differences between which are treated in the text. The other two
reports. (sub. nom. Chaldron or Chadron v. Harris) are two nearly identical versions of a note on
the case, giving nothing like a picture of its unfolding.
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to the grant of administration to Chadborne. The Court thought the objection without merit, however, so that the only serious question was
whether the ecclesiastical court was at liberty to disregard the will for
lack of sufficient witnesses.)
When the Court first discussed the case, the judges disagreed. Justice
Gawdy favored a Prohibition, but in somewhat hesitant term. He began
by enunciating the general principle that ecclesiastical courts are entitled
to their two-witness rule in testamentary matters, though it differ from the
common law. But then he thought the instant case an exception, "because
he [Harris] has no other means than to pay himself by way of retainer."
What Gawdy meant by that is explained by Popham's rebuttal. Ordinarily, Popham explained, a new administrator is bound by the old administrator's "untrue" (wrongful) payments. Clearly, Gawdy used that rule to
reach his conclusion, as follows: If by color of the nuncupative will, Harris had paid a legacy to X., Chadborne would be bound -- i.e., would not
be able to get the goods back form X. But here Harris had no way of paying his own legacy to himself except by retaining the goods. Therefore
Chadborne should no more be able to recover those goods from Harris
than to recover the goods conveyed to X. in the other case, however
wrongful the self-payment by way of retainer was (i.e., however unjustified, owing to the insufficiency of the one-witness will.)
Popham disagreed with Gawdy expressly, and opposed Prohibition. He
first stated the general rule that an "untrue" payment binds the second administrator, then proceeded as follows: "But here it is not so, because
there is no sufficient proof for the legacy. Ergo it does not bind the second administrator." I find Popham's thinking harder to get at then
Gawdy's. My best guess would be this: The will must be treated as if it
did not exist, since by standards which the ecclesiastical court is entitled
to apply it is incapable of being given any effect. Harris's only pretense to
keep the goods is that they were paid to himself as his legacy. But how
can he so pretend when there is "no such thing" as a will? Since Harris is
utterly unable to prove that there is any will leaving him a legacy, he must
be supposed to hold the goods merely in the capacity of first administrator, in which capacity he has no longer any right to them. (I am confident
enough that is Popham's meaning. The only disturbing note is the gen-
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erality of the statement "it does not bind the second administrator." Does that
mean the second administrator could recover goods paid in the name of legacy
to a stranger, X., by the first administrator? My guess would be "No," except
in a very theoretical sense. X., like Harris, could not rely on the "nonexistent"
nuncupative will, but he could probably defeat Chadborne's attempt to regain
the goods by showing generally that Harris paid them to him in his capacity
as first administrator, whether or not he had color to do so. In the instant
case, Harris could not begin to justify his retention of the goods without
relying on the "nonexistent" will. Quaere tamen. Popham concludes his
remarks with an incidental observation: "and if one writes a will with his
own hand and has one witness to it, that is sufficient because there is in
effect (come) a double proof by the spiritual law." Add. 25,205 adds the
further phrase "and this the spiritual law allows." Presumably Popham
said this way of contrast with the principal case: A nuncupative will reduced to writing and supported by one witness is no good; a will written
by the testator and supported by one witness is good. What he would have
concluded if the contrasting situation came in question is a matter of some
interest, though undeterminable. The further phrase in Add. 25,205 gives
the remark the force, "Ecclesiastical rules on the witnessing of wills are
not unreasonably rigid. Our intervening in this case would be easier to
justify if they were, for then we would perhaps have no better course than
to fall back on common law standards -- to say that obstacles which we
would not put in the way of establishing acts ought not to be interposed by
ecclesiastical courts either. But in reality the ecclesiastical rules make perfectly
good sense. They demand two witnesses in the case of a nuncupative will,
where there is obvious danger of fraud, but are satisfied with one for the
purpose of establishing that a will was actually written by the testator. The
mere fact that the rule on nuncupative wills is formalistic or cautionary in a
sense for which there is no precise common law analogy is no basis for
complaint on our part." Thinking this way, what would Popham do if it were
alleged that an ecclesiastical court had disallowed a will written by the
testator and supported by one witness? Would he say that if any such disallowance had actually occurred it was a violation of ecclesiastical standards, remediable by appeal? Or prohibit on the ground that the
ecclesiastical court had displayed the kind of rigidity on whose absence
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its right to handle testamentary cases by its own standards depended?
Those must remain questions.
Justice Fenner's remarks seem to respond to the last of Popham's
points as I construct them above. Fenner did not say positively that he favored a Prohibition, but he asked a fundamental question about the ecclesiastical courts' right to their own standards in testamentary cases (in
contrast to Gawdy, who conceded that right while favoring a Prohibition
in the instant case.) Fenner invoked the commonplace historical view that
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over wills was not an ancient or inherent facet
of spiritual authority (a view supported by the fact that testamentary jurisdiction was temporal in other countries.) If, Fenner asked, the ecclesiastical courts' jurisdiction is a latter-day delegation of authority originally in
the common law, why should common law standards of evidence not be
binding on ecclesiastical courts? ("The King's courts now of late time remit the probate of wills to the spiritual court, and at common law one witness suffices. Why not in the spiritual court, which has its authority from
us?") Taken as a specific response to Popham's views as stated above,
this would say, "Quite regardless of whether ecclesiastical standards for
proving will are reasonable, or unduly rigid, or in flagrant conflict with
the 'spirit' of the common law, have they any right to vary from the common law at all? In other fields -- tithes, perhaps -- ecclesiastical rules
may have what amounts to a prescriptive right to vary (subject, like other
prescriptive rights, to control if the variance is excessive, or utterly unreasonable, or deleterious to men's common law interests and expectations.)
But is that the case in the testamentary field?"
The three judges whose opinions are reported being thus divided, the
case was adjourned. Later, with Justice Gawdy absent, the Court denied
the Prohibition. Fenner need not have been converted to Popham's opinion, for the two judges who are not heard from individually, Yelverton
and Williams, could have concurred with the Chief Justice to make a majority. The case is strong authority for ecclesiastical courts' right to demand two witnesses to prove a nuncupative will (and note that Gawdy did
not dispute that, whether or not he would have held out for his dissent if
he had participated in the final decision.)
The Add. 25,205 report of Harris v. Chadborne, after giving the
judges' initial opinions, goes on with (a) a summary of a later case (Hill v.
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Browne, H. 3 Jac.); (b) a speech labeled "Tanfield"' (c) brief notes of related recent Common Pleas opinions. Though it is impossible to be sure, I
take it that the remark by Tanfield was in Hill v. Browne, in which event
he spoke as a judge, having just been appointed to the Bench.
In Hill v. Browne, a man wrote his will with his own hand, but named
no executors. Administration was accordingly granted with the will annexed. A legatee sued the administrator. A Prohibition was granted on
surmise that the ecclesiastical court would not allow the legacy because
there were not two witnesses to support the will. Assuming this to be a
definitive and unanimous decision, it bears strongly on the question raised
by Popham's opinion in Harris v. Chadborne: If an ecclesiastical court
will not allow a will written by the testator and supported by one witness,
should it be prohibited.? Hill v. Browne seems to say "Yes" -- i.e.,
that such a disallowance is not an error remediable only by appeal. There
is a difference to worry about, however. We encountered the view
above that a will without executors is no will, so far as the common law
is concerned. Noy's brief report of Harris v. Chadborne says that the
Court agreed on that proposition, with the qualification that legatees may
recover if the executorless will is annexed to the letters of administration.
Strictly speaking, Hill v. Browne would only decide that, having annexed
the executorless will, the ecclesiastical court was not free to block legacies by evidentiary rules stricter than (by Popham's presumption) it
would apply to the same will with executors. In other words, once an executorless will is attached to the letters of administration it is to be treated
as a proper will to all intents and purposes (hence provable by one witness if written by the testator); it must not be subjected to the proof requirements appropriate to nuncupative wills. Prohibiting to enforce that
point would not in strictness amount to interfering with ecclesiastical canons of proof. It would be interfering with ecclesiastical autonomy in the
testamentary field, but rather to a substantive end than an evidentiary one.
The decision would not say, "You must let wills written by the testator be
proved by one witness or risk Prohibition"; but, "You must not treat executorless wills as nuncupative once you have annexed them." It does not,
of course, follow that the Court in Hill v. Browne actually made this distinction. It may have intended to insist by way of Prohibition on the rule
that Popham laid down in Harris v. Chadborne (and expected that ecclesi-
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astical courts would not question): The testator's writing plus one witness
suffices.
Tanfield's remark in Add. 25,205 consists only of a citation of Bagnall
v. Stokes (for its dictum, its significant point). Taking Tanfield as a judge
speaking in Hill v. Browne: His merely citing a case says nothing abut his
opinion, but relying on Bagnall v. Stokes suggests that the problem was
seen as evidentiary. Bagnall v. Stokes could only be loosely relevant, as
general authority for intervention to block application of the two-witness
rule. Intervention to block its application to a release of a legacy, arguably a "common law transaction" (Bagnall v. Stokes), does not necessarily entail intervention to prevent its being applied to the authentication of
a will of personal estate, arguably a "merely spiritual" transaction. To the
Common Pleas opinion noted in Add. 25,205 we shall return when we
take up that court.
The King's Bench was divided in Harris v. Chadborne, but the split
was not altogether stark, since Justice Gawdy did not dissent on the twowitness rule as such, and there is no certainty that Justice Fenner dissented in the end. In the very well-reported Armiger Brown v.
Wentworth,14 the Court was cleanly split. In the latter case, a Prohibition
14

T. 4 Jac. K.B. Yelverton, 92; Lansd. 1111, f.241b; Harl. 1631, f.329b; Add. 25,205, f.46b. All
four reports are good, and there are no conflicts of substance among them. Yelverton and Add.
25,205, however, essentially synthesize the majority and minority positions, whereas Lansd.
1111 and Harl. 1631 go judge-by-judge and occasion-by-occasion. My exposition is accordingly
based on the latter two MSS. Those MSS. do not give exactly the same picture of the stages of
the discussion. My account combines them into what seems a probable narrative of the case's
unfolding. Nothing in substance depends on the details of the narrative. The two reports compare
as follows:
(1) Lansd. 1111 starts by stating the case. Then it gives speeches by Popham, Fenner, and
Tanfield, in that order. Then comes the notation "another day," after which Yelverton speaks in
favor of the Prohibition (majority position), followed in order by Tanfield, Fenner, Williams, and
Popham. Then, with the notation "afterwards" the reporter gives the outcome -- viz., denial of the
motion for Consultation and demurrer by the defendant-in-Prohibition. The report ends with a
summary of Peppes's Case (cf. Note 3 above).
(2) Harl. 1631 does not state the case, but says it was moved "as before." The MS. does not
contain an earlier entry on the case, but it is clear that it was brought up on a previous occasion. I
take the first exchange in Lansd. 1111 (Popham, Fenner, Tanfield) to relate to that previous
occasion. and Harl. 1631 to represent the second discussion. Harl. 1631 runs Popham, Williams
(inconclusively), Fenner, Tanfield, Popham (disputing Tanfield's interpretation of Lloyd's Case),
Yelverton leaning Popham's way, Popham again. Then comes the specific note that three days
later Yelverton changed his mind and made his argument on the Fenner-Tanfield side (in favor
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to block application of the two-witness rule was upheld, 3-2, on motion
for Consultation. Although the issues in the two cases were not the same,
they meet sufficiently at a certain level of abstraction to permit the following formulation: In Brown v. Wentworth, Justice Fenner, who in Harris v. Chadborne expressed principled objection to the two-witness rule in
all testamentary cases, carried Tanfield (Gawdy's replacement) with him
and won over a somewhat wavering Yelverton; Popham, who opposed interfering with ecclesiastical evidentiary canons in both cases, carried
Williams with him into vigorous dissent. However, no two of the judges
saw Brown v. Wentworth in exactly the same way, and that case can be
compared with Harris v. Chadborne only "at certain level of abstraction."
The facts of Brown v. Wentworth were as follows: "An esquire of Suffolk who was killed by his servant" made a will with executors. Then he
made a second will without executors, revoking the first, after which he
was killed. Administration was committed to Brown with the second will
annexed. Wentworth sued Brown for a legacy left to him by the first will.
Brown pleaded that the first will was revoked, then got his Prohibition on
surmise that he was not allowed to prove it by one witness -- i.e., was not
allowed to prove the revocation by producing the second will in the testator's handwriting, plus one witness and (which he also offered) "comparison of hands and such like" (i.e., physical evidence tending to verify that
the document was actually written by the testator.) As the case was discussed, the issue was: Should the ecclesiastical court be prevented from
insisting on two witnesses to prove revocation of a will? In other words,
nothing was made of the peculiar features of the case -- the fact that the
act of revocation was comprised in an executorless will, and that that will
was annexed to the letters of administration. Fitting the MS. reports together to give an exact picture of the progress of the discussion presents a
few problems. I shall tell the story in what seems the probable order.
Whether it is precisely correct does not affect the content of the judges'
views.

of the Prohibition.) Then, with the notation "another day," come speeches by Tanfield. Fenner,
Williams (decisively on Popham's side), and Popham. No result is reported. I take it that Lansd.
1111 telescopes the later discussions while Harl. 1631 spells them out stage by stage.
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When the motion for Consultation was first discussed, Chief Justice
Popham stated his basic opinion firmly: Proving revocation of a will is no
different in principle from proving a will. Both are properly ecclesiastical
matters. The ecclesiastical court having exclusive jurisdiction over both
questions -- "Did A. make this will?" and "Did A. revoke this will?" -- it
is "against reason" to prevent the ecclesiastical court from applying its
own evidentiary standards in deciding them. On this rock, Popham edified a few explanations and qualifications. (a) Lest it be said that the two
questions are not on the same level: Revocation is, as it were, implicit in
probate. It makes no sense to hold that two witnesses may be demanded
for probate, but not for a question which may expressly arise in probate
proceedings (if someone comes forward to contest probate by attempting
to show revocation), and which otherwise is implied in the probate question ("Is this actually A.'s last -- i.e., unrevoked -- will?"). And surely two
witnesses may be required for probate. ("... for it is a necessary matter in
the probate of a will to prove whether it is revoked or not, and probate ...
will be by two witness, and no Prohibition lies.")
(b) Lest it be doubted that insistence on two witnesses for probate
should be permitted: Objection to permitting it is likely to arise from concern about common law interests. In practice, the ecclesiastical courts did
not throw out uncontested wills for lack of two witnesses. They provided
a form for a kind of prima facie probate, whereby an executor without
two witnesses could establish the will and enter on his office. Such an executor could, however, be challenged to prove the will per testes, and
then he must produce two. If he failed, the estate would be committed to
an administrator, as if the decedent had died intestate. It is at this point
that doubt about the desirability of allowing enforcement of the two-witness rule may arise. For suppose the executor who loses his office by virtue of the rule has already dealt with the property of the estate, as by
selling goods or releasing debts. Will the vendee or releasee be hurt? "No,"
Popham replies. For if the administrator sues at common law for the debt
released or goods sold, the releasee or vendee need only plead the will. If
he can prove it by common law standards, he will win. Therefore no one
will be hurt at common law as a result of enforcement of the two-witness
rule for ecclesiastical purposes. Therefore the common law has no interest in blocking the rule.
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(c) Lest it be objected that ecclesiastical courts are simply not always
permitted to enforce the two-witness rule in cases properly brought there,
as Popham's general language might suggest they should be: Here Popham made a tentative concession. "It may be" ( only "may be") that when
such things as contracts or land transactions come in question in ecclesiastical suites "collaterally" they must be tried by common law standards,
under pain of Prohibition. In other word, the two-witness rule is objectionable, if at all, only when it is applied to a "common law issue." Revocation of a will, like the truth of a will in probate proceedings, is in no
sense a "common law issue." Making a will and revoking one are "nothing more than the testator's disposition as to who will have his goods after his death," and of such dispositions the common law takes no direct
notice. Testamentary matters become of interest to the common law -hence on a level with conveyances, contracts, and the like -- only when
executors and administrators start to deal with the estate, when "disposition" gives way to "execution." It simply does not follow that because
Prohibitions are sometimes properly used to block the two-witness rule,
they may always be so used.
(d) Lest the problem of the mixed will be introduced as an objection:
Here Popham made a large concession to the common law's power to
protect its interests. If probate of a will comprising both land and goods is
refused, or if a claim that such a will was revoked is disallowed, Prohibition lies for all (not, as the competing theory held, only quoad terram.)
Ecclesiastical courts should not (I take it from Popham's formulation) be
prohibited from so much as touching such a will, but they should be prohibited from making any negative judgment on it (judging it revoked or
no will) to the possible prejudice of common law proceedings on the
same will. Whether such a negative judgment resulted from the two-witness rule or something else would (I take it) make no difference. But
nothing follows as to this case from the mixed-will case. Ecclesiastical
courts cannot be given a free rein with mixed wills precisely because
common law interests should not be exposed to the harm which application of ecclesiastical standards might indirectly do them; no common law
interest depends on the bare question whether or not a will of personal estate was revoked.
Fenner, the senior puisne Justice, spoke after Popham, directly to the
contrary. In his first speech, Fenner took issue solely and flatly on Po-
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pham's argument that probate and revocation are indistinguishable: "... although the probate ... belongs to ecclesiastical courts, yet the revocation
does not, for that is to prove that there is not any testament. And if one
devises diverse legacies, and afterwards he says that his will is that J.S.
shall not have his legacy, it seems to me that this revocation will be tried
according to the course of the common law." In other words, "This will
was revoked" means "There is no will for the ecclesiastical court to probate -- no basis for any ecclesiastical proceedings having to do with this
document, even its bare authentication." Therefore, whether "This will
was revoked" is a true statement is in no proper sense an ecclesiastical
question, suitable for trial by ecclesiastical standards. It is rather a question as to whether there is any ecclesiastical question. ("No proper sense":
Does Fenner mean that Prohibition lies on the bare surmise that an alleged will was revoked, or that the ecclesiastical court may try the revocation provided it does not insist on the two-witness rule? If the latter, there
is obviously a sense in which "Was this will revoked?" is an ecclesiastical questions -- i.e., a question which an ecclesiastical court may determine even though one party objects. It is not, however, an ecclesiastical
question in the strict or proper sense that how it is determined is of no
concern outside the ecclesiastical system. In connection with Fenner's
thinking, cf. the modus: Does claiming a modus amount to claiming that
the tithe suite was void ab initio, in which case there is no sense in which
"Does this modus exist?" is an ecclesiastical question. Or does claiming a
Prohibition on the basis of a modus only amount to claiming that the ecclesiastical court is incompetent, or notoriously unwilling, to try one sort
of question within its jurisdiction?)
Justice Tanfield spoke next, making an argument in support of Fenner's position. Tanfield took the rule in Bagnall v. Stokes as his premise
(without citing the case specifically though he did so as a later point in the
discussion): Two witnesses may not be insisted on to prove a release of a
legacy. Is a revocation not like a release, Tanfield asked.(" ... and as a release is a discharge of the legacy, so is a revocation an annulling of the
will.") I.e.: Both a legatee's release and a testator's revocation are "negative" acts -- acts which, if they actually took place, go to destroy ecclesiastical claims or remove the need for ecclesiastical proceedings.
Therefore whether they took place is not properly an ecclesiastical question, not a question arising out of claims or proceedings that can be said
to be before the ecclesiastical court -- in accord with Fenner's opinion.
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At the least, it would be anomalous to treat releases and revocations differently. (If they should be treated the same way, note the implication
that the ecclesiastical court should try the revocation provided it waives
the two-witness rule. For no one pretended that releases were not triable
in ecclesiastical courts on that condition, and Bagnall v. Stokes held expressly that the ecclesiastical court should be prohibited only on a clear
surmise that it had insisted on the two-witness rule.) Yelverton and Williams are reported the have doubted what Tanfield said -- in just what respect does not appear.
On what I take to have been the second discussion of the case, Popham
repeated his basic point. Williams spoke to two incidental points, without
showing his hand on the principal case. On the question of mixed wills,
Williams said that ecclesiastical courts should be prohibited only quoad
terram if there is only one witness to prove the will (contrary to what Popham said on the first hearing.) Secondly, Williams affirmed the rule of
Bagnall v. Stokes on legacy releases, which Popham and Yelverton are
reported to have conceded. Popham did not dispute the premise of Tanfield's argument from the release to the revocation, though he rejected
the argument itself.
Justice Fenner spoke again, this time switching from his narrow logical
distinction between probate and revocation to the broad historical argument he had used in Harris v. Chadborne: "[Disallowing the revocation
for lack of a second witness] is contrary to the law of England, from
which they have their power to probate testaments, which at the beginning did not belong to them, wherefore they ought to pursue the form of
our law, and so it is for the revocation." Two points should be observed
here: (a) Whatever independent validity the distinction between probate
and revocation may have, Fenner's historical argument removes the difference. He all but explicitly says what the argument implies: Because
testamentary jurisdiction originally belonged to the common law the twowitness rule has no place in any testamentary proceedings, probate or
revocation. (b) If the common law delegated testamentary jurisdiction to
the ecclesiastical system, it presumably delegated authority to decide
claims of revocation as well as probate power, both with the proviso that
common law evidentiary standards be observed. At least there would
seem to be no reason for assuming the contrary. Therefore, Prohibition

254

Evidentiary Disallowance Surmise: The Two-Witness Rule
should lie in a revocation case only on surmise that the evidentiary proviso had been broken.
Tanfield spoke next. Relying on a Lloyde's Case, he distinguished probate and revocation as follows: Probate is an inherently "spiritual" function, revocation a temporal act, properly speaking within common law
jurisdiction (hence, for the purposes of the principal case, to be determined by common law evidentiary standards even though literally tried in
the ecclesiastical court.) For ecclesiastical courts should be prohibited in
toto from determining a claim that a mixed will was revoked, whereas
they should only be prohibited quoad terram from probating a mixed will
-- so held in Lloyde's Case.
Popham then intervened, once again to accept Tanfield's premise and
dispute his conclusions: Admittedly the ecclesiastical court was prohibited in in toto in Lloyde's Case, where revocation rather than probate was
involved. But no radical distinction between probate and revocation follows from that. The reason why the Prohibition was total in that case was
simply that an ecclesiastical trial quoad bona might prejudice subsequent
common law litigation about the land. We have seen an indication that
Popham favored total Prohibitions in mixed-will cases when only probate
was in question. If (in accord with Williams's opinion above and prevailing authority) Popham would not have insisted on the latter point, he
would still have a perfectly good explanation of Lloyde's Case. For it is
quite arguable that an ecclesiastical trial on the specific, indivisible, and
controverted claim that a document was revoked would be more likely to
prejudice common law litigation than mere probate proceedings, ostensibly going only to as much of the will as concerned goods. In other words,
one can reasonably say that there is a practical distinction between probate and revocation, in the context of deciding whether total Prohibition
is necessary to avoid prejudice, while still maintaining that there is no essential distinction.
Save for one further remark by Popham (repeating, with an unspecific
citation, his earlier point that application of the two-witness rule to probate will not hurt people who have had dealings with a temporarily installed, later ousted executor), the only other speech on the present
occasion was by Yelverton. He said briefly and generally that he could
see no difference between probate and revocation -- if wills are "spiri-
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tual," so are revocations of wills -- clearly implying agreement with Popham. Three days later, however, (Harl. 163 l specifies the three days),
Yelverton changed his mind. He now announced his opinion that revocation of a will in an inherently temporal act. It may be tried by ecclesiastical courts if it comes up obiter in ecclesiastical litigation -- like leases,
contracts, etc. -- but then common law evidentiary standards must be observed. Beyond that basic point, Yelverton contributed a slant of his own
on the case: "...in all cases where the temporal court could have jurisdiction and the ecclesiastical also, the temporal will be preferred, as it appears in all our books that when trials are to be by both laws, that only
will be put in issue which is triable by the common law, as induction will
be put in issue and not institution." Harl. 1631 says that Yelverton "put
several cases" to sustain this point, unfortunately without telling what
they were.
Yelverton's thinking is of interest for the frame of the case. Holding
the "swing" vote, he shows symptoms of a troubled judge -- searching his
books, looking for an approach to the case that would be a little more satisfying than anything he had heard. What he found seems to me a somewhat softened version of the Fenner-Tanfield position. Yelverton did not
quite want to say that revocation and probate are miles apart (logical polar opposites, as it were) or that ecclesiastical authority in testamentary
cases is by the gift and at the sufferance of the common law. He preferred
to think in terms of priorities in the event that jurisdictions with conflicting rules overlap. Yelverton did not want to say that ecclesiastical courts
have, in strictness, no business deciding claims of revocation, or that a
claim of revocation goes to deny that there is any testamentary matter for
the ecclesiastical court to take up. He preferred to see the revocation
claim as an "incident," like any other, of an ecclesiastical cause -- a matter arising, something that must be decided by someone before the suit
can be disposed of. Once it is seen that way, the question arises whether
the "incident" should be tried by common law or ecclesiastical standards.
The question is a real one (as Popham admitted in the discussion of this
case), for it was plainly not the law that ecclesiastical courts are always
free to try "incidents" of their own suits by their own rules. How does one
decide? It seems to me that the thrust of Yelverton's remarks is to propose a rule of thumb close to "When in doubt prefer the common law."
The nicer formulation would be: "In cases of ambiguity -- where there is
a legitimate sense in which an issue may be seen as concerning, or appro-
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priate to, the common law -- take it as a 'common law issue' for the purpose of evidentiary standards; blot out the sense, though that may be legitimate too, in which it may be seen as an ecclesiastical issue." (With
such a formulation in mind, Yelverton's analogy with benefice-law
makes a kind of sense. In many cases, whether a clergyman was installed
in a benefice was both a matter of whether he was instituted -- a "spiritual" act -- and of whether he was inducted -- a "temporal" one. Common
law policy was to resolve the problem whether such cases were primarily
about induction or about institution by "blotting out" the latter and forcing
common law litigants to take issue on the former.)
Whether revocation of a will ought to pass Yelverton's test is questionable. Popham would certainly say it does not, without necessarily disputing the test as such. For Popham saw no ambiguity, no legitimate sense in
which revocation of a will of personalty touched the common law. It
seems to me that an argument can be made, however, though no one in
the reports makes it in these terms. It is, after all, true that whether a will
was revoked could affect people's interests -- most notably those entitled
to intestate succession. Often, surely, the motive for revoking a will is to
restore to grace the near relatives who would take an intestate estate, or at
least to withdraw benefactions which the decedent once wanted to bestow
at the expense of his wife and nearest kin. The rights of intestate successors were ecclesiastical, in the sense that suits to obtain administration
and recover shares of the estate must be brought in ecclesiastical courts.
However, the freedom of ecclesiastical courts to deal with intestate estates was severely hedged in by statute. The common law frequently intervened to see that the statutes were observed, and that the interests of
wives and children, which the statutes protected, did not suffer. There is
a sense in which the common law had a kind of tutelary interest in the intestate successors. Applied to probate, the effect of the two-witness rule
was to make wills harder to establish, to insure that intestate successors
were not deprived of their due by false or dubious wills. Applied to revocation, the effect would be to make wills harder to break. Perhaps the
common law's "tutelary interest" is strong enough to justify insisting that
an issue of revocation is a common law issue. That may be an interest at
least equal to the interest in protecting executors who say that legacies
have been released but cannot produce two witnesses. It is probably true
that intestate successors were a good deal safer with ecclesiastical courts
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than executors trying to defeat legacies. One should not assume too much
about reality on the basis of the lawyerly arguments in Brown v.
Wentworth. Granting a Consultation in that case would not necessarily
lead to recovery of the legacy. Indeed, the legatee would seem to have a
shaky case, for he was suing an administrator for a legacy bequeathed by
a will other than the one attached to his letters of administration. The effect of a Consultation would only be to leave the ecclesiastical court free
to struggle with a complicated case as it saw fit, and free to prevent the
administrator from pleading revocation of the first will -- whatever other
defenses he might have.
The same point can be made for more normal circumstances. To hold
that ecclesiastical courts may insist that claims of revocation be supported
by two witnesses does not necessarily mean that intestate successors and
beneficiaries of wills made after revocation of a former will would suffer
in practice. It does not mean that the first executor who could find two
people to swear to his will would be absolutely safe against claims of
revocation unsupported by an equal number of oath-helpers. How the ecclesiastical courts actually handled complex testamentary situations when
left to themselves is an obscure question. However, the "tutelary interest"
runs a certain risk if the ecclesiastical courts are left to themselves. That
may be reason enough to prohibit, or as good a reason as was ever available in two-witness-rule Prohibition cases. The arguments above were not
to all appearances made in Brown v. Wentworth. I am not sure the values
they touch on can be left out of account as sub-surface influences. Anxiety lest the shades of gentlemen who thought better of their benefactions
be offended, and the kinsmen likely to gain from revocations be harmed,
may have tipped the balance in a tight case. Justice Yelverton, who did
the tipping, at least provided the framework in which those motives can
be given explicit recognition.
At the final discussion of Brown v. Wentworth, Tanfield and Fenner
restated their position without significant additions. Justice Williams now
declared himself on Popham's side. Williams, like Yelverton, shows
signs of perplexity and research. He cited some Year Book authority for
the generalities of the Popham position (that ecclesiastical courts may try
the issues that arise in their cases -- as much as the old books would
show, but bringing them in perhaps lent some extra conviction to the application of those generalities which Popham worked out for the present
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case and Williams concurred in.) He faced Fenner's historical argument,
answering it as if he took it seriously. It is true, Williams conceded, that
ecclesiastical testamentary jurisdiction was not ancient, that before the
Fourth Lateran Council it belonged to the temporal courts. But Williams
would not draw Fenner's conclusion from that premise. Sine the common
law had delegated testaments to the Church courts, Williams said in effect, the right to try testamentary matters by ecclesiastical standards must
be taken as included in the gift. ("But now that it belongs to them to prove
testaments, the law must also allow them a means of trial, and other trial
they cannot have than by their own law.") Finally, Williams challenged
the use that had been made of Bagnall v. Stokes. Having apparently done
some research into the record, he was able to expose Tanfield's inaccuracy. Tanfield had cited the case as a decision that the two-witness rule
may not be applied to a release of a legacy. As shorthand, that was fair
enough, for the Court plainly meant so to hold. But, as Williams discovered, it was not strictly correct. The Prohibition in Bagnall v. Stokes had
been granted because the executor was suing against his own release,
wholly without reference to the two-witness rule; all the Court decided
was that the Prohibition should not have been granted on that ground,
wherefore Consultation was awarded. Thus, Williams concluded, "to say
that if they had refused the trial by one witness that the Prohibition would
stand is imagination out the case." If Williams had a report of Bagnall v.
Stokes, instead of the official record, it would not have seemed so imaginary. Nevertheless, even with full information, Williams would have been
perfectly entitled to say that the rule on releases was only a dictum, and,
as such, not an authority which one need be reluctant to dispute.
The Chief Justice, who spoke last, would not accept the help that Williams's research provided. Popham's parting argument conceded the legacy-release case and went on to distinguish it. A legacy release, he held, is
one of those "collateral" issues which ecclesiastical courts may try if and
only if they are willing to waive the two-witness rule; revocation of a testament is not such an issue. Whereas Tanfield thought a release and a
revocation essentially similar -- both "negations" of ecclesiastical claims - Popham took the exactly opposite position. As he had argued before,
"the revocation is a necessary dependent upon the testament, and it is all
one to try whether the testator made a will or not, or whether he revoked
his will after making it, and both are acts done by the testator." Similarly,
Popham now added, an executor's claim that he paid a legacy is triable by
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ecclesiastical standards, for that too is "dependent" on the ecclesiastical
claim. A release, on the other hand, is "collateral," and therefore as much
to be tried by common law standards as the obvious sorts of "common
law issues" that may arise in ecclesiastical cases (issues such as "Who has
the property in these goods?", which, unlike a bare release of a legacy,
could actually come in question in common law litigation.)
The dependent-collateral distinction may be expounded as follows:
this A.'s last will?" relates to "was this will revoked by A. (so that it is not
his last will)?" as "The executor owes me a legacy" relates to "I, the executor, have paid the legacy claimed (so that the executor does not owe
the claimant a legacy)." In both instances, the second group of words -whether question or statement -- "depends" on the first in the sense that
answering one question answers the other, and verifying one statement
disverifies the other. "The executor owes me a legacy" relates differently
to "The claimant released the legacy," even though it be made to look like
the second term in the sets above by adding a negative phrase, "(so that
the executor does not owe the claimant a legacy)." For the negation here
is really an "artificial conclusion of the law," rather than a logical translation. It follows because the law recognized a power in legatees to wipe
out their rights to recover legacies; "The claimant released the legacy"
does not mean "The executor does not owe a legacy."
If one asks which law recognized the legatee's power to release, the
answer must ultimately be the common law, though the ecclesiastical law
may also recognize it as a matter of contingent fact. For suppose ecclesiastical law did not recognize the power to release ecclesiastical duties: It
is unimaginable, surely, that so fundamental a conflict with the common
law would have been tolerated for a moment -- as unimaginable as tolerating an ecclesiastical rule which said, e.g., that tithes cannot be conveyed
by lease. Per contra, where a legatee says that the legacy is unpaid and
the executor says it is paid, the executor's response in no way derives its
defensive validity from the common law, for by "mere reason," or the
necessary rules of any legal system, to say that a duty is discharged answers the claim that it is undischarged. Where a claim in the last analysis
derives its defensive validity from the common law, it makes sense to say
that common law evidentiary standards must be applied, for to permit
their non-application is to let ecclesiastical canons of proof deprive people of rights which the common law gives and hence is responsible for
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defining. A right is defined in part by what is required to establish it. Contra, where a right does not have its source in the common law, so that the
common law is not responsible for articulating its meaning. Since the
mere plea that a legacy or tithes have been paid does not have a common
law source, ecclesiastical courts are free to say, if you like, that "paid"
means "paid in the presence of two witnesses," or that what counts as discharging ecclesiastical duties is what can be proved to have been done according to a certain method, however, rigid or unfair the proof-procedure
may be. (With respect to legacies and other testamentary matters, incidentally, this logical argument holds up even though one concedes Fenner's
historical argument, as Williams did. Historically it might be true that
legacies originally belonged to the common law, that therefore that payment of legacies may have been handed over to the ecclesiastical system
at a specifiable point in time. In that sense, legacy law would be "derived"
from the common law, as the power to release may be said to be" derived" from it. However, the validity of a plea of mere payment would
still not be derived from the common law. The crucial test is whether the
ecclesiastical rule could possibly not exist -- whether the validity of the
defense is ultimately forced on the ecclesiastical law. The historical
transaction Fenner posited would not involve telling the ecclesiastical
courts they must allow payment as a defense to legacy claims; by giving
them legacy claims, it would merely enable them to apply their existing,
because necessary, rule to a new situation.)
Chief Justice Popham argued redoubtably in Brown v. Wentworth. It
was one of his last great cases, for he was about seventy-five years old
and died roughly a year later. Though unsuccessful, he may not have argued altogether in vain, for after the motion for Consultation was denied,
the defendant demurred to the Prohibition. With the Court so closely divided and the difficulty of the case so fully exposed, the demurrer was
well-advised. One change of opinion, comparable to Yelverton's aboutface on the motion, would have done the trick. However, no further
events in the case are reported. The chances are that the demurrer was
dropped, the defendant finally deciding that the likelihood of converting
anyone after such profound discussion was slight. It is ironic that one
term later Coke's Common Pleas overturned the dictum in Bagnall v.
Stokes, on which all the King's Bench judges (with the possible exception of Williams) agreed. Coke was soon to strike a fundamental blow at
two-witness-rule Prohibitions; the King's Bench in Brown v. Wentworth
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extended the scope of such Prohibitions in the face of strong resistance by
two judges. At least by Popham’s reasoning, it would have been hard to
extend it much further, for if one witness must be accepted for revocation
of a will, must one witness not be accepted for payment of a legacy, or
payment of tithes? The one place left for the two-witness rule would seem
to be bare probate of wills of personalty, or quatenus they concerned personalty.
The remaining cases from the Jacobean King’s Bench are not very numerous or very strong. They do not all go the same way, but if anything
they suggest greater caution about two-witness-rule Prohibitions than had
characterized the King’s Bench up to the climactic Brown v. Wentworth.
Coke, and posthumously Popham, may have exercised a cautionary influence. From Sir Thomas Fleming’s Chief Justiceship (1607-13), I have
only three exiguous reports. One says merely that an executor who
claimed to have paid a legacy and had only one witness first obtained a
Prohibition and then lost it by consultation.15
The second report, of Parson Close’s Case,16 is dated H. 5 Jac. K.B.,
but the case was an earlier one in another court, which Chief Justice
Fleming happened to recount in that term (in what context does not appear). In Close’s Case, a tithe-payer wanted to claim that the parson was
deprived because he had obtained his living by simony. A Prohibition
was granted by the Exchequer, a most unusual place to seek the writ, to
judge by the evidence of law reports. (Fleming knew about the case because he had formerly been Chief Baron of the Exchequer.) The ground
of the Prohibition was that three witnesses had been rejected, two for
competence (because they had been somehow involved in the simoniacal
transaction) and the third because he was a single witness, whereas at
least two were required. Six years later (quod nota) the Prohibition was
reversed by Consultation on the ground that tithes belong to the ecclesiastical system, and therefore that anything erroneous or unreasonable that
the particular ecclesiastical court did was remediable only by appeal.

15
16

T. 5 Jac. K.B. Add 25,213, f.82b, reported briefly under the heading of another totally unrelated
Prohibition case, Freeman v. Nascall.
Harl. 3209, f.6l.
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That is as much as the report tells. I would take the case as making
two points: (a) If a parishioner in a tithe suit disputes the parson's incumbency by reason of simony, the ecclesiastical court is entitled to insist
on two witnesses to prove the simoniacal transaction. This holding is surprising in one way, because automatic deprivation for simony was statutory. It would seem arguable that an ecclesiastical defendant who relies
on a statute to defeat his liability should be allowed to establish the facts
to which the statute gives significance by common law standards. However, that may not be so clear. If a statute creates an ecclesiastical offense
or increases the sanction for one and says nothing to the contrary, perhaps
it should be taken to mean that the ecclesiastical courts are perfectly free
to apply their own evidentiary canons to relevant facts, so long as they do
not disregard or misinterpret the legal rule which the statute enacts. (b)
Where the ecclesiastical courts are free to apply the two-witness rule
straightforwardly (where there is no suggestion that more than one witness could be produced), they are free to apply it in the somewhat more
complicated circumstances of this case. I.e.: They are free to say that "two
witnesses" means "two competent witnesses," and therefore to rule out a
single witness who survives after other proferred witnesses have been
ruled incompetent. If the rulings on competence are erroneous or unreasonable, or if it is excessive to apply the two-witness rule when a party
has done his best to find multiple witnesses but turns out to have only one
who can qualify, the remedy is by appeal. Close's Case enters into the
King's Bench tradition only on the assumption that Fleming, who told the
story, subscribed to its moral.
In Mallins's Case,17 toward the end of Fleming's tenure, it was held
that the two-witness rule may not be applied to a commutation agreement
for tithes. I.e.: The parishioner says the parson agreed to take money instead
of tithes (not by composition-real, but by ordinary bargain); the suit will
be prohibited if the parishioner is not allowed to prove the agreement by
one witness. Subject to the element of doubt that existed as to whether
ecclesiastical courts were bound to recognize such bargains at all, the decision is not surprising, for a contract is an obvious candidate for the class

17

T. 10 Jac. K.B. Harg. 15, f.278.
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of matters of such interest to the common law that they should be tried by
common law standards.
There are no two-witness-rule cases from Coke's period as Chief Justice of the King's Bench (1613-16). From the post-Cokean years I have
three reports. In Barnewell v. Tracy18 a parishioner pleaded a relatively
formal contractual commutation of tithes: The parson covenanted that
certain land be discharged of tithes, rendering rent (i.e., the land to be encumbered with a rent-charge in lieu of tithes); the covenant was conditioned to be void if the rent was not paid. The parson did not deny the
covenant, but claimed that the rent was not paid on the day specified,
wherefore the covenant was void for breach of condition and tithes were
due. The parishioner sought a Prohibition because the issue was whether
or not a "real contract" (comprised in a deed and affecting land) had been
broken and forfeited, and because the ecclesiastical court would not allow
proof by a single witness. From the judges' remarks, it would appear that
disallowance of evidence as to whether the rent was paid on time was not
concretely alleged. Rather, the surmise pointed to ecclesiastical evidentiary standards in general terms, as "notoriously" inappropriate to this
case. For Justice Houghton said, with Justices Dodderidge and Croke
concurring, that Prohibition would lie if the ecclesiastical court would not
accept one witness to prove payment of the rent. As the case stood, in their
opinion, Prohibition would not lie, for the ecclesiastical court was perfectly
able to try whether the rent was paid. That breach and forfeiture of a "real contract"
were at stake was not sufficient reason for Prohibition, and disallowance of
evidence was not adequately surmised. Chief Justice Montagu may have thought
that prohibition would not lie even with a surmise that proof by one witness
had been disallowed, though this is not clear. He took the position that the
ecclesiastical court should be prohibited, irrespective of the evidence it allowed, if issue had been taken on the truth of the "real contract." But the
parson had admitted the contract, and the parties were at issue on the payment of the rent. That issue, Montagu said, was an "accessory" of the ecclesiastical suit. He may have meant that the ecclesiastical court was free
to try that issue by its evidentiary standards. Houghton spoke after Mon18

T. 16 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle, 42.
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tagu, agreeing but adding the proviso that common law evidentiary standards must be applied. Croke and Dodderidge are reported as agreeing
with Houghton, but nothing is said about the Chief Justice. That is slight
evidence that he doubted the proviso.
In Wood v. Churley,19 a man devised a legacy conditionally: A. was
bound in an obligation to B., and C. was A.'s surety. C. left a legacy to
A., on condition that A. provide security to save C.'s executor harmless if
he should become liable to pay B. on the bond. A. sued for the legacy; the
executor said the condition had not been performed; A. replied that he
had tendered security, but that the executor had refused. The ecclesiastical court proceeded to try the question thus raised, deciding that A.'s tender was sufficient and that the legacy should be paid. The executor
obtained Prohibition by surmising these facts -- i.e., on the ground that
the reality of the tender and its sufficiency to satisfy the condition were
intrinsically common law questions. The report relates to a motion for
Consultation. Counsel argued that the tender was an incident of ecclesiastical litigation, hence determinable by the ecclesiastical court. In support
of this point, Bagnall v. Stokes was cited -- correctly for a change, for the
decision rather than the dictum was relied on. Chief Justice Ley supplied
the dictum, however. The intent of his speech was to favor the Consultation in this case, but he added that common law issues triable in ecclesiastical courts must be tried by common law standards. Justice Dodderidge
agreed, the only other member of the Court to speak. Note that Bagnall v.
Stokes (decision and dictum) was still alive as a King's Bench precedent,
notwithstanding Coke's repudiation of the dictum in the Common Pleas.
Another point of interest in Wood v. Churley arises from a phrase in
Ley's speech and one in Dodderidge's. Ley explained what he meant by
ecclesiastical trial using common law standards: " ... though it is not by
jury, yet by such proofs as would be allowed before a jury here." Dodderidge explained why ecclesiastical courts may not insist on two witnesses when trying common laws issues: " ... in our law proof by one
witness is good, for the jurors are to give their verdict from their own
knowledge although no evidence is given." What these explanations suggest to me is a touch of intellectual discomfort about the meaningfulness
19

T. 21 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle. 439.
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of "ecclesiastical trial by common law standards." It is as if someone had
said, "You keep talking about a class of common law matters, which may
be tried as 'incidents' of ecclesiastical suits so long as they are given
common law trial. You will not take the clean, dichotomous way -- prohibit when there is an issue which you really think should have common
law trial, so that it gets such trial; otherwise, let the ecclesiastical courts
proceed with their own methods and rules. But perhaps such a hard-edged
choice ought to be made in every case. For does it make sense to speak of
common law trial in an ecclesiastical court? Common law trial means
trial by jury, not trial by testimony, with or without a two-witness rule.
You talk as if trial by one witness were the common law method, trial by two
witnesses the ecclesiastical. But that is misleading both ways. At common
law, juries decide with the help of such evidence as is presented to them,
if any is, and if they credit any of it. There is no such thing as a 'one-witness
rule', any more that there is a 'six-witness rule'. If you like, the common law
operates with a 'twelve-witness rule!' On the other hand, it is misleading to
describe ecclesiastical trial as trial by two witnesses. The essential point is
that it is trial by witnesses alone, without the jury of twelve to fall back
on. The two-witness rule is a natural, rational function of that system. Not
having 'twelve witnesses,' it makes sense, for the sake of reliability, to insist on at least two, to restrain a solo judge from deciding a given way if
he believes a single witness. Perhaps the ecclesiastical method is a bad
method; perhaps the element of formalism that the testimony-system entails is a reason for not having such a system, or for limiting its scope as
much as possible. But then the thing to do is to take issues in which the
common law has a defensible interest out of the ecclesiastical system altogether -- let them be tried the better way, the real common law way.
The alternative course is to turn such issues over to an inferior version of
the ecclesiastical system -- trial by testimony without the insurance of reliability which, given the system, such institutions as the two-witness rule
clumsily provide."
Though there are no signs that such a argument was spelled out in
Wood v. Churley, the phrases used by Ley and Dodderidge seem to be directed against aspects of it. Ley's says, as it were, "Of course when we
speak of common law trial in ecclesiastical courts we are not talking literally, but there is a legitimate sense in which merely waiving the two-wit-
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ness rule brings an ecclesiastical trial closer to the common law model.
Substitute the ecclesiastical judge for the jury, and think of the one witness as 'minimum evidence,' and you are not too far off the mark. For
common law trial consists in a fact-decider -- twelve men as it happens,
but make it one -- free to decide from 'minimum evidence,' and given the
ecclesiastical system 'minimum evidence' can only mean one witness."
Dodderidge's language says, "Literally speaking, there is of course no
such common law institution as proof by one witness. But an ecclesiastical judge who is constrained to decide even though all the evidence he
has to go on is the testimony of one witness approximates significantly to
the common law system, where juries decide even though no evidence is
presented." Neither remark seriously rebuts the argument above. The
judges did not sit down to rebut it. What they did perhaps do, merely by
dropping phrases, was to parry it, as if it were in their minds or in the air.
The argument is obvious enough, but I have found no traces of it in earlier cases on the two-witness rule. Historically, it may represent a relatively sophisticated doubt. There was considerable practice behind the
idea that common-law 'incidents' should be tried by ecclesiastical courts,
but without the two-witness rule. It was perhaps taken for granted that to
ban the two-witness rule was to guarantee a close enough imitation of
common law trial to satisfy the common law's interest -- until it occurred
to someone to doubt. Ley and Dodderidge were defending the conventional wisdom.
In a case of 1623,20 a Prohibition to stop a legacy suit was sought on
two grounds. The MS. report states the two grounds with perfect clarity,
but how they fit together into one case is not so clear. The first ground
was that the ecclesiastical court had refused to accept an acquittance written and sealed by the legatee, acknowledging receipt of the legacy, because it was unsupported by witnesses. (According to the executor, the
witnesses were all dead.) The second ground was that the ecclesiastical
court had misconstrued or refused to recognize a "shifting" legacy. (A.
devised 10£ to B., to be paid when B. reached twenty-one, and if B.
should die before reaching twenty-one, C. to have the £10. According to the
surmise, B. died before twenty-one but his executor was nevertheless try-

20

M.21 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle, 414; Harg. 30, f.169.
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ing to recover the £10 from A.’s executor. The ecclesiastical court had allegedly give sentence for B.’s executor.)
Combining the two grounds, I should suppose the case to be as follows: The disallowed acquittance went to show that A.’s executor had
paid C. The-relevance of establishing that in order to defeat B.’s executor
is not evident, for the obvious argument against him is that B.’s death before twenty-one broke the condition and simply disentitled B.’s estate.
Perhaps it is arguable, however, that the ecclesiastical court ought to have
allowed A.’s executor to prove payment to C. by way of establishing his
“clean hands.” Conceivably, the ecclesiastical court could have taken the
position that A.’s executor was under the circumstances estopped to dispute his duty to pay B. or his estate unless he could claim to have paid C.
In property-law terms, that is a funny position (the devise ought either to
impose a valid condition on B.’s legacy or not, so that B.’s executor was
either entitled to £10 or not, that being the sole question), but perhaps a
case can be made for it in legacy law. A testamentary court, seeking to
effect the testator’s intentions, might reasonably take the conditionality of
B.’s legacy as less than absolute, thus: A.’s first choice was to benefit B.
if he survived to adulthood. His second choice, should B. die in his nonage, was to employ the £10 to benefit C. But what was his third choice?
What would he have chosen if, say, C. disappeared from the country,
never claiming, the £10 (a small sum, after all) and not being reachable
by the executor? It is not so clear that he would have wanted the £10 to go
to the residuary legatee, in preference to B.’s estate (via which those
would probably benefit who would have benefited if B. had received his
legacy and died at twenty-two.) Perhaps a testamentary court which was
allowed the flexibility to do so could reasonably look into whether C. had
been paid, and whether, in view of the lapse of time and other circumstances, there was any likelihood of his ever claiming the legacy. If C.
had not been paid and could not be reached, and A.’s estate was overdue
for final settlement, the ecclesiastical court might reasonably prefer B.’s
estate to the residuary legatee (typically the executor himself,)
The alternative to this reconstruction is to suppose that two distinct
claims were joined in one legacy suit, and that the two grounds of the surmise go to different matters. The court’s handling of the case, however,
encourages the reconstruction I have given. The judges were divided on
the merits as they appeared, but agreed that no action should be taken un-
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til the ecclesiastical sentence was shown (produced so that the Court
could inspect its details, as opposed to pleaded in general terms.) The
judges' insistence on knowing exactly what the ecclesiastical court had
done suggests that they were a little confused by the double surmise, a little uncertain whether the disallowed evidence was relevant in the ecclesiastical court's own eyes, whatever difference that might make. I infer that
the goings-on in the ecclesiastical court were somewhat complex and unusual, as they must have been if both elements in the surmise relate to a
single claim.
On the apparent merits, Justice Houghton took the position that there
was no basis for Prohibition. He expressed himself in the most general
vocabulary -- simply that the ecclesiastical court had cognizance of the
principal matter and was therefore free to handle matters arising as it
chose. Perhaps his spelled-out position would not be that legacy suits are
never prohibitable, but rather that in this case (a) ecclesiastical courts may
apply their own evidentiary requirements to a mere plea of payment (perhaps not, e.g., to a release); (b) ecclesiastical courts may construe legacies
as they see fit, subject only to appeal -- e.g., whether a legacy is conditional, and whether conditionality has the same meaning in legacy law as
in the common law of property. Justices Dodderidge and Chamberlain
thought that both parts of the surmise stated grounds for Prohibition.
They expressly disputed the generality that cognizance of the "principal"
carries cognizance of the "incidents." That is not true, they said, when
departure from common law standards will affect a third party (C. in the
scheme above) or will deprive the executor of what belongs to him. They
described the disallowance of the acquittance as a "strange conceit." Witnesses, they said, "cannot be kept in life, and ytt is the hande of God."
(This need not imply that the two-witness rule could never be enforced
with respect to payment of a legacy. There might be room for saying that
the two-witness rule is enforceable as "transaction formalism," but that
when the party took pains to obtain a witnessed acquittance in writing he
must not be required to produce live testimony when it is impossible or
unreasonably difficult.) On the substantive matter, Dodderidge and
Chamberlain held in effect that the devise must be construed by common
law standards: As it stood, B's death before twenty-one simply extinguished his right; contra if there had been no expressly conditional language (if he dies before twenty-one, then to C.) (I.e.: If the devise were
simply £10 to B., to be paid when he reaches twenty-one", B.'s executor
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would be entitled to the £10 when B. would have been twenty-one even
though B. died earlier.)
Turning now to the Jacobean Common Pleas: We have already noted
the reversal of the dictum in Bagnall v. Stokes, which took place in M. 4
Jac. in Peppes's Case. Before that, I have one faint contrary indication: A
note in one report of Harris v. Chadborne, above, that in M.3 Jac. Justice
Daniel of the Common Pleas expressed agreement with the rule of Bagnall v. Stokes on releases. The same report also notes another Common
Pleas Case: In M. 2 Jac. a Prohibition was granted to prevent application
of the two-witness rule to probate, but later (H. 4, after Peppes) a Consultation was granted. The reporter notes that "it does not appear whether
the will was written by the devisor or not" (If it was not, the Consultation
was unsurprising; if it was, the Consultation expressed relatively strong
willingness to let the ecclesiastical courts set their own standards in testamentary matters.)
In Roberts's Case,21 Coke's Common Pleas extended the principle of
Peppes's Case to a lease of tithes, using language strong and general
enough to rule out two-witness-rule Prohibitions altogether. The Court
invoked the usual generality that "incidents" of ecclesiastical causes
should be left to ecclesiastical determination by ecclesiastical standards,
but also relied on Coke's argument that fictitious surmises were a virtually unlimited danger. Counsel made one specific objection to the holding, to which the Court made a clear and broad response. Suppose, it was
objected, that A. sues for tithes, claiming to be lessee of the rectory; suppose the parishioner pleads that the rectory was leased to B. by an earlier
lease, so that B. rather A. is entitled to the tithes. If the parishioner is not
allowed to prove the lease to B. by one witness, he will be condemned to
pay A. For the internal purposes of the ecclesiastical system, that is not a
particularly evil result, because the parishioner will no doubt be protected
against B. But suppose B. brings a common law action for the value of the
tithes plus punitive damages (as in some circumstances he was entitle to do
by 2/3 Edw.6, c 13.) If B.'s lease is actually senior, he will have no trouble
21

M.8 Jac. C.P. 12 Coke, 65; Croke Jac., 629 (dated H. 8 and mislabelled K.B.)
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proving it by one witness at common law and will recover, the parishioner paying twice. To this point specifically, the Court replied that the
parishioner has no complaint, because he would not have been caught in
double liability if he had done his duty in the first place. The parishioner’s duty is to set out his tithes; once he has done so, he has discharged his obligation to the person entitled to the tithes, whoever that
may be; if the tithes belong to B. but A. gets there first, B. has no claim
against the parishioner; if B. sues, either in an ecclesiastical court or at
common law, all the parishioner need do is plead the setting-out. (Note
that this reasoning is fairly tough on tithe-payers. Imagine a parishioner
who knows there is a dispute going on about whom the tithes are leased
to. He has pretty good reason to think that B. is really entitled, but also
reason to suppose that if the tithes are set out A. will make off with them.
So with the intention of doing right and protecting B. he carries the tithes
off to his own barn -- perfectly willing to satisfy B. when he gets a chance
to make demand, perfectly willing to deal with A. if he will demand the
tithes and show convincing evidence of his title, willing to litigate with
him if necessary, unwilling simply to have his tithes disappear into a dubious claimant’s hands, with possible recriminations from Neighbor B.
The court spared no pity for a parishioner who got into trouble from such
good intentions.)
Going on in more general terms, the Court expressed doubt that ecclesiastical courts would in fact insist rigidly on the two-witness rule in such
cases as the present one. In reality, the judges thought, one witness plus
some such “vehement presumption” as possession would satisfy the ecclesiastical law. (I.e., in the instant case: Direct proof by one witness that
the tithes were leased to A., supported by evidence that B. had collected
tithes from this or other parishioners, would do. To doubt that ecclesiastical courts actually had a universal two-witness rule is not, of course, to
doubt that they applied such a rule rigidly in some instances -- notably, to
transactions, such as releases and tithe payment, of whose occurrence corroborative circumstantial evidence was unlikely to exist. Coke and his
brethren thought its rigid application to such transactions -- including
documents purporting to comprise them -- entirely reasonable.) Then the
Court took exception to speaking of a “one-witness-rule” as if the common law recognized such an animal. (Cf. my discussion of Wood v.
Churley above.) Nothing is established at common law, the judges
pointed out, because one witness swears to it; facts are established be-
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cause the jury is persuaded in its “conscience” that they are true. Therefore there is no easily intelligible sense in which a two-witness rule in a
jurisdiction that does not use the jury system conflicts with the common
law. Conflict (this comes to saying) implies meeting, responding differently in comparable contexts; the two-witness rule does not conflict with
the common law because the common law has no contexts in which it has
to choose between a two-witness rule and alternatives. But Prohibitions -the Court went on to say almost expressly -- are warranted only when
there is conflict (save for those designed to prevent “foreign“ courts from
entertaining suits to which they have absolutely no title.) Prohibitions
controlling the interlocutory behavior of ecclesiastical courts are justified
when it is shown that a statute has been ignored or misconstrued, or when
it is otherwise made to appear that a legal question governed by the common law has been, or is likely to be, mishandled. Prohibition never lies -I think it was the Court’s clear intent to say -- on surmise that an ecclesiastical court proposed to determine matter of fact by standards of its own
choosing. In the discussion of Roberts’s Case, Coke recounted Foster v.
Whiscarre (above), among whose holdings he numbered a general condemnation of two-witness-rule Prohibitions.
Peppes’s Case and Roberts’s departed flatly from the King’s Bench
tradition. Whether or not Coke’s influence made the King’s Bench more
restrained, that court continued to grant two-witness-rule Prohibitions.
Did the Common Pleas persist in disapproval of them? There are three
cases in point from Lord Hobart’s Chief Justiceship (1613-23), and most
of the Caroline cases come from that court. All three cases from the Hobart court go against the Cokean doctrine.
In Chibborne v.
,22 the Court did not have to decide whether
to block enforcement of the two-witness rule, but it said unmistakably
that it would do so in a legacy-release case if called to. In the instant case,
a release was proved by only one witness, but the ecclesiastical plaintiff
(administrator of the legatee) did not dispute that the release was made.
Rather, he maintained that the releasor was an idiot. The Court held that
his mental capacity was triable in the ecclesiastical court and denied a
Prohibition. By way of dictum, the Chief Justice, apparently speaking for
22

M. 15 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.42b (anonymous); Hobart, 188 (named but undated.)
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the Court, said that insistence on two witnesses to prove a legacy release
could not be suffered when comparable evidence was not required to establish discharges of common law duties more solemn than legacies (recognizances, judgement debts, and the like.) On the other hand, Hobart
said, the common law should not interfere with ecclesiastical decisions
concerning the competence of witnesses. Two judges disagreed on another case which Justice Hutton put by the way: A legatee releases at the
age of seventeen; when he later sued for his legacy, the executor pleads
the release. In Hutton’s opinion, Prohibition would not lie; Justice Winch
disagreed. Although the report does not say so, I assume Hutton meant
that Prohibition would not lie on surmise that the release was disallowed.
(I.e., even if the ecclesiastical court took the legal position that a minor is
bound by his legacy release, at least a minor old enough to have some
sort of putative responsibility for this acts.) Assuming his concurrence
with the dictum on the two-witness rule, Hutton’s opinion in the nonage
case adds an accent to it: Ecclesiastical courts are free to follow their own
standards, at least within reason, with respect to the age of responsibility,
but not with respect to evidence. Winch’s contrary opinion is more predictable: Although, as in the principal case, there is no reason to prevent
the ecclesiastical court from trying such a fact as idiocy, when there is no
sign that its standards differ from the common law’s, once there is any
sign of deviance, substantive or evidentiary, Prohibition lies.
23

In Conisby v. Watts, a Prohibition was granted essentially to block
application of ecclesiastical evidentiary rules, but there was a reinforcing
factor. A. devised £100 to Elizabeth, his granddaughter, who married
Watts. A.’s executor, B., paid the legacy in 3 Jac. and took an acquittance
under Watts’s hand and seal; the acquittance was witnessed by two people. Watts later sued C., B.’s executor, for the £100. C. surmised that the
two witnesses were dead and the ecclesiastical court would not accept the
acquittance without their testimony. It was further surmised that live testimony to verify the original witnesses’ signatures on the acquittance
was rejected, as well as other evidence (writings plus live witnesses to
prove that the acquittance was in Watts’s hand, and further testimony by
persons who had heard Watts confess making the acquittance.) Finally,
23

M. 16 Jac. C.P. Hobart, 247; Hutton, 22; Helty;
Harl. 5149, f.245.
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the ecclesiastical court was alleged to be unwilling to accept a husband's
release of his wife’s legacy when she was not party to the suit. In the
nature of the case, the last claim was bound to be speculative -- a matter of saying that ecclesiastical courts (notoriously) would not consistently uphold the husband’s power to bind the wife (cf. the case in Section II above on this point.) For if the acquittance was excluded on
evidentiary grounds, plaintiff-in-Prohibition could hardly say that it was
in fact excluded on substantive grounds -- or excluded for what, so far as
appears, must be improper legal reasons. Prohibition would probably lie
on surmise that a husband’s release had been disallowed, but not on mere
suggestion that it might be. In this case, if the judges suspected that the
ecclesiastical court might not respect the husband’s release, the obvious
way to cut it off was to prohibit on evidentiary grounds. A court strongly
opposed to interfering with ecclesiastical canons of proof might grant
Consultation on condition that the husband’s, acquittance not be excluded
as a matter of law -- thereby permitting the ecclesiastical court to exclude
it in practice by insisting on evidentiary rules with the kind of unreasonable rigidity displayed in this case. The Common Pleas in Conisby v.
Watts simply granted general Prohibition.
Justice Hutton cited a Hawkins v. Stockdale, in which a Prohibition
was granted because an ecclesiastical court would not accept one witness
plus circumstantial evidence to prove a modus. Note the affinity of that
precedent to the principal case: The parishioner in Hawkins v. Stockdale
presumably chose to stick with the ecclesiastical court instead of seeking
the Prohibition he could have had on bare surmise of the modus. When he
came to seek a Prohibition, he put his surmise on an evidentiary basis, for
whatever reason. (I cannot suppose he needed to, sed quaere. Could it
ever be argued that the conduct of ecclesiastical courts undercut the presumption that modi were not respected there? Suppose a man pleads his
modus, has his evidence disallowed, takes two ecclesiastical appeals
solely on the ground that the disallowance of evidence was improper,
loses, then seeks a Prohibition on bare surmise of his modus. Is there any
way for the parson to establish the events in the ecclesiastical system as
facts, and then at least to argue that the evidentiary decision by the ecclesiastical court was uncontrollable, or that the parishioner had delayed too
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long?) In any event, the effect of not prohibiting to block enforcement of the
two-witness rule would be to let the ecclesiastical court get away with
awarding tithes in kind where there was enough evidence to make it quite
likely that the modus could be established at common law. So in Conisby
v. Watts: the effect of not prohibiting on evidentiary grounds would be to
let the ecclesiastical court enforce indirectly the "unlawful" view of marital
relations it could reasonably be suspected of entertaining. There is a special sense in which awarding tithes in kind where there is probably a modus and qualifying the husband's power to bind his wife are both
"anti-common law" acts. The sense is not strictly logical, but "moral" -reverence for custom and the conception of husband and wife as one person were very important values embodied in the common law.
Owing to the lurking matter of the husband's power, and also to the extreme rigidity with which the two-witness rule was insisted on, Conisby
v. Watts can be played down as a precedent for two-witness-rule Prohibitions in general. One might say (in a Cokean spirit) that such Prohibitions
ought to be eschewed, but that the courts must retain a certain discretion
to prevent the two-witness rule from being the means to such substantively unacceptable ends as depriving a husband of power to bind his
wife. Perhaps "discretion" should be emphasized: The judges may look at
the circumstances in order to discern whether evidentiary requirements
really are being used to subvert the common law. In Conisby v. Watts,
there was excellent reason for so concluding, for strong substitute proofs
had been rejected when witnesses in the unpredictable course of nature
had died. An executor who pleaded a husband's release of his wife's legacy and did not pretend to have had the transaction witnessed by more
than one person perhaps ought not have a Prohibition -- no more than if
the man had released his own legacy. An ecclesiastical court insisting on
a reasonable sort of "transaction formalism" would not appear to be aiming at an unacceptable substantive goal; contra if the transaction was surrounded with due precautions and the ecclesiastical court seemed to be
trying to make proof impossibly difficult. So with Hawkins v. Stockdale:
Granted that two-witness-rule Prohibitions should be avoided in general,
in the unlikely event that the rule is used to stop a man from establishing
a probable modus the attempt should be blocked -- for the ecclesiastical
courts' respect for modi is doubtful, a man's right to the benefit of custom
is especially important, and a surmise of disallowed evidence in a modus
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case is probably misconceived anyhow. However, although Conisby v. Watts
and Hawkins v. Stockdale can be mitigated as general-purpose precedents, it
does not follow that the Common Pleas judges in 1618 would have regarded
them as discretionary exceptions, for those judges may not have shared the disapprobation of two-witness-rule Prohibitions characteristic of Coke's court.
That they did not share it comes out clear1y in the last case from Hobart's Chief Justiceship, Devenish v. Downes24 The Court's thinking was
not unanimous or uncomplicated, however. Good MS. reports enable us
to follow it. Devenish v. Downes was a simple tithe suite, in which the
parishioner claimed simply that he had paid. He sought a Prohibition on
the ground that his proof of payment by one witness had been disallowed,
that witness being his servant. Note the last point: The parishioner himself
did not claim that the two-witness rule had been enforced against him altogether flatly; he admitted that the proof had been disallowed in part because of the identity of his witness, a servant whose objectivity could be
questioned; he was in effect asking not only that the two-witness rule be
blocked, but also that the ecclesiastical court be prevented from excluding
proof solely by a servant as ipso facto incredible.
When the case was first discussed, both sides were represented by
leading counsel (Serjeant Harris for the parishioner, Serjeant Davies for
the parson.) On that Occasion, Davies made the basic Cokean argument:
Prohibitions of this sort could be the means of depriving ecclesiastical
courts of jurisdiction almost without limit. Justice Winch spoke first from
the Bench, in favor of prohibiting. He expressly used Conisby v. Watts
as authority (" ... I was of this opinion in the case of Lady Conisby v.
Watts as well ..." i.e., Winch apparently saw no basis for distinguishing.)
Winch also argued from the well-known rule that setting out tithes converts them into the parson's chattels, so that the parson can maintain an
action of trespass against a stranger who makes off with the tithes, while
the parishioner cannot. In the report, he only states that rule. I take his
meaning to be: The common law has a particular interest in a transaction - setting out of tithes -- which constitutes a transfer of secular property in
goods as well as satisfaction of an ecclesiastical duty. Even if ecclesiasti24

M.-H. 17 Jac. C.P. Harl. 4813, f.29; Harl. 5149, f.347b; Harg. 30, f.64.
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cal courts cannot be prevented from applying their evidentiary standards
to purely ecclesiastical transactions, they should not be free to apply them
when the common law is also interested in whether the transaction took
place.
Justice Warburton (the senior puisne Justice, who became a member of
the Court six years before Coke’s appointment as Chief Justice, in contrast with Winch, who served under Coke for about two years at the end
of his tenure) disagreed. Warburton repeated the Cokean argument and
relied expressly on the decisive Alcock v. Peppes. That case having been
cited, a curious sequel took place, beautifully illustrative of the unreliable
use of authority in 17th-century jurisprudence. The record of Alcock v.
Peppes was brought into court (plainly, the judges were interested, and
perhaps disturbed, by Warburton’s claim that there was a unanimous antiProhibition precedent bearing Coke’s imprimatur.) On inspection, the
roll of Alcock v. Peppes showed no Consultation! The case appeared on
the record as a Prohibition granted to block the two-witness rule in a legacy-release case and never reversed by Consultation, contrary to Warburton’s memory. Ample law-report evidence demonstrates that the record
was either simply wrong (a clerk failed to get around to recording the
Consultation) or misleading owing to accident (no Consultation was actually issued because the executor saw that the Court was against him and
settled with the legatee without further ecclesiastical litigation.) The discovery must have taken the wind out of Warburton’s sails; it may even
have convinced him that his memory was wrong, for he seems in the end
to have changed his mid and agreed to a Prohibition in Devenish v.
Downes. Several other record-precedents (none of them cases of which I
have reports) were meanwhile cited in support of evidentiary Prohibitions.25 Even if Warburton stuck to his memory of Alcock v. Peppes, he
was outnumbered.

25

(1) Audley v. Leather, H. 36 Eliz. C. P.: The question was whether tithes had been set out.
Prohibition granted on surmise that proof by two witnesses was disallowed, both witnesses being
the tithe-payer’s servants. (According to Harl. 5149, Harl. 4813 represents this case as involving
disallowance of proof by one witness.)
(2) Reynard v. Gole, M. 39/40 Eliz. C.P.: Payment of a legacy provable only by one witness;
Prohibition
granted.
(3) Clark v. Wall, H. 14 Jac. C.P.: Payment of tithes provable only by one witness: Prohibition.
N.b: Two Elizabethan precedents and one from the Hobart Court itself.
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When the case was taken up again, Serjeant Harris, for the parishioner,
argued from custom in the looser sense (not usage of the sort that established prescriptive titles, but those "ways people ordinarily do things" of
which the law may sometimes take account.) Men do not usually bring
in outside witnesses to watch them set out tithes; the ordinary witnesses
of that transaction are only those who happen to be working in the fields,
very possibly a single workman employed by the tithe-payer, as in this
case. Ecclesiastical courts should not, by Harris's theory, be permitted to
demand a standard of care and formality higher than common practice
and assumptions endorse. (Harris may have meant to imply what this argument points to: "Common practice and assumptions" do recommend
having transactions comprised in documents witnessed -- leases, releases,
and the like. That being so, perhaps the law's title to step in with specifications -- e.g., that there must be two witnesses to a release -- is comparatively strong. In contexts hardly thought of as "business," where
traditions of informality prevail, ecclesiastical law has less right to intrude
with requirements that will inconvenience people and make them change
their ways.)
Chief Justice Hobart then gave his somewhat hesitant opinion. In the
abstract, he was clear for Prohibition: Two witnesses ought not to be demanded to prove payment of tithes; moreover, a witness ought not to be
excluded merely because he is the tithe-payer's servant. Hobart was not
sure, however, that this case could be decided by applying those abstract
truths. The surmise admitted that the ecclesiastical court had given sentence against the parishioner and attributed the sentence to the erroneous
exclusion of this evidence. This is what bothered Hobart: "...if it could be
made apparent to us that sentence was given there against the defendant
for defect of number in the witnesses, I would grant Prohibition, But if
his credit is impeached there, though he have several witnesses, if they
for any exception to their credit give sentence against the defendant, yet it
is no cause of Prohibition. And it is hard to make it appear to this court
that the reason for their sentence in the ecclesiastical court was solely for
the defect of number in the witnesses, for that is never mentioned in their
sentence. And if it does not appear of us, then on such suggestion they
could be prohibited where they ought not." I take it that the Chief Justice
would have had no qualms if the complaint of disallowed evidence had
been made before sentence, that he was in effect specifying one situation
where Prohibition must be sought before sentence.
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In one way, I find Hobart's reasoning strange. If all the facts stated by
the surmise are assumed to be true (tithes were claimed -- the sole evidence that they were paid was ruled out -- parishioner was condemned to
pay the tithes as if they had not been paid), how can the sentence not follow from the exclusion? How could any other sentence be given, once the
error of excluding the evidence was committed? It seems to me, however,
that there are two answers to this objection: (a) Be it noted to start with
that Hobart was talking about any possible surmise -- whether the dependence of a sentence on an evidentiary exclusion could ever be made to
appear in an airtight manner -- not about any contingent defects in the
surmise in this case. Hobart was inclined to think that such dependence
could never be made to appear, and we have asked directly whether that
is true. It is true, but only if "make it appear" is given a particular interpretation. Obviously I can "make it appear" (subject to ascertainment that
I am telling the truth) that X. is the cause of Y. if I say so. Hobart's position implies that any explicit causal language in a surmise should be overlooked. The solid legal reason for so holding is that the cause of a judicial
act is a poor jury issue. How is a jury (especially on the ancient theory
that jurors draw on their own knowledge) supposed to know whether an
ecclesiastical judge reached conclusion-X "because" he made evidentiaryruling-Y and for no other reason? Yet claims to Prohibitions in such
cases as this must be issuable; otherwise any tithe-payer could try his luck
in the ecclesiastical court, wait until sentence turned out to be unfavorable, then have a Prohibition on a feigned surmise that the sentence was
give "because" certain evidence was excluded--say documentary evidence
in support of oral testimony. Conceivably the fact of exclusion could be
treated as issuable even if the causal connection were not.) Then, if explicit causal language is disregarded, all plaintiff-in-Prohibition can
"make appear" is that X. happened and later Y. happened. Can the Court - assuming the question to be appropriate for the Court, not for a jury -ever infer a causal connection without committing the post hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy? If it ever can (as my questions above say), it ought
to be able to in a case like the present one, where sentence is known to
have been given against A. and all evidence in support of a defense sufficient to discharge A. from liability is known to have been excluded. Nevertheless, in strictly logical terms, a showing of sequentiality does not
"make it appear" that a causal connection exists between the events in the
sequence.
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(b) There is some legal point in insisting on logic for general purposes,
even though the point in this case is exiguous. For other cases can be
imagined in which it would be genuinely difficult to decide whether a
sentence really depended on an exclusion of evidence. (For example, in
Conisby v. Watts, if there had been a sentence in that case. The ecclesiastical court there could have admitted proof of the release and still given
sentence against the executor, on the theory that a husband may not release his wife's legacy. Application of that particular theory would probably have been stopped by Prohibition, but that is not entirely certain, and
other theories on which ecclesiastical courts might act were clearly not
controllable.) It is arguable that the best rule is for the judges to use common sense -- prohibit when a sentence in all probability does depend on
an improper exclusion, do not prohibit when there is a reasonable chance
(or some appreciable chance, or a strong chance) that it does not. But it
is also arguable, in Hobart's support, that the courts are better off avoiding the question of an ecclesiastical sentence's ''cause" so far as possible (hence avoiding such problems as whether there must be a "reasonable," "appreciable," or "strong" chance of non-dependence.) The
simplest means to that end would be a flat rule that Prohibitions on surmise of improper exclusion of evidence must be sought before sentence.
Such a rule would have something to recommend it as a compromise in
the troubled area of two-witness-rule Prohibitions. In Devenish v.
Downs, Serjeant Davies, Justice Warburton, and Hobart all touched on
the danger of fictionalization and abuse. Coke's general condemnation of
two-witness-rule Prohibitions was obviously too strong for most judges to
swallow. To adopt a "before-sentence-or-not-at-ail" rule would have cut
off some of the opportunity for abuse and made a troubling form of Prohibition harder to get, without doing away with a type of Prohibition on
whose necessity most judges agreed.
Justice Hutton, who spoke after Hobart, went for the heart of the Chief
Justice's argument. "If such a suggestion is made as is supposed, it is issuable," Hutton said, "scil. whether that is the cause of their sentence or
not." In other words, an express surmise that a sentence depends on an
evidentiary exclusion can go to a jury on the point of causality; the objections above are no objections; if the jury thinks the exclusion explains the
sentence, the Prohibition stands (assuming the verdict is otherwise favorable to the parishioner, if other facts could be put in issue at the same
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time -- quaere de hoc ); if the jury thinks the ecclesiastical judge reached
his sentence by an independent path, the Prohibition falls. In the instant
case, Hutton thought the surmise made it appear clearly enough that the
sentence depended on the exclusion, as by common sense it obviously
did, for he joined Winch in support of a Prohibition. Brownlow, the
Court's learned Prothonotary, came to the aid of Winch and Hutton, saying that there were precedents of Prohibitions in "such case." I assume he
meant in cases where the Prohibition was sought after sentence and there
could be a question of the sentence's dependence on the exclusion, not
simply two-witness-rule Prohibitions in general.
Hobart was not converted, but he was perhaps moved by the two
judges and Prothonotary against him. For he now said that if a Prohibition
should be granted, it should be qualified -- "if that be the cause of their
sentence." The ecclesiastical court, that is, should be permitted to execute the sentence "at its peril," if it was honestly convinced that it would
have given the same sentence even if the evidence had been admitted.
The report then says (whether the reporter's observation or Hobart's
skeptical comment on his own proposal), "and yet, as I conceive, it is dubious whether that would be available [= of any avail] to the party." In the
instant case, the qualified Prohibition almost certainly would not help the
parson, since the sentence almost certainly did depend on the exclusion.
Even in less clear cases, I too should wonder whether ecclesiastical courts
and plaintiffs would often dare to proceed. Would they not risk attachment for actually disobeying the Prohibition, and upon such attachment
could jury trial on the point of causality (the very thing Hobart was doubtful about) be avoided? If, on the other hand, such a qualified Prohibition
were taken to imply willingness to trust the ecclesiastical court, it would
be of little use to the other party (plaintiff-in-Prohibition.)
With the Court thus divided, the case was again adjourned. It was
probably argued again. Harl. 5149 says there was "much debate in several
terms at the Bar and Bench." That is probably an exaggeration, since the
other reports indicate that the case was begun in Michaelmas and finished
in Hilary, 17 Jac. In any event, on some occasion Serjeant Davies tried
another interesting argument against prohibiting: He invoked the preliminary proof requirement of 2/3 Edw. 6 as (presumably) a sign of the reasonableness, or acceptability in common law contexts, of two-witness
rules. On the same occasion, Davies tried to shift the emphasis away from
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the two-witness rule as such, to the competence of the single witness provided in this case, as if to say, "Even if ecclesiastical courts are not free to
insist on two witnesses in some cases, including this one, they should be
free to insist on at least one competent witness. And their standards of
competence -- at any rate the one applied here, that a servant of the tithepayer unsupported by other evidence is not competent -- are not within
common law control." However, Davies's further efforts did not help.
Eventually, the Court agreed that a straightforward Prohibition would lie.
Harl. 4813 says expressly "per totam Curiam," so it would seem that Hobart and Warburton were converted at last. Even so, the decision was
slightly qualified. Justice Hutton, the author of Harl. 4813, reports "and
yet it was referred to be ordered by me at Assizes." Though the less
authoritative Harl. 5149 says Prohibition was granted, I think there is
every reason to follow Hutton's account. He does not say a Prohibition
was granted, only, in effect, that the Court agreed that one should be, or if
necessary would be, "and yet" (the point would seem to be) one or two of
the judges did not quite like the conclusion the arguments and precedents
drove them to. They did not quite like setting another precedent. So they
put off formal action, trusting Hutton to treat with the parties at Assizes
and bring them to a settlement in the light of the Court's opinion. Hobart's Common Pleas never broke quite cleanly with Coke's position on
two-witness-rule Prohibitions, though it tended away from it.
Caroline cases from the Common Pleas show somewhat mixed results,
certainly no return to Coke's view. In a case of 1627,26 an executor
sought a Prohibition because a bishop's chancellor would not let him
prove a will by one witness. (It is probably significant that a diocesan
court was involved, rather than the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, the
"big-time," experienced testamentary court, which would not have insisted on two witnesses for unchallenged, prima facie probate). Justices
Hutton and Croke were puzzled as to how a Prohibition could be framed
in this case (they sound as if they would gladly prohibit if they could
overcome their puzzlement.) As they put it, the executor was trying to
prohibit his own suit, but their meaning was clearly not that self-prohibition is objectionable in itself. The executor was not seeking to prohibit a

26

H. 2 Car. C.P. Littleton, 20; Harl. 5148 f.114.
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suit in which he was plaintiff on the ground that the defendant had introduced a claim determinable at common law, as in the usual self-prohibition case. He was seeking the prohibit a suit in which there was no
defendant, a suit which existed only in the form of his own ex parte application for probate, which the ecclesiastical court would not entertain. In
other words, he was asking the Court to "prohibit" the chancellor from
doing what the Chancellor did not propose to do unless another witness
was produced. In effect, he needed a Mandamus and was trying to make
a Prohibition do the job. Justice Yelverton was more optimistic. "We
may prohibit him from condemning the will because there is only one
witness," Yelverton suggested. I suppose that means, "We cannot order
him to accept one-witness proof by the 'Thou shalt not' language a Prohibition necessarily uses, but we can achieve the same effect by saying, 'Thou shalt not condemn the will by virtue of the two-witness rule.'"
Exactly what an ecclesiastical judge forbidden to condemn a will for a
particular reason would and would not be free to do might make a question, but he would certainly be put in a touchy position. For example,
could he refuse to entertain a legacy suit founded on the will without risking attachment for "condemning" the will in violation of the Prohibition
and having, at best, to argue his way out of the charge? The judges put
off disposing of this odd case until precedents were searched; nothing
more is reported of it. In support of two-witness-rule Prohibitions in general, Hutton and Croke said that Prohibition is "always" granted if proof
of payment of tithes by one witness is not accepted. Always?
In Eaton and Morrice's Case,27 an unusual two-witness rule Prohibition was denied. The ecclesiastical suit was for defamation -- imputing
adultery to a married woman -- but the circumstances were out of the ordinary. Eaton and Morrice were "reputed" churchwardens, but had not
taken the required oath and therefore were not properly installed in the office. Undertaking to act as churchwardens, they presented the woman for
adultery "on common fame" (i.e., as someone generally reputed or reported to be an adulteress -- a proper-enough presentment for proper
churchwardens.) The woman and her husband sued for defamation.
They were on the point of having sentence given in their favor when the
27

P. 3 Car. C.P. Harl. 5148, f.133b.
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churchwardens appealed. A prohibition to the appellate court was sought
"because this presentment cannot be proved except by one witness, [and
therefore] they sentence the husband and wife." Such are the words of the
report. I assume they mean that the appellate court (unlike the court of first
instance) refused to conclude that the defamatory act (presentment) ever
took place unless at least two witnesses would swear that it had, and
therefore that a sentence against the husband and wife (charging them
with costs) was given, wherefore they sought to prohibit the suit in which
they were plaintiffs. But the report is obscure. The alterative meaning
would be that the churchwardens were seeking the Prohibition, sentence
having been given for the husband and wife, on the ground that they were
improperly prevented from proving that the alleged defamatory act was a
presentment and immune as such. (Cf. Phillips v. Piper, in Section II
above, as to whether defamation liability could be attached to an untrue
ecclesiastical presentment. Quaere whether that problem should be
resolved the same way for true and "reputed" churchwardens.) In any
event, the Court denied the Prohibition -- as the report says, "for
they were presented first, and also it is a cause in which this court has no
cognizance." I do not know what the first clause means, but the second is clear. It would be surprising to find the two-witness rule blocked
when its effect was to make it harder to establish an act of defamation. It
would be almost equally surprising for the common law to prevent ecclesiastical courts from using their own standards of evidence for the purpose of unravelling the kind of problem presented by Eaton and Morrice
-- whether an official ecclesiastical act performed by persons pretending
and supposed to be ecclesiastic officers, but not lawfully such, constituted
an act of ecclesiastical defamation.
Denn's Case28 only touches on conflicting evidentiary standards as a
cause of Prohibition. Deferring the details: the upshot of this case was
that a suit to revoke a mixed will was prohibited in toto, not because evidence had been disallowed, but because the judges thought that the ecclesiastical court simply ought not to handle such a suit, to the possible
28

T. 4 Car. C.P. Croke Car., 115.

284

Evidentiary Disallowance Surmise: The Two-Witness Rule
detriment of common law interests in the land. It was said at the Bar,
however, that the ecclesiastical court would insist on unacceptable standards of evidence if it were left to determine the claim of revocation. In
this instance, it was not the two-witness rule that counsel pointed to, but
over strict and rigid exclusionary rules -- the unwillingness of ecclesiastical courts to accept the evidence of servants, kinsmen, and legatees whose
testimony could be presented to a common law jury. The Court may have
been moved to prohibit in part because it shared counsel’s opinion that
improper evidentiary standards would be insisted on, possibly necessitating a Prohibition later on if one were denied, or granted only quoad terram, at this point. (As to the possibility of a partial Prohibition, which
was discussed: The judges would probably have been more willing to
consider that solution if their faith in the ecclesiastical court’s evidentiary
standards had been greater. To permit an ecclesiastical trial quoad bona
and a common law trial quoad terram is not so bad if the chance of the
two trials’ coming to different conclusions is relatively slight. Rigid evidentiary requirements -- whereby every piece of evidence going to show
that the will was revoked might be ruled out in the ecclesiastical proceedings -- would magnify the chance of conflicting results.)
In a case of 1630,29 the Common Pleas refused to speculate as to
whether proof by one witness would be ruled out, insisting that actual and
issuable disallowance of evidence be surmised before an evidentiary Prohibition would be considered. Whether a Prohibition would be have been
granted on a firm surmise in the circumstances of this case is a question
of some interest, to which a confident answer is impossible. All one can
say is that the Court did not rule out the possibility. A parishioner being
sued for tithes claimed a written, but unsealed, agreement to take 18/ in
lieu of tithes for seven years. He sought a Prohibition primarily on the
theory that the contract was intrinsically determinable at common law
(i.e., did not say that the agreement had been disallowed, just that it existed.) The Court refused to prohibit on that basis. The parishioner also
said that he could prove payment of the 18/ for two of the seven years,
but that his proof was by one witness, which the ecclesiastical court
would not accept. The alternative theory of the surmise was that, if left to
the ecclesiastical court, he would not be given as much opportunity as he
29
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deserved to prove that the contract existed. He had his piece of paper, but
the lack of a seal reduced its value; whether he had any witnesses to the
making of the contract does not appear; he had evidence that the contract
had been performed for two years -- i.e., that 18/ had been paid to the parson, whence, combined with evidence that tithes in kind had not been
paid, it might be inferred that the agreement comprised in the writing was
actually entered into; the last item of evidence, he claimed, would be rendered valueless by improper ecclesiastical insistence on two witnesses.
The Court refused to consider the alternative theory because it was not
claimed that proof of the payments by a single witnesses had actually
been offered. If that hurdle were overcome, the question would be: May
ecclesiastical courts insist on two witnesses to prove a fact which is not itself in issue, but which, if established, would provide a good basis for inference as to the matter at issue? Previous cases provide no ready clues.
One might argue that the two-witness rule may not be applied to the direct proof of transactions or documents, but that it may be applied to facts
whose value as a basis for inference may be variously judged. Per contra,
one might argue that the two-witness rule is a reasonable formalistic requirement for transactions and documents, but that is has no place once
inferential proof of such transactions is admitted in principle, as a substitute for, or supplement to, direct proof. A further question implicit in our
case would be whether the ecclesiastical court is obliged to admit inferential proof of a contract at all -- instead of direct proof; to supplement direct proof by one witness; or merely to add weight to direct proof which,
if credited, is perfectly adequate by ecclesiastical standards. (The arguments might vary, depending on which of those three functions the inferential evidence was assumed to have.)
The last of our Common Pleas cases, Warner v. Barret, 30 is badly reported, but through the obscurity one catches glimpses of the judges' continuing bafflement by two-witness-rule Prohibitions. In the principal
case, Warner sued for a legacy and the executor pleaded "Plene administravit." He sought a Prohibition on the ground that he was not allowed to
sustain his plea by a single witness. The report gives no conclusion. We
have seen that ecclesiastical handling of pleas of "No assets" or "Plene
30
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administravit" in legacy suits was not usually interfered with. One might
therefore expect ecclesiastical courts to be left free to use their own evidentiary standards -- as they were allowed to use their judgment about the
general condition of the estate -- in determining whether an executor was
in a position to meet unpaid legacies.
Some of the judges in Warner v. Barret may have been inclined to that
position, but it is hard to tell. For the rest, the report shows them ruminating inconclusively on evidentiary Prohibitions in general. Chief Justice
Richardson asserted their legitimacy and said that refusal to accept one
witness to payment of tithes is cause of Prohibition. He seems hard put at
first to distinguish the present case. Justice Croke grasped at the respectable theory that ecclesiastical courts may not be prevented from applying
their standards of proof to pleas that only say an ecclesiastical duty has
been discharged. Richardson seems to latch onto that point and conclude
that the "Plene administravit" in the present case was such a plea-in-discharge. What Justice Hutton was trying to say is hopelessly lost in the report, except that he cited a Hawkin's case to prove that refusal to allow
one witness for payment of tithes (the paradigm, one would think, of a plea
-in-discharge) is grounds for Prohibitions. From Justice Yelverton's speech, one
distinction emerges coherently: If an executor pleads simply that he paid a pecuniary legacy, the ecclesiastical court is free to insist on two witnesses; but if
the legacy was twenty oxen and the executor claims that he paid a sum of
money which was accepted in lieu of the oxen, then common law, or one-witness,
proof must be accepted under pain of Prohibition. The distinction is along
the lines of pleas-in-discharge ("I owed £5 as a legacy and I paid £5") versus
"collateral" defenses (in effect "I owed twenty oxen as a legacy, but a
contract to substitute £5 for the oxen was made and executed".) In the
principal case, Yelverton seems inclined to say that "Plene administravit"
should be tried by one witness because the common law and ecclesiastical
definitions of assets sometimes differed. (As if to say, "Because the common law could insist that its legal definition of assets be accepted by ecclesiastical courts, it may also insist that the question of whether the
estate has assets to satisfy legacies be tried by common law evidentiary
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standards.") Finally, Yelverton cited the dictum in Bagnall v. Stokes, with
apparent approval. Croke speaks again at the end of the report to agree
that one witness to payment of tithes must be accepted, without showing
how that claim is anything but a plea-in-discharge. I repeat, the report of
Warner v. Barret is execrable, not a fair indication of the judges' thinking.
I have taken notice of it because for all its obscurity it is of some value as
evidence that after many years and many cases the principles of two-witness-rule Prohibition were still up in the air.
In Dickes et uxor v. Brown,31 the Caroline King's Bench laid down a
clear distinction between substantive and evidentiary disallowance surmises in "No assets" cases, but only by way of dictum. I have discussed
this case in Vol. I for its primarily procedural interest. In substance, a Prohibition had been granted either on the bare surmise that the adequacy of
an estate to support legacies was in question or on the surmise that "No
assets" had been disallowed. (The reports are confusing and conflicting.
Benloe and Noy represent the case a straightforward "No assets" problem:
Legatee sues, executor pleads "Plene administravit" or "No assets" and
surmises disallowance of the plea. Bulstrode, much the best report of the
case's unfolding, says that the executor won in the ecclesiastical court on
the plea of "No assets," whereupon the legatee first appealed, then deserted the appeal and sought a Prohibition. If that is what happened, disallowance of "No assets" could obviously not be the ground of the surmise.
A remark by counsel in Bulstrode suggests that there was no disallowance-surmise, but a bare allegation that the condition of the estate was in
question, which is compatible with the legatee's being plaintiff-in Prohibition -- viz. accuses the plaintiff of using the Prohibition vexatiously,
having deserted his appeal, to make the other party spend more on litigation to recover his legacy than it is worth. I therefore conclude that Bulstrode's initial statement of the case is garbled -- that the executor lost in
the original court, appealed, then switched to Prohibition. I so state the
case in discussing its procedural aspects. As to whether the Prohibition
was obtained on bare surmise or substantive disallowance surmise: Dodderidge in Bulstrode says the parties were "at issue ... in the Court Chris31
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tian touching fully administered." That means the plea of "No assets"
could not have been disallowed, as Noy and Benloe say. Either the complaint was barely that the sufficiency of the estate was in question, or else
there was a patently false disallowance surmise.)
In any event -- abstracting from the procedural complications -- the issue was whether the Prohibition ought to have been granted, hence
whether it should be undone by Consultation on motion. The judges
thought the Prohibition plainly bad. Though they were probably faced
with a bare surmise, their language at least suggests that they would also
have disapproved of prohibition on a substantive disallowance surmise.
They sound affirmative toward ecclesiastical jurisdiction over claims of
"No Assets" as common "incidents" of legacy suits and seem to take it for
granted that no ecclesiastical court -- unless one patently in error by its
own standards and hence correctable by appeal -- would disallow that
plea as such. More to the point, Justice Dodderidge and then the whole
Court (Bulstrode) are explicit in saying that disallowance of proof which
is acceptable by common law standards is grounds for Prohibition in "No
assets" cases. It is probably fair to infer that only disallowance of evidence -- insistence that executors meet a too high or rigid standard, or a
standard too different from what they would encounter in seeking to establish that an estate was inadequate to satisfy a common law claim
against it--would justify Prohibition in this Court's opinion. Though it
only expressed itself by way of dictum, the Court had no doubt that a
two-witness-rule surmise would be good -- no qualms about denying the
ecclesiastical courts their evidentiary standards after conceding their competence to decide whether estates were sufficient to bear legacies.
A second report from the Caroline King's Bench, Nicholls v.
Knowles, 32 is too brief to be meaningful. It says only that a two-witnessrule Prohibition was granted in a tithe suit, but gives no information as to
the kind of issue -- bare payment, lease, contract, etc. -- the rejected evidence related to. Two further King's Bench cases are more substantial. In
one, Bellamy v. Alden,33 an administrator was accounting for his estate in
an ecclesiastical court, in the process of which he said he had paid a cer32
33
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tain sum to a creditor. The creditor intervened to challenge the account,
claiming that the administrator had paid him a smaller sum than the later
claimed. The administrator verified his account on that item by one witness, but the ecclesiastical court considered that proof insufficient and excommunicated the administrator. Justices Dodderidge and Jones, alone in
court, granted a Prohibition on those facts. As they understood the case,
however, what they granted was not a two-witness rule Prohibition. For
Dodderidge and Jones thought that the ecclesiastical court had no business trying the truth of the account, by one witness or a hundred. The account should be accepted as offered; if the creditor thought he had more
coming to him, he should sue at common law, where of course one witness would suffice for the administrator. Upon a further hearing, from
which Dodderidge was absent, some difference of opinion among the
judges came out, for Chief Justice Crewe thought that the ecclesiastical
court was entitled to inquire into the truth of the account. Jones then fell
back on the rejecting of proof by one witness, and on that basis the other
judges (Crewe and Whitelocke) agreed to the Prohibition. Whitelocke
was clearly on Crewe's side on the other matter, for he emphasized that
"the jurisdiction of their court is not taken away, but their proceedings." A
two-witness-rule Prohibition was granted in Bellamy v. Alden because it
was the common denominator of a divided Court.
The last King's Bench case34 is straight and classical; the Court was
not unanimous. An executor simply pleaded that he had paid a legacy and
offered unsuccessfully to prove it by one witness. Three member of the
Court--Jones, Whitelock and Chief Justice Hyde -- held that Prohibition
would not lie. Jones, speaking for the majority, said that jurisdiction over
legacies carries with it the right to try whether a legacy has been paid or
released by ecclesiastical standards. Jones did, however, make an important distinction, never before clearly stated: If a legatee makes a release of
several things, including his legacy, and some of the things released are
common law claims, trial by one witness must be accepted. Justice Croke
dissented (the same Sir George Croke who appears in the Common Pleas
cases above -- translated to the King's Bench in October, 1628.) Croke
rested firmly on the analogy of tithe-payment cases, in which he said that
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Prohibition was "usually granted" if two witnesses were insisted on.
("Usually" probably has its common 17th-century force of "customarily"
or "regularly," as opposed to the modern ''most of the time.") A touch
of emotion comes through Croke's concluding words: "... to have
a prohibition in such case is the privilege of the subject, and I am of
opinion that there are some precedents in this court of Prohibitions
granted on this very surmise." There is vehemence in Jones's reply, too:
"Perhaps some Prohibitions have been granted, but I was never nor will
be of the same opinion without better reason given than I have heard
yet." Croke then ordered counsel to search the precedents. With that the
report ends. Presumably the other judges were willing to defer to Croke's
strong doubts by delaying denial of the Prohibition pending research.
Nothing more is heard of this case, and throughout the 1630's there are
no signs of two-witness-rule Prohibitions. Is that a pure accident, or were
lawyers pessimistic about obtaining them in the heyday of ecclesiastical
influence?
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